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# SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1955–1956

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# SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1955–1956

BY

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AND

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# PREFACE

THE present volume in the Survey of International Affairs covers the period from the end of 1954 to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956. A subsequent volume will deal with the consequences of that act, carrying the story to the end of 1958. Although the period under review saw, among other things, the fall of President Peron of Argentina, the affairs of Latin America have not been included, since they did not, so far as we have been able to establish, contribute at this time in any direct way to the general development of international relations.

What is here presented to the public is the joint work of the two authors whose names appear on the title-page. We have had the benefit of the co-operation of Dr. F. C. Jones, who has provided accounts of events in China, Japan and Korea, which have been of great use to us; and Mr. A. S. B. Olver has contributed the section (pp. 14–21) on Indo-China in Part I. We are also grateful to Miss H. G. Oliver, who has prepared the index, and to Alan Bullock, Dr. Noble Frankland, and the Hon. C. M. Woodhouse, who have read the volume in manuscript and provided a number of useful and constructive comments.

G. BARRACLOUGH

*December 1958*

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# ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| Cmd. | Command Paper (London, H.M.S.O.) |
| *Documents*, 1955<br>*Documents*, 1956 | *Documents on International Affairs*, 1955 *or* 1956 (published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs) |
| D.S.B. | Department of State Bulletin (Washington, U.S.G.P.O.) |
| H.C. Deb. | House of Commons Debates |
| H.L. Deb. | House of Lords Debates |
| I.C.S.C. | International Commission for Supervision and Control |
| T.I.A.S. | Treaties and International Agreements Series |
| *U.S. Documents* (or *American Documents*) | *Documents on American Foreign Relations* |

# PART I

## JANUARY–APRIL 1955

# CHAPTER I

# INTRODUCTION

THE legacy of 1954 to 1955 was three unsolved problems: Formosa, Indo-China, and in Europe the task of implementing the agreements concluded at Paris in October 1954, by which the German Federal Republic was to obtain the rights of a sovereign state and Western European Union was to become a reality. These were, of course, not the only factors weighing in the international situation at the beginning of 1955; but until they had ceased to be centres of crisis, they dominated the scene to such an extent that it was impossible to foresee how significant the new tendencies were likely to be, which had been making themselves apparent in 1954.

Among these new tendencies two stood out. The one was the growing inclination to question, in the light of the thermonuclear revolution, the postulates underlying policy. The other was the increasing coherence of a 'third force', belonging neither to the communist nor to the anti-communist camps, in the form of the 'neutralist' or 'uncommitted' powers of Asia, which had already met in April 1954 and had made their influence felt at the Geneva conference of the same year. But it would be a mistake to exaggerate the significance of either factor at this stage. The confused debate on the strategical consequences of thermonuclear warfare was far from producing practical results, and the new association of Afro-Asian peoples was still only in the making. Not until the Bandung conference in April 1955 was it evident that it had become a factor, the influence of which other powers could no longer afford to ignore.

It is true that, for anyone looking back over the past twelve months, there was little doubt at the beginning of 1955 that tensions had relaxed. But the result was rather a hard-won breathing-space than any new initiative in the direction of affairs. The atmosphere of the 'cold war' still prevailed; and although the fear that it might turn overnight into a 'hot war' may in retrospect seem to have been exaggerated, it was real enough at the time. The doctrine of 'instant and massive retaliation', which had caused such stir when enunciated by Mr. Dulles early in 1954, had given way before the end of the year to President Eisenhower's policy of studied moderation, and most people in the American camp endorsed his view that the only way forward was 'the hard way' of steadiness and patience.[1] But

[1] '. . . We owe it to ourselves and to the world to explore every possible means of settling differences before we even think of such a thing as war. And the hard way is to have the courage to be patient, tirelessly to seek out every single avenue open to us. . . . We must, on the other hand, be steady and refuse to be goaded into actions that would be unwise' (*N.Y. Times*, 3 December 1954).

this was a change in tactics, rather than in the principles and direction of policy. Hence western diplomacy, in so far as it was united under American leadership, showed little sense, in the closing months of 1954, of the need for new thinking and new methods. The old, and (as some people were beginning to think) obsolescent, policy of 'containment'—the policy of constructing a series of alliances, and at the same time of securing a series of bases around the perimeter of the communist world for the American B. 47 bomber force, with its relatively limited range of operations—still held sway. The truce in Indo-China in August 1954 was followed not by a *détente*, or even an attempt at *détente*, but by the hurried negotiation of the South-East Asian treaty and the formation of S.E.A.T.O., and by the mutual defence pact between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek. Almost simultaneously the Balkan treaty was concluded, and the diplomatic manœuvres were inaugurated which led, early in 1955, to the Baghdad pact. But it was in Europe that the disinclination of western policy to break away from old formulas was most plainly evident. Here, the implementation of the Paris treaties hardened into a trial of strength between the American and the Soviet blocs, and as such it was pursued, with little regard for long-term consequences, as an objective to be put through at all costs for its own sake. The intention, on the western side, was to create stability by constructing a firm line of defence on all vulnerable fronts against communist Russia and communist China; but, in fact, instead of stabilizing the situation, these expedients gave rise to new problems which played a major role in international relations in 1955.

The fundamental reason why western diplomacy clung to its traditional patterns after the Geneva conference of 1954 was scepticism whether, in spite of outward signs of flexibility, there had been any fundamental change in communist policy, either in Europe or in the Far East. Ever since the death of Stalin in 1953 there had been speculation and talk of a *détente*; but little effective relaxation occurred as a result of the advent of the Malenkov régime in Russia. It was still the official view in the west that Soviet policy was directed towards weakening and dividing the western governments, as a prelude to aggression; and the Soviet proposals for disarmament during 1954 were treated as manœuvres with this end in view. Talk of a new era of 'competitive coexistence', taking the place of the cold war, became more common as the year progressed; but even at the year's end, to judge from their actions, governments were thinking in terms of 'positions of strength'. Experience had not yet driven home the lesson, which was to emerge during the months to come—and which, even then, was only learnt reluctantly—that supposed 'positions of strength' at this stage were in fact (as the famous chess master, Richard Réti, had long since pointed out) positions of weakness and focuses for counter-attack.

That this was so was due, in the first place, to the persistence of the un-

settled issues enumerated above, which made it difficult, if not impossible, to abandon postures and advance from positions adopted in different circumstances some considerable time previously. Of these issues that which most directly threatened peace was the conflict which had flared up over the small islands held by the Chinese Nationalists between the Chinese mainland and Formosa. But on other fronts also, in South-East Asia and in Europe, the western powers were scarcely less apprehensive. Although active warfare in Indo-China had ceased, the deterioration in the western position in the preceding period was such that to most people the halt in the communist advance had the appearance of *reculer pour mieux sauter*, and it was generally believed that the authority of the west was damaged beyond repair. Whatever the position in Laos and Cambodia, few contemporary observers believed that the situation in South Vietnam could be stabilized, and the beginning of 1955 found the western powers bracing themselves to meet a renewed communist thrust, if not by open hostilities at least by 'subversion' and internal pressure. In Europe, also, the rejection of E.D.C. had been a serious reverse for those who planned to erect a European bulwark against the communist bloc. Although brisk and agile diplomacy had rapidly produced an alternative in the form of the Paris agreements, it still remained an open question whether they could be enforced in view of the misgivings and hostile reactions in France and Germany. The ratification of the Paris agreements was not a foregone conclusion at the beginning of 1955; but until they had been ratified, in the view of the western governments, further progress was impossible. The Middle East alone among the fronts between east and west seemed relatively quiescent, and the Anglo-Egyptian agreement for the evacuation of Suez, which was concluded in October 1954, appeared to hold out hopes of a peaceful evolution; it was, as events were soon to show, a false and delusive lull, and those who took heart from it were confusing the smooth diplomatic surface with the deeper currents in international affairs. By April 1955, when the Bandung conference met, it was clear that the peoples inhabiting the eastern and the southern shores of the Mediterranean were preparing themselves to play a positive and active part.

The present section, therefore, deals in the first place with the backwash of 1954—with the specific issues which had confronted the world in that year without finding settlement. But it is not for that reason merely preliminary. The way these questions were handled in the following months, and the type of solution they found, set the stage and helped to determine future attitudes. The experience, between January and April 1955, of what was possible and what was not possible, or no longer possible, affected both specific calculations and the more general climate of affairs in both the communist and the anti-communist camps. These considerations alone justify a careful survey of what took place; but we

must not make the mistake of supposing that the precise issues around which action crystallized are the whole story. From this point of view, international politics may be likened to an iceberg, of which the visible portion is the least. What was going on below the surface was as important as what was exposed to full view; and here we should emphasize the ferment among the 'uncommitted' peoples of Asia and Africa, which was soon to find expression at Bandung. Of all that happened in this period it may be that, on a long-term view, nothing was of more lasting importance than the Bandung conference. After April 1955 a world which had deluded itself into believing that it was finally polarized into two irreconcilable blocs, was forced to radical rethinking. By adding a 'third force', Bandung recast the framework of international affairs and placed old problems in a new context; it broke the deadlock which had paralysed the world since the first atom bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

## CHAPTER II

# CONFLICTS IN ASIA

*Formosa and the Off-shore Islands*

Of the problems remaining unresolved at the beginning of 1955 the dispute concerning Formosa and the off-shore islands was probably the most likely to lead to war. The equivocal position in the Formosan straits was the result both of long-standing factors and of more recent events: on the one hand the continued existence in the area of two Chinese authorities with conflicting claims, and on the other, a marked increase in the number of hostile incidents in the autumn of 1954, which had immediately created the possibility that the great powers might become involved. But behind this situation were factors more deeply embedded in the international situation. In particular, there was the underlying consideration, in American policy, that Formosa and the Pescadores constituted an essential element in the United States defence system in the Pacific, and that any action which indirectly weakened them—for example, in regard to the Chinese off-shore islands—must be resisted. Furthermore, the position in Formosa could not be isolated—at least in American thought and planning—from the situation elsewhere on the Asiatic perimeter of the communist and anti-communist worlds. The outcome of events in Indo-China, after the fall of Dien Bien Phu in the summer of 1954,[1] strengthened American resolution to resist from the outset any further signs of communist infiltration. This attitude, without doubt, underlay the signing of the Manila treaty on 8 September 1954.[2] The result was that when, in the autumn of 1954, tension increased in the region round Formosa, and was accentuated by bellicose outbursts of charges and counter-charges from Peking and Taipeh, the United States was quick to see a new danger-spot developing, which required new measures. What these new measures were was seen when, on 1 December 1954, it was announced that the United States had concluded a mutual security alliance with the authorities in Formosa. This statement, following upon the signing of the Manila treaty in the previous September, had every appearance of greater American involvement in the area, perhaps in conjunction with a forward policy. This was certainly the way in which, after several years' hostility between the United States and China, the treaty was interpreted in Peking. At the beginning of 1955, therefore, Chou En-lai's hostility to the United States as the ally of Chiang Kai-shek was augmented by hostility to the United States as such.[3]

[1] Cf. *Survey*, 1954, pp. 18 sqq.

[2] Ibid. pp. 73 sqq.

[3] In this connexion it may be recalled that the United States had not recognized the Peking

In this situation there were several alternative possibilities: either of the Chinese governments might allow local aggression to develop into the 'liberation' of enemy territory, with or without allied support; the existing position might be stabilized through the legal recognition of the rights of each government within the area it controlled (the so-called 'two Chinas' policy); the United Nations might arrange a cease-fire leading to a permanent agreement; or there might be a return to the previous stalemate. In the United States President Eisenhower, speaking on 19 January, indicated that there had been no final decision either on maintaining control of the outlying islands, or on the two Chinas policy. Meanwhile Chinese communists had occupied the Yikiang islands and were bombing the Tachens, and the Nationalists retaliated with intensified attacks on the coastal area of south-east China.

On 24 January, in a message to Congress, President Eisenhower reaffirmed that the United States would welcome the intervention of the United Nations to end hostilities in the area, but urged that meanwhile Congress should authorize measures, including the use of armed forces, to ensure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores. He referred to possible assistance to enable the Chinese Nationalists to redeploy and consolidate their forces. He also spoke of military action to counter any concentration or employment of Chinese communist troops which was obviously undertaken to facilitate attacks upon Formosa, provided that these activities were 'recognisable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores'.[1] Through this provision Eisenhower attempted to clarify the American position, and limit Nationalist expectations of American backing. But the attempt to distinguish between an attack on Quemoy or Matsu *per se*, and an attack as a preliminary to an attack on Formosa, was not perhaps altogether happy. Moreover, taken together with the mutual security treaty currently before Congress, and the well-known Washington attitude towards Peking, the general impression remained that the United States was becoming further involved in the situation.

That this was the impression in Peking was confirmed when Chou En-

government as the *de facto* government of that part of Chinese territory which it controlled. In consequence, knowledge of each other's views and attitudes depended largely on public speeches, or more occasionally on the intermediacy of the diplomatic services of third parties. Similarly the restrictions on 'western' exports to China, imposed at the time of the Korean war and retained largely in deference to American opinion, were more stringent than those regarding exports to the Soviet Union (through which China could get many of the goods in question—the Soviet Union thus acquiring supplier status!). The Chinese, for their part, lost no opportunity of irritating American opinion, e.g. by their handling of such issues as the imprisonment of American airmen for espionage in the autumn of 1954. (Following a resolution in the General Assembly Mr. Hammarskjöld visited Peking in January 1955 to discuss their release, but this was not immediately achieved.)

[1] *Documents*, 1955, p. 443.

lai, speaking on the same day, asserted that 'the Chinese people are determined to liberate their own territory of Taiwan', which, he added, 'is a matter of China's sovereignty and internal affairs; no outside interference is allowed'. Moreover, he affirmed that 'neither the United Nations nor any foreign country has the right to intervene in the Chinese peoples' liberation of Taiwan'. He accused the United States' government of increasing war provocation and concluded with the categorical statement that 'the government of the Peoples' Republic of China absolutely cannot agree to a so-called cease-fire with the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique repudiated by the Chinese people'.[1]

These statements were generally regarded as indicating that both parties were, in certain circumstances, prepared for war; and there was widespread anxiety lest precipitate action should lead to full-scale hostilities. In particular, the allies of the two parties—on the one side Great Britain, and on the other side the U.S.S.R.—who had no direct interest in the quarrel, and may have foreseen the beginning of another Indo-Chinese imbroglio, were not prepared to view with equanimity the course events were taking. In these circumstances the British government sought to clarify the position. On 28 January the British chargé d'affaires in Peking advised the Chinese government that it would be dangerous to proceed on the assumption that the United States would not in any circumstances come to the aid of its ally in the defence of the coastal islands. If tension eased, however, the British government believed there could be a satisfactory settlement; it would, moreover, support an invitation to Peking to send representatives to take part in Security Council discussions on the question. An approach was also made in Moscow. There the British ambassador confirmed that London was in constant contact with Washington regarding the need to ease tension and firmly believed that the Americans wanted a peaceful settlement. He urged, therefore, that the Soviet Union should use its influence to restrain the Peking government and to encourage its acceptance of an invitation to take part in discussions.[2]

In the United Nations the New Zealand representative made a formal request that the Security Council should consider the situation and this move was supported on 30 January by a Soviet resolution which also urged the evacuation of American troops from the area. The Security Council accepted both resolutions and invited Peking to send representatives. This attempt to seek a solution through the United Nations was, however, rebuffed by the Chinese communists when Chou En-lai replied to Mr. Hammarskjöld on 3 February. He supported the Soviet resolution; urged that the United States should be condemned for its aggression and for its interference in China's internal affairs; but emphasized that Peking's representatives could not discuss the situation while the National-

[1] Ibid. p. 445.

[2] *Soviet News*, 31 January 1955.

ists retained China's seat in the United Nations. Unless communist representatives were present, he added, all decisions would be void. Peking's representatives would only discuss the Soviet resolution if the Nationalists on the Security Council were replaced.[1]

In these circumstances further attempts to discuss the problem did not seem profitable; and Moscow's proposal for a conference sponsored jointly by the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and India was not accepted in London on the grounds that, among other things, it was felt that the Chinese Nationalists should be represented in any discussions. Nevertheless the occasion was taken to clarify the British position. In a written reply in the House of Commons the foreign secretary stated that the surrender of Formosa and the Pescadores by the Japanese had been confirmed in the peace treaty of April 1952; but this did not make them Chinese territory. Furthermore, the arrangements made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis of military occupation pending further arrangements, and neither did this of itself constitute the territory Chinese. In these circumstances the *de jure* sovereignty of the territory was uncertain or undetermined. The off-shore islands held by the Nationalists, on the other hand, 'undoubtedly' formed 'part of the territory of the Peoples' Republic of China'. It was, however, pointed out that any attempt by Peking to assert its right to these islands by force might, in the present circumstances, endanger peace and security.[2]

This attempted distinction found no favour with either of the belligerents; but the clear differentiation in the British statement between the position of Formosa and that of the off-shore islands was an indication, both to Washington and to Taipeh, of the extent to which they could count on British support. On the communist side it seems probable that Moseow was similarly preoccupied by the hardening of the situation. It seemed as though it was Peking's rejection of the jointly sponsored invitation to discuss Formosa under United Nations' auspices which had resulted in the British refusal to participate in a conference without Nationalist representation and caused the resulting deterioration. It would appear that Moscow wanted a peaceful solution and had probably suggested to Peking that China should modify military propaganda and concentrate on economic development. At all events, although incidents continued, the influence of Great Britain and the Dominions, on the one side, and that of the Soviet Union, on the other, gradually brought about a reduction of tension.

On 7 February Mr. Dulles gave the clearest indication to date of the degree of control exercised by the United States over its ally in Formosa. He referred to notes exchanged in December 1954 which provided that offensive military operations from the territories held by the latter, and the

[1] *Documents*, 1955, p. 449.
[2] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 536, col. 159 (4 February 1955).

movement of military equipment from within the treaty area to other areas, would only be undertaken as a matter of joint agreement. On the other hand, he made it clear that congressional authorization for the use of American armed forces in the area extended only to Formosa itself and the Pescadores.[1] On 8 February the Foreign Relations Committee of the American Senate approved the mutual defence treaty with Nationalist China, but in doing so it made three reservations: first, the treaty should not be held to imply recognition of Nationalist Chinese sovereignty over Formosa; secondly, any extension of the pact to other territories should depend on the consent of the Senate; and thirdly, no military operations should be undertaken by either party from the territories under Nationalist control without joint agreement. These reservations were not written into the treaty itself and so their legal validity was questionable. But the fact of their public expression, together with Mr. Dulles's statements, was indicative of increasing caution on the American side in their attitude towards their Nationalist allies. Not unexpectedly, the Nationalist prime minister and foreign minister immediately disputed these statements. Formosa, they claimed, had been a Chinese province since the Japanese surrender in 1945; and they asserted that the American government was committed to the defence of Quemoy and Matsu. But, at the stage which had now been reached, this type of statement had little more than propaganda value. Far more significant was the fact that the Americans persuaded the Nationalists to reconcile themselves to the evacuation of the Tachen islands. This took place between 6 and 12 February under cover of the American Seventh Fleet, and on 24 February the Nanchi islands, situated some 140 miles north of Formosa, were similarly evacuated. If earlier it had been American policy to maintain the Nationalist position intact, the United States had clearly changed its ground.

In the meantime the meeting of the S.E.A.T.O. powers in Bangkok[2] had given the western leaders an opportunity to discuss the Formosa dispute in a wider context; and when Mr. Dulles visited Taipeh at the beginning of March he was able to present their views to the Nationalist leaders. In the speech he delivered on 3 March, on the occasion of the exchange of ratifications, his references to possible circumstances in which treaty engagements might be extended to Quemoy and Matsu were guarded and carefully phrased.[3] On the other hand, he made it clear that he would not negotiate without the Nationalists, to which, of course, the Chinese mainland government could not agree. It was for this reason, no doubt, that Sir Anthony Eden, reporting to parliament on 8 March on his conversations at Bangkok and later,[4] declared that he had reluctantly come to the conclusion that a conference was not yet possible. The British

[1] *Documents*, 1955, p. 452. [2] Cf. below, p. 21. [3] *N.Y. Times*, 4 March 1955.
[4] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 538, coll. 159–63.

government, he continued, must therefore concentrate its efforts for the present on preventing 'incidents and further fighting'. He therefore appealed to all parties to exercise restraint and 'abstain from all offensive military action'. This was, in effect, a plea for a cease-fire. It made little impression upon Chiang Kai-shek, who lost no time in protesting against Eden's proposal. But elsewhere it was not ineffective, and the desultory attacks which were launched from the Chinese mainland on Matsu and Quemoy petered out at the end of March. In the United States Mr. Adlai Stevenson queried whether Quemoy and Matsu were essential to the security of the United States, or even to the defence of Formosa, and warned against the risk of alienating both America's traditional allies and the non-communist powers of Asia. In Canada Mr. Lester Pearson, the Canadian minister for external affairs, dissociated his country from automatic support of the United States. They could not, he said, subscribe to all aspects of American policy in regard to Formosa, and later he added pointedly that Canada had no commitments in that area other than those arising from membership of the United Nations:

> it is our policy to stay out of this struggle for these off-shore islands, and I think that other governments would be well advised to adopt the same policy.[1]

On the communist side, also, there were growing signs of a desire to avoid international complications. This may have been due, in part, to the moderating influence of the contacts between Peking and the British government, to which Sir Anthony Eden had referred in his speech of 8 March. It was also widely believed that, despite public statements by Bulganin and Molotov in support of the Chinese government, Moscow (which was also in touch with London) had privately warned Peking to do nothing to precipitate a major conflict. Chou En-lai was also probably nervous lest a local incident might produce a trigger-happy American reaction which would unleash the war nobody wanted. But what perhaps counted most with him was what he learnt of Asian attitudes when he attended the Bandung conference between 18 and 24 April. His first speech, on 19 April, with its pointed reference to 'the tension created solely by the United States of America in the area of Taiwan', showed little sign of a desire to compromise.[2] But four days later, after extensive discussions, a marked change of attitude was visible. Although naturally reserving 'the just demand of the Chinese people to exercise their sovereign rights in liberating Taiwan', Chou now registered his view that 'China and the United States should sit down and enter into negotiations'.[3] 'The Chinese people', he unequivocally stated,[4]

> are friendly to the American people. The Chinese people do not want to have

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 12 and 23 April 1955. [2] Cf. *Documents*, 1955, p. 409.
[3] Ibid. p. 428. [4] Ibid. p. 425.

a war with the United States of America. The Chinese government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East, and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area.

The reaction to this statement in the United States was cool. It was seen as an attempt to drive a wedge between America and its Nationalist allies; and Dulles characteristically asked for tangible evidence of China's sincerity and good intentions.[1] Although, a few days later, Eisenhower did something to modify the frigidity of this reply,[2] it would be idle to deny that the attitude of the State Department was seen by the 'uncommitted' peoples, whose representatives had certainly had a hand in Chou's offer, as confirmation of their opinion of the intransigence of American foreign policy. Elsewhere, however, Chou's statement seemed to open a door which, until recently, had appeared to be in danger of being slammed tight. The British chargé d'affaires in Peking was instructed to seek an elaboration of it,[3] and on 30 April Nehru announced that he was sending Krishna Menon to Peking for discussions with Chou. Menon arrived in Peking on 11 May with 'no particular prescription', but a firm conviction that 'the political atmosphere for the settlement of the Formosan question' was 'definitely better', and ten days later it was reported that the talks were going very well.[4] But in spite of a good deal of speculation and talk of a 'Menon plan',[5] Mr. Menon's own statement at the conclusion of his visit on 21 May was very cautious. There were, he said, very great obstacles to be overcome. American insistence on a conciliatory gesture in the form of the release of American airmen held in China was easily met;[6] but behind this were two intractable problems. The first was the position of the Formosan government, on which China and the United States were diametrically opposed. The second was the admission of communist China to the United Nations. In theory, it may have seemed feasible to isolate the 'external' issues (concerning China and America) from the 'internal' issues (concerning the Chinese People's government and the Nationalist régime); but in practice it was impossible to find a formula satisfactory to all parties.

In point of fact, at the time of his departure, Mr. Menon himself let it be understood that in his view all that was practicable for the present was 'at best' a stalemate in the Formosan straits. His objective was to avert the possibility of war rather than to negotiate an overall settlement.[7] To this objective, it may fairly be said, his mission to Peking made a substantial contribution. There was sporadic shelling of Quemoy by the communists

[1] Ibid. p. 457.
[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 27 April 1955.
[3] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 540, col. 1066.
[4] *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, 9 and 21 May 1955.
[5] *Hindu*, 25 May 1955.
[6] Cf. below, p. 130.
[7] *The Times* and *N.Y. Times*, 10 May 1955.

during May; but thereafter, in spite of harassing activity by Nationalist aircraft and warships along the Fukien coastal area, hostilities died down. Eventually, in August, discussions between China and the United States began in Geneva;[1] and although their positive results were negligible, the fact that they could be held at all marked a definite turning-point. Once again, as elsewhere in previous years, both sides had tacitly recognized the *de facto* position, and without abandoning their rights had accepted the *status quo*. Once this situation was reached, Formosa, at least for some time to come, had ceased to be a danger-spot, and the focus of international affairs, which for so long had been concentrated in the Pacific, moved elsewhere.

*Indo-China*

The varying situations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the early months of 1955 reflected the varied nature of the agreements on the former French Indo-Chinese states reached at Geneva in July 1954.[2] Briefly, the prospects there envisaged were of a divided Vietnam, with the possibility in two years time of elections which, if held, seemed certain to provide a communist success; of a Laos in which the French were still allowed to retain two bases, some troops and a training mission, but in which the Pathet Lao—an organization led by a Laotian, Prince Souphanouvong, though certainly trained and inspired by the North Vietnamese communists—held *de facto* control of much of the two northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, and so possessed a means of bringing pressure to bear on the government; and of a Cambodia likely to follow an independent, if somewhat eccentric, policy under its king, Norodom Sihanouk.

The Korean war had been brought to an end in the previous year and the Chinese Government, which wished to get on with its first five-year plan, had in 1954 evidently seen no profit in allowing the United States to be provoked into another direct intervention in a state on China's borders. It had also perhaps been influenced by the traditional Chinese policy of keeping neighbouring states small and weak. It had in consequence supported a solution which gave the Vietnamese communists less than, failing U.S. intervention, they could certainly have achieved by force. The United States had decided that it should not, and perhaps could not effectively, intervene to prevent the French defeat, but had been terrified that if it did nothing the states of the whole South-East Asian area might all bow without more ado to the wind blowing from the north. It had therefore promoted the Manila treaty in order to signify its intention of trying to draw a line against further communist advance.

The French, who had long been sick of the burden of the Indo-Chinese

[1] Cf. below, p. 131.
[2] Cf. *Survey*, 1954, pp. 65 sqq.

war, and who had hesitated in their withdrawal from power[1] principally because of a fear of the repercussions on their position in North Africa, were prepared, now that the decision had been taken, to withdraw from responsibility with a speed and completeness which embarrassed the International Commissions in both Vietnam and Laos. The Pau agreements, which bound the Indo-Chinese states in economic association with each other and with France, were abrogated in December 1954. After this France abandoned its responsibilities to others, except for an attempt to reach some sort of accommodation on economic and cultural interests with the North Vietnam government—an attempt which achieved little except the irritation of the United States. It also maintained the bases, troops, and military mission in Laos agreed to at Geneva.

French rule had been the main influence promoting association in French Indo-China, and, but for the French, Laos and Cambodia would almost certainly long since have been swallowed up by Vietnam and Siam. With the departure of the French the four successor states began at once to move apart. A symptom of this was that both Cambodia and Laos began to diversify their communications with the outside world, which hitherto had passed largely through Vietnam, while the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in North Vietnam expanded its railway communications with China. Another symptom was the signature by Cambodia on 9 December 1955 of a treaty with Japan which provided *inter alia* for negotiations for the extension of facilities for Japanese immigration, a provision which seemed primarily to be designed to counter-balance Vietnamese infiltration. Cambodia and South Vietnam almost immediately came into conflict along their border which, until the French froze Indo-China in the nineteenth century, had been steadily moving westwards under the pressure of Vietnamese settlement and conquest.

The division between the two parts of Vietnam was accentuated by the continuing, if subdued, struggle in which China tried to extend, and the United States to set a limit to, Chinese influence in the area. The Chinese maintained their support for the North Vietnamese government. On 7 July 1955, following a visit to China by the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, the Chinese announced a grant of 800 million yuan in aid. This was followed by a similar announcement from the Soviet Union of aid amounting to 400 million roubles.

The Americans, on the other hand, having found newly in office in South Vietnam a prime minister—Ngo Dinh Diem—who was both a

[1] An interesting indication of the process of French withdrawal is provided by the numbers of French civil servants in Indo-China. There were 27,050 in 1939, 2,500 in 1952, and under 800 in 1954, according to Bernard B. Fall, *The International Position of South Vietnam, 1954–58*, vol. ii, p. 2. For 1957 Fall gives the number in South Vietnam as some 200, including embassy staff and members of the French technical aid mission, against some 2,400 U.S. military and civilian employees in South Vietnam.

staunch nationalist and an opponent of the communists, began to give him their full support in his struggle to establish himself firmly in power against both non-communist and communist opponents. They also secured the acquiescence of the French and British in supporting Diem, and when Dulles visited Saigon on 1 March 1955 he was able to convey this to Diem. American support enabled Diem, against all expectation at the time of Geneva, so to strengthen his position in South Vietnam as to become generally accepted as a match for the northern régime.

The United States also tried to stiffen the resistance of the governments of Cambodia and Laos to Chinese pressure and blandishment. Each was offered a military aid agreement and each accepted the offer. In announcing that he had done so the prime minister of Laos, Katay Sasorith, remarked that 'we have need of aid to defend our state. We have common frontiers with China and North Vietnam.'[1] But the history of South-East Asia is full of examples of rulers of small states who suffered through too openly backing the wrong horse and of others, more cautious, who sent 'tribute' missions to more than one superior power. While the South Vietnam régime was firmly opposed to the communist countries,[2] Laos and Cambodia had every incentive to put themselves in a position in which, although receiving American financial support—and military support if it proved necessary—they would not attract the unfavourable attention of China, if it could be avoided. Cambodia had an additional reason for taking up an uncommitted position since it had traditionally been at odds with Siam and Vietnam, both of which enjoyed American favour; while Laos was exposed to pressure from the Pathet Lao to adopt a strictly neutralist policy. Both were also to some extent limited by the terms of the Geneva agreements,[3] Laos perhaps more so than Cambodia.

Both Cambodia and Laos were encouraged in an independent direction by India which, having accepted the chairmanship of each of the three International Commissions, had acquired a new, if somewhat vague, political influence in the area to add to its immemorial cultural influence on every country west of Vietnam, and to its prestige as the leader in the movement for Asian independence. Mr. Nehru announced in the Lok Sabha on 16 March 1955 that, though India did not have formal diplomatic relations with them, it had for all practical purposes recognized

[1] *Le Monde*, 2 March 1955. The Military Aid agreement with Cambodia was effected by an exchange of notes on 16 May 1955 (U.S., *T.I.A.S.* 3240). The agreement with Laos was economic as well as military and was in form an extension, effected by an exchange of notes on 6 and 8 July 1955 (U.S., *T.I.A.S.* 3664), of the Economic Co-operation agreement signed on 9 September 1951. This provided for additional direct economic assistance to further economic co-operation and 'to promote the effective defense' of Laos.

[2] South Vietnam took a leading part in the Asian People's Anti-Communist League started in June 1954.

[3] Cf. article 7 of the Cambodian agreement and article 9 of the Laotian agreement, and declarations made by both governments at Geneva (Cmd. 9239).

Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Vietnam, and had a special mission in Cambodia and consulates-general in the other three states. Leaders of all four states visited Delhi in the following eighteen months: Norodom Sihanouk and the prime minister of Cambodia in March 1955, Pham Van Dong, the foreign minister and vice-premier of North Vietnam, in April 1955, and the crown prince and prime minister of Laos in September 1955. The communiqué after each visit laid particular stress on the five principles of coexistence. Finally in August 1956, the South Vietnamese minister, Nguyen Huu Chau, visited Delhi and was received by Mr. Nehru. In general the influence of India was directed to softening the lines of division, to widening the area uncommitted to any world power, and to creating a situation in which the major contestants would find it at least embarrassing to intervene.

This was the background against which the International Commissions had to supervise the execution of the Geneva agreements. The actual execution of the agreements was in the hands of the parties, acting through Joint Commissions, and their close co-operation was therefore essential to success. It was not always forthcoming, and the reports of the Commissions[1] occasionally contain complaints to this effect; but on the whole, given the bitterness engendered by a long war, the execution of the agreements had by 18 May 1955 been relatively smooth. In particular, except in the two northern provinces of Laos, the combatants had been successfully regrouped and separated. That this was achieved seems to have been due to the influence exercised by the International Commissions backed by the desire of the great powers that the Geneva agreements should be implemented in general outline, if not in every detail.

The principal difficulties faced by the International Commission for Vietnam in North Vietnam were twofold. The first was the inspection of war materials entering the country across the Chinese border,[2] which was hampered by difficulties of terrain as well as by obstruction from the North Vietnamese régime. The second was in securing implementation of article 14(*d*) of the agreement on Vietnam[3] in the face of the northern régime's dislike of the great movement of refugees to the south which, under that article, they had to permit until 18 May 1955. No state likes its citizens to 'vote with their feet', and communist states have usually taken vigorous measures to prevent this. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was compelled by article 14(*d*) to accept this process on a large scale. Despite 'the narrow or hostile attitude of local authorities'[4] in some areas,

[1] Each Commisssion issued a series of interim reports covering its activities. These were subsequently issued as United Kingdom Command Papers.

[2] Official western sources claimed subsequently that the North Vietnamese army had been so strengthened by the embodiment and re-equipment of irregular forces that by April 1956 it comprised twenty divisions as against seven in July 1954.

[3] Cmd. 9239, p. 30.

[4] *I.C.S.C. Vietnam: Second Interim Report*, Cmd. 9461, p. 49.

hundreds of thousands of people moved from North Vietnam to South Vietnam up to 18 May 1955. Nevertheless, in the Commission's view, all those who wished to move had not by then done so. The Commission therefore proposed to the parties an extension of the time limit to 20 July 1955. The United Kingdom, in a note of 7 May 1955, also proposed an extension to the other co-chairman of the Geneva conference, the U.S.S.R. The extension to 20 July was accepted by both parties and further movement of refugees took place. According to the Commission 892,876 refugees had moved south up to 20 July 1955 and 4,269 had moved north.[1] Even so, in the view of the Commission there remained a few people in each state who wished to move but had not been able to do so.

In South Vietnam the main difficulty lay not in obstruction by the French High Command, the signatory to the agreement, which was 'trying hard to carry out its obligations',[2] but in 'the independent attitude taken by the government of South Vietnam' which had not signed the agreement, had protested against it at the time, and was now determined to emphasize its own sovereignty. This particularly affected the ability of the French High Command to ensure the carrying out of article 14(*c*) of the Vietnam agreement under which each party undertook to refrain from reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities. The Commission gave some countenance to complaints of violation of this article in South Vietnam.

One of the main reasons for the refusal of South Vietnam to accept the validity of the Geneva arrangement was its unwillingness that the 'free general elections by secret ballot'[3] called for in paragraph seven of the Final Declaration should be held in July 1956. Its government, which was still in May 1955 fighting to establish its authority in its own territory, claimed that as civil liberty was of the essence of free elections and as it did not exist in North Vietnam, free elections could not be held. Although the supervision of such elections, if held, was not to be the concern of the International Supervisory Commission as such,[4] the holding of elections, because it became the main issue between North and South Vietnam, necessarily affected its tasks. Innumerable minor difficulties arose in the south from the régime's unwillingness to appear, by recognizing the Commission, to recognize the validity of the Geneva agreement, and from the fact that some of the Commission's tasks involved restrictions on the sovereignty of the South Vietnamese state which its government was not willing formally to accept. The French, on the other hand, had signed the agreement and had assumed the obligation to assist the Commission. But they

[1] *I.C.S.C. Vietnam: Fourth Interim Report*, Appendix IV, Cmd. 9654, p. 30. The figures given seem to be incomplete, but not widely so.

[2] *I.C.S.C. Vietnam: Second Interim Report*, Cmd. 9461, p. 50.

[3] Cmd. 9239, p. 10.

[4] It was to be carried out by a special commission drawn from the three countries, India, Canada, and Poland, represented on the Supervisory Commission.

had also undertaken to leave the country, and as they withdrew the Commission became increasingly dependent on the collaboration of the South Vietnamese government in order to carry out its functions successfully.

The question reached a climax on 20 July 1955, the last day on which refugees could move between North and South Vietnam, when a mob, believed to consist largely of refugee students, which had collected to demonstrate against the Geneva agreements, made an attack on the two hotels in Saigon where the Commission's staff were staying. The government expressed its willingness to give full protection and practical co-operation to the Commission but not to make a formal public declaration to that effect. The Commission, not unnaturally, did not regard this as sufficient, and the Indian and Polish members called on the co-chairmen 'to resolve the uncertainty regarding (1) the sanction for the working of the Commission and (2) the probable duration of its activities'.[1]

In Cambodia the International Commission had, by comparison, a relatively simple task. Few communist Vietnamese troops had reached the country and these were quickly evacuated. There were some complaints by Cambodia of infiltration and border incidents, none of a very serious character, directed both at South and at North Vietnam; there was also a complaint from North Vietnam, dated 20 June 1955, that the Military Aid agreement of 16 May between Cambodia and the United States was not in conformity with the Geneva agreement. The Cambodian government argued that the Military Aid agreement, as they interpreted it, was perfectly compatible with their obligations under the Geneva agreement—and incidentally with Prince Norodom Sihanouk's declaration of neutrality made at the Bandung conference—and the Commission, by a unanimous resolution passed on 23 July 1955, accepted the government's argument.

The Commission's principal concern, however, was with the general elections mentioned in article 6 of the Cambodian agreement.[2] On 7, 8, and 9 February 1955 King Norodom Sihanouk held a referendum to answer the simple question: 'Has the royal mission been accomplished to the satisfaction of our people?' The voting, which was not by secret ballot, resulted in an affirmative vote of 99·8 per cent. Shortly afterwards, on 19 February, the king announced a project of reform which involved changing the 1947 constitution in a manner which members of the Commission clearly thought might conflict with the proper carrying out of the Geneva agreement. No official stand was taken by the Commission, but individual members seem privately to have urged this consideration on the king. On 2 March 1955 he abdicated in favour of his father, Norodom Suramarit, and on 15 March the government announced the abandonment of the reform project. The general elections in which the Popular

[1] *I.C.S.C. Vietnam: Fourth Interim Report*, Cmd. 9654, p. 17.
[2] Cmd. 9239, p. 13.

Socialist Community, led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, won all 91 seats, were held on 11 September 1955 in a manner approved of by the Commission. The Commission was then able greatly to reduce its strength.

The Commission in Laos had a far more difficult task. The core of its problem lay in the determination of the Pathet Lao to secure for itself a position of strength in a united Laos and to compel the royal Laotian government to adopt a neutralist position in foreign policy. Katay D. Sasorith, who was prime minister of Laos during 1955, took the view that the members of the Pathet Lao were not themselves communists, but were under the domination of the North Vietnamese communists. The royal government directed its efforts to having its administration re-established in the two northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, and, in so far as it was able, to detaching the Pathet Lao from the North Vietnamese. This the government naturally failed to do, since the Pathet Lao's connexion with the communist states was a principal, if not the principal, source of its strength in the struggle for power in Laos.

The difference of attitude on foreign policy was brought out in replies to a request by the International Commission on 29 March 1955 to be kept informed of the progress of political negotiations. The Laotian government replied on 8 April that political talks were being impeded because the Pathet Lao 'consider themselves still under the authority of the Vietminh High Command'.[1] The Pathet Lao, on the other hand, in their reply, received by the Commission on 22 April, accused the royal government of co-operation with the United States of America. On the day after this accusation reached the Commission, on 23 April 1955, Katay met Pham Van Dong in the presence of Nehru and Chou En-lai at Bandung and was told that the North Vietnam government considered the settlement in Laos as 'a question of internal order which the royal government of Laos and Pathet Lao are entirely free to solve in the best way possible in the higher interests of the country and people of Laos'.[2] It was agreed at this meeting that the two governments should 'develop and harmonise the good neighbourly relations which tie and should tie these two countries to each other, within the framework of the five principles'. Nevertheless, this undertaking did not prevent the signature, at the beginning of July 1955, of a supplementary agreement between Laos and the United States, in which reference was specifically made to the use of American aid funds for the defence of Laos.

The International Commission was hamstrung in this situation because the Polish member of the Commission consistently opposed Indian or Canadian resolutions designed to settle disputed points, thus enabling the Pathet Lao to delay settlement by preventing the Commission from sup-

[1] *I.C.S.C. Laos: Second Interim Report*, Cmd. 9630, p 9.
[2] *New China News Agency*, 25 April 1955.

porting the position of the royal Laotian government effectively. The reason for this concentration on Laos on the communist part is plain. Laos has a common frontier with China and its territory forms salients both northwards into communist territory and southwards into non-communist South-East Asia. The communist states, therefore, have a strong interest in neutralizing it and, to a lesser extent perhaps, in penetrating it.

Given the support of the communist states for its intransigence, the position of the Pathet Lao was a strong one. Its forces were concentrated along the border with North Vietnam and China, across which they could be supplied, if need be, with directions, arms, and (if complaints by the royal Laotian government are to be believed) with personnel. It was in a position to prevent the Commission's inspection teams operating effectively, to spin out negotiations, to maintain a constant state of tension in the two northern provinces, and to wait until the royal government, which had an overriding interest in uniting the country, should tire and give way. This, eventually, it did, though not until 1956, when Katay resigned and Prince Souvanna Phouma, brother of Prince Souphanouvong, became prime minister again in a government committed both to a neutralist foreign policy and to further concessions to the Pathet Lao on internal matters.

*S.E.A.T.O.*

The developments outlined in the preceding section necessarily influenced western policy in South-East Asia. During 1954[1] the area had held a predominant position in political and military thinking; and when, after the loss of Dien Bien Phu,[2] it became clear that the French position was crumbling beyond repair, the United States and its allies were faced with the task of preventing, if possible, the whole region from falling under communist control. This was the original purpose behind the Manila treaty and the South-East Asian Treaty Organization.[3] By the spring of 1955, however, the sense of urgency which had marked earlier negotiations had largely disappeared. In Indo-China the calming effect of the Supervisory Commission was already making itself felt, and at the same time American preoccupation over the defence of the area had lessened. So it was that the first S.E.A.T.O. Council meeting which took place in Bangkok on 23 February, four days after the Manila treaty officially came into force, was of less importance than had been anticipated. Although the meeting was attended by seven foreign ministers and an impressive number of military representatives, and thus provided a good opportunity for a full exchange of views, its decisions were largely of a technical nature.

The communiqué issued on 25 February was little more than an enumeration of details of operation and organization.[4] It was decided that mem-

[1] See *Survey*, 1954, pp. 42 sqq.
[2] Ibid. p. 17.
[3] Ibid. pp. 73 sqq.
[4] See *Documents*, 1955, pp. 508 sqq.

bers should in general be represented on the Council by their foreign ministers; that it should meet at least once a year in the treaty area; and that decision should be by unanimous agreement. To ensure policy co-ordination between meetings a permanent body of representatives was to be established in Bangkok. These representatives, who were empowered to ask for expert assistance, were to make recommendations to the Council and to the governments concerned.

Other than these decisions on organization the Council discussed defence, principally against subversion, and economic assistance. It was decided that the military staff planners should meet in Manila in April to deal with technical problems and meanwhile the Council 'condemned not only warlike action but also those subtle forms of aggression by which freedom and self-government are undermined and men's minds subverted'. Any hope which Thai or Philippine official opinion may have retained of a N.A.T.O. type organization was firmly dispelled. Later, in his report to the American nation, Mr. Dulles again emphasized that all fronts against the Chinese communist danger were interdependent and that defence in Asia should rely both on mobile striking power and on the mutual defence treaties the United States had concluded with non-treaty members, rather than on new military bases and specially assigned troops.[1] Nor was there any great innovation in the economic field. Although economic experts were appointed to assist and advise the Council there was no promise of a large-scale increase in aid. Mr. Stassen, the director of the United States foreign operations administration, was present for one day; but no new commitments were undertaken, even in the field of atomic energy, as the Philippine delegation had hoped.

The Bangkok communiqué is of interest largely for the extent to which it mirrors the changes in the area since the previous summer. The Manila treaty had been hastily conceived during 1954 to counter the anticipated continuation of Chinese expansion in South-East Asia. But in the absence of any indication that this was Peking's immediate aim—a view which was to be reinforced by Chou En-lai's behaviour at Bandung—S.E.A.T.O. found itself without the offensive thrust which alone could have cemented the alliance. Nevertheless, the possibility that the treaty might be used as an excuse for the reimposition of western authority was sufficient to condemn it in the eyes of neutralist opinion. Indeed, in spite of the 'cordial greetings' sent from Bangkok to Bandung, many felt that the sense of the two meetings was opposed: the powers represented at Bangkok accepted the theory of involvement, those assembled at Bandung proclaimed neutralism and a refusal to take sides in the conflict which had divided the world during the preceding decade.

[1] Cf. text in *The Bangkok Conference of the Manila Pact Powers* (Department of State publication 5909), p. 5.

## CHAPTER III

# MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEMS

By comparison with South-East Asia and the Western Pacific, the position in the Near East and in the Mediterranean basin at the close of 1954 seemed relatively stable, and in some ways had shown signs of improvement during the year. Mendès-France's dramatic intervention in Tunisia, on the one hand, and the completion of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty for the evacuation of the British base in the Suez Canal Zone,[1] on the other hand, appeared to many observers to have prepared the way for a more peaceful evolution in the relations between the western powers and the forces of Arab nationalism.

On the other hand, the Middle East could not easily be isolated from the tensions between the communist and anti-communist blocs in other parts of the world, in Indo-China and Formosa; they were shadows cast from afar, rather than immediate Middle Eastern realities, but their significance was considerable. In this area as elsewhere, apprehension of Soviet intentions was the dominant note in Anglo-American policy. In fact, events in 1954 provided little evidence of direct Soviet interest in the Middle East; but, in western eyes, its military weakness constituted a standing invitation to Russian intervention, and western effort was largely concentrated on combating this potential but at this juncture still largely hypothetical 'danger'. After the conclusion of the South-East Asian treaty in the autumn of 1954, therefore, western statesmen had turned their minds to the creation of a complementary organization in the Middle East, which would be linked through Pakistan with S.E.A.T.O. and through Turkey with N.A.T.O. In this way, the Middle East was brought into the compass of global strategy. But these more general considerations springing from the conflict between the communist and the non-communist worlds, were not the only points of substance in western calculations. They were reinforced by three specific factors of great local importance: the evacuation of the British base at Suez, the imminence of the date at which the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1932 was due to expire, and the likelihood that the British military arrangements with Jordan would also come up for revision in the immediate future. Taken together, these developments amounted to a considerable change in the military situation, which, in western eyes, necessitated effective counter-measures, if Russian influence were to be held at bay.

Whether western policy was wise in viewing the Middle East primarily

[1] *Survey*, 1954, pp. 194, 230.

in military terms as an anti-Russian base and an area to be closed to communist influence, is another question. As we shall see, subsequent events indicated rather that its effects were to call up the very devil it was seeking to exorcise. The immediate result of concentration on the alleged Russian danger, on the other hand, was perhaps that western policy still took too little account of the force and coherence of Arab nationalism, and tended to treat it as a series of local manifestations, with which each individual government must be left to cope as best it could. Except in relation to Russia—and here by no means consistently—there was no co-ordinated western policy towards the Arab world. The Middle East was still regarded as a British sphere of interest, and the United States preferred to keep in the background; its action was economic rather than political, and mediatory rather than direct, leaving Great Britain to make the running. North Africa, on the other hand, was for obvious reasons regarded as France's special interest; but there were many French complaints, not only that it was not receiving support from its Anglo-American allies, but still more that the United States and England were intriguing to expel France from North Africa and to use Libya as an anti-French base.[1] Since, after the set-back in Indo-China, North Africa had first priority in French eyes, this disunity was a serious matter. Moreover, there were similar sentiments on the English side about Cyprus, which had assumed new importance as the last British military base in the eastern Mediterranean after the evacuation of Suez. Although the United States had voted with Britain when the Cyprus question came up before the United Nations in December 1954,[2] it was widely felt that American sympathy lay with Greece and the Cypriots. These and other divergencies stood in the way of a common policy; while the very fact that Russian pressure was potential rather than immediate prevented it from serving—as, for example, it had served in Europe—as an urgent reason for drawing together.

*The Baghdad Pact*

The negotiations for a Middle East defensive alliance, linked with Turkey and Pakistan, which had been proceeding in the closing stages of 1954,[3] reached a decisive phase on 12 January 1955, when it was announced that Iraq and Turkey would conclude a treaty of mutual defence in the immediate future, with the participation, if possible, of 'other interested countries'. If the object of this agreement, which was regarded in some quarters as a coup by the State Department in Washington,[4] was to increase the stability and security of the region, the reactions it precipi-

[1] Thus in the debate in the National Assembly on 2 February 1955 M. R. Dronne demanded that the 'Anglo-Americans' should cease 'their anti-French activities'; England, he said, was 'embarrassed by the presence of France in the Fezzan and even in Tunisia'. The same charges were repeated by M. Jacques Bardoux. Cf. *Journal Officiel*, 1955, pp. 607, 609–10.

[2] *Survey*, 1954, p. 183. [3] Ibid. pp. 206 sqq. [4] *Combat*, 14 January 1955.

tated were sobering. In England, it is true, the impending treaty was welcomed 'without reservation', as 'most promising';[1] but Soviet Russia, which had already protested against the closing down of the Iraq mission in Moscow as 'evidence of an unfriendly attitude', issued a categorical warning that 'the Soviet people cannot remain indifferent to the intrigues of aggressive circles in the United States and their associates close to the borders of the U.S.S.R.'—'machinations', it was added, which the Soviet Union could not passively ignore.[2] The Egyptian reaction was even more outspoken. The official newspaper *al Goumhouriya* wrote of the 'unhappy chance' that 'at this delicate moment in Arab history' the Iraqi government should be headed by a man entirely under the sway of 'the imperialist formula', and launched into a personal attack on Nuri es-Said, whose policy (it alleged) served the objectives of foreign powers seeking to divide the Arab peoples.[3] The Egyptian government took the view that the Turco-Iraqi alliance was contrary to the spirit of the collective security pact of the Arab League, and summoned a special meeting of the League in Cairo on 22 January to review the new situation.

There is no doubt that the Turco-Iraqi agreement came as a shock to Arab opinion, not only in Egypt. Less than a month previously, at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Arab League in Cairo, Iraq and Egypt had agreed that the collective security pact should be strengthened and developed into an effective military organization, which, following the British withdrawal from Suez, would take over exclusive responsibility for the defence of the Middle East. In these circumstances, the sudden *volte face* of Nuri es-Said had an air of insincerity and double-dealing. It is true that the Iraq government argued that the agreement with Turkey was compatible with the aims of the Arab League; but little, if any, credence was given to this view. Even in Iraq itself, in spite of the dictatorial form of government, there was talk of a crisis, and a bomb was thrown at the Turkish embassy. In Syria demonstrations and hostile incidents were widespread. But it was in Egypt that the reaction was most lively; and in convoking an extraordinary meeting of the Arab League, the Egyptian government made it clear that its object was to prevent the impending treaty from being implemented.

In the west, the Egyptian reaction was regarded primarily as reflecting the struggle between Egypt and Iraq for leadership of the Arab world; and the Iraqi agreement with Turkey was mainly seen as a setback to Cairo and a blow to Egyptian prestige that might well deprive it of this leadership. That this factor entered into the situation is certain. But this was only one element, and more important in the long run was the fact that the agreement broke the solid front which the Arab League, under Egyp-

[1] *The Times*, 14 and 15 January 1955.
[2] *Soviet News*, 20 January 1955.
[3] Cited in *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 15 January 1955.

tian leadership, had hitherto presented against association with the North Atlantic security system, and opened a breach in the Arab 'neutralist' bloc. The question—particularly as Iraq made no secret of its intention of soliciting increased military aid from the United States—was whether this breach could be healed, or whether it would open still wider.

Already before the special meeting of the Arab League, Turkey had attempted to persuade Syria to join the new alignment; but the Syrian prime minister's rejoinder was the announcement that he had no intention of departing from the policy of avoiding further foreign commitments. A similar *démarche* in the Lebanon produced the reply that it would not undertake independent action outside the Arab League. But when the prime ministers of the Arab League met in Cairo on 22 January, in the absence of Nuri es-Said, who was 'indisposed', both countries declined to support a resolution committing all Arab countries to abstain from adhering to the Turco-Iraqi pact. In fact, alarmed by the signs of growing Arab disunity, their policy was to side with neither party, and to try to restore harmony by mediation. But the efforts of President Chamoun of the Lebanon were without result. On 30 January Nuri es-Said had declared that, if his policy were condemned, his government would consider itself no longer bound by the Arab League security pact; on 7 February Major Salah Salem, the Egyptian negotiator, replied that Egypt would similarly secede if Iraq signed the treaty with Turkey, and the next day Saudi Arabia announced that it would follow the Egyptian lead. A Lebanese proposal for a meeting between Nuri and Nasser on neutral ground was turned down by the former; and finally the pact between Iraq and Turkey was signed on 24 February and ratified two days later.

The signing of the pact was officially welcomed in London as a contribution to the security and stability of the Middle East. But even those who viewed the pact in this optimistic light were aware that it provided no more than a 'framework',[1] particularly as its specific measures were extremely vague;[2] and the decisive question was whether it could be developed and turned into a regional defence system on an adequate scale. Even before the pact was signed Turkey and Pakistan had initiated negotiations, aimed at bringing Persia, Syria, the Lebanon, Jordan, and Yemen into the new grouping; and at the moment of its conclusion Nuri es-Said expressed the hope that Britain and the United States would adhere to the treaty, adding also that Pakistan and Persia would be welcome. But although the United States let it be known that military aid would flow more freely to pact members, the expectations pinned on the pact failed to materialize as rapidly or as completely as had been hoped. If Egypt had been unsuccessful in its efforts to prevent the conclusion of the treaty, its counter-measures in the second phase were more effective; and

[1] *The Times*, 26 February 1955. [2] Cf. *Documents*, 1955, pp. 287–9.

a vigorous campaign was immediately set on foot. On 26 February Major Salem, the Egyptian minister of national guidance, proclaimed that 'the Arab security pact no longer exists', and outlined proposals for a new security pact from which Iraq would be excluded. It was to include a provision forbidding alliances by its signatories with non-Arab states, and it envisaged a unified command and a common foreign policy for its members. This new Egyptian policy quickly scored a first success. On 2 March an agreement on the lines set out was signed between Egypt and Syria; and a few days later Saudi Arabia and the Yemen gave their approval also.'[1]

Therewith, however, Egyptian policy came to a halt. Both Jordan and Lebanon avoided committing themselves to either the Egyptian or the Iraqi group, and about 20 March there were rumours—which were, however, immediately denied—of Egyptian readiness for compromise.[2] On the other hand, Turkish pressure on Syria, even when supported by troop concentrations, equally failed to bring about a weakening in Syrian support for Egypt; while a Turkish bid to secure French as well as British and American participation in the Baghdad pact was completely abortive. Meanwhile, Russia had intervened to prevent Persia from linking up with the Turco-Iraqi axis, pointing out that under its treaties with the U.S.S.R. the Persian government had no right to allow military bases to be established on its territory or foreign troops to be stationed there;[3] and although the Russian representations were formally rejected, they were nevertheless effective, in so far as Persia did not, in fact, at this stage adhere to the Baghdad pact. But the most serious set-back of all was the failure of the United States to respond to Nuri es-Said's appeal for American participation. As American adhesion had been confidently forecast, this decision—although cast in the form of a postponement—caused widespread 'puzzlement'.[4] The issue before Washington, it was said, was 'one of timing, not of a basic change in policy', and reflected a belief that it would be expedient 'to wait for Middle East affairs to cool off' before the United States took any action. More specifically, it was argued that it would be a mistake to join the 'northern tier' while the Arab nations were bitterly divided; and secondly, America feared that it might alienate in advance the Asian and African nations which were shortly to meet at Bandung, if it appeared to be under-pinning a revival of western imperialism through the backdoor methods of defence alliances. But what if Middle East affairs never did, in fact, 'cool off'? The arguments of Washington may have been valid in themselves; but the fact remains that, for supporters of the Baghdad pact,

[1] Cf. *Documents*, 1955, p. 326.

[2] For the rumours, cf. *N.Y. Times* and *Manchester Guardian* 21 March 1955; for Major Salem's denials, cf. *La Bourse Egyptienne* and *Le Monde*, 24 March 1955.

[3] *Pravda*, 8 March 1955.

[4] *N.Y. Times*, 17 March and 4 April 1955.

the attitude of the United States administration was a serious blow, which was only partially offset when, on 30 March, the conservative government in England announced its decision to adhere to the Turco-Iraqi treaty.

The accession of Great Britain, formally completed on 4 April,[1] was the only success achieved by Mr. Menderes, the prime minister of Turkey, and by Nuri es-Said. But, as the State Department in Washington was quick to point out, the British government had special reasons for taking this action. Since the Anglo-Iraqi agreement of 1932 was due to expire in 1957, the immediate value of the Baghdad pact for Britain was that it provided a substitute; or, as one British commentator put it, it seemed 'to give this country the defensive substance of the treaty which now lapses'. In this sense, therefore, the adhesion of Great Britain did not bring any increase in power to the alliance, but was simply the continuation, on new terms, of existing arrangements. Although Britain adhered to the Turco-Iraqi treaty, the essential point on the British side was the special agreement with the government of Iraq for mutual defence co-operation under article 1 of the Baghdad pact. Under this agreement the airfields in Iraq occupied by Great Britain in accordance with the 1932 treaty were to pass under Iraqi sovereignty; but the existing facilities for overflying, landing, and servicing British aircraft in Iraq were to be maintained, and British military personnel would remain in Iraq, under British command, for this purpose, and would enjoy appropriate amenities. Furthermore, the installations on the airfields retained for British use were to remain British property. The effects of the new agreements were therefore juridical rather than practical; in other words, although sovereignty and legal ownership passed to Iraq, effective use by Great Britain remained largely undisturbed.

The new relationship with Iraq seemed advantageous, from a British point of view, because the bilateral pact of 1932, which had become obnoxious in Arab eyes, was replaced, at least on paper, by a wider arrangement of a regional character, which (it was hoped) might prove acceptable to Arab opinion. Indeed, the British foreign secretary, Eden, expressed the view that a system had been evolved 'which can serve as the foundation of a general defence agreement in the Middle East',[2] the alleged intention being to merge the British air forces in Iraq and the Arab Legion in Jordan in 'a sort of Middle East N.A.T.O. arrangement', under a joint command established in Cyprus. But these wider implications were still in the future, and whether they could be made effective, depended on the further development of the situation. It was perhaps an ominous sign that, even in Iraq itself, the only part of the announcement of the new arrangement that was greeted with loud cheers by the combined houses of parlia-

[1] For the text, cf. *Documents*, 1955, pp. 293–300.
[2] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 539, col. 381.

ment was the statement that the R.A.F. bases at Habbaniya and Shaibah would be placed under Iraqi sovereignty. In Egypt, as was to be expected, the reaction was openly hostile; Britain, it was alleged, had re-established a protectorate over Iraq.[1]

All in all, the positive results achieved by the long-drawn-out negotiations were of limited value. To date, the Baghdad pact had the support of only one Arab state, and much of that support was centred in one man, Nuri es-Said. Its future was clearly precarious. The real question was whether these limited positive results had been purchased at disproportionate cost. Here there were four points of substance. First, if, as Sir Anthony Eden declared, the decision to evacuate the canal zone had enormously improved Anglo-Egyptian relations,[2] the conflict with Egypt over the Baghdad pact had caused renewed deterioration, and offset the gains. Secondly, it is at least doubtful whether this deterioration was necessary, or might not have been avoided by more patient diplomacy. The suggestion, rife at the time, that the arrangements with Turkey and Iraq were a victory for the western powers, with the underlying implication that Egypt was unreliable, if not anti-western, was hardly consonant with the best information. At the beginning of 1955 both Egypt and Iraq were 'with the west', and the difference between them was one of method and timing rather than of principle.[3] The view of the Egyptian prime minister, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was that until the Arab peoples felt that they were in charge of their own defence, they would not willingly enter into defence arrangements with the west, and that, to give them self-confidence, it was necessary for them to generate their own defensive organization before accepting formal alliances with the great powers; indeed, at a later stage,[4] he specifically complained that the United States and Britain had violated a 'gentleman's agreement' with Egypt, which envisaged that the latter country should take the lead in constructing a purely Arab defence alliance. In view of the fears and suspicions of colonialism rife throughout the Middle East, this attitude was understandable; but it failed to win understanding in the west, with the result that Egypt was alienated, although, even after the British adhesion to the Baghdad pact, Nasser insisted that, in case of war between the communist and the anti-communist blocs, Egypt would be found fighting on the side of the latter. Thirdly, the common assumption in the west that, once the pact were signed, it was 'not particularly important' what Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen decided to do, and that if they did not wish to co-operate they might 'stay out without wrecking the scheme', was hardly the whole story. Although the Egyptian group was not strong

[1] *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 2 April 1955.
[2] In an interview on the B.B.C. on 11 March 1955; cf. *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 12 March 1955.
[3] *The Times*, 14 January 1955.
[4] *N.Y. Times*, 4 April 1955.

enough to prevent the signing of the Baghdad pact, and although the Egyptian plan for an Arab League pact directed against Iraq eventually came to nothing, the existence of two counter-balancing Arab blocs nevertheless resulted in something like a stalemate. Moreover, by alienating Egypt and its associates, the western powers created in the Arab world a series of potential *points d'appui* for Russia, if the Soviet Union decided to intervene actively in the Middle East, particularly as Saudi Arabia and the Yemen had reasons of their own for opposition to Great Britain.[1] For the time being there were no indications of such Russian activity; but the Soviet government gave due warning that it could not remain indifferent to the changes which had occurred, since the formation of a new power bloc and the establishment of military bases in the Near and the Middle East had 'a direct bearing on the security of the U.S.S.R.'[2] It was, in fact, inconceivable in the long run that Russia would view passively Anglo-American attempts to turn the Middle East into a parade-ground on its southern door-step. In sum, therefore, Gamal Abdel Nasser had good grounds for describing the Baghdad pact as a pyrrhic victory for the N.A.T.O. powers; as he said, London and Washington had obtained the tenuous allegiance of Iraq at the price of reawakening Arab fears of foreign domination and arresting the trend, visible after the Anglo-Egyptian agreement for the evacuation of Suez, towards closer political, economic, and military links between the Arab states and the western powers.[3]

Nor were the immediate consequences particularly encouraging in the field which directly affected the Middle Eastern nations, and was most likely to disturb the peace of the area. The Baghdad pact did nothing to improve Arab-Israeli relations. Although the terms of the pact were deliberately imprecise, the Israeli government took the view that the ancillary notes between Nuri es-Said and Menderes revealed a hostile intent towards Israel, which was explicitly precluded by article 5 from acceding to the treaty. Consequently, it denounced the agreement as 'liable to encourage Arab belligerent tendencies in relation to Israel, foment aggressive ambitions, and undermine peace and stability in the Middle East'.[4] In Egypt, on the other hand, it was argued that, by dividing the Arab powers, the pact encouraged Israel, particularly when Turkey and Iraq concentrated troops on the Syrian frontier. The result on both sides was thus to increase uneasiness and tension, which were not mitigated by Iraqi statements that the Baghdad pact provided 'an opportunity to strangle Israel'.[5] The Israeli reaction was to seek British and American guaran-

[1] The former in respect of the Buraimi oasis, the latter in respect of the Aden frontier; both issues were festering at this time, and eventually came before the General Assembly of the United Nations in October 1955. Cf. below, p. 81. [2] *Soviet News*, 19 April 1955.

[3] *N.Y. Times*, 4 April 1955. [4] Ibid. 27 February 1955; *The Times*, 28 February 1955.

[5] Cf. the remarkable statements of the foreign ministers of Iraq and Syria and of Fadhil al Jamali, former premier of Iraq, in *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, 1 and 22 July 1955.

tees for its security; but these were immediately refused, and subsequent statements by the British foreign secretary did nothing to allay Israeli misgivings. Hence it was not surprising that the month of February witnessed a rapid deterioration in Jewish-Arab relations, culminating in a major clash in the Gaza area on 28 February. Whether, as Egypt claimed, the appointment of Mr. Ben Gurion as Israeli minister of defence on 17 February reflected renewed Israeli apprehensions and fears of the insecurity caused by the Baghdad pact, may be left undetermined; but there is no doubt that, from the latter part of February, frontier incidents instigated by both sides became more frequent.

Another area in which the Baghdad pact had adverse repercussions was Cyprus. If the evacuation of Suez in 1954 left Cyprus as the only possible base in the Mediterranean in the eyes of British strategists, the treaty of 4 April 1955 enhanced its importance still further, by giving it a key position in the new system in process of construction in the Middle East. 'The importance of Cyprus depends on the importance of the Middle East as a whole in our wide-world strategy', said the British secretary of state for the colonies on 5 May. Nor were the strategic factors the only ones. The British government also took the view that the oil resources of the Middle East were at issue, and that the Cyprus base was essential if they were to remain at the disposal of the western powers. Inevitably, this appreciation of the situation led to a hardening of attitude towards Cypriot demands for self-determination. British control over Cyprus must be maintained unimpaired during the present period of world tension, the British government announced.[1] Hence, under the impact of outside events, the conflict in Cyprus, which had come to a head at the close of the previous year,[2] rapidly took a turn for the worse. By employing armed force against unarmed people (as the Cypriots complained), the British government invited reprisals; and on 25 January a caique was intercepted while landing arms and explosives. Meanwhile Archbishop Makarios had formally demanded recognition of the right to self-determination, as contained in the United Nations Charter; and on 7 February the Greek government reaffirmed its determination to support the Cypriot cause, after compromise proposals, involving the transfer of the British military base to the Greek mainland, had been rejected by the British government. By the beginning of April, when the Eden government was formed in England, the situation was deteriorating into a trial of strength. The British government branded the opposition in Cyprus as rebels, charged them with waging civil war, and accused the Greek government of incitement. The Cypriots, under the determined leadership of the National Organization for the Liberation of Cyprus (E.O.K.A.),[3] replied by stepping up resistance and direct action.

[1] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 540, coll. 1992–3; ibid. vol. 539, col. 834; ibid. vol. 540, col. 1933.
[2] Cf. *Survey*, 1954, pp. 183–4. [3] Literally, 'National Organization of Cypriot Strugglers'.

From April onwards conditions verged on civil war, and the beginning of May found the British government committed to a campaign of repression, heavy sentences, and intimidation.[1] Therewith the scene was set for the next stage. The Greek government drew the attention of the United Nations to the 'brutal repression' committed in Cyprus, and alleged that the British troops transferred to Cyprus from Suez were being used 'as an instrument of colonial domination' instead of for the defence of the Middle East against external aggression.[2] But it was Archbishop Makarios, on his return from the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung, who put the struggle in its wider context. 'By its international machinations', he said, the British government was undermining and endangering the peace and security of the eastern Mediterranean; its policy was weakening alliances and pacts concluded to protect the security of the region.[3] This statement refers, no doubt, in part to the Balkan pact; but it may also be regarded as an epitaph on the Baghdad pact and the policy it epitomized. So far from adding strength to the western position in the Middle East, that pact, it seemed, had destroyed much of the goodwill which the Suez agreement had created, and sowed new seeds of discord;[4] in months to come these seeds produced a crop of hatreds, hostilities, and resentments which turned the Middle East, still relatively tranquil at the beginning of 1955, into a theatre of international tension.

*North Africa*

Although less directly involved in the major issues of international politics than the Middle East, North Africa was becoming increasingly important in western calculations at the beginning of 1955. In the first place, since it was only separated from Egypt by Libya, it could not be isolated from the rest of the Moslem world and from the movement of Arab nationalism, into which western policy had been plunged as a result of the Baghdad pact. Secondly, its strategic significance for the west was considerable; in particular, American strategists regarded North Africa as 'tremendously important', partly for its 'potential manpower' and as a source of 'strategic raw materials', but primarily because of its air bases 'within easy striking distance of all parts of Europe and the Baku oilfields of Russia'.[5] Thirdly, it could not be left out of account in the European defence arrangements, upon which the energies of western statesmen were so largely concentrated at the beginning of 1955. As the British ambassa-

[1] The sentence imposed on Loizides on 6 May was the longest for a political offence in the whole history of the British occupation of Cyprus; *Daily Telegraph*, 7 May 1955; previously the chief justice had insisted on amending the indictment in order to procure heavier penalties (ibid. 3 May 1955). Cf. also *The Times*, 13 May 1955; *Daily Telegraph*, 18 May 1955. *Le Monde*, 5 May 1955, summed up the position when it said that, 'if the British wished to create martyrs, they would not act differently'.

[2] *The Times*, 10 May 1955.

[3] Ibid. 6 May 1955.

[4] *Observer*, 1 January 1956.

[5] *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, 20 March 1955.

dor in Paris, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, stated in April, in a speech which was generally believed to express the views of the new conservative government in England, North Africa was 'absolutely necessary' to France, which was itself an essential link in the western alliance; for without its African territories France would have the greatest difficulty in playing an effective part in Europe and elsewhere.[1] The more actively the west developed its military programme in Europe and the Middle East, therefore, the more the unrest in North Africa, which had been gathering force since 1949, became a liability. Turkey, in particular, expressed lively fears lest failure to secure a North African settlement might undermine its efforts to draw the Arab states into a western-supported regional security system.

The prospects of a settlement had been somewhat improved, in July 1954, by the direct intervention of the French premier, Mendès-France. His proposals for autonomy in Tunisia served at least to break the deadlock; but they left the more difficult problems of Morocco and Algeria untouched, and even the Tunisian proposals aroused bitter opposition in France and among the French settlers in Africa. At the beginning of 1955 nothing had been done to put them into effect, and the delay had again aggravated the situation. When at length the Tunisian negotiations were reopened on 23 January, opposition to Mendès-France quickly came to a head. General Aumeran, the right-wing deputy for Algiers, expressed the widely held view that the prime minister's policy, by encouraging Neo-Destour in Tunisia, had given a lead to the nationalist movement in Algeria, and on 5 February the government fell. As M. July, the minister for Moroccan and Tunisian affairs in the new government of Edgar Faure, had consistently opposed the North African policies of Mendès-France, the outlook was clouded; but it soon became evident that there was no turning back, and on 15 March negotiations were resumed. The outcome, on 22 April, was an agreement in principle, which was completed and initialed on 29 May. It was a compromise solution, which left foreign affairs and defence in French hands, and provided for a gradual transfer of the police and the judicial services to the Tunisians;[2] and as such it met criticism from those elements in the Tunisian population which aspired to a specifically Moslem solution. But it proved satisfactory to Tunisian opinion as a whole, and in particular to the leaders of the Neo-Destour Party. Returning to Tunis from exile on 1 June, Habib Bourguiba described the agreement as 'a step towards independence', as a result of which the Tunisian state had become a reality; 'if we have made concessions', he added, 'it is because we wished to construct a modern state with the collaboration of France'.[3]

[1] *Le Populaire*, 21 April 1955.
[2] For the terms, cf. *Notes et études documentaires*, no. 2034 (18 June 1955).
[3] *Le Monde*, 2 June 1955.

The more serious question, however, was whether the agreement in Tunisia was to be regarded as a first step towards a solution of the North African problem as a whole, or as a final concession on the French side. Whether or not the French government had 'turned the corner in North Africa', as a number of observers believed, depended upon the answer to this question. Even before the Tunisian settlement was concluded, it had become evident that the part of French North Africa which commanded most attention was not the two protectorates, Tunisia and Morocco, but Algeria, which was juridically a part of metropolitan France; here also a fresh approach was necessary, since the situation had altered considerably since the disturbances in November 1954. But the more it became clear that concessions in Tunisia were unavoidable, the more French opinion hardened in relation to the other North African territories. In Morocco, it was confidently expected that plans for political reform would be announced by M. July during his visit in the latter part of April. Instead France sent large reinforcements of police and reopened 'anti-terrorist' operations. In Algeria it took the offensive by proclaiming on 1 April a state of emergency, by imposing press censorship, and by establishing at the end of the month a military command for all the emergency areas, which were extended on 18 May by new emergency regulations. Earlier the governor-general appointed by Mendès-France, M. Jacques Soustelle, had hinted at a fresh approach to the Algerian problem; but before the end of May he had fallen back upon a policy of 'pitiless severity'.[1] Thus France's answer to the challenge of the nationalist movement was, in M. Soustelle's words, 'to fight back with all our forces'.[2] There was, he added, no question of negotiation; and to prove the earnestness of its intention, the French government announced, on 19 May, the withdrawal of 20,000 troops from the N.A.T.O. forces in Germany and their transfer to Algeria.

The repercussions of the North African unsettlement upon the newly concluded European defence arrangements thus made themselves felt early. But these repercussions were not confined to the European front. The decision of the French government to revert to a policy of repression aroused critical comment even in countries politically aligned with France. In France itself, the Union of Republican Youth issued a protest; in Karachi the international assembly of Moslem youth called for an economic boycott of France to force it 'to change its outmoded colonial policy'; while comment in Switzerland queried the wisdom of the French government, and refused to accept the French thesis that the African nationalists were merely lawless 'terrorists'.[3] In the United States the central committee of C.I.O. condemned France for its failure to recognize

[1] *Le Monde*, 22–23 May 1955.
[2] *The Times*, 27 May 1955.
[3] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 25 May 1955; *Der Tagesspiegel*, 25 August 1955.

the national aspirations of the African peoples; and in Pakistan Soustelle's policy of 'pitiless severity' was denounced as setting 'at nought the professed aims and purposes of France' in North Africa.

Even if in some cases these charges may have been prejudiced and exaggerated, it was unavoidable that they should have repercussions in the international sphere, since (as American comment emphasized) the question was one in which 'the whole free world' was intensely interested. The crisis was, in fact, 'assuming proportions which threatened to impair the security of what is a rear area of western defence, containing important American bases'.[1] Hence the United States government found itself in a difficult position, caught (as it were) between two fires. It had obvious reasons for not wishing to weaken French influence in the Magreb; but it had also, in the interests of its Middle East policy, to consider Arab sentiments and susceptibilities. About these there was no doubt. The Egyptian broadcasting station, 'The Voice of the Arabs', vociferously supported the nationalist movement, while in Damascus, where there were anti-French demonstrations, a new North African propaganda service was inaugurated on 1 February. Already in May it was widely believed that the nationalists were receiving arms from the Middle East, while it was well known that support and directives came from Egypt or from Arab leaders in Spanish Morocco. Thus France was involved with Spain, which lent its support, tacitly if not openly, to the National Reformist Party which aimed at Moroccan reunion and independence. At the same time its relations with Libya, already troubled by the unsettled question of the French bases in the Fezzan, were adversely affected, since Libya had provided a refuge for Tunisian refugees. To set in the opposite balance was the fact, already noted,[2] that one of the earliest acts of the new British government, after its constitution at the beginning of April, was to come out openly in support of France. France, Sir Gladwyn Jebb was instructed to state, could count on England to give all possible support to its position in North Africa. This statement, which contrasts so markedly with Churchill's critical attitude towards French policy in January, has the appearance of a *quid pro quo* for French approval of the Paris agreements, and was the first indication of a realignment which was to have momentous consequences for the future. For the moment, however, the fact that impressed independent observers was that England had similar problems in Cyprus to those confronting the French government in North Africa, and that it was embarking at this very moment on a similar line of policy. To the peoples of Asia and Africa, therefore, the new Anglo-French *entente* had the appearance of an understanding between two 'colonial' powers—an interpretation which, whether right or wrong, did not help to make western policy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East more palatable

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 4 February and 30 May 1955.

[2] Above, p. 33.

in their eyes. Nor was it altogether an advantage that the only other country which came out unreservedly in support of France happened to be the Union of South Africa.[1] These reservations in African and Asian minds were inevitably a weakness in the western position in the Middle East. But they acquired added weight and significance in the international balance from the fact that, at this very moment, the representatives of the Afro-Asian peoples were meeting together for the first time in conference at Bandung. It was no accident that the final communiqué of the Bandung conference, issued on 24 April 1955, singled out Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco 'particularly' as examples of territories where 'colonial powers' had 'denied their dependent peoples basic rights', and explicitly supported their struggle for 'self-determination and independence'. Not the least significant consequence of the North African situation, in the wider field of international affairs, was the fact that it brought the western alliance into open disagreement with the Bandung powers at the very moment when the part played by the latter in global politics was assuming greater importance. Although there was no immediate likelihood of Africa turning to communism, the possibility of the African continent 'slipping away from the anti-communist cause' and joining the new forces of neutralism which were taking concrete form at Bandung was a present reality, which western policy could no longer afford to ignore.[2]

[1] *Johannesburg Star*, 23 May 1955.

[2] *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 February 1955.

## CHAPTER IV

# EUROPE

### *The Paris Treaties*

In Europe the overriding problem until 5 May, when Western European Union was formally established, was whether the agreements concluded in Paris in October 1954[1] would be ratified. In American thought the west would remain 'a weak target for communist divisive tactics',[2] until the North Atlantic alliance had been expanded to include a rearmed Germany. Hence the ratification of these agreements played an essential part in the United States' policy of building a defensive line around the communist world. After the failure of E.D.C. it had looked for a time as though American policy towards Europe might undergo radical reappraisal; but the compromise worked out in London and Paris modified the situation. Thereafter the United States used all its efforts to ensure that the treaties would be put into effect.

France and Germany, the two countries particularly concerned, were acutely aware of the problems, and of the dangers which ratification might involve, and it was Soviet policy to play upon the difficulties inherent in the situation. Already before the end of 1954 the Soviet Union had threatened to denounce its treaties of friendship with Great Britain and France; and the Polish, Czech, and German Democratic governments had pressed the French National Assembly to refuse ratification. In the case of Federal Germany, Soviet pressure took the form of a threat that ratification would inevitably prevent German reunification, a view that was shared by a considerable section of public opinion in that country and elsewhere. But supporters of the official American view argued that only if east–west negotiations were entered upon from a position of military strength, could there be hope of a constructive outcome.

Apart from these considerations, the Saar question still stood in the way of Franco-German co-operation. An agreement, to cover the period until the final peace treaties, had been reached in October 1954; but interpretative resolutions added by both the French and German assemblies caused bitter comment and friction, since the French were unwilling to acquiesce in German rearmament without an agreement on the Saar which was satisfactory from their point of view. In addition, there was general apprehension that rearming Germany would encourage a revival of German militarism. This argument was countered by those who claimed that without a German contribution the defence of Europe would be impos-

[1] *Documents*, 1954, p. 102.

[2] *N.Y. Times*, 23 March 1955.

sible except from the periphery. Adherents of a 'forward' defence policy also argued that a Germany in N.A.T.O. was a Germany controlled; its preponderance in Europe would be lessened by the promised retention on the continent of four British divisions and a tactical air force,[1] and by the restraint exercised by the United States.[2]

In France public reactions were greatly influenced by consciousness of French reverses in Indo-China in 1954 and of increasing difficulties in North Africa. In particular, the North African situation, involving heavy military commitments, weakened the French position to such a degree that it was virtually impossible for that country to pursue an independent policy in Europe. It was, however, some time before this fact made itself felt. At the end of 1954 the National Assembly rejected the first clause of the treaty establishing W.E.U., and it seemed as though the London and Paris agreements would end in the same way as the E.D.C. treaty had done. The communist leader, Duclos, pointed out that the admission of Germany to N.A.T.O. contradicted the Assembly's order of the day emphasizing N.A.T.O.'s defensive character and precluding its extension to states with unsettled territorial claims, a resolution which the prime minister, Mendès-France, had supported.[3] Jules Moch added that the lack of an immediate threat of war and progress in disarmament negotiations were indicative of the value of holding four-power talks before ratification. Mendès-France, defending the agreements, warned the Assembly that they must be considered as a whole: all would lapse if any were not ratified. He emphasized that western Germany would be rearmed in any event, despite French opposition, and claimed that in the event of non-ratification there would be no question of a four-power conference; two- or three-power conversations would be far more likely. If France co-operated, however, it could hope to play a part both in the Atlantic alliance and in future negotiations between the great powers.[4] Moreover, adequate influence in N.A.T.O. was a practical consideration for France, because Algeria was included in the area which it covered.

French opposition to the Saar agreement centred less on the agreement itself than on German interpretations set out in a resolution attached to it by the Bundestag.[5] It was widely feared that the protocol gave insufficient guarantees to France; but Mendès-France emphasized that the assembly was voting on the agreement, not on a hypothetical German interpretation of it, and that any future French government could insist on Saar autonomy in negotiations for a peace treaty. But while E.D.C. had strong advocates in France, as well as violent abusers, W.E.U. was felt to be an

[1] *Documents*, 1954, p. 25. [2] Ibid. p. 21.
[3] *Journal des débats*, 21 December 1954, p. 6708*b*.
[4] Ibid. 22 December 1954, pp. 6737*a*, 6743*a*.
[5] The resolution affirmed the German view that the agreement did not affect German rights to the Saar within the frontiers of 1937: *Europa Archiv*, vol. x (1955), p. 7418.

unsatisfactory compromise, and the debates and procedural difficulties revealed very clearly the negative quality of French assent. In the upshot the Assembly passed votes of confidence on all articles and amendments previously adopted separately. But although the treaties had passed through the Assembly, it was by no means certain that they would not be so amended by the Council of the Republic as to require reconsideration, and it is not unlikely that certain groups in the French parliament may have based their calculations on this expectation.

If that were so, they misjudged the situation, and particularly the reaction of France's western allies. Events quickly showed how much the situation had changed since the earlier attempt to reconcile a politically rehabilitated and economically strong Germany with a weakened France had come to nothing. Great Britain and the United States were no longer prepared to brook delays; and after contact with Washington, the British Foreign Office issued a strongly worded statement, arguing that what was at stake was the unity of the western allies. 'The rejection of the Paris agreements would not mean that German rearmament would not take place. The issue was not whether the German Federal Republic would rearm, but how.' The United Kingdom commitment to maintain British forces on the continent of Europe, the statement concluded, depended on the ratification of the Paris agreements by all parties.[1]

In Germany the opposition to ratification was led by the Social Democrats; but hostility to the Paris treaties was more than a party manœuvre. Outside parliament Ollenhauer found support among the churches, youth movements, and refugee organizations, as well as trade unions, socialists, and communists, who opposed ratification until a further effort had been made to bring about four-power talks on reunification. One consideration in the minds of the opposition was that government policy was doing too little to exploit the possibilities implicit in the changes in Soviet policy after the death of Stalin; but other important factors were the moral disapprobation of the churches, and fear of the repercussions of conscription upon a buoyant economy. Within the parties, differences centred upon divergent interpretations of the probable consequences of ratification and rearmament on German reunification. The Christian Democrat speaker of the Lower House, Gerstenmaier, said on 1 January 1955 that 'when the Paris treaties go into force' then we can 'gather together our entire strength and apply the freedom restored to us to struggle with tenacious patience and iron energy for the reunification of Germany'.[2] The Social Democrats, on the other hand, based their opposition to Adenauer on the grounds that a policy of alignment with the west made the prospect of German reunification more distant. Their activities culminated in a meeting held in the Paulskirche on 29 January which was attended by representatives

[1] *Europa Archiv*, vol. x (1955), p. 7259.

[2] *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, 1 January 1955.

of a wide variety of shades of opinion and thus could be regarded as a national rather than a party occasion. Opposition to rearmament, however, was based not only on considerations of neutralism or pacifism, but on the practical argument that 'he who does not wish to shoot must talk'.[1]

At this juncture, the fall of the Mendès-France government in France increased Adenauer's difficulties, particularly as M.R.P. had officially voted against the government because of its handling of the German issue. Apart from the inevitable delays, it was feared that no other leader would be found in France to champion the agreements as Mendès-France had done. When Edgar Faure was appointed as successor there were doubts whether, even if he were willing, he would be able to carry the Council of the Republic with him. In fact, these fears were exaggerated, since on 23 February Faure announced that he would continue the policy of Mendès-France and complete ratification in the shortest possible time.

Nevertheless, the crisis in France played into the hands of the Soviet Union which redoubled its efforts, and hinted that constructive moves were imminent. Previously, on 25 January, the U.S.S.R. had ended the state of war with Germany; now, Molotov repeated before the Supreme Soviet the point already made a month earlier, that a four-power conference would make possible, in 1955, all-German elections with the aim of reunifying Germany, whereas the remilitarization of west Germany would make reunion impossible.[2] This was followed by the publication in the west German communist press of a plan adopted unanimously in Warsaw by a communist-sponsored conference of representatives of fifteen European countries, including east and west Germany. The proposals included the withdrawal of all occupation troops from Germany (Russian troops would be withdrawn to the Soviet Union); reunification of Germany through free elections under four-power supervision; respect for the Potsdam obligations; and a guarantee by other European powers and the United States of the inviolability of the frontiers of a Germany remaining outside all military coalitions.[3] The Social Democrats made this the occasion of new demands for four-power negotiations.

Dr. Adenauer, who was leading a campaign to rally the country to his policy, categorically refused to consider any modification of his views. He said that the resignation of Malenkov[4] and other ministerial changes in Russia indicated an internal instability in the Soviet Union which made its offers of negotiation merely unreliable propaganda. By the time of the final ratification debate, despite demonstrations outside the Bundestag, the country as a whole was tired of the prominence given to the issue. Nevertheless the Saar statute was bitterly attacked; by Dr. Becker for

[1] *The Times*, 3 January 1955.
[2] *Documents*, 1955, p. 241; *Soviet News*, 15–17 February 1955.
[3] *Europa Archiv*, 1955, p. 7385.
[4] Cf. below, p. 45.

delivering one million Germans to France in return for the privilege of twelve divisions; and by others for its lack of precision in defining the rights of German parties, and the scope for German development. Adenauer replied that both the French and the German negotiators were agreed that freedom of human rights must apply in the Saar after the plebiscite had taken place. Nor, he claimed, would the statute in any way affect the final status of the Saar, for this would be decided by a peace treaty. On the other hand, if the statute were confirmed the United States and Great Britain would consider themselves freed from the assurances given to France during the Moscow conference of 1947, that in future peace negotiations they would support political autonomy for the Saar and a Franco-Saar economic union.

Nevertheless during the debates in the Bundestag beginning on 24 February, German membership of the western alliance again came under fire. It was argued that the raising of twelve German divisions would make no difference to the balance of power, and that, in view of the existence of nuclear weapons, there could be no hope of security for one half of Germany through an alliance with the west. Dr. Adenauer, on the other hand, denied that Germany would become a battlefield fought over by Soviet and United States forces; General Gruenther had told him that, without German troops, allied defence positions would have to be based on the Rhine, but that with German participation, the defence line could be pushed farther east. The treaties were finally accepted on 27 February, but many of those voting in favour of the Saar agreement undoubtedly only did so because it was tied up with the other agreements; while others hoped for a Russian offer before the agreements were implemented, envisaging the treaties merely as establishing a stronger bargaining position.

With the conclusion of the debates in Germany all interest turned to France, against which the Soviet government now concentrated its pressure. With this in view Moscow announced that ratification would result in annulment of the Franco-Russian treaty of friendship of 1944, and on 21 March a further statement was made that in recent conversations between the governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the Soviet Union, agreement had been reached that in the event of ratification of the Paris agreements a treaty of friendship and aid, and a unified military command, would be established among the powers concerned.

It was soon apparent, however, that Russia had misjudged French reactions and was over-reaching itself. Pressures from the east had little effect; for in France, too, the debates had produced a sense of unreality and of boredom. The influence brought to bear by France's allies, on the other hand, was more subtle. The United States stressed the unreliability of Soviet promises and encouraged the belief that if France failed to ratify

the agreements, bilateral arrangements, from which it would be excluded, would be made between the U.S.A. and Germany. At the same time London came out in support of Washington, and on 21 March the letters exchanged between Mendès-France and Churchill early in January were made public. In this exchange Churchill had categorically rejected any approach to the Soviet Union until ratification had been completed, and he concluded his letter by stating that he was strongly opposed to the withdrawal of British and American troops from the continent and a 'peripheral' defence. On the other hand, if France failed to act in concert with its allies, he would feel bound to support the 'empty chair' policy despite the sorrow he would feel at seeing France isolated and losing her influence, and although this would involve large changes in the structure of N.A.T.O.[1]

It was, indeed, primarily the fear of disrupting the existing structure of N.A.T.O. which stimulated the little sympathy shown in western circles towards French indecision, and made Great Britain and the United States hesitate to proceed without France. For although it would have been possible for American strategy to be organized from bases in North Africa, the Iberian peninsula, Turkey, and England, it was recognized that this would mean abandoning most of Europe and would encourage the Russians whose policy for nine years had been to bring about an American withdrawal from the continent. In particular, the Canadian foreign minister, Mr. Lester Pearson, emphasized the difficulties which would be involved in any reversal of previous Atlantic policy. Speaking in the Canadian House of Commons on 20 January, he pointed out that N.A.T.O. air forces were based in France and French North Africa, and their navies used the French ports on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. 'No alternative airfields, ports or communications could be established elsewhere without a great weakening of our defensive arrangements and . . . much expense. In short, no Atlantic or European system of security could be really satisfactory or effective to which France did not willingly contribute.' Lester Pearson's views seem to have been appreciated in the United States, and the letters Eisenhower sent to the prime ministers of the countries involved contained phrases calculated to mollify both French and German opinion.[2] His statements that the United States would maintain 'its fair share' of forces needed for defence in Europe, and would co-operate in the closest possible integration of forces in the N.A.T.O. structure, thus ensuring that they would not be used for national aggression, were directed primarily to Paris; while his 'good hope' that any aggression 'could be stopped at the threshold' reiterated Gruenther's assurance that the N.A.T.O. defensive line would move east from the Rhine to the frontiers of the Federal and the Democratic German republics.

The French government nevertheless felt it necessary to strengthen its

[1] For the text of Churchill's letter, cf. Cmd. 9420.

[2] *Documents*, 1955, p. 148.

position against its internal critics and issued a statement in reply to German interpretations of the Saar agreement, stating that France intended to see that earlier agreements recognizing the 'separate political personality' of the Saar were written into the peace treaty; furthermore, they had no reason to suppose there had been any alteration in their allies' assurances of 1947. This was followed by the publication of a Franco-Saar protocol outlining the principal subjects to be covered by the Franco-Saar economic convention.[1] When the debate on the agreements opened in Paris on 23 March, M. Pinchard, a deputy from Lorraine, protested that France was yielding to pressure from its allies, and gave a strong warning against the danger of rearming Germany. The prime minister, M. Faure, denied that there had been pressure; but the foreign minister, M. Pinay, admitted that further delay would seem to those outside France equivalent to outright rejection and would destroy any chance of France taking part in future international negotiations. Germany, he emphasized, would be rearmed with or without French approval; but, in the latter case, the strategy of forward defence would be sacrificed for a strategy of peripheral defence, which would leave France exposed and vulnerable. The debate was concluded by Faure with a statement of future government policy, which, he said, would include the satisfaction of French demands in regard to the Saar, and to an arms control agency, as well as arrangements for an east–west conference. Furthermore, the government would seek to affirm western unity where at present it seemed insufficiently apparent—a clear allusion to North Africa, where, as Pinay had emphasized, France could ill dispense with allied support. Finally, on 27 March, the Council of the Republic passed the agreements.

The subsequent events were in the nature of an epilogue and can be briefly summarized. In Germany the agreements were ratified on 18 March; and during April the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Denmark, countries which had been awaiting the French decision, also completed ratification. Finally, on 5 May, the occupation of western Germany ended, and on the same day Western European Union was formally established. Six months of United States diplomacy had achieved its aims, and there was nothing in the way of the restitution of sovereignty to western Germany, and of Federal German acceptance of N.A.T.O. obligations. Of the countries involved Germany had evidently gained most; not only had it 'received from the United States more than four billion dollars as a gift, on the mere promise of remilitarisation',[2] but it had also won for itself a leading place in the western alliance. Many people in Germany, however, regarded the measures taken not as ends in themselves but as steps towards reunification, and they suspended judge-

[1] *Europa Archiv* (1955), pp. 7456, 7533.
[2] *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. cccliii (1956), p. 227.

ment on the treaties until they saw what, from that point of view, their effect would be. By 1955, in other words, western military preparedness, considered as an end in itself, no longer seemed a matter of such urgency, and it is hard to escape the conclusion that the long delay between 1952, when E.D.C. was first projected, and May 1955, when W.E.U. was finally established, had weakened some of the arguments in its favour. Conditions since the death of Stalin had changed too considerably, at least on the surface, for there to be unquestioning acceptance of the need for German rearmament. Furthermore, the play of international politics had veered away from Europe, and some of the powers at least were more concerned with what was happening in other theatres. Thus there were divergencies of view among the Atlantic allies which the treaties glossed over but left untouched. Finally, the conclusion of W.E.U. accentuated the crystallization of the division of Europe into two blocs at a time when the desire to lessen international tension was more prevalent, and the possibilities of lessening tension seemed better, than before. In so far as the success of western diplomacy in bringing Western European Union to completion compelled the Soviet Union to make a rapid reappraisal of policy, it is fair to say that the west had secured the initiative. But the question, what use it would make of this initiative, remained to be answered. In fact, it soon appeared that, in the long effort to overcome opposition and put the Paris treaties into effect, the west had shot its bolt and that, for the moment, its diplomatic effort was exhausted; whereas the Soviet Union, after a period of adjustment, was quick to adapt its policies to the new situation and to regain the initiative.

*The Soviet Union and the Eastern Coalition*

If, superficially, Soviet policy in the opening months of 1955 seemed as preoccupied as that of the western powers with the interlocked questions of W.E.U. and German rearmament, its deeper currents were affected by other considerations, most of them the result of continuing adjustment to the changed conditions which had followed the death of Stalin in 1953.

In so far as these adjustments related to internal affairs—e.g. agricultural policy, or the ratio between investment in consumer goods and in heavy industry—they are not directly our affair, though it is probable that they exercised an appreciable, if imponderable, influence over Soviet foreign policy. When, in an interview at the end of January with the American journalists, Hearst and Kingsbury Smith,[1] Molotov stated that 'the Soviet Union was busy with its domestic problems, of which it had more than enough, and was naturally concerned to secure peace, as were other peoples', it is more than likely that he had these considerations in mind, and there is no reason not to take his words at face value. More-

[1] *Soviet News*, 31 January 1955.

over, it is probable that militarily also Russia had been passing through a transition, involving re-equipment on a major scale, in particular the replacement of piston-engined aircraft by jets. The results of this were seen by the beginning of the summer, when the United States was forced to concede that Russia was operating both a long-range heavy bomber rivalling the American B.52 and an all-weather jet fighter;[1] but it is understandable that in the preceding period, until re-equipment had been carried through and parity established, Russian policy may have moved cautiously. Marshal Bulganin's statement, on 9 February, that Russia had re-equipped its 'armed forces with new and completely up-to-date weapons and military materials',[2] probably marked the turning-point in this process.

These under-currents, which probably affected Soviet policy throughout the winter of 1954–5, came to the surface in a dramatic way on 8 February, when Malenkov, who had headed the Soviet government since the death of Stalin, was displaced by Bulganin. Inevitably Malenkov's resignation aroused widespread speculation, although its implications on the home front were clarified by the speeches at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet which preceded and succeeded it. In the field of foreign policy, on the other hand, the implications were not so evident. The view of the United States government, as expressed by Mr. Dulles,[3] was that 'the full significance of what has occurred is still obscure'; but he conceded also that it was possible to 'perceive the outlines of a basic policy difference'—the difference, in effect, between those who put external power and those who put internal welfare first. In fact, apart from a new initiative in the Austrian question,[4] no immediate change in the direction of foreign policy resulted from the change of government,[5] although it is possible that one of the reasons for this was fear lest the 'new course' in the Russian economy, which the Malenkov régime had sought to implement, might adversely affect Soviet military potential and therefore Soviet capacity for action in foreign affairs. Marshal Bulganin was speaking for the new régime when he emphasized that 'heavy industry is the foundation of the invincible defensive capacity of our country';[6] and it was significant that the budget for 1955, in addition to revising the ratio between heavy and light industry, included an increase of 12 per cent. on defence expenditure.[7]

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 23 June 1955.

[2] *Soviet News*, 14 February 1955.

[3] *N.Y. Times*, 17 February 1955.

[4] Cf. below, p. 124.

[5] In this connexion it should be remembered that Mr. Molotov remained in office as foreign minister under the new government.

[6] Characteristically, he went on to refer to war-time experiences. 'If at that time our country had not possessed a powerful economic foundation—our heavy industry—we should not have achieved victory over an enemy who was armed to the teeth. Heavy industry has ensured the freedom and independence of our country.' *Soviet News*, 14 February 1955.

[7] From 100,300 m. roubles to 112,100 m. roubles; cf. *Soviet News* 7 and 22 February 1955; *The Times*, 4 February 1955.

The extent to which the resignation of Malenkov was precipitated by a failure of agricultural policy or by conflicts of personality, need not concern us here; but it is worth emphasizing that, behind the particular causes, there may have been a more general sense of dissatisfaction or frustration at the lack of effectiveness in Soviet foreign policy. In the first place, the tendency visible during 1954 to ease relations with the rest of the world had not produced immediate positive results. Furthermore, even if the collapse of E.D.C. be accounted a Russian success (which was doubtfully the case), the Soviet government had in fact achieved nothing of substance in foreign affairs in the whole of 1954, and the initiative in the communist camp seemed to have passed to China. And yet, as Molotov pointed out,[1] the changes in the international situation during the ten years which had passed since the end of the Second World War, were in many ways favourable to the Soviet Union. In particular, the Soviet Union was no longer isolated. Not only was post-war Europe 'far from resembling pre-war Europe', but the new situation which had developed in Asia, particularly the rise of China and the emergence of the republic of India as an independent force in international relations, implied a fundamental change in the 'correlation of the main world forces'. The change of government in February meant that a tougher, but at the same time more pliable, leadership took over, and carried through a reformulation of policy, with a view to taking advantage of the changed world situation which Molotov had outlined.

The stages in this reformulation are not clear; but by about May the new government was ready to take the initiative. Probably it was realized early in the new year that Soviet efforts to prevent the completion of W.E.U. were unlikely to succeed, and that the time had come to think ahead to the next stage. In any event, when W.E.U. came into force it found the Soviet Union ready to cope. But in the immediately preceding phase, the position was different and it is possible to perceive a certain ambiguity in Soviet policy. The dilemmas facing the Soviet government were, indeed, real. It had to combine active opposition to what it regarded as American plans for 'encirclement' with a policy of conciliation, designed to appeal to world opinion in general and to uncommitted opinion in particular. It had to decide how far, in the face of the possible outbreak of a major war, it would go in supporting China in the Far East. It had to take account of conflicting interests among its European allies, particularly over the question of east German rearmament; and it had to decide whether to go all out for reconciliation with Tito or whether to hedge in view of the possible repercussions such a policy might have in the people's democracies of eastern Europe. Above all else, perhaps, it had to keep its

[1] Report to the Supreme Soviet, 18 February 1955; printed in full in *Soviet News*, 15, 16, and 17 February 1955.

foreign policy in line with the internal needs of the Soviet Union and of the communist world, particularly the need for industrial development.

Between these different alternatives Soviet policy steered somewhat hesitantly in the early months of 1955. In Europe, in particular, its policy amounted to little more than a reaction to western initiative in launching W.E.U. The challenge presented by the London and Paris agreements was met in two ways: on the one side, by continuing and developing the policy of hostility to any form of German rearmament; on the other, by organizing an eastern alliance, similar to N.A.T.O., to incorporate a rearmed eastern Germany. Soviet opposition to west German rearmament and every aspect of the W.E.U. treaties has already been followed.[1] It must, however, be emphasized that, throughout eastern Europe, there was genuine anxiety at the prospect of German rearmament. No nation which had suffered from German militarism liked the prospect, and the idea of a divided Germany becoming the object of an arms build-up between the rival blocs, was as sobering in Prague or Warsaw as it was in Paris. The Moscow security conference of December 1954 indicated that Soviet policy envisaged two alternatives: ratification of W.E.U. to be countered by the formation of an eastern N.A.T.O. including a rearmed eastern Germany; or the abandonment of plans to rearm Germany and the holding of all-German elections in 1955.[2] At a meeting in Prague delegates from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and east Germany, protesting against the ratification of the Paris agreements, stated that, as the countries most directly menaced by German rearmament, they would take measures to ensure their security and independence.[3] But this practical evidence of the changed status of eastern Germany from that of an occupied territory to one of equality with other east European countries was received without enthusiasm by the latter. Moreover, the fact that Ulbricht had to denounce pacifist tendencies in the Democratic Republic suggested that there, no less than in the Federal Republic, there was internal opposition to rearmament.

While offers of negotiation on the German question continued to be made throughout the spring, the Soviet bloc continued with plans for its own defence organization. On 24 January Molotov saw the ambassador of the German Democratic Republic in connexion with the Paris agreements, and problems connected with the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic were thoroughly discussed. In February Czechoslovakia terminated the state of war with Germany, and on 8 February Molotov intimated that if the Paris treaties came into force the participants of the Moscow conference might find it necessary to conclude a treaty of friendship, collaboration, and mutual aid, and to set up a unified

[1] Above, pp. 40 sqq.

[2] *Documents*, 1954, p. 64; *Europa Archiv*, 1955, p. 7212.

[3] *Neues Deutschland*, 5 February 1955.

military command.[1] In March, when the foreign minister of the German Democratic Republic was again in Warsaw for talks on concerting defence, the occasion was taken to develop relations between Germany and Poland which until then had been of a purely economic nature. Discussions covered the transfer of 170,000 Germans from Poland to the Democratic Republic, the unification of that part of Zgorzelec (Görlitz) on the east of the Nyssa with the rest of the town in Germany, and the provision of harbour facilities in Szezecin (Stettin); although mainly of commercial significance the talks were a prelude to increasing political and military co-operation. In April a Polish delegation to Moscow, led by the prime minister, Cyrankiewicz, emphasized the need for a unified command among the east European powers.[2] The same day Khrushchev, who was in Warsaw with Marshal Koniev, emphasized the importance of the Polish-Soviet treaty which stated that the two countries would 'take all measures within their power to avert any threat of the recurrence of aggression on the part of a militarist Germany'. In view of the menace represented by the Paris agreements, he announced that the Moscow conference had decided to take measures 'for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation, and also to set up a joint military command'.[3] As soon as the London and Paris agreements were ratified, this decision was implemented. Early in May Moscow annulled the Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet treaties of friendship, and a conference on east European security was called in Warsaw. Here, on 14 May, the Eastern Security treaty was signed.[4]

In eastern Europe a number of bilateral agreements were already in existence, but there had hitherto been no comprehensive agreement for the whole area. The Soviet Union had bilateral treaties with all east European governments (except with Albania), which provided a legal basis for assistance from Soviet forces in the event of attack, and there was some co-ordination among the armed forces. But the permanent stationing of troops in Rumania and Hungary was limited by the 1947 peace treaties with those countries to a period extending for ninety days after the signing of an Austrian peace treaty. Thereafter Soviet troops could remain only if they had the consent of the governments concerned or if a new treaty conferring such a right were concluded. The Warsaw conference and the multilateral security treaty provided this. The participating states, the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the German Democratic Republic, formed a league for common assistance and defence. As the text emphasized, the treaty was framed in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, allowing regional arrangements for self-defence, and in the event of a

[1] *Soviet News*, 15 February 1955.
[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 21 April 1955.
[3] *Soviet News*, 27 April 1955.
[4] Text in *Documents*, 1955, pp. 193 sqq.

system of collective security in Europe it would automatically lapse. The treaty provided for the individual or concerted use of force in the event of an armed attack against one or more of the signatories in Europe, and, in article 5, for the establishment of a joint command over the forces made available by agreement among the signatory powers. In an annexe to the treaty it was laid down that the disposition of the joint armed forces in the territories of the signatory states would be decided by agreement among them in accordance with the requirements of their defence. Koniev was named as the first commander-in-chief, with his headquarters in Moscow, but further details of the administration of this eastern N.A.T.O. were not revealed.

Two aspects of the treaty are noteworthy. First, membership was declared to be open to all nations whatever their political sympathies, thus avoiding the charge of exclusiveness which could be raised against N.A.T.O.[1] Secondly, the position of the German Democratic Republic was different from that of the German Federal Republic in Western European Union; for simultaneously with the announcement of the joint command it was stated that the question of the participation of German forces would be examined later.[2] This indicates the delicacy with which Soviet diplomacy in eastern Europe had to proceed. Poland and Czechoslovakia might be sceptical of propaganda emphasizing western encirclement of the communist countries, but they had no illusions about the possibilities of German aggression and were chary of rearming even an allied German state. Nevertheless, the practical effects of the Warsaw pact were not very considerable. Apart from the fact that it provided a legal basis for the continued stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania, it did not substantially alter the balance of forces in Europe. In effect, it was little more than a tactical move in the conflict with the United States, indicative of a hardening of the two fronts in Europe—a clearer drawing of the dividing-line between the communist and the non-communist worlds, such as had already occurred in the Far East. In this sense it may be said of the Warsaw pact, as it might be said of the Paris treaties, that it marked the culmination of a policy which had already ceased to pay dividends.

Apart from measures designed to counteract any revival of German militarism, the diplomatic activity of the Soviet bloc in this period of transition was on a minor scale. Its main object was to improve relations with Jugoslavia,[3] and with non-communist countries. The trade agreements of the period indicate a continuation of the effort to break away

[1] In 1954 the Soviet Union had suggested that it should participate in N.A.T.O., but this suggestion was immediately rejected as 'completely unreal'. Cf. *Documents*, 1954, pp. 43, 45, and *Survey*, 1954, pp. 156–7.

[2] *Documents*, 1955, p. 198.

[3] Cf. below, pp. 54–55.

from the former bipolarization of commerce, and have a certain political interest. Moreover, Soviet measures were supported by similar overtures from other east European countries. In January Hungary signed its first trade agreement with Jugoslavia since 1948, and it was decided to exchange goods to the value of £5 million during the year. Nagy, in December 1954, and Hegedus after the change of government, both emphasized the Hungarian desire to strengthen relations with Jugoslavia and with other countries bordering on Hungary, especially Austria. In keeping with this policy, the National Assembly decided to issue invitations for an exchange of parliamentary delegations with Jugoslavia, Austria, and with Cominform neighbours. Attempts were made to remedy other irritants: a Jugoslav-Rumanian announcement envisaged a renewal of frontier markings by 1 October; while a Bulgarian-Jugoslav trade agreement included Bulgarian repayment of debts for rail transport.

It was, however, in trade agreements that the growing diversity and extent of east–west contacts were seen most clearly; new contracts were made and existing ones extended for a longer period. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic were foremost among east European countries probing new markets.[1] Agreements were made with countries of many groupings from Norway to Japan. Indeed, it would be unwise, simply because some agreements appear to have been generated by political considerations, to read politics into every commercial contract at this stage. The mere fact that, in 1955, the price of Ukrainian coal in Austria was $22·50 per ton, whereas a ton of American coal cost $27·30, was evidently a factor in the situation.[2] On the other hand, exports of machine tools and manufactured goods from eastern Europe were particularly valuable to countries hoping for rapid industrialization. Nevertheless, 80 per cent. of east European trade with the non-communist world still continued to be with western Europe and North America,[3] and in any case the new patterns of communist trade policy only affected a relatively low percentage of the trade of any one country. For this reason, the sensitivity of the western world to the political implications of communist trade policy at this stage is difficult to explain. In actual fact there is little doubt that the regulation and improvement of economic relations between the different members of the communist bloc, both in Europe and in Asia, still overshadowed trade relations with the non-communist world in Soviet calculations.

At the beginning of 1955 approximately 80 per cent. of Soviet foreign trade was conducted with countries adhering to the eastern or communist

[1] *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955* (Geneva, 1956), pp. 180, 182.

[2] *Report on the Soviet Union in 1956* (Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956), p. 196.

[3] K. E. Knorr, *Ruble Diplomacy* (Princeton, 1956), p. 5.

world market;[1] and although in certain east European countries, notably in Poland, eastern Germany, and Rumania, there was a noticeable trend to increase trade, both absolutely and relatively, with the west, at the expense of the eastern world market,[2] this preponderance was necessarily an important fact in shaping relationships within the communist bloc. In particular, the movement towards economic integration, which had begun in 1954,[3] was maintained, though its effectiveness should not be exaggerated.[4] Nevertheless there was increasing awareness of the limitations of a purely national approach to planning in comparatively small countries, such as those of eastern Europe, coupled with better understanding of the special requirements of countries, such as Poland, much of whose industry was geared to export markets.[5] The accepted view was now, as the chairman of the Rumanian Council of Ministers pointed out,[6] that each particular country should develop its 'natural resources in the interest of the whole camp'. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to regard Soviet economic policy in eastern Europe at this time as designed simply to strengthen 'the enforced political and economic consolidation of the area'.[7] This may have been the ultimate object, but the means employed fitted in with the liberalization of relations with the east European countries, which had gradually come into evidence since 1953.

On the political level a similar policy was seen in the release of political prisoners, including Zionists in Rumania, cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary, and the former deputy-premier, Gomulka, in Poland. At the same time there was a purging of objectionable elements in the state security forces.[8] All this was indicative of a policy of 'normalization' and relaxation, in spite of economic strains, mainly in the field of agriculture, which afflicted all the east European countries in various degrees. As the Czech finance minister reported in March, the failure to advance food-production commensurate with industrial development was everywhere acting as a severe brake on the economy;[9] and the necessity for reverting to a higher level of defence expenditure, implying renewed concentration on heavy industry, which was attributed to the threat of the Paris treaties and of German rearmament, aggravated the situation.[10] In addition, particularly

[1] *Report on the Soviet Union in 1956* (Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956), p. 180.

[2] *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955*, p. 180; Czechoslovakia appears to have been an exception to this trend.

[3] *Survey*, 1954, p. 164; cf. *Report on the Soviet Union*, p. 177.

[4] E.g. in eastern Germany the result in the end was 'only very slight modification' of the production plans for 1956; *Economic Survey*, p. 233.

[5] Ibid. p. 235.

[6] *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, 5 November 1954, p. 3.

[7] *Report on the Soviet Union*, p. 187.

[8] *The Times*, 21 January and 1 February 1955. [9] Ibid. 23 March 1955.

[10] Thus Czech expenditure on defence was raised by one-third in the 1955 budget, though it still only represented 12·1 per cent. of the total (ibid.); in Hungary there was a parallel rise of

in Hungary, there was conflict as to the best means of increasing agricultural output; this led on 18 April to the fall of the Nagy ministry, which had left greater latitude for the small independent peasant, and its supersession by the Hegedus ministry, with a policy of collectivization.[1] Elsewhere, however, for example in Bulgaria, where the government adopted a policy of cash incentives for increased crop yields, agricultural planning was modified in an effort to overcome the defects of over-centralization.[2]

Relations between China and the Soviet Union continued to develop on the basis of equality that had been clearly recognized in 1954. During the early months of 1955 various reports suggested that Peking's attitude to the nationalist held off-shore islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, was out of step with Moscow, which would have preferred a less bellicose approach to the problem. Such differences, however, if they existed, were not greater than those between the United States and its allies, and did not represent a divergence of basic policy. On the contrary, statements throughout the spring emphasized the unanimity of the allies. Voroshilov in his new year message pledged support for China against American aggressors, and at the same time warned Europe that the massed military manpower of China stood behind the Soviet Union and its allies if west Germany were rearmed.[3] The messages exchanged by Voroshilov and Lin Hsiao, the new Chinese ambassador to Moscow, when he presented his credentials, emphasized the solidarity between the two countries.[4] During his speech on foreign affairs to the Supreme Soviet the next day, Molotov cited the existence of the world camp of socialism and democracy headed by the Soviet Union and China, as one of the great changes in the post-war world; and in reference to the Far East he said that Soviet policy favoured an easing of international tension but that 'we consider the question of Taiwan to be a domestic affair of China's'.[5] To which Bulganin, speaking at a reception in Moscow to mark the anniversary of the Soviet-Chinese alliance, added that 'China knows that it can look to us not only for sympathy but also for help', and that 'that help will be forthcoming when needed'.[6]

That the Soviet Union favoured a peaceful settlement in the Far East was clear from both its pronouncements and its initiative. That China should reject the competence of the United Nations to intervene until the nationalist delegate had been replaced by a communist, was in line with

1·5 per cent. 'because of the ratification of the Paris treaties and the increased danger of German militarism', but here again it was still only 12·5 per cent. of the whole; *Manchester Guardian*, 20 April 1955.

[1] *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, 19 April 1955; the agitation against Nagy had been gathering since February; cf. *Le Monde*, 11 March 1955.

[2] *The Times*, 18 March 1955; *Le Monde*, 22–23 May 1955.

[3] *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, 3 February 1955.

[4] *Soviet News*, 9 February 1955.

[5] Ibid. 15 February 1955.

[6] *N.Y. Times*, 15 February 1955.

previous Peking policy and was to be expected in view of the status accorded to China at Geneva in 1954—a status which the Soviet Union had sought for years to achieve for its ally. The Soviet proposal that Russia, Britain, and India should convene a conference to which the People's Republic of China, the United States, France, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon should be invited to discuss Formosa, was a way out of this predicament and was believed to have Chinese backing from the start; indeed, at the reception on 14 February Lin Hsiao stated in public that the Soviet initiative was fully supported by China. All in all, it would seem that the new readiness to achieve a settlement is best explained as an indication that China and Russia were prepared to seek international stability in order to concentrate on economic development.

For co-operation in other spheres the year opened propitiously with the transfer to China of Russian shares in the joint companies, as agreed in the treaty of October 1954.[1] In January, too, China was among the Soviet allies which, it was announced, would receive scientific and technical assistance in setting up experimental bases for research into the peaceful uses of atomic energy; and shortly afterwards it was stated that Russia would make available fissionable material in exchange for raw materials. The evacuation of Port Arthur took place, as agreed, by the end of May,[2] and because occupation of Port Arthur had always been associated with the domination of Manchuria, the event had particular significance in Asian eyes. It was, moreover, relevant that the changeover should occur at a time when the Soviet Union was seeking to normalize relations with Japan.[3]

If, during the spring of 1955, Soviet policy appeared in some respects indecisive, it was probably a consequence of the situation confronting the U.S.S.R. In the first place, it was almost inevitable that the changeover from the Malenkov to the Bulganin–Khrushchev régime should impose some check on foreign policy. Although in fact the transition went smoothly, the government's immediate preoccupation was the consolidation of its position at home. In Europe it had been forced to counter the probable political and military consequences of the Paris agreements by the formation of a counter-alliance. In Asia its most powerful ally was still involved in a struggle which might well have led to war on an international scale. Within the people's democracies and within the Soviet Union itself internal economic considerations required far-reaching measures. Faced with the interaction of these considerations, Soviet diplomacy dealt with issues as they occurred. It was not until the situation both on the European and on the Asiatic fronts had crystallized, that the new Soviet government was in a position to evolve an overall policy adapted to the new situation. This

[1] *Survey*, 1954, p. 242.
[2] *Documents*, 1955, pp. 470 sqq.
[3] Cf. below, p. 129.

change took place in May, after the conclusion of the Paris and Warsaw treaties, and marks the beginning of a new phase.

*Jugoslavia*

To one country in Europe the increased tension which resulted from the struggle for W.E.U. in the early months of 1955 was particularly unwelcome. In spite of the settlement of the Trieste dispute and the conclusion of the Balkan alliance in the autumn of 1954,[1] the position of Jugoslavia between the two blocs was still uncomfortable; and although negotiations with Russia had been going on since the previous October,[2] relations were not yet back to normal. Two other factors contributed to make a delicate situation still more precarious; the one was the most disastrous harvest since 1918, which hit Jugoslavia in the winter of 1954–5, and necessitated emergency grain imports from the United States; the other was the activity of the right-wing socialists, Dedijer and Djilas, who used the opportunity of President Tito's absence from the country, on his visit to India, to stage a political demonstration intended (as Jugoslavs believed) to undermine the government.[3] Although the latter failed to secure the expected response and was easily dealt with, it contributed to the current sense of instability, not least on account of the disproportionate importance accorded to it in the foreign press.

In these circumstances it was obviously in Jugoslav interests to continue, and where possible to develop, the policy of the *via media*, adopted after the breach with Russia in 1948. In Marshal Tito's words, he would do what 'was possible to normalize relations with any country that wished it';[4] but this did not imply subservience to either bloc. In particular, Jugoslavia would not change its foreign or internal policy in return for material or financial aid, and would refuse aid given under conditions.[5] Within these

[1] *Survey*, 1954, pp. 167–72. [2] Ibid. p. 162.

[3] On 21 December Dedijer gave interviews to *The Times* and the *N.Y. Times*, complaining of action by the central committee of the party in reopening the case of his defence of Djilas in February 1954. On 24 December Djilas made a formal apeal for a two-party system. On 27 December Mr. Kardelj, acting president during Tito's absence in India, denounced the 'blackmail' of 'two bankrupt politicians' in attempting to reassert their position by the use of the foreign press. The decisive factor was probably the dissociation of General Dapcevic, the chief of staff, from Djilas and Dedijer; for instead of coming to their support (as appears to have been expected), and giving them the backing of the Jugoslav army, he said he detested their behaviour as did 'any other citizen of this country'. Thereafter the incident was speedily concluded. On 30 December criminal investigations opened on a charge of hostile propaganda with foreign support. On 7 February a government statement disclosed that the case had been under consideration for several months but was brought to a head by the Dedijer interviews. On 25 January the trial ended with sentences of imprisonment, Djilas to eighteen months, Dedijer to six months, both sentences to be suspended for three years and two years respectively, and neither would be deprived of liberty unless he repeated the offence in the meantime. The incident is fully recorded in *The Times*, 22, 28, 30, and 31 December 1954, and 8 and 25 January 1955.

[4] Speech at Belgrade, 12 February 1955; text in *Relazioni Internazionali*, 1955, p. 229.

[5] *The Times*, 23 May 1955.

limits, however, the early months of 1955 saw a definite broadening in Jugoslav policy. On the one side it negotiated trade agreements with Hungary—the first since 1948—and with Bulgaria; it made a new agreement with Rumania for frontier delimitation; and it accepted in principle a return to more normal relations with the Soviet Union. Tito, nevertheless, rejected Soviet implications that there had been a realization of past errors in Belgrade, and arranged further talks for the summer on a basis of complete equality; and he emphasized that *rapprochement* with Russia did not imply drawing away from the west.[1] Although critical of N.A.T.O., he accepted aid from Great Britain and the United States, and sent an observer to meetings of the Council of O.E.E.C. Nevertheless, difficulties with the west persisted. There were Jugoslav complaints of Italian breaches of the Trieste agreements,[2] and in spite of pious professions the Balkan pact obstinately refused to come to life. At a meeting of the three Balkan powers held on 3 March it was agreed to establish a parliamentary council; but it was to meet only once a year and to vote by delegation. An official Turkish visit to Jugoslavia at the beginning of May took place in an atmosphere of uninspired amity; but the 'development of relations' referred to in the communiqué produced nothing more tangible than a five-year trade agreement.[3] In reality, Turkey's membership of N.A.T.O. was not easily compatible with Jugoslav hostility to all power-groupings; while, on the other hand, the Cyprus issue was already looming up as a bone of contention between the other two partners in the Balkan alliance, Turkey and Greece.

The various agreements concluded in the early months of 1955, while in some degree smoothing Jugoslavia's way, were not sufficient, therefore, to bring about a substantial improvement in its international position, and it was in another direction that the real opportunity lay. This was seen in Tito's journey to Asia, between 17 December 1954 and 11 February 1955, as a result of which his policy acquired the essential *points d'appui* which it had hitherto lacked. His contacts in India with Nehru, in Burma with U Nu, his speech at the Indian National Congress on 21 January, and his meeting in Egypt with Nasser, all brought him into immediate touch with leaders and peoples who shared his critical attitude towards both the communist and the anti-communist powers. As he stated on his return in a speech at Zagreb,[4] the future lay with the uncommitted countries, Jugoslavia's 'true allies and our greatest friends'; and the communiqué issued after his talks in Delhi defined the direction of Jugoslavia's foreign policy as neither 'neutrality' nor 'neutralism', 'and therefore passivity... but... a positive, active and constructive policy seeking to lead to collective peace'.[5]

[1] *The Times*, 8 March 1955; ibid. 16 May 1955.
[2] Ibid. 19 March 1955.
[3] Text in *Le Journal d'Orient*, 9 May 1955.
[4] *Le Monde*, 13 February 1955.
[5] Text of communiqué in *The Hindu*, 24 December 1954.

Thus, in effect, he endorsed the principles of coexistence enunciated by Nehru and Mao; and although he repeatedly opposed the creation of a third bloc, the friendships he had formed in Asia indicated a new alignment, which enabled Jugoslavia to escape from the threat of isolation and strengthened its international position—a result already visible in the new negotiations with Russia in May 1955.[1] But, in addition to its favourable results for Jugoslavia itself, the association between Tito and the Asian and African leaders had wider implications: it foreshadowed also new lines of development in international relations which crystallized out, a few weeks later, at the Bandung conference.

[1] Below, pp. 133–5.

## CHAPTER V

# THE UNCOMMITTED PEOPLES AND THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

WHILE the western powers were seeking to strengthen their defences against what they conceived to be the overriding communist danger, in the eastern hemisphere a contrary movement was under way, the consequences of which were to be of no little moment. This was the rising crescendo of Asian political consciousness, the growing sense of solidarity and of common interests felt by the Asian peoples, and by the ex-colonial peoples of Africa, which found expression at the Bandung conference in April 1955. It was a movement primarily of peoples who espoused neither the communist nor the anti-communist cause, and whose aspiration it was to stand aside from the ideological division which had haunted the world since 1947. In their eyes the crystallization of policy around this division was evidence of a wrong turning in international affairs, for which the white peoples of Europe and North America were responsible. The Asians looked upon world affairs from a different point of view; and in their estimation, as the menace of atomic warfare became increasingly real, the time had come for them to make their views and their influence felt.

The immediate origins of this movement reached back to 1954, when, under the impact of the war in Indo-China, and the threat it carried with it of the use of atomic weapons in Asia, the prime ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan met together at Colombo.[1] But this five-power conference was very different in scope from the large-scale meeting of Afro-Asian peoples planned for the spring of 1955. Furthermore, in the intervening months the setting had changed as a result of the signing of the Manila treaty and the establishment of S.E.A.T.O.,[2] which were finally approved by the United States' Senate on 1 February 1955. Although in historical fact it was not the case, it inevitably looked as though the proposed Afro-Asian conference was designed as a countermove to S.E.A.T.O. and to offset the Bangkok conference of S.E.A.T.O. powers, which met on 23–25 February. Two facts served to underline this view. The first was that S.E.A.T.O. was largely a contrivance of non-Asian powers, upon whose military forces it relied, whereas the proposed Bandung meeting was specifically limited to the peoples in the areas concerned. Secondly, S.E.A.T.O. was directed against communist China—a fact underlined by Mr. Dulles and the United States' administration—whereas

[1] Cf. *Survey*, 1954, p. 286. There had previously been an unofficial Asian relations conference at New Delhi in March 1947, motivated by similar principles; cf. *Survey*, 1947–8, p. 355.

[2] *Survey*, 1954, pp. 79 sqq.

the Afro-Asian conference took its stand upon the five principles of co-existence, adumbrated by China and India in April 1954.[1]

It was against this background, at a time when a major war between the United States and China over Formosa seemed possible, that the preparations for the Bandung meeting went ahead. The decision to hold the conference, taken at a preliminary meeting at Bogor in Indonesia at the end of December 1954, had an immediate impact. In Asia, a competent observer reported, the whole continent was stirred.[2] In the west the reaction was inevitably cooler, if not directly hostile, since it was felt that such a meeting, irrespective of its expressed purpose, could not but weaken the spirit of resistance to communism in Asia, which the Manila pact had attempted, not very successfully, to galvanize. The United States feared that it might turn into an anti-American or anti-western demonstration, and that it might all too easily be dominated by a communist minority. Great Britain, which claimed to be an Asian and African power, resented its exclusion—as did Australia—and was concerned at the inclusion of territories, such as Gold Coast, which tended to be regarded as 'British preserves'. These fears and reservations were not lessened by the attitude of the Indian National Congress, at its meeting on 22 January, when S.E.A.T.O. was denounced as extending the area of the cold war, and when nuclear weapons were condemned;[3] nor were they alleviated by an Indonesian description of the proposed meeting as 'a severe blow to the American war-mongering policy'.[4] When it was announced that communist China would be invited to attend, it was thought that the western powers might put pressure on their Asian allies to decline. Japan announced pointedly that it would have to 'obtain the understanding of the United States' before accepting; and it appeared that Siam, the Philippines, and Turkey were similarly placed. But adverse reactions on the part of the western anti-communist governments, particularly Great Britain and the United States, had been discounted in advance, and preparations went on. No Asian or African nation, it was calculated, would willingly absent itself from 'a conference certain to be attended by most of its neighbours'. This reliance upon Asian feelings of solidarity, which made it difficult for anti-communist Asians to shun the conference, proved well-founded. Before the end of January it was confidently predicted that attendance would be 100 per cent. In fact, in the end all the 25 countries invited by the five sponsoring powers, except the Central African Federation, agreed to take part.

This result was a considerable success for the sponsoring powers, particularly for India, which had taken the moral lead; it both enhanced their influence in world affairs and ensured a platform for popularizing their

[1] *Survey*, 1954, p. 244.
[2] *N.Y. Times*, 9 January 1955.
[3] *Hindu*, 1, 2, and 23 January 1955.
[4] *Dawn*, 4 January 1955.

stand in international relations. Furthermore, if certain elements—notably Egypt, which at this very moment was in the throes of the conflict over the Baghdad pact—emphasized the disquieting aspects of the conference from the point of view of the western powers, Mr. Nehru showed considerable statesmanship in going more than half-way to meet western apprehensions. The conference, he insisted,[1] was not intended to be anti-western or anti-Australian in spirit, and there was no intention of creating a 'so-called third bloc'. These assurances smoothed the way for attendance by the anti-communist nations allied with the United States and Great Britain, and by the end of March western suspicions had been largely overcome; indeed, in the end the western powers appear to have encouraged Turkey to attend as a spokesman for their views.[2]

Nevertheless, when the conference opened at Bandung on 18 April,[3] there was considerable risk of its foundering through disunity and divided aims, as had been freely predicted in the west. The notion that the conference might 'become a tug-of-war between Chou En-lai and Nehru for leadership in Asia',[4] was certainly exaggerated; but there were other dangers. The first was that energies might be dissipated and unity disrupted by different countries pressing their own particular interests; thus Egypt, for example, introduced the Palestine issue, and Yemen raised the question of Aden. More serious, in so far as they immediately opened up the prospect of bringing the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir into the foreground, were the successful efforts of the Pakistani delegate, Mohammed Ali, to secure recognition for the 'right of self-defence exercised singly or collectively'.[5] But most serious of all, as likely to produce a deadlock, was the attempt to use the conference as a vehicle for anti-communist propaganda.[6] Already before the conference assembled General Romulo, the head of the Filipino delegation, had given notice of this intention, and when proceedings began he had the support of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, and other countries known to be associated through alliances or financial aid with the western powers. Two main points were here at issue. The first was the desire of the pro-western delegations to offset the effect of any condemnation of 'colonialism' by extending the term to cover the relations between the Soviet Union and the east Euro-

[1] *Hindu*, 25 March 1955. [2] *N.Y. Times*, 9 March 1955.

[3] For the following, cf. G. M. Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference* (New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1956); *Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia*, 18–24 April 1955: *Speeches and Communiqués* (Jakarta: Ministry of Information, 1955); *Selected Documents of the Bandung Conference* (New York: Inst. of Pacific Relations, 1955). These publications provide the main texts.

[4] *Christian Science Monitor*, 31 March 1955.

[5] Pakistan also pressed for and secured recognition of the obligation to settle all international disputes by peaceful means, 'namely negotiation or arbitration'. The object here was to make it difficult for India to refuse arbitration in the Kashmir dispute. Cf. Kahin, op. cit. p. 12.

[6] Or, in the words of *The Times* (25 April 1955), 'the quarrelling . . . stimulated by those primed with the anti-communist case'.

pean democracies—an argument introduced by Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon, which quickly precipitated serious dissension. The second was the fear, expressed particularly by the spokesmen of Cambodia and Siam, lest China might ignore in practice the principles of non-interference and peaceful coexistence.

That the conference did not fall down over these two stumbling-blocks was due, above all else, to deft handling by Nehru and Chou En-lai. The latter had obvious reasons for being conciliatory, hoping thus to win general support in Asia and Africa for recognition and for the entry of China into the United Nations Organization; but his attitude seems to have impressed most delegates as going beyond mere tactical compromise; even such strong supporters of American policy as Mohammed Ali, Prince Wan of Siam, and General Romulo were persuaded that China sincerely wanted peace.[1] By negotiating a treaty with Indonesia during the conference, which provided for the ending of dual nationality, he gave practical evidence of his intentions.[2] At private meetings he offered similar agreements to Siam and the Philippines, and to Prince Norodom of Cambodia he gave personal assurances of a satisfactory character. Furthermore, it was Chou who stepped in, at the critical moment, to bridge the widening gap between India and the western-aligned states.[3] Perceiving that the term 'peaceful coexistence' was objectionable to certain delegations because it had a communist smack, he suggested its withdrawal, and then put forward in place of the well-known 'Five Principles of Co-existence' seven points 'on which we all agree', coupled with an explicit assurance 'that we will carry them out'.[4] Meanwhile, Nehru had strained every effort to settle the dispute over colonialism. First, he persuaded Sir John Kotelawala to drop his proposed resolution attacking 'Soviet colonialism' in eastern Europe; as he pointed out, the states of eastern Europe were recognized as sovereign and independent by the United Nations, and it would be absurd for the conference to challenge the United Nations' basis of recognition. Then he secured the handing over of the question to a sub-committee, which in the end produced an acceptable formula condemning colonialism 'in all its manifestations'[5]—a vague phrase subsequently subject to divergent interpretation. On this basis, on 24 April, the final communiqué was drawn up and issued to the world.[6]

[1] Kahin, op. cit. pp. 15, 35; *Hindu*, 27 April 1955. Kotelawala is reported as saying 'many of us met premier Chou En-lai of China for the first time and I must say that, although we did not share his political views, he revealed himself to be a reasonable man who was prepared to respect the views of others'.

[2] This treaty had been under negotiation for some time. It was signed at the conference but before it was ratified further negotiations took place.

[3] Kahin, op. cit. p. 25.

[4] Speech of 23 April; Kahin, op. cit. pp. 57, 59.

[5] Final communiqué, para. D. 1 (*a*); Kahin, op. cit. p. 81; cf. ibid. pp. 19, 21, 31.

[6] Full text in *Documents*, 1955, pp. 429 sqq.

The unmistakable lack of precision in the key formulas of the final communiqué produced a widespread impression that the conference had only held together by compromise on the major issues.[1] It is true that the prediction of a western diplomat that the conference would 'be a Babylonic cacophony, ending up in a rising crescendo of confusion and indecision', was not fulfilled; but the view was common in the west that its outcome was an 'agreement to disagree' and that the results were 'equivocal'. Divergent views (it was said) had been reconciled, but only in a limited way; unanimity was exacted 'only with great patience', and concealed 'deep fissures'; 'a long series of platonic resolutions' were designed 'through their very imprecision to conciliate irreconcilables and create an illusion of a unanimity of voices'.[2] Some observers even went so far as to describe the conference as a success for the American cause, insisting that it had shown up irreconcilabilities and disrupted the Colombo front of 1954.[3] It is fair, however, to say that these attempts to minimize the outcome of the conference were based upon a superficial analysis. In reality, it had substantial results, both specific and general; and a judgement derived simply from the final communiqué and the various compromises it embodied hardly does justice to its real achievements.

First among the specific results immediately affecting the international situation was the clarification of the position of China. On arrival in Bandung Chou En-lai had encountered very considerable suspicion; after only one week he convinced even those who came to criticize, of China's good intentions. Probably the most striking single action at the conference, from the point of view of the immediate world situation, was the offer made by Chou on 23 April to negotiate directly with the United States over Formosa. Although this offer was subsequently clarified by a statement that it was not meant to prejudice China's rights in the island, the abrupt negative reaction of the United States made a bad impression, even upon so independent a statesman as Sir John Kotelawala. Even so, the offer itself, together with Chou's conciliatory attitude towards Siam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia, contributed towards reducing tension in the western Pacific; it was the clearest indication to date that Chou had moved away from the bellicose attitude which, many thought, had been the mark of Chinese policy throughout the previous winter. Thus the first positive result of the conference was to facilitate the discussion of a cease-fire in the Far East; and since one of the purposes of the conference was to create an atmosphere in which *détente* was possible, Chou En-lai's gesture was a definite success for the powers which had convened the meet-

[1] *The Times*, 25 April 1955.

[2] *N.Y. Times*, 25 April 1955; *The Times*, 26 April 1955; *Combat*, 25 April 1955; *Figaro*, 29 April 1955.

[3] Cf. *Le Monde* and *News Chronicle*, 25 April 1955; this view found expression, e.g., in the *N.Y. Times*, 24 April 1955.

ing. Even if it were true (as western critics argued) that Chou's offer was in part inspired by propagandist aims, even if it merely registered China's inability for the present to press on with the liberation of Formosa, the other Asian peoples were prepared, until evidence to the contrary was forthcoming, to take it at face value and to modify their attitude to China accordingly. Not the least significant incident of the conference was Mohammed Ali's assurance to Chou that Pakistan, although a party to S.E.A.T.O., would not participate in any global war or aggression launched by America. This again was a gesture which facilitated *détente* in the western Pacific; and in Indo-China the moves towards a neutralization of Laos and Cambodia worked in the same direction. It is true that, by this stage, other causes were operating in favour of a peaceful *détente* in the Far East and South-East Asia; but the contribution of the Bandung conference to the change in international atmosphere should not be under-estimated.

The second noteworthy result of the conference was the regrouping of political forces which it seemed to foreshadow. Although it was emphasized that the purpose of the meeting was not to establish a new power bloc, and although in fact no such bloc was created, it was impossible to overlook the fact that an opportunity had arisen for certain powers, not associated in the past, to draw together. In the first place, there was a visible *rapprochement* between China and the Arab states, many of which still formally recognized the Chiang Kai-shek régime. More important in the overall picture was the new understanding between China, India, and Egypt. This scarcely amounted, as some observers declared,[1] to the formation of a new 'axis'; but it was certainly a factor in the international situation, though it remained to see whether it would prove more than transient. On the one side, the shift was favourable to communist China, which emerged, thanks to Chou's intelligent use of his opportunities, with an enhanced diplomatic position. On the other side, it weakened the diplomatic position of the west which, by the time the conference ended, was left (as one commentator cruelly remarked) with one sure ally: the Lebanon.[2] In particular, Colonel Nasser, who had already had talks with Nehru in February which led to the signing of an Egypto-Indian treaty of friendship on the eve of the Bandung conference,[3] emerged with considerably enhanced prestige and with good reasons for expecting Asian support in his stand against the Baghdad pact. Furthermore, the welcome extended to Archbishop Makarios at Bandung strengthened the opposition of Cypriots and Greeks to British rule in Cyprus; while the fact that it was Pakistan, which was generally classed as pro-western, that introduced a strong resolution on behalf of Morocco and Tunisia and Algeria and against France, could not fail to discomfort the western powers. Although

[1] *Le Populaire*, 26 April 1955.
[2] *Combat*, 25 April 1955.
[3] For the text of the treaty of 6 April, cf. *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 7 April 1955.

the conference claimed to favour neither side, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Moscow had greater reason than Washington to be satisfied with its outcome.

Important as these consequences were, it is possible that the real significance of the Bandung conference lay in a different direction. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the meeting was the fact that it took place at all. It was true, as General Romulo emphasized at the conclusion of the conference, that its real test lay ahead; in other words, the future alone would 'determine whether the mood created at Bandung was momentary and misleading or whether it was strong and clean and vibrant'.[1] The fact remained that Bandung reflected a new mood among the Asian and African peoples, which might have considerable political significance. As President Soekarno pointed out in his opening speech:[2]

> It is a new departure in the history of the world that leaders of Asian and African peoples can meet together in their own countries to discuss and deliberate upon matters of common concern. . . . What can we do? The peoples of Asia and Africa wield little physical power. Even their economic strength is dispersed and slight. We cannot indulge in power politics. Diplomacy for us is not a matter of the big stick. Our statesmen, by and large, are not backed up with serried ranks of jet bombers. What can we do? . . . We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs. We can mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. We, the peoples of Asia and Africa, 1,400,000,000 strong, far more than half the human population of the world, can mobilize what I have called the moral violence of nations in favour of peace. We can demonstrate to the minority of the world, which lives on the other continents, that we, the majority, are for peace, not for war, and that whatever strength we have will always be thrown on the side of peace.

It may fairly be said that the larger significance of the Bandung conference is summed up in these words. They betrayed, perhaps, a certain political innocence; for the attitude described by Soekarno was only possible, on a mundane calculation, because and so long as the west had the strength to protect the 'uncommitted' peoples from communist manœuvres. Nevertheless, as an emotional attitude, which could be ventilated through the United Nations, where 'uncommitted' opinion had a useful outlet into the wider world, such ideas could not be brushed aside. They could not easily be evaluated in the conventional terms of politics; but for educated Asian opinion they represented a reality. Nor could they be adequately described in terms of narrow self-interest. The tendency in the west to treat anti-colonialism as the one positive manifestation of the new spirit in Asia and Africa was a narrower interpretation than Asian leaders were prepared to admit. The conference, President Soekarno insisted, was concerned not merely with specific Afro-Asian issues, but with 'the safety of

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 25 April 1955.

[2] Text in Kahin, op. cit. pp. 39–51.

the world at large', the relations of the communist and anti-communist blocs, and the threat of nuclear warfare.

> We are faced [he said] with a situation where the well-being of mankind is not always the primary consideration. . . . We are living in a world of fear. The life of man today is corroded and made bitter by fear. Fear of the future, fear of the hydrogen bomb, fear of ideologies. Perhaps this fear is a greater danger than the danger itself, because it is fear which drives men to act foolishly, to act thoughtlessly, to act dangerously.

Hence the objective at Bandung was, in the words of the Burmese premier, U Nu, to enlarge the areas of peace first in the orient and then in the rest of the world.[1] In calling for 'the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons of war', the nations of Asia and Africa believed that they were fulfilling their 'duty towards humanity and civilization', since only prohibition could 'save mankind and civilization from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction'.[2]

In so far as non-Asian opinion picked upon specific resolutions—such as criticism of French policy in North Africa, of British policy in Aden, or of Dutch policy in West New Guinea—in evaluating the results of Bandung, it tended to obscure what Asians regarded as the main point of the conference. In their view its lasting significance lay in the challenge it threw down to the great powers—the Soviet Union as well as the United States of America—to seek new ways out of the impasse in international relations. The 'great countries in America and Europe, whatever their political persuasions may be', had, as Mr. Nehru insisted, 'got into the habit of thinking that their quarrels are the world's quarrels', and therefore that 'the world must submit to them this way or that way'.[3] The result was that it had 'almost become impossible to consider any matter logically, reasonably or by itself'; on the contrary, everything had 'to be considered from the communist or anti-communist point of view'.[4] The significance of Bandung in Asian eyes was that it served notice that this approach to world affairs was no longer acceptable. It was not merely that the participants were determined to make it clear 'that the affairs of Asia are the concern of the Asian peoples themselves'; they also claimed a right to participate on an equal footing in world affairs, in the conviction that the Afro-Asian peoples had a fresh approach to bring to bear on international problems. 'They were not', they claimed, 'seeking advantage for their own countries', and they had, they alleged, 'no axe of power politics to grind', but they recognized, in the words of President Soekarno, that 'the affairs of all the world are our affairs, and our future depends on the solution found to all international problems, however far or distant they may seem'.[5]

[1] *Hindu*, 7 April 1955. [2] Final communiqué; Kahin, op. cit. p. 83.
[3] Ibid. p. 74. [4] *Hindu*, 1 April 1955. [5] Kahin, op. cit. pp. 46–47.

If measured up against the designs of Nasser in the Middle East, or the contest of India and Pakistan over Kashmir, these high-sounding phrases may sound rather hollow. Like other states, the Asian and African countries had aims which can most simply be described in terms of power politics. Furthermore, it was by no means certain that the apparent unanimity of view on world affairs registered at Bandung was more than a flash in the pan, or that it would withstand the pressures of day-by-day political reality. Nevertheless it was evidence of a point of view distinct from that either of Washington or of Moscow; and to that degree it was a new factor in the situation. If the great powers ignored it, 'even case-hardened United States observers' were aware, they were 'wholly certain to alienate all Asian opinion'.[1] Optimistically, and perhaps irrationally, opinion in Asia saw Bandung as the start of a new chapter, creating opportunities for a new political initiative. In fact, this was an exaggerated estimate. But non-communist Asia had at least 'asserted its will to be heard more attentively in the halls of world-diplomacy'.[2] Bandung, it believed, had given proof of the 'new dynamism of Asia',[3] and it demanded the same dynamism of statesmen in America and Russia and western Europe. In this sense, as a new impetus from a new quarter, it was one of the factors leading to a new phase in international relations.

[1] *News Chronicle*, 25 April 1955.
[2] Kahin, op. cit. p. 38.
[3] The phrase is Nehru's; ibid. p. 74, and cf. *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 April 1955.

# PART II

## MAY–NOVEMBER 1955

## CHAPTER VI

# INTRODUCTION

SOMEWHERE around May 1955 it was possible to sense a perceptible difference in the atmosphere of international affairs. To this a number of factors of varying importance with different implications contributed; but the result of their impact was a distinct change of direction. Above all else, the note of peaceful coexistence, which had been heard on and off from the time of Stalin's death in 1953, now became a dominant theme. The seed so recently sown at Bandung began to bear fruit—proof that it had fallen on fertile ground. More than that, the world which for seven years or more had been tied in knots by conflicting ideologies, perceiving in what a dangerous web it had been caught, turned seriously to practical measures for disentangling itself. Willingly or unwillingly, statesmen and politicians who had tuned their voices to the harsh dissonance of cold war, found themselves speaking the mellifluous language of *détente;* for some of them it was difficult to do so convincingly.

One factor contributing to the new atmosphere, which was not easy to evaluate either at the time or in retrospect, was the change of governments which had taken place in the Soviet Union and in England. In the Soviet Union the new Bulganin–Khrushchev government, which came to power on 8 February 1955, soon demonstrated its willingness to strike out on new lines. The first evidence of this was its abrupt break with the past over Austria.[1] This, evidently, was not an isolated incident, the mere liquidation of a minor commitment, but a programmatic move. It was intended, as Khrushchev himself emphasized,[2] to demonstrate the falsity of the old western allegation that the Soviet Union would never surrender any position it had once occupied, and that it was intent on overrunning the whole of Europe. From this basis it was easier to move on to wider issues, such as disarmament and east–west trade, which now became increasingly prominent in the Soviet programme; and though the ulterior motives of Soviet policy remained open to dispute—in particular, whether Russia was working towards the same objects by different tactics, or whether there had been a real change of ground—there is no doubt that the vigour and freshness and apparent conciliatoriness of the new Soviet régime was a positive factor, which gave western statesmen much to think about, and impressed itself on opinion all over the world, including that in countries of the western bloc.

In Great Britain Sir Anthony Eden succeeded as prime minister on

[1] Cf. below, pp. 124 sqq.

[2] *Soviet News*, 20 May 1955.

6 April, after the resignation of Sir Winston Churchill, and the reconstituted government, including Macmillan as foreign secretary and Selwyn Lloyd as minister of defence, which he announced on 7 April, was confirmed by the results of the general election held on 26 May. The effects of the change of government are not easily defined; but the impression that it was more conservative in outlook than its predecessor was probably correct. Although the new premier had the reputation, as an old 'League of Nations man', of liberalism in foreign affairs, it was generally believed that his personal influence in policy-making was more circumscribed than that of Sir Winston Churchill, and that power now rested in a 'triumvirate',[1] more closely linked with traditional conservatism than Sir Winston had ever been. In the field of international relations the consequences were twofold. First, without any immediate change in the close connexion with the United States, there was an increasing tendency to emphasize the maintenance of British interests,[2] and the 'Suez Group', which had chafed at the decision to withdraw from the Canal Zone in the previous year,[3] increased its influence. Closely connected with this was the decision, secondly, to draw closer to France, relations with which country had been strained in the latter months of the Churchill administration. This was attributed in part to the new foreign secretary's Francophile sentiments; but in reality, the realignment went deeper and was more fundamental. On the one hand, it reflected a reversion to the type of conservative policy followed, in an earlier generation, by Sir Austen Chamberlain; on the other hand, it was the expression of a new-found community of interests between France and England in defending positions which were under attack, particularly in the Mediterranean region. It was no accident that the speech of Sir Gladwyn Jebb, which proclaimed this new policy, came less than a fortnight after the formation of the Eden government,[4] and that the first important visitor to England was the French foreign minister, Pinay, who arrived in London on 21 April for consultations with Macmillan at a time when events in Indo-China had given rise to considerable tension between France and the United States.[5] As a concomitant to its closer relations with France, it was also believed that

[1] *Le Monde*, 9 April 1955.

[2] A French commentator pointed out that when France was attacked in the House of Commons for weakening N.A.T.O. by sending two divisions to North Africa, Macmillan had replied not merely by defending France, but by emphasizing that Great Britain also reserved the right to withdraw troops from Europe, in the event of a crisis in its overseas territories (*Le Monde*, 10–11 April 1955).

[3] Cf. *Survey*, 1954, p. 195.

[4] Cf. above, pp. 33, 35.

[5] For the Pinay visit, cf. *The Times* and *Combat*, 21 April 1955. The *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 April 1955, flatly suggested that Pinay was seeking 'British help for France's interests as a return for France's "good behaviour" in ratifying the London agreements'. For Franco-American differences, cf. *N.Y. Times*, 30 April 1955, and *Le Monde*, 2 May 1955.

the new administration would adopt a more overtly 'European' attitude; and although this did not imply drawing away from the United States, it might be taken, in conjunction with the new emphasis on specific British interests, as a sign of greater independence in the international field, particularly as personal relations between Eden and Dulles were known to be disharmonious. None of these things amounted to a change in the broad lines of policy; but they did produce a modification of emphasis, which was to exert a subtle influence over British policy for the duration of the Eden ministry, and which—long before it came into the open during the Suez crisis of 1956—affected the western alliance. Already by June 1955, when Adenauer visited the United States, there were signs that the Anglo-French *rapprochement* was being matched by a closer relationship between the United States and Germany;[1] and though there was no suggestion of a cleavage between the two groups, the growing feeling that Great Britain and France had interests of their own—to which, for example, they would, in case of necessity, subordinate their obligations to N.A.T.O.—did nothing to lessen the internal tensions to which the western alliance was prone.

These governmental changes, although significant in a limited way, nevertheless only touched the surface of events; the real changes went deeper, and sprang from the international situation itself. In the first place there was a distinct shift in balance between the different theatres in which policy was enacted. By May the war scare in the Far East had largely died down. Early in March, at a meeting of the Balkan powers, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece, and Jugoslavia expressed the conviction that the international situation no longer presented an immediate danger of conflict, and the same point was made by Nehru at the end of May: there was, he said, a great deal less tension in the world, and more hope and understanding. The result was that the Far East, which had tended to usurp the most prominent place in world affairs, lost much of its immediate importance, and Europe, with its unsolved problems centring around Germany and German unification, again came to the fore. But the context was no longer the same. By now the contending forces had taken up fixed positions all along the line dividing the communist and non-communist worlds—a process which had begun with the partition of Korea, continued with the partition of Indo-China, and reached its conclusion with the promulgation of the Paris and Warsaw treaties. Only in the Middle East was the situation relatively fluid, and for this reason the Middle East, which had played little part in the east–west struggle during the previous eight years, assumed a new importance from the late summer of 1955 onwards. Otherwise, the policies hitherto pursued had reached the end of the road; there was scarcely room for manœuvre and

[1] Cf. below, p. 104.

no real prospect of advance by either side, and unless a position of stalemate were to be accepted, the time had come for new methods and new directions.

In fact, it was impossible for either side, but particularly for the west, to accept a stalemate, because as part of the propaganda for the completion of the Paris treaties, opinion had been led to expect a major advance towards real peace between the communist and non-communist blocs. It had been the western thesis, hammered home unrelentingly by Dulles and Adenauer, that the formation of W.E.U.—and that alone—would create the 'position of strength', which was a precondition for successful negotiations with the Soviet Union. Once the Paris treaties entered into force, therefore, expectation rose, and could not be ignored. Nothing less than 'a campaign for an all-round peace settlement in Europe and Asia' was demanded of the western governments; and, as an American commentator added, 'such a peace offensive' was 'also necessary for the sake of the decent opinion of mankind'.[1] The point was well put by Mendès-France when he insisted that it was 'only at the price of an incessant initiative in favour of international understanding' that the western powers would 'succeed in preserving the indispensable support of public opinion'. This fact applied to the whole of the west, and was, of course, well known to the Soviet government, which could rely upon it as a factor in the situation; but it applied with particular force to France and Germany. In France it might well have been impossible to secure ratification of the Paris agreements, if it had not been implied, both by Mendès-France and by Faure, that they were linked, as two steps in a single process, with renewed efforts for international *détente*; and the French government was therefore under strong moral pressure to press on with negotiations. In Germany the position was somewhat different. Here Adenauer and the Christian Democrats had insisted that the Paris agreements were an essential preliminary to German reunification, and German opinion had finally accepted their thesis. But the result was that, once the agreements were ratified, the German people became increasingly impatient for reunification, which had been held out to them as the immediate consequence of ratification; and, in face of the criticism of his political opponents, Adenauer was unable to ignore the popular demand. Since the countries of the eastern bloc had their own reasons for wishing to reduce international tension—among which the desirability of avoiding military conflict in order to pursue their programme of economic development undisturbed by excursions and alarms, was probably foremost—it is not surprising that the turn of events brought a sudden shift back to the central problems dividing the communist and anti-communist worlds. The serious question, rather, was how far the leaders on the two sides were psychologically prepared

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 23 March 1955, from which is taken also the following quotation.

to adapt themselves to the new situation; for on this depended whether any advance could be made.

The new and widespread impatience with stale arguments and stone-wall tactics was due to the fact that, from about March, the debate about thermonuclear weapons had caught the headlines and suddenly become a live issue. A series of new facts served to bring an issue of which thinking people had long been aware, into the open. One was the decision of the United States, on 2 February, to send atomic artillery to N.A.T.O., which brought home to the peoples of Europe the unpleasant fact that they were in the firing-line. Secondly, and far more serious in its implications of a thermonuclear armaments race, was the announcement on 18 February that the conservative government in Great Britain had decided to build up its stock of nuclear weapons of all types, accompanied by the statement that it would 'not flinch from the necessity to use these weapons'.[1] The third was the revelation, only made public in February 1955, that the effects of the United States explosions of the previous year had exceeded all expectations and taken the scientists by surprise; in particular, that the radio-active fall-out was persistent within an area of 7,000 square miles.[2] These facts, coupled with the report issued by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, focused attention on the genetic as well as the military consequences of nuclear warfare, and made 'strontium' a household word; their effect was heightened by the reiterated admission, in May and again in June, that the United States had no effective civil defence available.[3] Finally, there was the realization, despite claims by each side to be ahead of the other in the development of thermonuclear weapons, that neither America nor Russia had a sufficient lead to act as an absolute deterrent—a realization borne home by President Eisenhower's admission that the American superiority, upon which the west had so long based its calculations, was 'problematical', and that in any case 'there comes a time when a lead is not significant', for once a country had 'enough of a particular type of weapon', it was not 'particularly important to have a lot more'.[4]

This accumulation of new fact in the spring of 1955 unleashed a great debate, backed by the sober warnings of atomic scientists, strangely but strikingly reinforced by the voice of General MacArthur. In Germany the famous physicists, Max Born and Otto Hahn, led the chorus; and opinion was alarmed rather than appeased when it became known that Adenauer had exerted pressure to prevent Professor Heisenberg adding his distinguished testimony to theirs.[5] Even more effective, however, was the joint statement issued on 9 July by nine scientists of the highest inter-

[1] *Documents*, 1955, p. 100.
[2] *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 March and 13 June 1955.
[3] *N.Y. Times*, 20 May and 21 June 1955.
[4] Ibid. 3 March 1955.
[5] *The Times*, 16 February 1955.

national eminence. The fact that it bore Einstein's signature, more than two months after his death, struck popular imagination with something of the effect of a solemn warning from another world to humanity to come to its senses before it 'put an end to the human race'.

> There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal, as human beings, to human beings: remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise: if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.[1]

There is no reason to doubt that these appeals had an appreciable effect on the climate of international affairs. People noted that (in the words of the scientists' appeal) 'the men who know most are the most gloomy', and that their views did not 'depend in any degree upon their politics and prejudices'. President Eisenhower's candid admission that all claims to superiority were problematical meant that to ordinary ways of thinking it had become 'an academic question' which side was ahead in the arms race; and the conflicting claims of both to be able to inflict destruction on the other led to the cynical but increasingly popular conclusion 'that all the rulers of the world are mad'. In the words of Aneurin Bevan, 'the ordinary man and woman'—sensing that statesmen were 'displaying a posture of little minds before big events'—was 'beginning spiritually to contract out of the quarrel'.[2] This sense of frustration was already becoming a tangible factor when, on 1 March, Sir Winston Churchill made a speech which had world-wide repercussions. Speaking of 'a situation laden down with doom', and what would lie ahead 'if God wearied of mankind', he drew a sombre picture of 'mutual destruction', and left no doubt whatever that 'there was no defence against the hydrogen bomb'.[3] The effects of his speech were wide-reaching, and from this moment the number of critical voices never ceased to increase. On 7 March Tito called for the destruction of nuclear weapons; on 14 March Attlee demanded a halt to experimental explosions; on 22 March the House of Commons debated the genetic effects of the hydrogen bomb.[4] Even right-wing opinion interpreted Churchill's speech as an urgent call for new diplomatic measures;[5] and *The Times* spoke openly of a 'moral crisis'. The hydrogen bomb, it said, was not only 'the great deterrent to war', it was also becoming 'the great deterrent to peace'. 'Everything' was 'in a state of inanition, lest any action should be misconstrued'; but now the time had come to be 'thorough, forthright and imaginatively hazardous in the fight for peace'.[6] This was not far from the argument of the opposition in the British parliament that 'the time to begin negotiations was now';

[1] Texts in *Observer* and *N.Y. Times*, 10 July 1955.
[2] *The Times*, 3 March 1955.
[3] Ibid. 2 March 1955.
[4] Ibid. 8, 15, and 23 March 1955.
[5] *Daily Express*, 2 March 1955.
[6] *The Times*, 14 March 1955.

for, as Mr. Strachey put it, the west could not say that they had met with a stony refusal by the Russians to negotiate.

> Whatever their motive may be, the Russians make offer after offer to negotiate, and, so far, what has the West done with those offers? It has written them off . . . on the grounds that they are all propaganda. . . . If we do not take them up, test and try them, we shall find that they are terribly good propaganda. We shall find that the man in the paddy-fields—and it is the man in the paddy-fields who is decisive in this respect—will say only one thing. He will say that it appears to be the West that refuses to negotiate.[1]

It was probably inevitable, as circumstances were by this time, that the pressure of opinion expressed in these statements should be effective, at least to the degree that a show of willingness to negotiate had become imperative. Other factors reinforced the purely moral ones. On the Soviet side, it was apparent by May 1955 that the policy of dividing the west—if that had, indeed, been the object of Soviet policy—had failed and therefore that a new approach was necessary. On the western side, the realization was spreading that economic strength was as important a consideration as military strength, and therefore that there were sound practical reasons for halting the economically exhausting armaments race, if possible. Now that the position in Europe had, to all appearances, resulted in a stalemate, Soviet initiative had moved to the less developed areas of Asia and Africa, where it was using economic rather than political or military weapons; in the previous year, it was noted,[2] communist countries had effected twenty-five new trade agreements with countries outside the communist camp, especially in the underdeveloped areas, bringing the total of such agreements in force to 120. This very fact necessitated a readjustment of western policy, for all the indications were that the struggle in this field would not be fought by military means or by nuclear weapons. Hence there was a new readiness at least to explore the possibilities of disarmament, conventional and thermonuclear, and to examine Russian proposals. The first positive evidence of this on the western side—a measure which, in a modest way, marked a turning-point—was President Eisenhower's decision on 19 March, to appoint Harold Stassen as his special assistant, with cabinet rank, in charge of disarmament proposals, or (as the post was soon called) as 'secretary for peace'. Stassen's appointment was important not merely because it showed a new will to come to grips with the problem of disarmament; it was significant, also, because he was made directly responsible to the president himself, thus sidestepping the State Department and its narrower, more professional view of political and strategic requirements. It implied, in theory at least, that

[1] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 537, col. 2079.
[2] [*Seventh*] *Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program* (Washington, D.C., 1955), p. 3.

disarmament was to be regarded as an issue in its own right, and not merely as one facet of national policy.

A further sign of a new atmosphere, or at least of an attempt to cultivate a new atmosphere, was the change in tone where exchanges between the communist and non-communist worlds were concerned. Much of the evidence for this seems trivial and was trivial; but since it certainly did not occur without governmental sanction, it had its significance. It was something of a landmark in international relations when, on 4 July, senior Soviet leaders visited the United States embassy in Moscow for the first time since the conclusion of the Second World War. Equally symbolic was the goodwill visit of the British navy to Gdynia on 1 July. Even earlier the British government had 'requested' the British Council to promote closer cultural relations with Russia;[1] the outcome was the crescendo of visits by Soviet oarsmen, circuses, soldiers' choruses, ballet-dancers and folk-dancers—'bounding, spinning, stampeding, ebullient'—which did so much to cheer up international affairs during the succeeding eighteen months. The emotion released expressed genuine relief at the relaxation of tension, or what at the time it was fashionable to call 'the thaw'; it also expressed to some degree a cynical public's disbelief in the Russian bogey painted in such lurid colours by politicians, government departments, and the chancelleries of the west. Otherwise its effect was negligible. Nevertheless, the very fact that such a renewal of contacts was welcomed and encouraged showed how much, by the early summer of 1955, attitudes had changed, even in high places. It demonstrated at least the existence of a public opinion it would have been dangerous to ignore.

The result was that, whereas in the previous period the threads of policy had been dissipated all over the globe, from May 1955 the central issue of disarmament became the focus of international negotiation. It was a sudden, perhaps in the event too sudden a change, involving—if it were to be successful—too rapid a readjustment of thinking for most of those concerned. The very fact that as late as April it had still been possible to envisage war between the United States and communist China, was an indication that basic attitudes had not yet changed, and that the mutual confidence necessary for negotiating overall disarmament had not yet been established. In a sense, in turning to the central issue of disarmament, governments were capitulating to their own public opinion; whether they were genuinely seeking a settlement in the sense of being ready for the compromises such a settlement would necessarily entail, is not so certain. Moreover, as will become evident later, the western powers thought it necessary to link the issue of disengagement with the German question. Whether this was necessary and advantageous, even from their own particular point of view, is open to debate; but it certainly complicated the

[1] *The Times*, 12 May 1955.

problems. Nevertheless it was at least necessary to go through the motions of negotiation; and from the moment that necessity was conceded, disarmament and the related questions took the centre of the stage. Only later, when it became clear that no solution was in sight, did the off-stage rumblings, particularly in the Middle East, begin to attract attention.

These facts and dispositions set the scene for the following sections; they are the backcloth against which international affairs were played out for the next six months. During this period, or until near the end of it, when the new situation caused by Soviet arms shipments to the Middle East began to attract attention, the dominant feature was the so-called 'summit' conference in Geneva, held between 18 and 23 July 1955, and the events leading up to and stemming directly from it. In this situation the course of international events can hardly be treated satisfactorily by a purely regional survey; for such a survey is all too apt to separate closely related aspects of policy and to dwell on local issues at the expense of the central problems. The Middle East, and the problems of Arab nationalism, stretching from the Persian Gulf to the western Mediterranean, will be treated separately, because there events in the period under review brought the American and Russian blocs into contact and conflict in a way which had not occurred at an earlier date. But the crisis in the Far East, in Formosa, and Indo-China, after claiming a central place as a focal point of international conflict, had died down, and what happened there was now of significance largely as an index of the current attitudes of the great powers to each other. It seems better, therefore, to abandon a regional survey, and to approach events from the point of view of the major powers involved in the Geneva negotiations, seeing how they adapted their policies, in various fields, to the new situation. For the period with which we have to deal is characterized by the fact that the protagonists, after fighting a long series of engagements along the perimeter, had now come face to face. Only the failure of the foreign ministers' conference, which met from 27 October to 16 November as a sequel to the summit conference of July, changed this situation and therewith brought a distinct phase or period of international relations to an end. Therewith attention turned again from the centre to the perimeter, but this time to new points along the frontiers of the communist and non-communist worlds—to the Middle East, and to the struggle for the 'uncommitted' world, to the fellaheen of the Nile valley and the labourer in the paddy-fields of Asia, whose views and interests and aspirations (it was beginning to be realized) might ultimately be decisive factors in world affairs.

## CHAPTER VII

# THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

By May the excitement aroused by the formation of the Baghdad pact had largely died down, and the Middle East again entered a period of relative quiescence. Although the counter-attack mounted by Nasser had succeeded in preventing the extension of the Baghdad pact throughout the area, his alternative plans had failed to produce a unified Arab front. Hence the area once again reverted to a series of individual conflicts, in which, if any unifying element were to be found, it was Arab hostility to Israel. This continued unabated.

From the point of view of the west this was on the whole a satisfactory position, particularly as the Soviet Union had as yet given no indication of active intervention in the area. This meant that the policy of extending the Baghdad pact as a basis for a united Middle Eastern front against the U.S.S.R. became less urgent, and for a time the west was able to avoid the danger of arousing the opposition which such a policy was likely to provoke. It was, indeed, only in the autumn when Egypt requested increased arms deliveries for use against Israel that the dilemma inherent in the situation became apparent. While the Egyptian request was a logical development in Arab nationalist policy, it was not one with which the western powers, whose aim of keeping a balance in the area had been registered in the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, could easily comply. On the other hand it gave the Soviet Union a legitimate reason for playing a more positive part in the Middle East. Even at this stage, however, the Middle East showed no likelihood of a clear division between east and west, such as had occurred in other areas. It is possible that the Soviet initiative was connected with the failure, of which more will be said later,[1] to make progress at Geneva, and it was certainly part of the Soviet offensive for extending its range of friendships outside the communist bloc. In spite of the disquiet it caused in the west, however, the United States contented itself for the present with expressing disapproval of Egyptian policy, but did not formulate a Middle East plan of its own.

Meanwhile, France and Great Britain continued their earlier policy in the area, where, although local nationalism was increasingly uncompromising, it was not yet visibly co-ordinated. North Africa, Cyprus, and the protectorates were treated as apparently unconnected problems within the comprehensive if ambiguous concept of security. In these circumstances it is most logical to consider them as such.

[1] Cf. below, pp. 155–74.

*Cyprus, Aden, Buraimi*

In Cyprus the British government sought to convince the people that it was not in their interests to be 'mesmerized' by unrealistic political aims.[1] But violence grew and latent hostility between Greek and Turk increased to such a degree that the policy of repression not only exposed the British authorities to ridicule,[2] but also in the view of many observers jeopardized the security of a region that it was meant to safeguard.

In fact it was the different interpretations given to the word security that hindered clear thinking on the issue. The British government spoke of the overriding need for bases in British-controlled territory at this time of world tension.[3] But they were not, as transatlantic comment often implied, thinking exclusively of flying distance to Baku and the maintenance of bases for use against the U.S.S.R. The British government felt it must retain a base from which military activities of all types could be carried out throughout the Near East, and successive police actions throughout the year emphasized this aspect of British policy. The Turkish interpretation of security was different; they had lost territory to Greece after 1918, and were consequently unwilling to have their traditional enemy established within forty miles of their coastline. The Greek government, on the other hand, which by the summer of 1955 had fully accepted the Cypriot claim for *enosis*, saw a clear division between their own defence requirements in the area, defence as envisaged by N.A.T.O., and the future of Cyprus.

It was in these circumstances that Sir Anthony Eden announced on 30 June that Greece and Turkey had been invited to discuss at an early date 'political and defence questions which affect the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus'.[4] The British initiative was acclaimed as evidence of a willingness to discuss the problem in a wider context, but there was no indication that this was the result of a reappraisal of the issue. For while Turkey accepted the implications of the defence formula, Greece maintained that Turkey had no right to be consulted on the future of the island. Furthermore, archbishop Makarios pointed out that the defence of the eastern Mediterranean could not be discussed in the absence of other Mediterranean countries, such as Egypt and Syria; while the future of Cyprus could only be decided in bilateral negotiations or through the United Nations.[5] When the conference was postponed from early August until the end of the month the Greek government finally accepted Makarios's request to put the issue on the agenda of the General Assembly

[1] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 540, col. 1932.

[2] Some twelve-year-old schoolgirls were bound over and their parents fined for tearing down a picture of the queen in their classroom; *News Chronicle*, 13 June 1955.

[3] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 540, col. 1933.

[4] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 543, col. 511.

[5] *Sunday Times*, 17 July 1955.

of the United Nations without awaiting the outcome of the London meeting.

Meanwhile during the first visit ever paid to the island by a British colonial secretary, the governor at last met Makarios;[1] talks were also held with the Mufti. But as the summer passed and Cypriots were faced with the suspension of *habeas corpus* and more stringent measures for the detention of suspects, Makarios, afraid that the Greek government might temporize, declared emphatically that no decision would be considered binding unless ratified by the Cypriots themselves.[2] Consequently, by 29 August, when the tripartite conference opened, in spite of the optimism of the delegates the conflicting minimum demands of the participants had already reduced chances of solving the issue and seemed to give the British the paradoxical position of mediators. Formal statements were made on the positions of the three delegations. The British offered constitutional reforms. But when in reply to a Turkish query, the British foreign secretary replied: 'we do not accept the principle of self-determination as one of universal application: we think that exceptions must be made . . .',[3] any hope the Greeks may have held of an early settlement was lost.

The conference was suspended on 7 September. The same day news of a bomb attack on the Turkish consulate in Salonika provoked anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir. In spite of immediate action to make good the losses sustained, Greece refused to participate in either the forthcoming N.A.T.O. manœuvres or the council meeting of the Balkan pact. Atlantic alliance and the Bled treaty notwithstanding, it was considered useless in Athens to disguise the fact that the alliance with Turkey lacked all popular support.

Meanwhile in Cyprus further measures were taken to curb unrest which had increased throughout August. The British carrier *Ocean*, with six hundred marines on board, and six mine-sweepers were dispatched to attempt to end the gun-running. When on 23 September it was again decided to omit the Greek resolution on Cyprus from the Assembly agenda,[4] Makarios outlined a plan for a passive resistance campaign. At the same time the British appointed Sir John Harding, formerly chief of the imperial general staff, as military governor of the island, and he took up his duties on 30 October. Thereafter several meetings were held between the governor and the archbishop but no agreement was reached and

[1] It was also the first time these two had met; *The Times*, 11 July 1955.

[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 27 August 1955.

[3] For the text of all statements at the conference, see Cmd. 9594.

[4] The voting was 28 to 22 with 10 abstentions. The United States, the western European members, and the Commonwealth (except India, which abstained) supported the British position by voting that the 'application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus' should not be included on the agenda. *General Assembly, Official Records, Tenth Session, 521st Plenary Meeting, 23 September, 1955*, p. 65.

renewed outbreaks of murder and terrorism led to the imposition of a state of emergency on 30 November. By now, however, it was clear that the issue could no longer be considered a domestic one, for the Cypriots' agitation had succeeded in mobilizing behind their cause the sympathies of people throughout the Near East, an area which increasingly had the potentialities of a powder magazine.

For Cyprus was not the only base which British strategists deemed it necessary to maintain, even though situated among a reluctant population. In the West Aden protectorate, reprisal bombing for non-payment of a collective fine stimulated smouldering discontent to new outbursts of violence.[1] There were undoubtedly real economic grievances and some Yemeni gun-running. But these features were less noteworthy than the fact that reinforcements had to be flown in from the Suez canal zone, and that conditions in Aden led to a visit at the beginning of July by the commander-in-chief of the British forces in the Middle East.[2] Moreover, even if bombing was the usual method of restoring order, and was, as it was alleged, well understood in the area, Moslem countries had begun to question the value of 'counter-terrorism' as a means of checking terror.[3] Nor were British plans for the future of the territory unchallenged. It was claimed that the British policy of federation among the twenty-odd states was 'gaining acceptance, particularly among the seven more important rulers'; but it was indicative of the new spirit when the sultan of Lahej asserted that he wished to be totally independent, 'freed from both the English and the Yemenis'.[4]

In September another dispute in the area concerning the sovereignty of the Buraimi oasis, which had been the subject of diplomatic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and Great Britain for several years, came before an *ad hoc* arbitration tribunal at Geneva. On 11 September, before the boundary question was considered, Britain charged Saudi Arabia with widespread bribery in the disputed area in violation of the arbitration agreement.[5] These proceedings ended in stalemate, followed by the re-occupation of the disputed territory on 26 October.[6] Nevertheless the incident was important. The disputed territory contained valuable oil

[1] *The Times*, 17 June 1955, reported ten people killed in an ambush. The previous R.A.F. action was for killing three guards and a civilian during an attack on a convoy.

[2] *The Times*, 2 July 1955.

[3] *Dawn*, 19 June 1955.

[4] *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 12 December 1955.

[5] *The Times*, 12 September 1955. Britain was acting on behalf of the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the sultan of Muscat. The hearing was suspended when the British representative resigned on learning that Sheikh Jusuf Yasin, the Saudi Arabian representative on the tribunal, was in charge of the area for his own foreign ministry, and was briefing Saudi witnesses; ibid. 5 October 1955. Thereupon the president and another neutral member resigned.

[6] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 545, col. 198. In a statement in the House of Commons, however, Eden announced that Britain would now take the Riyadh line with the 1937 modifications in favour of Saudi Arabia as the frontier.

deposits which interested the British Iraq Petroleum Company on the one side, and the American company, Aramco, on the other—a fact which enabled the Saudis to rally support from those who saw all the trouble in the Middle East in terms of oil politics. The British dilemma was twofold: to prevent any further deterioration in relations with Saudi Arabia, which had already been disturbed by the conclusion of the Baghdad pact, and to reassert British authority which had already been compromised by the disorder in Aden, in order to justify the continuance of its protecting power status in the Persian Gulf. The restrained tone of the British explanation to the secretary-general of the United Nations, however, did nothing to mollify Saudi indignation. Emir Feisal, crown prince and prime minister of Saudi Arabia, claimed that the 'ghastly armed attack' was a reply to the recently signed Saudi-Egyptian defence pact.[1] Furthermore, although it could easily be foreseen that the Arab League and Egypt would support Saudi Arabia, the incident had even wider repercussions. The leader of the Syrian Moslem brotherhood condemned it in the name of Arabs and Moslems everywhere; and the Soviet Union offered 'material and moral help' which included the supply of arms.[2]

The actual dispute might once again be insignificant, an episode which formerly would have passed off largely unnoticed. But taken in conjunction with the British withdrawal from Suez, and the difficulties encountered in establishing alternative bases in the area, any incident which seemed to indicate a decrease in British influence aroused comment. Furthermore, the existence of the United Nations offered an opportunity which Moslem opinion, now increasingly coherent, was quick to utilize. The United States was an old ally in condemning British colonialism; and more recently the Soviet Union, by its offer of arms to Egypt, had indicated its willingness to enter the arena. In these circumstances feelings were becoming more relevant than existing rights of ownership, and 'generous concessions' were sometimes obscured by emotional nationalism. 'Colonial' issues were, in fact, no longer open to unilateral settlement; and domestic differences—as France, as well as Great Britain, was discovering—tended increasingly to become international property. Against this changing international background French troubles in North Africa acquired a new significance.

*North Africa*

The signature of the Franco-Tunisian statute on 3 June[3] opened a new phase in North Africa; but whether, as many hoped and expected, it would prove a turning-point remained to be seen. By recognizing the principle of internal autonomy, it gave the Tunisians an opportunity to

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 28 and 31 October 1955.
[2] *The Times*, 16 November 1955.
[3] Cf. above, p. 33.

prove that they were capable of creating and administering a modern state. But in practice much was still to be done as regards the relationship with France, and in establishing harmony between the different elements in the country. Bourguiba, on return from exile, had emphasized the 'eternal imperative of co-operation' with France and had asked that there should be no anti-French demonstrations.[1] But even within the Neo-Destour Party there was already evidence of a conflict of view. While all agreed that the terms of the conventions were inadequate and in no sense final, Bourguiba was willing to accept them as a starting-point for further concessions, such as Tunisian control of the police. On the other hand, the secretary-general of the party, Salah ben Youssef, who was in voluntary exile in Egypt, urged their outright rejection and in this he was supported by broadcasts from Cairo and Damascus.[2] This divergence of view became increasingly indicative of more fundamental differences: whether, in short, the new state should first establish a constitution and alleviate its own economic distress in close co-operation with France, as envisaged by the economic convention signed on 3 June; or whether, as the first of the three North African territories to obtain an independent status, it should concern itself with the other nationalist movements and with the even more amorphous concept of pan-Arabism.

In Paris M. Faure raised the question of the future relationship of France and Tunisia in similar terms, when ratification was debated in the National Assembly. It was perfectly natural, he argued, that the Tunisians should aim at complete independence, for nationalists could hardly be expected to accept 'home rule only' as their slogan; it was for France to make interdependence seem even more attractive than independence, for while it could not be imagined that Tunisians would remain permanently debarred from their own diplomacy and defence, they were unlikely to break off an association which brought them nothing but benefits.[3] The impressive majority of 540 to 43 was, however, less the result of M. Faure's oratory or of a change of heart among the right wing than of a change of policy by the Communist Party. Their vote was probably determined, as it had been in February, by other issues in international politics; in part by the approaching Geneva conference; and in part perhaps because of the unpopularity they had incurred in North Africa generally by their opposition to the Neo-Destour Party.

Meanwhile in Tunisia an attempt was made to unify the Neo-Destour Party. It was decided to send a delegation to Salah ben Youssef in Cairo to inform him of the existing situation in Tunisia. But although Salah

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 4 June 1955.

[2] *Figaro*, 14 June 1955. In the first place, however, the Franco-Tunisian agreement had been officially welcomed by the Arab League; *Combat*, 6 June 1955.

[3] *The Times*, 9 July 1955.

ended his self-imposed exile early in September, he refused to withdraw his opposition to the agreements. In urging the Tunisians to continue their struggle for independence, and in assuring Algerian patriots of his support, he again took up a line which Bourguiba could not follow.[1] In the event the duel between the two men widened into a struggle between the policies they represented. While Salah ben Youssef was dismissed from the post of secretary general, and had his party membership withdrawn, the political committee of the Arab League decided to allocate £E100,000 towards helping North African nationalists. It was ben Youssef, moreover, who praised the independence shown by Nasser in foreign affairs, 'particularly in the vital purchase of arms necessary for assuring the security of the Arab world'.[2] At the first legal Neo-Destour party conference since 1938, which opened in Sfax on 15 November, Bourguiba again appealed for moderation, saying that he was not wholly in the French camp, and emphasizing that an Arab and Moslem nation such as Tunisia necessarily had links with Middle Eastern countries of the same racial and religious origin. This argument, intended to restore harmony, was emphasized by the presence at the conference of Egyptian and Libyan cabinet ministers and government representatives from Iraq, as well as from India, Ceylon, and Indonesia. But the divergence between the two wings was soon apparent again. The official Egyptian delegate left the conference early, in order to attend a mass rally organized by ben Youssef, and therewith the struggle between those in favour of co-operation with a reformed France and those who supported the pan-Arab movement was firmly set in an international context; before the end of the year it had led to internal unrest and bloodshed.[3]

While in Tunisia the greater part of nationalist feeling could be satisfied by a political settlement, in Morocco the situation was complicated by the dynastic issue.[4] By May it was generally recognized that the attempt to install Sidi Mohammed ben Arafa had failed despite the support of El Glaoui, and even in Paris there was talk of a council of regency, although any possibility of the return of the ex-sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef was still denied. The whole issue assumed an importance out of all proportion to the original episode. For the nationalists ben Youssef was a symbol, and, on account of the religious aspects of the sultanate, he brought them the advantage of devout Moslem support. His deposition with French connivance had helped to foster the nationalist myth that he was a liberal martyr. Moreover, the changing attitude towards ben Youssef reflected the successive stages of French concessions before the logic of nationalist demands and the increasing pressure of world opinion on the handling of the North African question.

[1] *Le Monde*, 10 October 1955.
[2] *Combat*, 23 October 1955.
[3] *N.Y. Times*, 16 and 21 November, 13 December 1955.
[4] Cf. *Survey*, 1953, p. 80.

In itself, the political settlement asked for by Moroccan nationalists needed no new departure from the principle that had been established in negotiations with Bourguiba. For the nationalist parties—the Istiqlal, and the Democratic Party of Independence—supported by the Moroccan Workers' Union, were agreed in seeking an 'independence confirmed and regulated by the ties of interdependence' in place of the present 'nominal independence which puts the country under a foreign yoke'.[1] When the French government appointed a new resident-general, M. Grandval, on 7 July, it seemed as if it was the beginning of a new approach: changes in the administration, a political amnesty which enabled Morocco's only internment camp to be closed, overt condemnation of French counter-terrorist activities and recognition that doubts about the integrity of the police were justified, were all evidence of a new readiness to expose the administration in Casablanca to criticism.

By mid-August, as the second anniversary of ben Youssef's deposition approached, there was an atmosphere of apprehension in Morocco tempered by the growing hope that the French government would realize the need for early and positive action, as Grandval had urged. But the French government still procrastinated, and no action occurred. The fact was that they were ready to sacrifice ben Arafa, but not yet prepared to recognize ben Youssef. By now M. Faure was willing to negotiate with any representative Moroccan government that could be formed,[2] on the basis of a plan which was reputed to contain provisions to legalize trade unions, raise wages, and to introduce more troops to suppress the expected disorders; and conversations to sound Moroccan opinion in this sense opened at Aix-les-Bains on 22 August. But both the Istiqlal and the Democratic Party of Independence reiterated their opposition to any scheme which precluded the eventual return of ben Youssef.[3] In fact, despite the advance made during the Aix-les-Bains conversations, there was still no evidence that the French appreciated the significance of the dynastic issue; and when right-wing pressure brought about the acceptance of M. Grandval's resignation on 31 August, it seemed as if French policy which had already very nearly used up 'the large reserve of patience of the Moroccan Moslems',[4] would again flounder in a morass of party bickering.

The gravity of the situation was increased by the growing interest shown throughout the Moslem world in the issue. French protests at Syrian and Egyptian broadcasts to North Africa had produced a temporary

[1] *Le Monde*, 17 July 1955.

[2] The sultan's advisory council, the Maghzen, was no longer considered suitable. Ben Arafa had been asked to form a fully representative government.

[3] *Le Monde*, 16 and 20 August 1955. The Istiqlal observer at the United Nations summed up their views as 'nothing with ben Arafa, anything with ben Youssef'; ibid. 21 August 1955.

[4] *Corriere della Sera*, 30 August 1955.

modification in their tone; but Arab hostility to French policy continued, and at the beginning of July discussions had taken place in Iraq in order to unify Arab policy towards France.[1] In Washington Arab representatives urged that it was in the general interest to see that French domination in North Africa was replaced by liberty and co-operation; while Nuri es-Said, who had emphasized the need for intervention by the great powers, was disappointed when an Iraqi *démarche* to this effect was countered by her Baghdad-pact ally with the laconic statement that Great Britain considered the whole question to be the sole concern of France.[2] Popular demonstrations occurred throughout the Moslem world, and Arab hostility, voiced sometimes against the French alone but more usually directed against the west and N.A.T.O. as a whole, became more vehement.

Meanwhile the negotiations taking place in France and Morocco were unexpectedly extended to Madagascar, where the ex-sultan was in residence. The realization by the French government that progress was impossible without Sidi ben Youssef's co-operation was striking evidence of a new French approach. The first step was an invitation to the ex-sultan to return to Nice for consultations; the second was his decision, apparently taken without the cognizance of the French government, to move from Nice to Paris; the third was the surprising decision to allow him to return to Morocco, thus reversing the policy adopted by France in 1953.

This radical change in French policy, although marking a humiliating retreat, was less effective than might have been thought. The Moroccan nationalists had been optimistic of avoiding further bloodshed, once ben Youssef's co-operation had been obtained; but it soon became evident that the ex-sultan's return had opened up new problems. Although Moroccan political consciousness was less developed than Tunisian, there was already evidence of two opposed views on independence. While the majority of nationalists had not insisted on ben Youssef's immediate return, provided that any political settlement secured his freely given assent, Allal el Fassi, with Egyptian support, argued for his unconditional return. This was described by Cairo radio as the 'only solution'. Many Moroccans, on the other hand, feared that the 'nationalists' sultan', once restored to power, would be less liberal than nationalist propaganda had painted him; and when, on reaching France, ben Youssef expressed himself as favouring a policy of 'Franco-Moroccan interdependence . . . friendship, and the safeguarding of reciprocal interests'—a policy which he somewhat unrealistically asserted to be the unanimous wish of the Moroccan people—it seemed as though their apprehensions were justified.[3] The result was that el Fassi once again veered round, declaring himself in favour of total

[1] *Le Monde*, 13 July 1955.
[2] *Combat*, 27 August 1955.
[3] *The Times*, 2 November 1955; *Hindu*, 4 November 1955.

independence, and conceding only that an alliance could be negotiated with France after full independence had been attained.[1] In fact, within four days of ben Youssef's return to Morocco on 16 November there were clashes between divergent nationalist parties, and in this unsettled political situation there were greater opportunities for intervention in support of Arab nationalism than there had been in Tunisia. It was in Algeria, however, where the circumstances were most propitious for external intervention, that the French came up against the full force of international Moslem opinion.

France had always claimed that the position of Algeria was different from that of the other two North African territories; but the French argument, although juridically correct, was rapidly ceasing to be so politically. When disturbances broke out in the Aurès mountains, they were at first treated as a revolt similar to others which had occurred on previous occasions.[2] But circumstances in 1955 were quite different from those only a few years earlier. The settlement in Tunisia, and the growing appreciation of the real issue in Morocco, had changed the whole tone of French North African policy; moreover, the growing cohesion of Arab opinion on nationalist questions, and the importance attributed to the views of the smaller independent nations in international affairs, had multiplied the pressures to which French action was subject.

The immediate French reaction to the new Algerian outbreaks was that a small number of lawless tribesmen were disturbing the peace, which could best be restored by repression. But a parliamentary delegation which visited North Africa in May took another view and emphasized the need for economic and political reforms to be applied at the same time and with the same degree of urgency as police and military measures. It was, in their view, not yet a case of waging war; but it would be dangerous to misconstrue reality, and to consider the operations in force as simply police action.[3]

It was probably true at this stage that the insurgents depended on local organization. Although they may have been receiving directions from Tunisia or from exiled leaders in Cairo, there was as yet no immediate connexion between the revolt and the nationalist parties.[4] But since under French law any advocacy of Algerian nationalism was punishable as an 'offence against the integrity of French territory', it is not difficult to see the irreconcilability of even a liberal French policy with the views of nationalists of any type. This meant that a growing affinity was inevitable

[1] *Figaro*, 12 November 1955.

[2] Cf. G. Kirk, *The Middle East in the War* (1952), pp. 426–31, for the rising and repression in Algeria in 1945; see also *Survey*, 1952, p. 269.

[3] For the full text of the report, see *Figaro*, 30 June 1955.

[4] The two main nationalist parties were the *Union démocratique du manifeste algérien* and the *Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques*.

between terrorists and those, like the secretary-general of U.D.M.A., who emphasized that the demand for improved social and economic conditions, together with political changes recognizing Moslem preponderance, in no way implied the expulsion of French settlers from the territory.

The governor-general, M. Soustelle, wished to keep the rebel elements separated from the rest of the population by pursuing two policies at the same time. He advocated repression for the rebels, with conciliation for the rest by a policy of economic development, greater local self-government, and the freedom of Moslem institutions from French control. But his efforts were frustrated by the demands of an influential section among the French settlers for a policy of general repression, and by the attitude of such deputies as M. Roger de Saivre, who called for recruits for an Oran League for the defence of Algeria, and proclaimed that there was neither colonialism nor oppression in the territory. This failure in French logic meant that Algeria, more than Tunisia or Morocco had ever been, became an issue of international concern.

Towards the end of June the Algerian National Liberation Front launched an appeal for a 'stop colonial aggression in Algeria week' to be observed throughout the Moslem world,[1] and drew the attention of all democratically minded peoples to the Algerian issue. The French reaction was to urge the United States and Britain to show evidence of Atlantic solidarity by the provision of helicopters, and by a strengthening of the British garrison on the frontier between Libya and Tunisia. In Paris M. Bourgès-Manoury stated that there had been a decrease of activities in the Aurès mountains, but he admitted that over the country as a whole 'psychological deterioration' had taken place; and in Algiers the governor-general's office gave the press details of the plots allegedly being woven in the Near East against Algeria.

Against this background of growing internationalization, the French government outlined its policy. It decided to call an extraordinary session of the Algerian assembly for 27 September to examine M. Soustelle's plan; to extend the state of emergency in Algeria for a further six months; to reorganize the administration; and to give increased powers to the police.[2] Although M. Faure had not entirely given way to extremist opinion, it was evident that a 'real war' was now being fought in the Aurès mountains, and 'rebel tactics' were noticeably more adroit.

There was, indeed, by now some evidence of cohesion in North African affairs which was emphasized by the terrible risings and counter-reprisals which occurred in both Morocco and Algeria on the weekend of 20 August. The French reaction was revealing. A leader of the national liberation

[1] It was to take place during the week of 5–11 July, which was the 125th anniversary of the conquest of Algeria; *Dawn*, 23 June 1955.

[2] Cf. the report of the parliamentary debate in *Le Monde*, 30 and 31 July 1955.

front in France was arrested; M. Soustelle appealed for nine more battalions, and six were sent immediately. This was followed in September by the dissolution of the Algerian Communist Party, and while a 'merciless war of race and religion' was being waged throughout the Constantine area, M. Faure congratulated French forces on the speed and efficiency of their counter-attacks, approving 'all measures taken to track down the rebels with the utmost rigour'.[1] This was to flout the wishes of Moslem deputies from Constantine who had urged him to end 'the collective, pitiless, disproportionate repression', which had followed the uprising, and showed that the French government was opposed to any negotiated solution of the Algerian problem and determined to intensify a policy of force.[2]

By this time in Algeria approximately 1,000 active insurgents with the complicity of the Moslem population were tying down some 200,000 French troops, who could do little beyond dealing with incidents as they occurred.[3] Moslem deputies, including those previously known for pro-French sympathies, refused to co-operate in the Soustelle reforms and declared that the policy of integration had been outstripped by events.[4] Still undaunted, the French government outlined a plan of 'pacification zones' to meet the 'psychological effects of rebel armies', while M. Bourgès-Manoury rejected emphatically any suggestion that France would negotiate with 'rebel murderers' and so insult the loyal Moslem population. Nevertheless, while M. Faure repeated 'Algeria is French; there is no Algerian nationality', the outbreak of revolts in previously unaffected Oran may have stimulated second thoughts; for by the second week in October the conception of integration had been modified; now it was considered as a term which, while it precluded both secession and assimilation, left the final political status of Algeria to be determined.[5]

By now, however, it was no longer certain that France would have a preponderant influence in deciding the issue. Already at the end of August, the president of the National Liberation Front had left Cairo for meetings in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. At the same time, while local support was rallied in this way, the Arabs turned to Washington for great-power backing. The United States, by tradition 'anti-colonialist', found itself in an anomalous position, for on this occasion military considerations precluded unequivocal support of the nationalists. Nevertheless the Algerians appealed to Eisenhower to 'end the cruelty and horror of French colonial repression', and the Syrian ambassador sought United States' support in getting an Afro-Asian motion on self-determination for Algeria put on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Mean-

[1] *The Times*, 3 September 1955.
[2] Ibid. 3 and 14 September 1955.
[3] *N.Y. Times*, 22 September 1955.
[4] *The Times*, 28 September 1955.
[5] Ibid. 23 September and 14 October 1955.

while Nasser informed the United States' ambassador in Cairo that every Moslem country regarded the French use of N.A.T.O. forces in North Africa as implicating the whole Atlantic alliance and as an act of aggression against Arabs everywhere.[1] He also specifically mentioned Turkey in this context, and so introduced the thorny question of the Baghdad pact. The fact was that the Algerian question was showing a dangerous tendency to cut across existing alignments. As was to be expected, Indian opinion, with the analogy of Goa in mind, was unequivocally on the side of the nationalists; but in Pakistan also, the prime minister declared that 'our sympathies rest entirely with the people of Morocco and Algeria'.[2]

To what extent foreign interest was genuine and to what extent stimulated by ulterior motives, is difficult to determine, and obviously it varied in strength. Similarly, while expatriate Algerians were doubtless grateful for the publicity given their cause, in Algeria itself attention was still fixed on Paris rather than on Cairo or New York, and even the Neo-Destour congress in Tunisia and the return of ben Youssef to Morocco failed to arouse interest. It was still an exaggeration to regard the Maghreb as a unitary whole where different stages of the same pan-Arab struggle were in progress. Even in the Near East, although the North African issue was certainly an element in the power struggle of Arab League politics, Israel as the perpetrator of increasingly heavy reprisal raids, remained the predominant interest, and this was a situation which French diplomacy knew how to exploit. After the repeated failure of *démarches* in Cairo and Damascus on the subject of anti-French propaganda, the French government applied the screw, and at the end of October halted arms deliveries to Egypt, although continuing them to Israel. The results were soon visible. From an Egyptian point of view, encouragement of the nationalist movements in North Africa was a secondary consideration, by comparison with the strengthening of the Arab military position *vis-à-vis* Israel; and the consequence was that the hostile treatment of French policy by the Arab press and radio was abruptly modified. Consequently in November the French government, having achieved its aim, resumed arms shipments to Egypt: deliveries were made of mortars, Mystère fighters, and light tanks to the value of $10,000,000.[3] A certain apprehension was expressed, lest this action might lead to further blackmail of France over the North African problem; but the official view in Paris was that it was 'not a bad price to pay', if it led to the dissociation of Egypt from the Algerian cause. On the other hand, the resumption of arms deliveries to Egypt, with its obvious effects on the balance of power between the Arab states and Israel, could not be a matter of indifference to Great Britain and the United States

[1] *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 27 August 1955. [2] *Dawn*, 28 August 1955.

[3] These deliveries completed a $50,000,000 contract; *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 December 1955.

which had expressed consternation when Nasser concluded an agreement for the purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia. When it was suggested that French action tended to weaken, if not to destroy, the unity of the western front in the Israeli-Egyptian dispute, French diplomats replied that it had at least the virtue of assuring Egypt a western and non-communist source of weapons. This answer was more effective at glossing over than at clearing up the divergences in western policy. France, not unnaturally, put North Africa first, whereas Great Britain's prime interest was the stability of the Middle East, and the United States, fearing the inroads of communism into the Moslem world, was not prepared for measures which might forfeit the friendship of the Arab peoples. So far as they could, without compromising their other objectives, England and America were prepared to give at least tacit support to France in the Maghreb; but there can be no doubt that in their eyes Egypt was a more important factor in the international situation. This became even more evident when, in September, Nasser announced the conclusion of his arms deal with the communist bloc.

*Egypt, Israel, and the Middle East*

Egypt's efforts in the spring of 1955 to steal the diplomatic limelight, and therewith to secure the coveted leadership of the Arab world in its struggle to throw off what it regarded as the fetters of western imperialism, had been curiously ineffective. Although the courtesies of Tito and Nehru[1] and his own efforts at Bandung had increased Nasser's personal international standing, earlier plans for an Egyptian counter-alliance to the Baghdad pact had not prospered.[2] Even more surprising was the Egyptian failure to profit from developments in the Sudan, where the time for implementing the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1953 was drawing near.[3]

Already during the course of 1954 evidence had accumulated that the expectation, which was general at the close of 1953, that the Sudanese people would opt for some form of link with Egypt, was less certain of fulfilment than many had thought.[4] What is remarkable is the failure of Egyptian policy, under the direction of Major Salah Salem, to reverse this trend. As early as 7 April the Egyptian government had to admit that talks with the Sudan over the distribution of the Nile waters had broken down. Even earlier it had become evident that the overwhelming desire for union with Egypt apparent twelve months earlier no longer existed. Nevertheless, whatever was the eventual political arrangement, the geography of the area required some form of economic co-operation, especially

[1] Egypt and India signed a treaty of friendship on 6 April 1955, emphasizing their opposition to military blocs; the text was printed in *Hindu*, 7 April 1955.

[2] Cf. above, p. 27.

[3] Cf. *Survey*, 1953, pp. 159–63.

[4] Cf. *Survey*, 1954, pp. 199–202.

since an agreement on the division of the Nile waters was a necessary preliminary for securing aid from the World Bank to finance the proposed Aswan and Roseires dams. Hence talks on the subject were resumed in May, after a break of seven weeks, only to fail in June, when Cairo radio accused the Sudanese minister of the interior of plotting to overthrow Nasser, while Khartoum retorted threateningly by pointing out that Sudan lay upstream of Egypt.

Since Sudanese political developments were the joint responsibility of Egypt and Great Britain, they were also involved in the continuous if sometimes latent hostility which characterized relations between those two countries. When Nur el-Din, a Sudanese minister still in favour of close links with Egypt, was dismissed on 19 June, Cairo radio claimed that he had been ousted by the British government. His dismissal marked the failure of Egyptian policy in northern Sudan. Cairo's reply was to turn its attention to southern Sudan, where racial and religious differences, sharpened by economic disparity and a certain historical separatism, encouraged opposition to the north. When the south rose in rebellion in the middle of August, the Sudanese government accused Cairo radio of inciting the rising by harmful broadcasts in the southern dialect.[1] This charge was rejected by Major Salem; but the fact that he came out with immediate proposals for joint Anglo-Egyptian intervention increased suspicion that Egypt was planning to use the revolt in its own interests. The British government, however, refused to swallow the bait. Rejecting the Egyptian proposals out of hand, it threw its weight behind the Sudanese government, and the result was that Major Salem's policy collapsed. Attacks on the Sudanese prime minister in the Egyptian press, Cairo appears to have realized, were producing results the opposite of those intended; and on 29 August Major Salem was dismissed. Henceforward responsibility for Sudanese relations was taken over by Colonel Nasser himself. It would seem that at this stage, when Egypt had just broken off talks with Israel on the situation in the Gaza strip, the government in Cairo had come to the conclusion that it was inopportune to have a conflict with the Sudan on its hands. Thus interest in the Sudan, which at an earlier stage had seemed to be a major consideration of Egyptian policy, was affected and to some extent counteracted by its other pre-occupations: the championing of Arab nationalism, the search for allies against Israel, and antagonism, sometimes overtly expressed, to British policy in the Middle East. The result of these complications was that Egyptian plans for the future of the Sudan, which had started off so hopefully, failed to make headway and finally atrophied.

This was seen when, on 16 August, the Sudanese parliament met and approved a resolution calling for the withdrawal of British and Egyptian

[1] *The Times*, 24 August 1955.

troops within three months, thus starting the process which was to bring the transitional period to an end. In a statement issued on 18 August, the government asked Egypt and Britain to meet Sudanese wishes by declaring the independence of the Sudan, provided the Sudanese parliament agreed to this course. Thereafter discussion centred on the alternative methods for deciding Sudan's future status. After Egypt had indicated its support for a plebiscite, Great Britain accepted this procedure instead of the election of a constituent assembly, and by the end of November agreement had been reached on the terms of reference for a supervisory commission. But the unsettled conditions, resulting from the revolt in the south and its suppression, made the procedure of plebiscite dangerous and undesirable; and already on 18 October El Azhari, from whom the proposal for a plebiscite had originated, suggested that it should be abandoned in favour of a vote by the existing Sudanese parliament. The fall of El Azhari's government temporarily delayed a decision; but on 19 December, after the ministry had been reconstituted, parliament in Khartoum decided the issue by a resolution declaring that the Sudan was to become 'a fully independent sovereign state', and requesting the two powers exercising condominium to recognize the declaration forthwith.[1]

Although these 'rush tactics' were criticized in some quarters—notably in South Africa—as 'not auguring well for the future of democratic institutions in the new republic',[2] the significance of the whole episode lay rather in the demonstration of the desire of the Sudanese for complete independence, and in the Egyptian failure to make union palatable. Since the Egyptian government in the preceding months had been ostentatiously pursuing a 'policy of influencing people and winning friends in the Middle East and North Africa',[3] the outcome in the Sudan was a setback not only in its plans for the Nile valley, but also in its standing in the Arab world. Although Egypt put the best face on the result, urging that it only desired Sudanese friendship, irrespective of party and past differences, it emphasized the need of the revolutionary government for a success in foreign policy, and in this way contributed to a hardening of the Egyptian attitude in the conflict with Israel, which at this time had become the main concern of Egyptian policy. The reverse on the southern frontier made success on the northern frontier more imperative.

In this latter area, Egyptian policy had shifted considerably in direction since the spring, when opposition to the Baghdad pact, as an obstacle to Arab unity, had for a time loomed larger than the traditional objective of opposition to Israel. After Nasser's declaration in March, that Egypt would rely only on her own strength and not on the decisions of the

[1] The declaration also provided that consideration should be given to the special position of the southern provinces; *Manchester Guardian*, 20 December 1955.

[2] *Johannesburg Star*, 20 December 1955.

[3] *Hindu*, 21 December 1955.

Security Council, Cairo had concentrated on increasing the number of its allies and on building up its military strength. In April and May, as the number of border incidents with Israel increased, Egypt's relations with Iraq improved. At the beginning of June, in spite of tension in the Sudan, the British fleet was welcomed in Alexandria. Pronouncements from Jordan and Egypt to mark the seventh anniversary of the outbreak of the war in Palestine dwelt largely on the 'disgrace suffered by the Arabs in consequence of their own racial and military disunity', and urged greater co-operation. When, in June, incidents along the Gaza strip again raised tension, the Syrian prime minister said that all his country's 'potentialities' were at Cairo's disposal; while the Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia pledged their support, and in Baghdad it was declared that Iraqi troops would also fight if Israel attacked.[1] This was followed in mid-June by an Iraqi proposal for an Arab League meeting to discuss the continuous Israeli aggression, and to undertake collective measures to end it for all time.

The United Nations supervisory commission made various proposals intended to reduce tension in the area, but border incidents continued throughout the summer. The existing state of opinion in both Egypt and Israel was prejudicial to negotiation and Egypt maintained its opposition to any direct meeting with Israeli diplomatic or military officials, considering the armistice commission adequate.[2] Furthermore, the issue of free navigation through the Suez canal was again raised when Israel renewed inquiries about the *Bat Galim*.[3] In opposition to the Security Council resolution of 1951, Egypt still refused to permit free navigation and during the summer two more ships were added to the existing schedule of ninety vessels blacklisted for calling at Israeli ports. On 3 July the *Anshun* was fired on at the entrance to the Gulf of Akaba and shortly afterwards the German tanker *Isibek* was stopped. Taken together these incidents served to emphasize Egyptian intransigence. When, on 11 September, new regulations requiring 72 hours' notice in Alexandria were published by the Egyptian government, Israel officially expressed its determination to defy the blockade, Mr. Ben-Gurion saying that if Egypt did not respond to diplomatic pressure, Israel would force the Tiran passage 'within a year'.[4]

Meanwhile in Israel efforts were maintained to extend educational facilities and agricultural improvements to Arab areas, to proceed with the integration of the Arab minority, and to reduce their civil disabilities.[5] Nevertheless, Israel still felt unable to permit resettlement of the Arab refugees, and Arab areas in Israel were under military government and

[1] *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 June 1955.
[2] *The Times*, 18 June 1955.
[3] For the incident in which this Israeli vessel was involved, cf. *Survey*, 1954, p. 218.
[4] *The Times*, 6 October 1955.
[5] *Christian Science Monitor*, 27 April 1955.

nightly curfew. It was only towards the end of the year that steps were taken to reduce military administration to 'vital and actual security requirements' and to avoid 'unnecessary infringement upon civil rights' and on the freedom of movement of inhabitants in border areas.[1]

Nevertheless, the Israeli election on 26 July in which the Heruth Party, representing the remains of the terrorist Irgun Zvai Leumi, almost doubled its strength in the Knesset, revived fears of possible expansion by Israel. Although Mr. Ben-Gurion branded this group as a 'quasi-fascist force', and himself advocated co-operation with Arab states,[2] his own programme for increased military development and intensification of immigration was not calculated to allay Arab apprehension. The renewed outbreak of incidents in the Gaza area, starting with the attack on the Egyptian post at Hill 79 on 22 August, provoked a series of reprisals within Israeli territory, answered by the Khan Yunis attack at the beginning of September.[3] The whole episode served to intensify Arab feeling and led Walid Salah, the former Jordanian foreign minister, to express the view that Israel was the 'only real danger confronting the Arab world'.[4]

If this statement needed amplification, it was provided in dramatic form on 27 September, when Nasser, opening an armed forces' exhibition in Cairo, announced the conclusion of negotiations to purchase arms in Czechoslovakia.[5] There is evidence that negotiations had been under way since the summer; but the definitive announcement had an electrifying effect. It is true that neutral and uncommitted opinion in Asia and Africa, emphasizing the 'purely commercial basis' of the transaction as a barter-deal in exchange for Egyptian cotton and rice, saw it as practical evidence of diplomacy without strings. In western capitals, on the other hand, a different view was taken. It was known that Egypt had been seeking to improve its military position by the acquisition of armaments; but the western powers, although willing to supply a certain quantity for the limited purpose of 'legitimate self-defence', were not willing to provide them unconditionally. Egypt had therefore appealed to all nations. Nevertheless, the Czech initiative raised limitless possibilities in the minds of western statesmen, no less so since the Soviet Union disclaimed any responsibility for the transaction, but stated firmly its belief that 'every state has a lawful right to provide for its defence and to buy arms for its defence needs from other states on the usual commercial terms'.[6] The western powers, which had grown accustomed to regarding themselves as the sole arbiters, resented the intrusion of what they considered

[1] *The Times*, 7 December 1955. [2] Ibid. 18 August 1955.

[3] Cf. *Documents*, 1955, p. 365, for the report by General Burns to the Security Council on 5 September 1955.

[4] *Manchester Guardian*, 6 August 1955.

[5] Cf. *Documents*, 1955, p. 370, for the text of his speech.

[6] *Tass* statement, 3 October 1955; *Documents*, 1955, p. 375.

an irresponsible supplier of armaments;[1] but the significance of the Czech action in the minds of western statesmen lay less in the additional support obtained by Egypt, and the consequent disbalance between the Arabs and Israel, than in the evidence it afforded of a new initiative in the Middle East. The Soviet Union, it seemed, was asserting its right to exert influence in an area from which it had been absent since it withdrew its forces from Persia in 1946.

During the spring attempts had been made to consolidate the Middle East in opposition to possible Soviet interference and they had largely failed because the immediate danger was felt to be Israel. In August Mr. Dulles had given evidence of increased American interest in the area when he put forward suggestions for settling the Arab–Israeli dispute. The Dulles plan envisaged a United Nations guarantee of negotiated frontiers, and Israeli compensation for the displaced Arabs, helped if necessary by an international loan. But Dulles's statement that the 1949 boundaries were 'not designed to be permanent in every respect', was interpreted in Israel as making a security pact conditional upon a prior agreement between Israel and the Arab states, and to that extent relatively remote.[2] When the British government came out in support of the United States plan,[3] Israeli apprehension increased and the immediate, if not the direct, effect was the inclusion in the cabinet of pro-Soviet groups—a rather more liberal interpretation of the wish expressed by Mr. Dulles to see the spirit of Geneva extended to the Middle East than had probably been envisaged in Washington.

In short, the Israelis felt their position to have worsened considerably during the preceding months. The director-general of the Israeli defence ministry claimed that although improvements had been made in Israeli forces, and certain arms were now produced locally, Israeli superiority over the Arabs was relative, and depended largely on Jewish ability to manufacture new arms.[4] On 2 November, in fact, Mr. Ben-Gurion openly criticized Great Britain for selling arms to Egypt while refusing to supply Israel, and the United States for arming Iraq.[5] He laid responsibility for any 'dangerous explosion' which might occur both on those who gave arms to the 'many aggressors' and on 'those who deny arms to the few defenders'. On the other hand, his offer to meet the Egyptian premier

[1] Mr. Nutting, replying to a question in the House of Commons, said: 'We cannot, on the one hand, embark on an arms race in competition with the Soviet bloc; on the other hand, to put a ban on deliveries would merely have the effect of further driving these countries to less responsible suppliers than ourselves. [*Laughter.*] I do not know why that should cause so much laughter. If hon. Gentlemen who find so much merriment in that answer regard the Soviet bloc as a responsible supplier, I do not.' Cf. H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 545, coll. 673–4.

[2] *Documents*, 1955, p. 361.

[3] See statement by the British Foreign Office on 27 August 1955 in *Documents*, 1955, p. 365.

[4] Cf. the statement of 3 October, in *Documents*, 1955, p. 373.

[5] For the text of his speech see *Documents*, 1955, p. 379.

and any other Arab ruler in order to reach a settlement, was dismissed as a propaganda gesture stimulated by fear of the consequences of the Czech arms agreement, and was rejected out of hand. The secretary-general of the Arab League stated in reply that there was no responsible person in any Arab country who would negotiate with Ben-Gurion or even meet him.[1]

In spite of the psychological pressure exerted on Israel and of the danger from the growing Arab military potential, it is uncertain whether Israel benefited diplomatically as a result of the large-scale counter-attacks, such as those in El Auja on 21 September and 26 October and that on El Sabha on 3 November, which were becoming a feature of Israeli policy. On 9 November President Eisenhower reiterated his support for the Dulles proposals. A speech by Sir Anthony Eden at the Guildhall on the same day was regarded in Israel as open support for the Arab position.[2] He blamed the suppliers, 'not the recipients', for the effects of recent arms deliveries in the area and based his hopes on a territorial settlement representing a position somewhere between that set out in the United Nations resolution of 1947, and the Armistice Agreement of 1949—a 'mutual compromise' which Mr. Ben-Gurion scathingly rejected.[3] The Israeli prime minister agreed that local adjustments might be desirable, but reiterated his earlier statement that while the Jews did 'not desire even one inch of foreign territory', at the same time they would 'not allow one inch to be taken from them'.

The Arab governments, on the other hand, extended a cautious welcome to the proposals of Mr. Dulles; but they were sceptical whether a friend of such long standing to Israel could become a friend of the Arabs. In contrast, the Soviet Union's policy seemed unequivocal and its initiative was welcomed. On 9 August Nasser accepted an invitation to visit Moscow; on 19 August Voroshilov sent a message of congratulation to Nasser to mark the beginning of the Moslem New Year. Invitations to Hungary and Poland followed—trivial pleasantries, perhaps, but nevertheless some indication that the place Nasser held in Arab opinion was appreciated by the Soviet Union and its allies.

In comparison with these measures, western policy made little progress. Economically advantageous schemes put forward by the west, such as the Johnston plan for development of the Jordan waters, were stalled by the predominance given to political considerations in the Arab countries.[4]

[1] *Le Monde*, 4 November 1955.

[2] Cf. *Documents*, 1955, p. 382.

[3] Cf. his statement to the Knesset on 15 November, *Documents*, 1955, p. 385.

[4] This scheme, which Mr. Johnston had championed untiringly since 1953, involved agreement between Jordan, Syria, the Lebanon, and Israel. Not only was each Arab nation jealous of its rights over the rivers involved, but all felt that Israel was to 'obtain a share greater than that to which she was entitled, if she has any right in the waters' at all. *Dawn*, 14 August 1955. The scheme would have made possible the settlement of 250,000 refugees 'without prejudice to their rights in any future settlement'.

Even when the technical aspects of a modified plan had been accepted by all, the Arab fear that work on the scheme would lead to normalization of relations with Israel prevented a final decision.[1] Nor had the scheme, which was to be financed in large part by an American loan, the same appeal to the nationally superconscious as had Egypt's project for the Aswan dam. Here, too, western hesitations were overtaken by an offer of aid for economic development made by the Soviet Union on 10 October.

The undoubted appeal of Soviet offers lay in their apparent freedom from strings. Nationalists throughout the Arab world were increasingly easily irritated by even well-intentioned 'American politicians who believe they can direct international affairs and regulate the world by edicts issued in Washington and New York which make mock of the will of the people'.[2] So it was that the Lebanon, which in May had been prominent in attempting to bridge the rift between Iraq and Egypt over the Baghdad pact, came out increasingly in support of the latter. Strikes in Beirut, in protest against French policy in North Africa, coupled with the forthright declaration that the Lebanon refused to accept the Johnston plan, or any other scheme which entailed the recognition of Israel as a state, gave clear notice where Lebanese sympathy lay in issues which involved Arab principles.

Nor could the west derive much satisfaction from the fortunes of the Baghdad pact itself. The adherence of Pakistan on 23 September was probably not unrelated to the attraction of receiving American military aid which might also be useful for settling disputes other than those relating directly to Soviet penetration. The accession of Persia on 11 October is less easily explained; but if it completed the 'northern tier', this structure could hardly be regarded as evidence of Arab solidarity. Indeed, the accession of Persia was immediately followed by a strengthening of the links between Egypt—which was attempting to substitute bilateral arrangements for the ill-fated Arab League pact—and other Arab states outside the Baghdad grouping. To this end agreements were signed with Syria on 20 October, and with Saudi Arabia on 27 October, and arrangements were made for a joint military command.

The efforts of western diplomats were further prejudiced by inability to agree on a common plan for the area as a whole. Separate aspects of the same problem were treated with little attention to their relevance to the whole and too often the western powers seemed to be working in opposition to each other.[3] Furthermore, western policy encountered in-

[1] *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 October 1955. Israel, however, promised not to start action on her alternative plan before February 1956 to give the newly formed governments of Lebanon and Syria time to consider the project.

[2] *Al Goumhouriya* quoted in *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 18 November 1955.

[3] This was seen when oil interests were directly involved, as in the Buraimi dispute. It was also evident in American reluctance to get tarred with the imperialist brush by seeming to under-

creasingly unfavourable comment in neutralist circles. If it was the aim of American policy to align the Middle Eastern countries with the west by giving them arms and economic aid in return for military agreements, Soviet initiative had already gone far to undermine it. The theory that all nations must 'join our military alliances or be considered fellow-travellers on the way to becoming Communist satellites',[1] that had so long governed American thinking, was too crude for conditions in the Middle East. To the extent that the initiatives of Great Britain and France were becoming increasingly suspect in Arab eyes, the United States was faced with the prospect either of modifying a policy which, from Morocco to Indonesia, had earned it the reputation of interfering in the internal affairs of new countries in support of factions which would accept an American alliance, or of becoming increasingly identified in the minds of neutrals with the authoritarian governments of Greece, Turkey, Iraq, Persia, and Pakistan—governments which had fallen into line.

These were the dilemmas which beset western policy at the close of 1955. Probably there was no straightforward solution to them; but the United States, which hitherto had tended to leave the direction of policy in the Middle East in the hands of its allies, was by now highly sensitive to developments in the area, and was beginning to realize that new initiatives were necessary if the effects of the Czech arms deal and the Soviet offers were to be countered. Moreover, it seems to have been appreciated in Washington that western policy had now to be formulated in a way less likely to displease the vocal, if not yet influential, opinion of the uncommitted neutrals. This reassessment, however, was piecemeal, incomplete, and difficult to implement in view of the divergent points of view obtaining in London, Washington, and Paris. Nevertheless there is no doubt that, by the beginning of 1956, American policy in the Middle East was infused with a new sense of urgency.

write British policies in the area, as shown by the failure of the U.S.A. to join the Baghdad pact. Furthermore, outdated nationalist considerations jeopardized western policy, as when France was believed to be intriguing in Syria against the latter's adherence to the Baghdad pact, for fear lest British influence would further displace French influence in that country; cf. *Observer*, 30 October 1955.

[1] *Hindu*, 17 November 1955.

## CHAPTER VIII

# DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

WHAT would be the course of development, now that the Paris treaties were ratified and in force? Would they prove, as had been so freely predicted, to be a position from which the west would move forward? Would the success registered by American policy, despite Soviet manœuvres and the setbacks in 1954, create a new enthusiasm for the western cause, and a conviction, among allies and neutrals alike, that the west was in the ascendant? And what would Soviet reactions be? How would the communist east meet the new situation? These were the questions confronting the world in May 1955, and we shall discuss them in two sections: the first dealing with the policies and problems of the western powers, the second with the policies of the communist bloc. Against this background it will then be possible to see the spirit and circumstances in which they approached the summit conference of the four great powers, held in Geneva in July, around which the diplomatic activity of the period revolved.

In the west it was hoped that the signing of the W.E.U. treaties would strengthen the western alliance which would then be in a more advantageous position to negotiate with the Soviet Union. It is questionable whether, in fact, either expectation was justified. The North Atlantic alliance, of which Germany became a full member on 5 May, was neither politically nor militarily so single-minded as it had been in the early fifties. Those countries interested in economic development and political integration were more anxious to go ahead with the development of 'Little Europe' than to concentrate on military and political issues.[1] The reduction of tension between the Soviet Union and those countries which were not committed to Washington's line, had reduced the will among America's allies, in Europe and elsewhere, to overlook differences of policy and opinion. Hence, from the summer of 1955 onwards, weaknesses and divergencies in the western alliance became more marked.

These weaknesses made themselves felt in a number of separate and often minor political issues, usually where the interests of different partners in the alliance came into collision; and for this reason it will be convenient to take the various questions separately. But they do, in fact, fall into groups. First, there are the cases where, owing to internal divergences, the western alliance failed to make the most of the advantages it already possessed; secondly, the west showed little skill in establishing good

[1] See below, pp. 105 sqq.

relations with the new nations, which had asserted themselves at Bandung; and thirdly, the attitudes and activities of some of the minor powers aligned with the west involved the alliance with dubious causes and made it seem as though, for tactical reasons, it was condoning policies which ran contrary to its proclaimed ideals and objectives. In addition, there was a tendency for the alliance to break up, in practice, into splinter-groups. It is true that none of these factors must be exaggerated; but in the aggregate there is no doubt that they affected the efficiency of the alliance and contributed to an atmosphere of frustrated discontent.

*The Saar*

The first issue over which interests diverged was the future of the Saar territory, which ever since the war had been the main bone of contention between France and Germany.[1] Now, with the referendum to decide its future status drawing near, it acquired an importance due more to prestige than to its economic wealth or its political position. The contradictory attitudes towards the Saar agreement, revealed during the ratification debates in Paris and Bonn, had been clarified by talks between Faure, Pinay, and Adenauer, who reaffirmed the official position that both countries were in favour of administration under the European statute. The laws regulating the referendum, drawn up by the W.E.U. Council and amended by the Saar Landtag, were promulgated on 23 July.[2] The referendum, fixed for 23 October, to be preceded by a three-monthly period of freedom of expression for all types of political opinion, was intended to give the inhabitants the opportunity to vote either for or against administration by a European commissioner under the W.E.U. Council. But the fillip to German national self-esteem, resulting from the restoration of sovereign status, led to the re-emergence of parties which advocated a return of the Saar to Germany, and soon the violence of their propaganda falsified the intended position.

In these circumstances the plebiscite commission reminded the Federal German government at the beginning of August that outside interference in the referendum was expressly forbidden by the terms of the Franco-German agreement, and that German politicians should therefore not visit the Saar during the election campaign. To this the German Social Democratic Party replied that France also was guilty of outside interference,[3] and the campaign continued with increasing acrimony and vio-

[1] For the previous post-war history of the question, cf. *Survey*, 1951, pp. 111 sqq.; *Survey*, 1952, pp. 91 sq., 122 sqq.; *Survey*, 1953, pp. 57 sqq.

[2] Cf. *L'Année Politique*, 1955, p. 707. Previously, on 3 May, an economic convention signed in Paris had established a new economic relationship between the Saar territory and France; ibid. p. 696.

[3] They were referring to a statement by M. Pinay on 9 August in which he reaffirmed the French view that rejection of the statute would automatically bring about a return to the situa-

lence. By mid-August the situation was such that M. Dehousse, chairman of the European Commission, was forced to announce that unless violence and hostility to the Commission diminished, it would be necessary to report to the Council of W.E.U. that free expression of opinion during the campaign could not be guaranteed.[1]

As a result there was a temporary lull, and on 26 August the Christian Democratic Party in the Federal Republic issued a statement in support of the statute. This was an attempt to moderate the German parties' propaganda. It denied their allegation that Dr. Adenauer had negotiated the agreement with France under pressure, and stated that the manner in which the campaign was being conducted distorted the issue and was harming Germany's reputation. The purpose of the referendum was to seek a decision for or against the statute, not a judgement on Herr Hoffmann's policy; and this being the case, many of the statements being made failed to explain the issue to be decided. At the beginning of September Dr. Adenauer once again differentiated between a vote in favour of the statute and a vote in favour of Herr Hoffmann's government. Nevertheless, on 4 September the three pro-German parties organized themselves into a Heimatbund and issued an appeal to all Germans in the Saar to hold firm to their fatherland, to maintain German culture in the Saar, and to fight any falsification of the will of the people.[2] In these circumstances M. Faure and Dr. Adenauer met again on 5 October, and reaffirmed that the Saar agreement was 'an integral part of European policy and of Franco-German co-operation'. But this was insufficient to stop increasingly frenzied propaganda and extravagant appeals. On 14 October—a little over a week before the people concerned were supposed to make a free decision as to their future—the Heimatbund appealed to Bonn to help in the reunification of the Saar with Germany.[3] In Paris M. Pinay maintained the French position that rejection of the Saar agreement would

tion existing before the Saar agreement was signed; that it would deprive Saarlanders of important advantages; and that it would have serious repercussions upon Franco-German relations.

[1] Prior to his intervention pro-German demonstrators had tried to break up the first important meeting held by supporters of the European statute. Meanwhile, Herr Hoffmann's supporters alleged that the campaign of the three pro-German parties was being financed from Bonn, and specifically named Herr Kaiser, the federal minister for all-German affairs, as being involved. It was at this stage that M. Dehousse intervened. He suggested that there might be a truce of a week or a fortnight during which no public meetings would be held in connexion with the campaign, and that joint meetings might be organized by the opposing sides. But both Herr Hoffmann, leader of the pro-statute Christian People's Party, and Dr. Schneider, leader of the pro-German Democratic Party, adversely criticized these proposals.

[2] *The Times*, 5 September 1955. Propaganda took an ever more nationalistic turn. Dr. Ney proclaimed: 'The Saarlander who approves the statute cuts himself off from his people and his country; he breaks faith with his motherland; he is a traitor.'

[3] It suggested a reduction of tariffs between the two countries; improved communications; increased cultural exchanges; and the establishment of a Saar council at the ministry for all-German affairs, to investigate the problems connected with the reunification of the Saar and Germany.

make it impossible for any government or parliament to reopen negotiations.[1]

On 23 October 96·59 per cent. of the 663,970 eligible voters went to the polls; 32·28 per cent. voted in favour of the statute; 67·72 per cent. against it.[2] When the results became known Herr Hoffmann resigned immediately and a non-political caretaker government was established under M. Welsch, an administrator of considerable experience. Its object, as M. Welsch himself stated, was to prepare for the realization of the Saarlanders' wishes, and this very definition of policy showed how little likelihood there was that the French hope of restoring the *status quo* would be realized. Elections for a new Landtag were fixed for 18 December, and while former members of the Nazi Party and others previously excluded from the territory streamed back, the international implications of the vote were studied in Paris and Bonn.

In view of the trend of events since August most European observers, if not their governments, had regarded the rejection of the statute as inevitable. But the decisive vote caused some surprise and not a little despondency. It could well be interpreted as a vote against Europe, as a disavowal of Adenauer's policy of co-operation with France, and as evidence of the re-emergence of nationalist and anti-democratic forces in Germany. It is debatable whether, after the failure of E.D.C., Europeans in general believed sufficiently in the idea of Europe to surrender national territory for such an experiment. Certainly few Frenchmen or Germans and only a minority of Saarlanders did. Nevertheless, 'European' enthusiasts who, logically or illogically, were probably more numerous in the United States than in Europe, were shaken by this disavowal of integration coming only a few months after the 'improvement' registered in the acceptance of the W.E.U. treaties and the new prospects opened up by the Messina treaties.[3] The more sceptical, however, had long considered the settlement of the Saar question to be merely one of an economic arrangement between France and Germany. Indeed economic considerations were now uppermost in French and German minds.

It soon became clear that the French government had no intention of putting to the test its views that an adverse vote would bring about a return to the *status quo*. When, on 24 October, Adenauer sent a telegram to M. Faure expressing his conviction that the result of the Saar referendum should not, and would not, prejudice Franco-German relations, the latter replied that the outcome should not be allowed to divert the two governments from the paths they had taken; new difficulties would make the task harder but would not weaken their common will to secure the cause of freedom and Franco-German understanding. Three weeks later Pinay

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 21 October 1955.

[2] *Le Monde*, 25 October 1955.

[3] Cf. below, pp. 105–6.

and Adenauer resumed discussion of the question and decided 'to seek in consultation with the Saar Government, in office after the coming elections, a solution of the Saar problem which would take into account the essential interests of the two countries, notably on the economic plane'. Talks continued between Pinay and von Brentano during the N.A.T.O. meeting in December, when economic considerations, particularly the canalization of the Moselle, predominated in the discussions. But no conclusions were reached until the following year when, preoccupied with other aspects of policy, France yielded to German demands.

*European Alignments*

That the concentration of effort leading up to the Paris treaties should be followed on the part of the western powers by some relaxation, was perhaps inevitable. But the tendency for different groups to go different ways was more than ordinarily marked in the latter half of 1955, except in the negotiations with Russia at Geneva. In the first place, the success of Dr. Adenauer in carrying Germany into the rearmament camp made a deep impression on American opinion, and resulted in a new intimacy in German-American relations. Germany was widely regarded in the United States as the only reliable ally on the European continent, and during the summer there developed something like a German-American *entente* within the Atlantic alliance. On the other hand, Great Britain and France, with common preoccupations in the Mediterranean, began to draw together;[1] while Italy and the Benelux countries had their own views on the post-Paris situation. For them, the conclusion of the Paris treaties was important, not primarily (as in American and German eyes) as a stage in military preparedness, but as creating an opportunity—or rather, as reviving the possibility which the collapse of E.D.C. had seemed to destroy—for developing western European institutions and a western European community. These different objectives were not necessarily contradictory; but at the same time they reflected different attitudes to common problems and different priorities, and almost necessarily coloured the responses of the different governments to the initiatives and feelers which Russia was putting out.

At this period the most marked feature of the emerging alignments within the western camp was the close identity of interests and policy established between the United States and western Germany. Dr. Adenauer's visit to Washington on 13–15 June was a personal triumph; it marked without much doubt the zenith of his international standing. Hailed by Eisenhower as 'one of the greatest statesman of the world', he himself boasted on his return to Germany that his policy had proved right in all things.[2]

[1] Cf. above, p. 70.

[2] *The Times*, 9 and 29 June 1955. Replying to criticism of his policy during the first reading of

Certainly he had no difficulty in carrying the American government with him in his view that there could be no question of the neutralization of Germany.[1] The communiqué issued at the conclusion of his visit,[2] with its pointed reference to the 'consistent, sound policies followed by the United States, the Federal Republic, and their allies', seemed to pick out western Germany as America's senior partner. By emphasizing that 'the bonds of friendship' between the two nations had 'become very close', and underlining the conviction that they would continue in the 'closest co-operation in the future', it served notice of the creation of an *entente* which could not but exercise pressure on the policies of other countries in the western bloc. The strength of this *entente* was the greater in that it rested not only on identity of political views, but also on a combination of American resources with a burgeoning German economy.

The sense that Europe, in its divided state, was in no position to withstand German and American economic pressure, was not least among the factors leading in the period following the ratification of the Paris treaties to a revival of proposals intended as steps towards the establishment of a European community. The Italian prime minister, Alcide De Gasperi, in particular, had been a leading proponent of the belief that it was only by forming a bloc that Europe could play a role of any significance; and his views had been accepted and propagated by the Benelux countries. Here and in Italy the immediate question, following the conclusion of the Paris agreements, was seen in terms of 'making Europe', rather than of coming to grips with Russia from a 'position of strength'; and the first step, it was urged, should be the development of a non-military association parallel to N.A.T.O.[3] There was widespread approval for M. Faure's suggestion of organizations for the production and control of armaments, for the administration of external aid and for the equalization of economic and social conditions between member-states. Italian enthusiasm was based on political as well as economic grounds. Indeed, as the great powers blustered and blundered their way along the path of coexistence, the importance of an effective, if necessarily weaker, intermediary was increasingly widely canvassed.

In June the delegates of the six European countries which had previously co-operated to form the European Iron and Steel Community, met at Messina to consider how best to integrate their economies further. A resolution at the end of the meeting outlined general aims, and envisaged an eventual economic unity, with transport and power resources shared among the six. The objectives which were enumerated were the joint

the Volunteers Bill, Adenauer said that 'the policy of the Federal government had shown itself as the only right one. It had brought about the unity of the free west, the Geneva conference and the invitation to Moscow.'

[1] *U.S. Documents*, 1955, p. 100.

[2] *Documents*, 1955, p. 248.

[3] *Le Monde*, 29 March 1955.

development of the great routes of communications; the exchange of gas and electric power, and co-ordinated production; a common organization concerned with the peaceful development of atomic energy; and a common European market free from all tariff barriers and all quantitative restrictions, to be realized in several stages.[1] The creation of a European investment fund was also suggested as was a common policy in the social field. Moreover, it was decided to set up committees of government delegates and experts to report back by 1 October 1955.

Before the conference had met it seemed as if France would be unwilling to agree to any further delegation of powers to international economic organizations. Furthermore, there were indications that Germany, in the middle of an economic boom, might be hesitant to commit itself. Nevertheless, if such divergencies existed, they were not visible in the final communiqué. It is true that ample opportunities were left for alternative plans and compromises; but the conference as a whole was indicative of a revival of Europeanism, which if it had reached its peak in 1953 had never entirely faded away, especially in Italy and the Benelux countries. Although the theme of supra-nationality favoured by Benelux had not been pressed, M. Spaak felt able to say that basically the delegates were in agreement on the need to 'make Europe', and to fuse their national economies. Washington was mildly surprised and its evident pleasure was prudently restrained so as not to be accused once again of pushing the European idea.

M. Spaak was invited to preside over the committee and M. Beyer went to London on 20 June to report on the results of the Messina conference and to invite Great Britain to take part in the work of the committee and in the forthcoming Brussels conference which would study the Messina decisions. Britain accepted, and increased enthusiasm on the German side augured well for the discussions.

By September, however, it had become evident that although the integration of transport, and gas and electricity undertakings had seemed probable in June, it was now unlikely to occur. On the other hand, the idea of a common market which had formerly given rise to French and German reservations, seemed more probable. Meanwhile plans went forward to create a European nuclear agency which would own plant and experimental laboratories, and control the production of nuclear fuel, hold patents, and regulate capital expenditure on common projects. Although Great Britain was unwilling to commit itself and Germany was sceptical, the project had American support and a possibility existed that a common agency would receive technical aid from the United States.[2]

[1] Cf. *Documents*, 1955, pp. 163 sqq.

[2] On 11 June President Eisenhower had offered help for 'peaceful atomic development' to

Later in the year the same theme was taken up in the Council of Europe. A resolution adopted on 26 October envisaged the appointment of persons 'independent of any one government for certain fields in which integration is envisaged, so that they may give a continuous stimulus of a political nature to European unification, with the constant aim of creating a genuine community of interest between the European countries, extending to all their main political, economic, financial and social activities'.[1] Thereupon European commissioners were appointed to prepare European projects and to supervise their implementation. The Consultative Assembly resolved specifically to establish a European Atomic Energy organization and urged that the work of the Brussels conference for the formation of a common market should be brought to an early and successful conclusion.[2]

From a long-term point of view it is perhaps true that the steps towards European integration were one of the most hopeful developments of the period on the western side. As the delegates to the Messina conference announced, 'such a policy' was 'indispensable if Europe' were 'to maintain her position in the world, regain her influence and prestige and achieve a continuing increase in the standard of living of her population'.[3] On the other hand, the significance of what was actually achieved should not be exaggerated. Though the revival of interest after earlier setbacks was noteworthy, the mere passing of resolutions established nothing, and all the practical steps remained to be taken. From this point of view it is fair to say that the year 1955 was not marked by any decisive initiative. Moreover, economic could not effectually be separated from political questions; and where political matters impinged, the position of the Council of Europe was notoriously weak and its powers very limited. Already at this stage underlying political considerations—namely, the desire to retain sovereign national control over anything as important as atomic power—were beginning to act as a check on the creation of a common agency for nuclear energy. In sum, the tentative steps towards economic integration were not yet sufficient to offset the tendencies to political differentiation which were the characteristic feature of the western alliance in the period beginning in May 1955.

*North Africa*

Among the factors affecting western co-operation in Europe none received wider attention than the consequences of French preoccupation with its North African problems. By this time the situation in North Africa and the Mediterranean was engrossing French attention in a way

the 'free peoples'; cf. Eisenhower's address at Pennsylvania State University, printed in *American Documents*, 1955, pp. 461–4.

[1] Resolution no. 88; cf. *Documents*, 1955, p. 166.

[2] Resolution no. 90; ibid. p. 168.

[3] Ibid. p. 163.

which made it difficult for France to pursue an effective policy in Europe. French attention, at first preoccupied with achieving a settlement in Tunisia and Morocco, was increasingly distracted by the political murders in Algeria, which as part of metropolitan France was included in the area covered by the N.A.T.O. treaty. In these circumstances, the French government felt justified in withdrawing a division of troops from Germany to increase and relieve the forces in Algeria. On 26 May M. Faure stated that it was within the logic of North Atlantic defence that troops should be used to maintain order in important rear areas, behind the main N.A.T.O. force, and that General Gruenther had been consulted about the French action.[1] Similarly General Koenig, speaking to the French army on Bastille Day, asserted that in temporarily transferring one of its divisions from Germany to Algeria, the French government had not chosen between its alliances and its national interests but had 'withdrawn reinforcements from one of the still fragile ramparts of the free world to reinforce another more seriously threatened'.[2]

This argument was not, however, altogether convincing. The reduction of N.A.T.O. strength in Germany, before Bonn had even decided on the scope and timetable of its contribution to the western military effort, could hardly fail to emphasize the frailty of the military shield on the continent; it not only decreased its practical efficiency, but also had serious political repercussions, particularly in western Germany, where it seemed as though the purpose of raising German divisions was less to increase the total strength of N.A.T.O. forces in western Europe than to release French troops for service elsewhere. It is true that it was argued that, in an age of atomic weapons, technical proficiency was more important than numbers. But this argument failed to convince German military observers, in whose view the drain on conventional N.A.T.O. forces by French commitments in Africa revealed 'deep fissures' in 'the moral foundation of the Atlantic Pact'.[3]

*West German Rearmament*

This situation was particularly unfortunate because it provided the setting in which the controversial question of west German rearmament was brought up for discussion; it contributed, with other factors,[4] to the bitter debates in the Bundestag in the summer of 1955. Finally, in September, it was announced in Bonn that a compromise had been reached on the length of time considered necessary to raise the west German armed forces. It was planned to recruit the army in a period of three years

[1] Political considerations apart, France was not alone in asserting the strategic importance of North African bases; see above, p. 33.

[2] *Le Monde*, 15 July 1955.

[3] Cf. H. Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War* (New York, 1957), pp. 89–90.

[4] Cf. below, pp. 140 sqq.

beginning from 1 January 1956; it would therefore be fully trained and equipped by 1 January 1959 and the navy and air force would be ready a year later. That these dates were later than those contemplated a few weeks earlier, and that there was still no adequate financial provision, did not escape comment.[1] Moreover, the number of people in Bonn who doubted whether the ministry of defence could complete even the compromise programme, in view of the technical problems involved, was increasing; while, on the other hand, doubts were expressed as to the effective value of German conventional forces. During the debates in July Franz-Josef Strauss, later to succeed Blank as minister of defence, argued that modern weapons of mass destruction had created a strategic revolution in consequence of which land forces no longer had their former importance; and although Blank sought to demonstrate, in reply, that 'ground forces have not become superfluous despite nuclear weapons, airplanes and missiles', criticism of the 'antiquated planning' of the defence ministry persisted.[2]

A further factor casting doubt on the policy of German rearmament was the signature of the Austrian peace treaty, which Soviet propaganda naturally used as part of its peace offensive. If a neutral Austria was possible, people asked, was it out of the question for Germany to remain unarmed?[3] In addition, the Austrian State Treaty affected the deployment of western as well as of Soviet troops. The agreement to evacuate all forces from Austria during a period of three months beginning on 27 July entailed the transfer of 5,000 American troops from Salzburg to Verona, and this further weakening of the forces stationed north of the Alps had psychological as well as strategic implications. In the opinion of many German military observers, the capabilities of N.A.T.O. had decreased rather than improved during 1955.[4]

*Greece and Turkey*

But it was not only the military effectiveness of the North Atlantic alliance which was being strained. The situation in Cyprus was a source of instability in the Mediterranean, and a cause of irritation between Greece and Great Britain. When, on 30 June, Sir Anthony Eden invited the Greek and Turkish governments to discuss political and defence questions affecting the eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus, hopes of a settlement were raised and it seemed as if peace would be kept between the

[1] *The Times*, 22 September 1955. The minister of finance would not allow defence expenditure to exceed 9,000 million marks a year; calculating on 15,000 million marks aid from the United States—considerably more than had been mentioned—this would only bring the total to 51,000 million marks of the estimated 60,000 million needed over the four-year period.

[2] Speier, op. cit. pp. 191–2.

[3] For Mr. Dulles's answer to this question, cf. below, p. 153.

[4] Speier, op. cit. p. 89.

allies. But the postponement of talks from the beginning of August until 29 August, a week after the closing date for adding issues to the United Nations agenda, was a prelude to political recrimination between all three participants. By September the historical enmity between Greece and Turkey was reasserting itself. Finally, the incidents of 7 September,[1] when a bomb exploded in the Turkish consulate in Salonika, produced an immediate and violent reaction in Turkey. Greek property was destroyed and Greek officers serving at the N.A.T.O. headquarters in Izmir were insulted. Athens protested to General Gruenther and it was stated that Greek troops would not take part in N.A.T.O. exercises in October.

Attempts were made to placate Greek feeling. In Paris Lord Ismay and the permanent representatives on the Council of N.A.T.O. met to consider events; and on 19 September Admiral Fechteler arrived in Athens to mediate between Greece and Turkey. But the fracas was not easily stilled. On 21 September the Greek deputy prime minister declared that Greece was contemplating withdrawal from the Atlantic pact 'as a theoretical possibility, but not as a probable action', although certain events might lead to the adoption of this theoretical possibility. Greece refused an American suggestion to postpone discussion of the Cyprus issue in the General Assembly, in order to contribute to a relaxation of tension; and Greek officials were asked to prepare a report of the military position in the event of withdrawal from N.A.T.O. Meanwhile Greece continued its non-participation in the forthcoming exercises and asserted that any resumption of its obligations would depend on Turkish moral reparation.[2] Nor was this all. The interaction of antipathy and distrust between the allies was further emphasized when, on 30 September, Greece cast the deciding vote in the steering committee of the United Nations Assembly in support of the Afro-Asian motion for discussion of Algeria, and in so doing precipitated French withdrawal from the session.[3]

*Spain*

These dramatic expressions of disagreement in the Mediterranean tended to obscure other divergencies which, if less forcefully expressed, were intrinsically of no less importance. Ever since 1951 when the United States, supported only by Portugal, had urged the inclusion of Spain in N.A.T.O., the relationship of this fascist dictatorship with the western alliance had remained something of an anomaly. Now American defence thinking forced the question into the open. On 17 July the House of Representatives approved a resolution advising the admission of Spain

[1] Cf. above, p. 80.

[2] *The Times*, 29 September 1955. This took place on 25 October in a ceremony at Smyrna.

[3] The issue was decided by 28 votes to 27; all N.A.T.O. countries opposed the motion except Iceland, which abstained, and Greece which voted in favour. Israel supported France.

to N.A.T.O., and a few days later it was announced that the United States was to make an additional grant of 5 million dollars to Spain for the modernization of its navy, raising the total to 30 million dollars. Perhaps not surprisingly, these moves were viewed with some misgiving in western Europe, where dislike of the Falange and recollections of Falangist support for Hitler and Mussolini were still lively, and when Mr. Dulles left Geneva at the beginning of November to visit General Franco uneasiness increased. It was not alleviated by the statement issued at the conclusion of the talks that the two 'found themselves in mutual understanding with regard' to the 'principal problems that affected the peace and security of free nations', and that the purpose of Mr. Dulles's 'visit was not only to demonstrate the United States' friendship for Spain but to tend to increase such friendship'.[1] Evidently the American purpose, in spite of hesitations on the part of its allies, was to draw Franco into the western alliance.

*Scandinavia*

In Scandinavia the position was different. During the summer there had been a noticeable deterioration in relations between the United States and northern members of the Atlantic alliance. The bilateral agreement of 5 May 1951, by which the United States had undertaken the defence of Iceland 'pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty', provided that either government might ask the N.A.T.O. Council to review the continued necessity of the American base. 160 million dollars had been spent on airfields and radar installations; another 200 million dollars were to be spent on a naval base; but it would seem that public relations had been neglected. The result was the growth of restiveness among the population of 160,000 at the presence of 6,000 Americans, with all that this implied, and it seemed doubtful whether the treaty could be renegotiated, and even if it were, whether it would again be approved by Iceland's parliament.

In Norway, too, where opinion was perhaps influenced by the Soviet withdrawal from Porkkala,[2] the postulates of American policy were no longer unquestionably accepted. On 15 November a joint Soviet-Norwegian communiqué stated that Norway would not grant bases to foreign forces so long as Norwegian territory was not attacked or threatened with attack. This decision on the part of the Norwegian government was significant not only as weakening the northern flank of N.A.T.O., but also because it seemed to call in question the underlying thesis of the North Atlantic alliance—namely, that it was a defensive grouping of countries continuously threatened by the Soviet Union. Nor was this the only divergence of opinion between Norway and the United States. Earlier

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 2 November 1955.

[2] Cf. below, p. 127.

in the summer, Norway had been antagonized by American trade policy.[1] Indeed, conflicting economic policies were another factor which were an obstacle to Atlantic co-operation.

*Conflicting Economic Policies*

Trade and currency policies had on previous occasions given rise to disagreement within the western alliance. In the summer of 1955 there was continued evidence of economic incompatibility and of the instability of some of the soft currencies. In the sterling area Australia, which had had an overseas trade surplus of £A 146·7 million in 1953–4, showed a deficit of £A 68 million by 6 July 1955, and it was expected that this would be increased by invisible items.[2] In these circumstances it was announced at the end of September that from 1 October there would be further restrictions of imports to reduce estimated expenditure to a level at which it would be possible to finance imports by 30 June 1956 without a further reduction of the country's external reserves. Nevertheless the Australian failure to balance its trade account was serious because what credit there was within the sterling area, and with the dollar bloc, was needed urgently by underdeveloped territories; some of which, such as the Gold Coast and Malaya, were themselves substantial dollar-earners.

During July the sterling area gold and dollar reserves fell by nearly £49 million and there was a deficit of £25 million with the European Payments Union. Moves were immediately made in Great Britain to reduce internal demand; and at the end of August, Eden warned the country that there was a real danger of being priced out of world markets, because productivity was not rising as fast as costs.[3] There were rumours of impending devaluation but any such move was firmly denied by Mr. Butler at the International Monetary Fund meeting in Istanbul in September. He reaffirmed that British policy was to enlarge trade and make payments freer, but emphasized that 'much depends for all of us on the world dollar supply'.[4] In this respect he praised President Eisenhower's initiative in liberalizing American trade but declared that progress in United States good-creditor policies had in general been slow and reluctant. He hoped for 'atomic propulsion' by America towards tariff reductions and wider trade opportunities.

[1] On 10 July the U.S. Congress passed a law providing that agricultural surpluses might be sold abroad for foreign currency. A month later it enacted that at least half of any such sales must be transported abroad in 'privately owned, United States-flag, commercial vessels'. Norway, with an annual grain deficit, had hoped to purchase American wheat. But with the third largest merchant fleet in the world, of about 7,000,000 tonnage, Oslo resented the subsequent proviso; indeed, it feared the further application of the principle by other countries or to other trades.

[2] This represented a sevenfold increase in the deficit with the United Kingdom and a threefold increase in the deficit with the United States.

[3] *The Times*, 29 August 1955.

[4] *Financial Times*, 15 September 1955.

The British chancellor of the exchequer was not the only critic of Washington's policies. Speaking on 17 October to the Boston chamber of commerce, Mr. Heeney, the Canadian ambassador, told his audience that 'at the end of 1954 total foreign long-term investment in Canada amounted to nearly $12½ billion, of which over three-quarters was owned in the United States';[1] but American interest in investment was not paralleled by the provision of liberal trade opportunities for Canada. 'Customarily Canadians—a population only one tenth as large—buy much more from the United States than Americans buy from Canada.' In 1954 the current account deficit with America was $810 million and since 1950 the total of such deficits had amounted to nearly $4 billion. In spite of Canada's need for increased trade with the United States, however, and of the two countries' agreed desire to establish 'a prosperous trading community in which barriers to the movement of goods are at a minimum and current international payments can be made without restriction', the safeguards for American industry embodied in the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act and the escape provisions which had been added in Congress inevitably cast doubt on the value of tariff concessions made by the United States. Moreover, Mr. Heeney added, such moves strengthened and encouraged reactionary trade policies in other countries.

Something of this was seen during the long negotiations during the summer which preceded Japan's entrance into G.A.T.T. A protocol setting out the terms of Japan's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was open for signature from 7 June; and by the beginning of August the necessary two-thirds of the thirty-four members had agreed to Japan's entry. But already at this stage some countries had indicated their intention of invoking article 35,[2] and finally fourteen nations including Australia, New Zealand, the Benelux countries, France, and Great Britain—which together accounted for over 40 per cent. of Japan's trade with G.A.T.T. members—invoked the clause. Japan protested at such treatment and asked for evidence to show why she should not be treated as an equal trading partner. The United States administration was a severe critic of its allies, not least because it feared that if Japan, faced with an increasing population and a decline in American aid, were not permitted trade with the non-communist world, it would seek an entry into the communist world-trade system.[3]

[1] *Statements and Speeches*, Information Division, Department of External Affairs, no. 55/35.

[2] Any country invoking article 35 was entitled to withhold the privileges accruing to G.A.T.T. members at will: i.e. it might raise barriers against imports from Japan on its own account, whenever it considered such a course to be necessary.

[3] It was suggested that if textiles were removed from the scope of G.A.T.T. privileges some of the countries invoking article 35 might reverse their decision, but this would have weakened the organization even more than reservations concerning agricultural products had done, and was unlikely to make it much more acceptable.

The Japanese delegate left the conference in no doubt that his country felt wronged. The Japanese government, he said, 'insists that rules solely applicable to Japan shall not be adopted within G.A.T.T.' Furthermore, it was of the opinion that 'non-discriminatory treatment on the part of the free world is a condition *sine qua non* for collaborating with it'.[1]

The view here enunciated by the Japanese government expressed the essence of the criticism directed against the western powers, in particular by the Asian countries. This was not merely a question of commercial discrimination. What was resented, more generally, was the apparent inability of the western powers to gauge the importance of the new nations in any but power terms. In a world increasingly accepting the principle of 'one head, one vote', whether in internal government or in the United Nations, the strength of the new nations lay in their numbers and in their influence over opinion. In these circumstances it might have been thought that the great powers would go out of their way to educate and to elicit the support of that opinion. Instead the western powers did little to explain their policies in terms comprehensible to neutralist thinking, with the result that incompatibilities were exaggerated and the worst features in the policies on both sides tended to be emphasized. On the one side, the powers directly or indirectly connected with the Atlantic alliance showed little ability to treat the new nations as equals; on the other side, the latter, believing that the ex-colonial powers would only yield under tangible pressure, were themselves apt to fall back upon force as an instrument of policy. These tensions were seen particularly in the relations between India and Portugal over Goa, and between the Netherlands and Indonesia; and it was not long before it began to seem as though, in the long run, the inability of the western powers to agree among themselves might be a less serious weakness than their failure to get on with the new nations.

*The Netherlands and Indonesia*

There had been little harmony in relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia since the latter had asserted its independence in 1949. During 1955 the Indonesian trial of Dutch citizens and the unsettled issue of West New Guinea continued to cause irritation.[2] On 13 June a white paper was published in The Hague dealing with the former issue. The Dutch government did not deny the right of Indonesia to arrest and try Dutch subjects, but charged the Indonesian government with failing to ensure a fair and speedy trial, and with maltreating and torturing the

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 21 November 1955.

[2] Cf. *Survey*, 1954, p. 312. During the early summer, when additional Dutch counsel had been refused entrance to Indonesia, a British lawyer was appointed; but on 25 May he also was refused admittance.

internees. In August the Afro-Asian conference of United Nations members agreed to try once again to have the question of Dutch New Guinea put on the agenda of the General Assembly.[1] The Netherlands immediately sought the necessary one-third of votes to defeat the resolution, helped by Australia which was 'confident that the Commonwealth countries' would oppose the resolution. But this was one of the issues on which there could be no Commonwealth unanimity, for Pakistan and India were part-sponsors of the Afro-Asian resolution,[2] and in spite of protests from the Dutch delegate, the General Assembly accepted the item. Nevertheless, at the beginning of October there were signs of an improvement in relations between the Dutch and Indonesian governments. It was hoped that informal talks in New York would be a prelude to official discussions. It was agreed to discuss such problems as trade, migration, and transport between West New Guinea and the Indonesian islands, but not the actual sovereignty of the territory. Meanwhile ratification of the protocol liquidating the Netherlands-Indonesian union was also temporarily delayed. Formal discussions opened at The Hague on 9 December.

*Portugal and Goa*

The continuation of Portuguese rule in India was a further cause of ill-feeling. During the early summer renewed attempts were made to persuade the people of Goa to join the Republic of India. Early in June Portugal notified the Indian government that attempts to enter Goa illegally would be treated 'as criminal violations of Portuguese sovereignty', and that the Indian government would be held 'exclusively responsible for any consequences' that might ensue. The Portuguese complained of intentional distortions of opinion in Goa, and directed attention to nineteen attacks on Portuguese frontier posts between 26 January and 4 June by groups which were 'organized on the soil of the Indian Union, thanks to the connivance of the Indian authorities'.

Although the Indian government protested at this interpretation of the situation, the Portuguese government was as good as its word and violations of the frontier continued to be countered by arrests. The result was an outburst by Nehru. 'There is nothing more fantastic, absurd and scandalous', he said, 'historically, politically, religiously, than the Portuguese occupation of Goa'; and, in a rising fury, he added that there must be

[1] In the charter of transfer of sovereignty issued after the round table conference in 1949 it was stated that 'the question of the political status of New Guinea should be determined through negotiations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands'. Negotiations had, however, broken down after the unilateral termination of the Netherlands-Indonesian union in 1954.

[2] On 29 September 1955 in the General Assembly Steering Committee Mexico, Haiti, Ethiopia, Egypt, the Soviet Union, and Poland voted in favour of including the item. France, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom were opposed. The United States and China abstained.

'no nonsense about Goa, no matter from which quarter it comes. Let the world take notice, let the Atlantic Powers also take notice.' There was no comparison, he insisted, between his recent injunction to Vietnam to keep the Geneva Agreements signed on its behalf by France, and India's responsibility for keeping agreements signed by Great Britain. He condemned the handling of the issue by the press and asserted that if the Portuguese continued to be indifferent to moral pressure 'we think that their regime in Goa will collapse, and if they are not careful their regime in Portugal itself will collapse'.[1] Compared with this outburst the reply from Lisbon seemed moderate and patient.

> Mr. Nehru [the Portuguese government stated] is undoubtedly an outstanding figure in the present international scene, but he is also a person who gets impatient at the least hitch or the least obstacle in his path. If the question of Goa is understood as a transfer to the Indian Union of the sovereignty of Portuguese territories, it is certain that the question will not be solved by peaceful means. If the question is understood as a series of problems arising out of the contiguity of territories or their mosaic features, out of historical circumstances which make them not only neighbours but closely related as well, a solution, we should say, is not only possible but relatively easy. We are always ready to negotiate in a friendly way.[2]

Indian opinion, however, was not mollified. Instead, the Indian government replied by closing the Portuguese legation, and, on 19 August, following a particularly serious incident on India Day, consuls were withdrawn. Thereafter, however, when it became clear that India was not going to get its way, different counsels prevailed. At the beginning of September the All-India Congress approved a resolution admitting that mistakes had been made in the Indian campaign; and it was agreed that in future no Indians should enter Goa as political demonstrators. Although this decision was criticized by the communists and the Praja socialists, whose supporters had formed the majority of the demonstrators, Nehru reaffirmed on 17 September that crossing into Goa would be prevented, but he added that economic and financial sanctions would be maintained.

The issue was one of more than local interest because, as a result of Portugal's determined stand, India was compelled to withdraw, and its international prestige suffered in consequence. Furthermore, Nehru's midsummer blustering detracted somewhat from the current image of a calm if moralistic statesman. Nevertheless it was equally easy to represent the issue as another occasion when a colonial power (in this case, moreover, an undisguised dictatorship) had opposed the legitimate desires of a subject people; and it is perhaps unnecessary to add that, in the international

[1] *Hindu*, 20 July 1955.
[2] *The Times*, 23 July 1955.

atmosphere current at the time, the latter view had at least as wide a circulation as the former.

*Ethiopia and Somaliland*

A further opportunity for the uncommitted world to point to the insensitivity of the western powers where subject peoples were concerned, arose from incidents resulting from the implementation of the Anglo-Ethiopian agreement of November 1954. By this agreement, which came into force on 28 February 1955, some 25,000 square miles of territory were transferred to Ethiopia,[1] against the wishes, as it would seem, of the Somalis inhabiting the territory, who would have preferred to remain within the British Somaliland protectorate. With this in view, a Somali delegation approached the Colonial Office, which, however, claimed that it was unable to intervene and warned the delegation against taking its case either to the International Court at The Hague or to the United Nations Assembly.[2] Nevertheless, the Somalis decided, at the beginning of May, to appeal to the Assembly,[3] and, somewhat ironically, it was Cairo which offered to sponsor their arguments for remaining under the British protectorate, and which got the credit for its action.[4] Nor was it long before incidents in Ethiopia aroused further concern in Somaliland and greater sympathy for the Somali cause.

In August reports reached London of Somalis being publicly hanged in the enforced presence of relatives,[5] and in the course of the autumn further reports of armed clashes, unexplained arrests, torture, and other forms of official oppression and of racial and religious discrimination, continued to come in. Even now, however, no action was taken in London, and the Somalis complained that they could not 'understand why the British government should try to stop us from appealing to the United Nations and to the International Court of Justice. It is Great Britain, our protector, which is determined that we shall have no redress and shall

[1] See Cmd. 9348. The area in question had previously been Ethiopian territory, since the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897 and subsequent arrangements had been made without prejudice to Ethiopian sovereignty. In the negotiations of 1954, however, the British government had secured grazing rights for the 300,000 Somalis who used the territory.

[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 24 February 1955.

[3] The appeal was to be on the grounds that the 1884 and 1886 agreements, by which the Somalis had voluntarily placed themselves under the protection of the British crown, took precedence over the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1897; and that a trustee can renounce its trusteeship but cannot dispose of its wards' possessions without their consent.

[4] 'Egypt', the Somali leader said, 'will be ever remembered for this day by the Somali people.' *The Times*, 6 May 1955.

[5] Ibid. 20 August 1955. These incidents occurred in an area transferred to Ethiopia in 1951. The Ethiopian authorities had subsequently tried to collect taxes for the whole of the previous eight-year period of British administration; as a result incidents had occurred during which a policeman was killed; arrests had followed and after lengthy imprisonment death sentences had been passed.

not seek redress elsewhere.'[1] At the beginning of November, however, there was a change and notice was officially taken of the situation in London, where the minister of state for colonies referred to difficulties which had arisen in the implementation of the agreement, particularly in regard to the reserved area, and announced that discussions would be held between British representatives and the Ethiopian authorities.[2] British dilatoriness, however, lost it some sympathy in Africa, and gave Egypt another opportunity to stand out as the champion of oppressed minorities.

*Developments in the Commonwealth*

Another area where similar issues gave rise to international comment, if not specific repercussions, was South Africa. Although members of the Atlantic alliance might, individually, deplore certain of the policies of the South African government, collectively they were apt, as colonial powers, to be identified with them by Afro-Asian opinion, and the exigencies of western solidarity made it difficult to adopt an unequivocal attitude. In addition to the basic problems of relations between Africans and Europeans, foreign opinion was also concerned with the question of Asian settlers in the country. This latter question was to have been discussed by South African, Pakistani, and Indian representatives; but following speeches by Mr. Nehru on the 'tyrannical oppression in South Africa', the Union government was 'obliged to abandon this attempt to . . . discuss existing differences in an amicable spirit', and Mr. Louw cancelled the proposed round table conference.[3] Correspondence published at the end of August showed that a United Nations' offer of mediation had also been rejected.

Indeed, South Africa had little respect for the convenient stick the Afro-Asian countries had found in the United Nations. On 5 May it had withdrawn from U.N.E.S.C.O. on the grounds that the organization spread propaganda hostile to South Africa's racial policies and because the government was convinced of its futility. On 8 July it withdrew its offer to negotiate directly with Great Britain, France, and the United States over South-West Africa, and ignored a United Nations refusal to accept the South African viewpoint. At the beginning of November the South African delegate walked out of the United Nations political committee on the grounds that the decision to continue investigation into South Africa's racial policy was interference in the Union's domestic affairs.[4] There was nothing new in South Africa's attitude; but the newly

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 16 September 1955.
[2] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 545, p. 121, 2 November 1955.
[3] *The Times*, 22 April 1955.
[4] The resolution, sponsored by seventeen Afro-Asian countries, was adopted by 37 votes to 7.

won powers of the Afro-Asian countries in the United Nations brought a new urgency to the question, and emphasized its international aspects.

In South Africa itself some of the implications of apartheid were beginning to arouse misgivings even among government supporters. The Senate Bill brought protests from educated opinion in the Nationalist as well as in the United Party, and led to the remobilization of the Torch Commando.[1] Nevertheless its third reading passed in the House on 9 June, and the Senate on 16 June; and the governor-general gave his assent on 20 June. It was immediately condemned by the Anglican archbishop of Capetown, who said that there could be no real peace or mutual confidence when legislation was based on fear. The wider international significance of the Act, on the other hand, lay in its effects upon opinion in the rest of Africa. Particularly significant was the comment of Dr. Nkrumah, who now maintained that independence for the Gold Coast would be meaningless, unless it were linked with the total liberation of Africa. In this way the South African question was tied up with Commonwealth development in general; and, more widely, in view of the enhanced importance of the African continent, both strategically and as a source of supply, the problems of African race relations were beginning to assume an important place in international affairs.

In Kenya the government continued the policy of combating Mau Mau. On 20 May it was announced that talks with African leaders on mass surrender had broken down because an 'essential condition'—namely 'substantial token surrender at an agreed place' to provide evidence of good faith—had not been fulfilled, and that intensified military operations

It was opposed by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Great Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Thirteen nations, including the United States, abstained on the vote to continue investigations into South Africa's apartheid policies. (Previously the United States had voted for the inscription of the item on the agenda.) Cf. *The Times*, 10 November 1955. It may be true, as the South African government maintained, that from a legal point of view the resolution contravened article 2, section 7, of the United Nations Charter; but the fact remains that in a political sense the policy of apartheid was throughout the period a matter of international concern. For that reason, it is discussed here.

[1] The purpose of the Senate Bill was to amend the South Africa Act of 1909 and the South-West Africa Affairs (Amendment Act) of 1949. It would enlarge the membership of the Senate; introduce a direct bloc vote system of election, instead of proportional representation for the election of provincial representatives, and change the number of senators representing each province. Its purpose was to enable the government to pass legislation for the separate representation of voters, and thus eliminate opposition representation except in Natal, and to ensure the government five more seats than the two-thirds majority in a joint session of both Houses, which was necessary to amend the South Africa Act. Separate representation of voters had been part of the Nationalist platform in two general and two provincial elections. Although on 23 May 1955 Mr. Strauss, leader of the opposition, attacked the Bill because it would deprive large sections of the people of representation in the Senate, on 20 October the Cape Congress of the United Party, whilst reaffirming its support for a common voters' roll, endorsed statements by Mr. Strauss, declining to commit himself unconditionally to restore coloured voters to the roll if returned to power, on the grounds that the Senate Act had abolished the former entrenchment of the coloured franchise.

would be launched.[1] On the other hand, there were some signs of an easing of repressive measures. It was suggested that there should be two more African representatives in the Legislative Council and that African political organizations based on district associations should be encouraged; and from 20 July the illegal possession of ammunition or explosives was no longer to be a capital offence. Nevertheless it was found during the summer that Mau Mau activities had spread to members of the Maragoli tribe. In Uganda both the amendments to the Namirembe recommendations on constitutional reform, and the appeal for the early return of the Kabaka, resolved by the Great Lukiko of Buganda at the beginning of May, were accepted by the British colonial secretary; and the Kabaka returned on 17 October. In Singapore, on the other hand, demonstrations led to the reimposition of emergency regulations, and on 3 June it was announced that there were still 3,500 to 4,000 guerrillas in Malaya, compared to the 8,000 believed to be at large in 1951.

In other ways, confidence between members of the Commonwealth was not so strong as it might have been. In spite of political advance and a decidedly liberal attitude in London, and in spite of United Kingdom contributions to colonial development and welfare, there was still suspicion of British imperialism—whatever that much abused term might mean. Malta, it is true, sought closer association with the United Kingdom and discussions to this end opened on 19 September; but in South Africa Mr. Strijdom announced the aim of his government to be the 'sovereign independence of a republic'. Moreover, there was considerable distrust between other Commonwealth countries. The most evident case was the dispute between India and Pakistan, but, in addition, Sir John Kotelawala warned Ceylon that, if it were to cut its connexions with the Commonwealth, the island would be dominated by India. Even more important, in a wider context, was the tendency of different members of the Commonwealth to view international affairs in different lights. Canada, in particular, seemed to be adopting an independent line. There had been evidence earlier that Canada did not fully agree with United States policies towards China and in Europe,[2] and when, in the autumn of 1955, Mr. Lester Pearson visited Moscow—the first official visit to the Soviet Union since 1947 by a foreign minister of one of the war-time allies—the flexibility of Canadian policy and its underlying tendency to cut across ideological barriers, made a considerable impression. In Moscow Mr. Pearson referred to the position of the two countries as 'neighbours across the North Pole' and emphasized how important it was 'that we should come

[1] On 25 May it was stated in the Legislative Council that 83,000 people were in prison; and later, that 324 African landowners, affected by the Forfeiture of Lands Ordinance, had had their land confiscated for failing to respond to the amnesty offer before 10 July.

[2] See above, pp. 12, 42.

to know one another better and more clearly understand our respective problems and points of view, so that we can work together for peace and understanding'.[1] This positive affirmation of a policy of coexistence was appreciated in Asia, and assured Lester Pearson of a warm welcome during his subsequent tour of that continent. Here he secured Indian good will by a statement dissociating the North Atlantic alliance from Portugal's dispute with India over Goa. Furthermore, while endorsing Pancha Shila in general terms, Lester Pearson emphasized his belief that something more positive was necessary. 'Co-existence', he said, 'is a fact. Co-operation is something we have to achieve.'[2] Nor, once back in Ottawa, did he cease to pursue an independent line. Convinced that the Soviet Union would not accept western terms for the reunification of Germany, he came out for a reappraisal of western policy and suggested that the next meeting of the N.A.T.O. Council was a suitable occasion for such a review. He had no doubt that the Soviet Union was genuinely frightened by United States bases abroad and the rearming of the nation which had plunged Europe into war in 1939, and urged the United States to 'avoid provocation and provocative statements like the plague'.[3]

*Korea and Formosa*

Whereas the attitude of Canada was an indication of dissatisfaction, on the part of some members of the western alliance, with the existing situation, and of a belief that it was possible with greater flexibility in western policy to better it, there were also governments allied with the United States whose very existence was bound up with the *status quo* and which therefore resisted all tendencies to change. Among them the government of South Korea and Chiang Kai-shek's administration in Formosa were the most tenacious.

In Korea trouble arose over the position of the neutral supervisory committee set up at the time of the Korean armistice. Following the gradual reduction of troops by both sides in Korea during the spring of 1955,[4] the suggestion was made that the Supervisory Commission should be abolished or considerably reduced. This suggestion, made at the beginning of March, was opposed by the Chinese government, which, however, agreed to a reduction in staff. Chinese opposition was treated as a provocation by the South Korean government which used the occasion to issue threats against the communist members of the Commission, and a period of deliberately provoked tension began.[5] Accusations and counter-accusations of violations of the armistice agreement were made during the summer. On 15 July the South Korean military chiefs of staff threatened

[1] *Soviet News*, 6 October 1955.
[2] *Hindu*, 6 November 1955.
[3] *N.Y. Times*, 20 November 1955.
[4] Cf. below, p. 131.
[5] *The Times*, 20 March 1955.

to march on North Korea unless the neutral nations Supervisory Commission was dissolved, and demanded that the military power of South Korea should be increased until it was equal to that of North Korea. At the beginning of August charges of espionage and obstruction were levied against Czech and Polish members of the Commission. At the same time, the South Koreans demanded the withdrawal of communist forces from the territory south of the 30th parallel which they had continued to occupy under the armistice agreement. This was followed on 7 August by an ultimatum to the Commission to withdraw by 13 August, and by a week of demonstrations and riots in Seoul, Pusan, and Inchon during which American troops had to protect the neutral teams.

These outbreaks of violence, which could scarcely have occurred without the connivance of the South Korean government, brought a protest from the British government, and on 10 August Mr. Dulles also expressed American disapproval. On 11 August the Chinese government denounced the South Korean demand for the withdrawal of the Commission as a plot to upset the armistice and stated that it would hold the United Nations' command responsible for preventing trouble. As a result of Anglo-American firmness, however, the South Korean government was prevailed upon to moderate its behaviour, and on 13 August Synghman Rhee announced that he was extending the deadline of the government's ultimatum for several days. By the end of the month the situation had quietened down, but the impression left by the course of events was embarrassing to the west.

Scarcely less bellicose was the attitude of the Chinese Nationalist régime in Formosa, which showed little hesitation in making the most of its nuisance value. In May auxiliaries of the Chinese Nationalist army still encamped on Burmese territory engaged in hostilities with Burmese government troops. Even the United States government, whose support was necessary to its very existence, was not immune; the Sino-American talks at Geneva,[1] for example, were described by the official Kuomintang newspaper as 100 per cent. proof of appeasement. But it was Great Britain, which was known to have mediated between communist China and the United States, that bore the brunt of the attack. In June Great Britain protested against interference with two British steamers by Chinese Nationalist warships in the Formosa straits, and on 11 July there was a further protest at Nationalist air attacks on the British freighter *Inchwell* near the mainland port of Foochow. Further attacks on British and Norwegian vessels occurred at intervals during the summer. These were pinpricks; but in so far as the Formosan government was regarded as a particular protégé of the United States, they were indicative of the tensions and divergences of interest between the different members of the western alliance.

[1] Cf. below, p. 131.

These tensions should not be exaggerated; they were mostly in a minor key, and where they existed, they had their origin in ineluctable geographical and economic circumstances, and were never important enough to weaken the underlying unity of purpose. Indeed, it is fair to say that many aspects of western disunity were more apparent than real, and that they may easily seem more serious than in fact they were. It is also true that similar tendencies were at play in the communist world, though here it was easier to avoid publicity, and it was only at a later stage that the divergences came out into the open.[1] Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that it was of the nature of a wide and loose alliance of democratic states for differences to be ventilated. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, at this period, it was the west which seemed to be suffering from divided counsels and disparate aims; and it was perhaps unfortunate, since a positive policy was all too likely to increase stresses, that the easiest way to iron out differences between the members of the alliance was to follow a negative line. At the highest level, in the negotiations with the Soviet Union during the summer and autumn, the western powers found little difficulty in presenting a common front; but even here neutral observers tended to regard and sometimes to criticize western policy as negative and unimaginative. The views expressed from Canada by Lester Pearson[2] found a considerable echo. It was, of course, easy for those to criticize who were not burdened with the responsibility of decision. Nevertheless, the impression of a certain lack of flexibility on the western side, and of an unclarity of aim springing from divided counsels, was a factor, at least among the 'uncommitted' nations. In their eyes, it would seem, there was a definite contrast between western slowness to move and communist initiative. The steps taken by the Soviet Union in the summer and autumn of 1955 to convince the world of communist desire for a *détente*, were certainly not ineffective in winning sympathy for the view that a new approach to the problems dividing the world was feasible.

[1] Cf. below, pp. 230 sqq.

[2] Cf. above, p. 121.

## CHAPTER IX

# SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

In the new situation which made itself apparent about May 1955, the Soviet government under Khrushchev was quick to grasp the initiative. It understood, better than the western powers appeared to do, the value of the psychological factors and the importance of timely gestures. *Détente* would not come of its own; an appropriate atmosphere had to be created, and in particular it was necessary to combat the view propagated in the west ever since the Czech crisis of 1948 and the Berlin blockade, that the Russian bear was waiting, voracious and implacable, ever ready to pounce. So long as this view held the field, and public opinion in the west was firm behind the statesmen who espoused it, the prospect of change was small. Hence it was Soviet policy to break the deadlock and to appeal to western opinion over the heads of its accredited leaders; and the method it chose was a series of conciliatory moves, of which those in relation to Austria, Finland, Jugoslavia, and western Germany were the most striking. At the same time communist China followed a similar line by its peaceful attitude in the Far East; and the attitude of the Bandung powers, particularly of India, set the seal of approval on the communist moves which were hailed, in the unaligned countries, as a major contribution towards an improved world situation. When, on 6 July, Nehru reviewed the factors which had brought about a change, it was noticeable that nothing which he mentioned was the result of western initiative.[1] Thus western policy appeared in a negative light; and its apparently negative quality was all too apt to produce a sense of dissatisfaction.

### *Austria*

On the communist side, the most impressive evidence of a change in attitude was the liquidation of the Austrian question, which had hung fire, largely as a result of Soviet intransigence, ever since 1947.[2] As late as 8 February 1955 Molotov had stated categorically that 'the Austrian problem could not be considered apart from the German problem'.[3] This was a point of view which the Soviet government had propounded from 1953 onwards,[4] and which, having regard to the historical circumstances, was neither incomprehensible nor indefensible. But less than a month

[1] The factors which he specified were (i) the Bandung conference, (ii) the Austrian treaty, (iii) signs of a *rapprochement* on disarmament, (iv) the Jugoslav–Soviet talks, (v) Nehru's own discussions with Soviet leaders. Cf. *Hindu*, 8 July 1955.

[2] Cf. *Survey*, 1947–8, p. 228; ibid. 1949–50, pp. 281–93.

[3] Cf. *Documents*, 1955, p. 217.

[4] Cf. *Survey*, 1953, p. 39.

later Soviet policy had undergone a complete *volte face*. Nothing more plainly indicated that the new Russian government had decided that it could not deflect the western powers from German rearmament, and had embarked on a new course. This change of attitude was clarified in interviews, on 25 February and 2 March, between Molotov and the Austrian ambassador in Moscow, in which the cardinal point was the elucidation of Molotov's statement of 8 February. Molotov's statement, it was now held,[1] was not meant to

> make the settlement of the Austrian question dependent on the settlement of the German question, but only pointed to the connexion which naturally existed between the two questions. At the same time the Soviet government attached particular importance to the fact that agreement should be reached on measures to prevent a new Anschluss. It was also pointed out that at the Berlin Conference the Soviet delegation had insisted that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Austria should be postponed until a peace treaty was concluded with Germany. The Soviet side now proposed that the four powers withdraw their troops from Austria without waiting for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. . . .
>
> The Soviet government . . . also attached great importance to the fact that Austria should not be drawn into any coalitions or military alliances . . . and that Austria's territory should not be allowed to be used for the establishment of foreign military bases.

This statement, in fact, set out the main headings, apart from economic issues, under which negotiations subsequently proceeded; and from this point discussions went quickly ahead.

In Vienna the government, apprehensive lest the western powers should react unfavourably to bilateral Austro-Russian negotiations, emphasized that 'a final solution of the Austrian question can be reached only through a conference of all the powers involved, with Austria also taking part'.[2] The western powers, however, while repeating that the conclusion of a state treaty was the concern of all four governments, nevertheless welcomed the Soviet initiative, and hoped that 'useful clarifications' would result from the visit of Herr Raab to Moscow on 11 April.

At the meeting in Moscow the Austrian delegation accepted the Soviet initiative and agreement was reached on outstanding issues. Among these that of particular concern to the U.S.S.R. was that Austria should give assurance that neutrality would not only preclude the joining of alliances, but also the retention of foreign military bases. This was of significance for the west both because it meant that existing United States bases containing some 5,000 men, had to be transferred south of the Brenner,[3]

[1] *Documents*, 1955, pp. 218–220.

[2] The course of these negotiations is documented in *Documents*, 1955, pp. 217 sqq.

[3] For the practical implications of this move, see D. C. Watt in *International Relations*, vol. i, no. 6.

and because it gave some indication of what a neutral zone in Europe would entail.

Furthermore, agreement was reached on outstanding economic questions, particularly on the German assets which the Soviet Union had claimed as part of reparations. In modification of those terms of the treaty[1] which related to claims arising out of the war, Russia was willing to accept Austrian goods, instead of (as formerly envisaged) the payment of 150,000,000 United States dollars in freely convertible currency. Moreover, on the coming into effect of the treaty, the Soviet Union was willing to sell its rights in German assets back to Austria. Although this settlement entailed heavy commercial and financial obligations, and the tacit acceptance of long resisted Soviet claims, it did ensure Austrian independence in economic as well as political affairs.

The foreign ministers of the four occupying powers met Dr. Figl in Vienna, and on 15 May formalities were completed. The occupying forces withdrew during the summer, the evacuation of Vienna being completed by mid-September and that of the rest of Austria before the expiration of the three-month schedule. In conformity with the government's undertaking, a draft law establishing the perpetual neutrality of Austria was submitted to parliament. This was passed by the lower and upper houses on 24 and 26 October respectively and took effect from 5 November. Meanwhile the re-establishment of complete political and economic independence had been celebrated throughout the country on 25 October, but it was the reopening of the Opera on 5 November which, for the Viennese at least, provided not only a particularly suitable occasion on which to rejoice, but also symbolized the freedom of Austria.

*Finland*

The conclusion of the Austrian state treaty contributed more, perhaps, than anything else to the more favourable view of Russian intentions which was gaining ground in the summer of 1955; and it was also seen as practical evidence of international *détente*. The impression was strengthened, later in the year, by similar developments in Sino-Russian and in Russo-Finnish relations. It is true that Russia's undertaking to evacuate Port Arthur and to transfer it to the Chinese Republic dated from 1954;[2] but the completion of the transfer, on 26 May 1955, nevertheless appeared, in the conditions of the time, as a further token of good will and conciliatory intentions.[3] The same applied to the restoration to Finland of the naval base of

[1] For the full text of the Austrian state treaty, see Cmd. 9482.

[2] *Documents*, 1954, p. 327.

[3] An even earlier gesture, on 1 January 1955, was the transfer to China of the Soviet shares in the Sino-Soviet mixed companies. The significance of these concessions has to be measured against Stalinist practice. According to a later statement by Khrushchev (*Daily Telegraph*, 5 June 1956) Stalin had made 'colonial' demands on China, which Mao-Tse-tung had bitterly resented.

Porkkala, which had been leased to Russia for fifty years under an agreement made in February 1947. Although changes in the nature of warfare had largely rendered the Porkkala base obsolete, the fact remained that here again the Kremlin had voluntarily surrendered a diplomatic bargaining-point it could legitimately have retained; it cancelled a lease which still had forty-two years to run, and 'which it could have extended at any time at the shake of a fist'.[1] Moreover, the move was the more effective because it came at a time when 'the signing of the Paris agreements gave the Soviet Union the legal right to make new demands on Finland', if it so wished. Hence it constituted still another addition to the Soviet Union's 'steady series of impressive but economical gestures' in the interests of more widespread *détente*.

Although the agreement for the Soviet withdrawal from Porkkala was not signed until 19 September,[2] there had been a number of indications from the time of the negotiation of the Austrian state treaty of the direction in which Russian policy was moving. Already in March it was reported that the new Soviet régime was following a 'soft' policy towards Finland; and although there were rumours in April that Russia was exerting pressure to draw Finland into the eastern bloc, these were formally denied by the Finnish prime minister, and proved to have been unfounded.[3] In fact, far from putting renewed pressure on Finland, the Soviet Union, according to diplomatic circles in London, was 'embarrassed at its continued hold on the naval base at Porkkala'; and in June it made a first conciliatory gesture by relaxing restrictions on travel in the area of the base. It seems probable that this move was designed to conciliate the Scandinavian countries, and to extend the Russian peace campaign to northern Europe.[4] In any event, it emboldened the Finns to aim higher, and on 12 July the leading independent Finnish newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*, pointing out the adverse effects of the continued Russian occupation of the base on the moral position of the Soviet Union, formally raised the question of the return of Porkkala to Finland. If, as the communists were demanding, the United States should evacuate Formosa, what (the paper asked) about Porkkala, now the only remaining Russian military base outside the territory of the Soviet Union?

These arguments evidently made a positive impression in the Kremlin. Early in September it became known that President Paasikivi had accepted

[1] *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, 27 September 1955.

[2] For the text, cf. *Documents*, 1955, p. 206.

[3] For the rumours, cf. *N.Y. Times*, 28 March 1955; *Figaro*, 8 April 1955; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 20 April 1955. For Mr. Kekkonen's statement, cf. *Soviet News*, 28 April 1955.

[4] Other evidence of this new approach to the northern countries was the invitation to a Swedish parliamentary delegation to visit Moscow, the statement in *Izvestia* that there were no outstanding disputes between these lands and the Soviet Union, and the change of tone in references to Denmark and Norway, whose adherence to N.A.T.O. had been the subject of attack during the earlier months of the year. Cf. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16–17 July 1955.

an invitation to Moscow and that he would leave on 15 September, accompanied by the prime minister, Mr. Kekkonen, and the minister of defence. Negotiations for the evacuation of the base were completed within two days. The U.S.S.R. renounced all the rights granted by the 1944 lease, and guaranteed the withdrawal of its armed forces within a period of three months, dating from the exchange of the ratified agreements. Furthermore, it agreed to hand over to Finland without compensation the installations which would remain; all mutual claims for other items would automatically lapse after the three-month withdrawal period had ended. At the same time the treaty of friendship between the two countries was extended for another ten years with the possibility of further extension.

If the speed and generosity of the Soviet moves were favourably commented on, the action itself was nevertheless something of an enigma. Marshal Zhukov's suggestion that it would be a good augury for peace if the United States were to follow Russia's example, was not regarded in the west as a serious challenge, since the opportunity for a bargain had passed. Nevertheless it was probably unwise of Washington to condemn the evacuation of the base as a relatively insignificant gesture; in a world grasping every shred of evidence of *détente*, it was at least a positive action. It is possible also that Moscow hoped that it might have wider consequences. Although Finland had rebuffed Soviet suggestions that it should join the Warsaw treaty organization, the Soviet Union perhaps hoped that it would be willing to form one of a belt of states whose neutrality would be guaranteed by both sides. This arrangement had been suggested in the case of Austria; and with the start of German rearmament it is not impossible that the Soviet Union was ready to welcome such a scheme which even at this stage might have prevented active west German participation in N.A.T.O.[1] Hence there were political observers who predicted repercussions 'extending far beyond the boundaries of Finland'.[2] This estimate proved, in fact, to be incorrect; but without going so far as to describe the Russian move as a sensational event, it was not unreasonable to consider it as an example 'which the western powers might find hard to match'.[3]

*The Far East*

In the Far East also there were signs that Russian policy was seeking a *détente*, though here the results were less conclusive. As already noted, outstanding points with China were liquidated, and in addition Russia offered China technical aid in setting up an experimental atomic pile.

[1] For other hints of this plan, cf. below, p. 134.
[2] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 September 1955.
[3] *Manchester Guardian*, 12 September 1955.

This was accepted in an agreement on 1 May, and on 5 July Peking announced a further agreement with the U.S.S.R. for the exchange of scientific and technical information. But it was in relation to Japan, rather than to communist China, that the change in the Russian attitude was most evident. Here the new line was facilitated by the fall of the Yoshida cabinet in Japan at the end of 1954, and the succession of Hatoyama as prime minister on 10 December.[1] As one factor in the fall of Yoshida had been rising discontent at his conformity to the policies of Washington, especially in respect to communist China,[2] the change of government created the opportunity for a new beginning; and when, on 11 December, Mr. Shigemitsu, the foreign minister in the new government, announced his wish to normalize relations with the communist powers, he found a ready response in Moscow. The upshot was that, on 25 January 1955, the head of the Soviet mission in Japan delivered a note from Molotov to Hatoyama, formally proposing that negotiations should begin.

From the very beginning, however, there were technical difficulties. Japan did not wish to conduct negotiations in Tokyo, since this might involve recognizing the diplomatic status of the Soviet mission, which had been in dispute since 1952.[3] On the other hand, to hold them in Moscow might arouse suspicion in Washington; while for opposite reasons Moscow was averse to Shigemitsu's suggestion that they should be held in New York. Not until April was any progress made, and then, characteristically for its new orientation, it was the Soviet government which broke through the deadlock by proposing either Geneva or London; eventually it was agreed that conversations should open in London at the beginning of June.

The readiness of the Soviet government to embark upon negotiations had aroused hopes in Japan that they would make substantial concessions in return for the resumption of normal relations. It was in this conviction that the Japanese put forward their proposals on 7 June. They included, according to a prior statement by Mr. Shigemitsu, the question of the 12,000 Japanese alleged still to be in Soviet hands, the Japanese claims for the return of the Habomai islands and of Shikotan island, as well as for the Kurile islands and Karafuto, and the matter of Japanese fishing in waters adjacent to Soviet territory; in addition, there was the question of Japan's entry into the United Nations, which the U.S.S.R. had hitherto blocked.[4] But when, at the next meeting on 14 June, the Russians presented their terms, it was immediately evident that the two sides were far apart. The Russians demanded, first of all, that there should be a declaration ending the state of war and an exchange of ambassadors; they rejected the Japanese territorial claims *in toto*, and required Japan to recognize

[1] *Survey*, 1954, p. 270. [2] Ibid. p. 265. [3] Cf. *Survey*, 1952, pp. 365 sqq.
[4] *Nippon Times*, 27 May 1955.

Russian sovereignty over the islands in question; and they reiterated their earlier statement that, except for war criminals, all Japanese prisoners had already been repatriated. Other Soviet requirements were that Japan should not become a party to any military alliance directed against countries which had opposed her in the Pacific war, and that the straits which connected the Japan Sea and the Pacific should be closed to all foreign warships, except those of the U.S.S.R. and communist China.[1] In return, the Soviet government was prepared to support Japan's admission to the United Nations, to negotiate on fisheries and commercial questions, to waive (on a reciprocal basis) any claim to reparations, and to promise on the same basis to abstain from interference in Japanese internal affairs.

The publication of these terms—which was criticized from the Japanese left as a breach of faith, and as evidence that the government did not really want the negotiations to succeed—produced, as was to be expected, a hostile reaction in the Japanese press. Nevertheless, the negotiations continued during July and August and resulted in agreement upon a number of questions. These included Soviet support for Japan's entry into the United Nations, the waiver of reparations and war damage claims, non-intervention in domestic affairs, and the conclusion, subsequent to the restoration of normal diplomatic relations, of fishing and trading agreements.[2] But on the matter of Japanese detained in the U.S.S.R. and on the territorial issues, divergencies remained. On the latter, it is true, the Soviet government showed some disposition to yield on the Habomai islands and Shikotan, but remained adamant in its refusal to return the Kuriles and Karafuto (southern Sakhalin).[3] Eventually, in mid-September, the Japanese envoy was recalled to Tokyo, ostensibly to make an interim report, and the negotiations were allowed to lapse.

Although, in the end, the Soviet-Japanese negotiations came to nothing, their resumption in the summer was still another factor contributing to the impression at that stage of willingness on the Soviet side to negotiate. But perhaps even more important in this area was the attitude of communist China, which by this time was conciliatory. By the end of April it had become clear that no party wanted war over Formosa, and China was quick to make peaceful gestures. At the end of May four American airmen who had been in custody for two years, were deported and returned home via Hongkong; on 1 August the Chinese government announced the release of eleven others. This had some psychological significance; but more practically important was the thinning out of Chinese forces from

[1] *Soviet News*, 15 June 1955.

[2] *Nippon Times*, 30 June, 16 July, 4 August 1955; *N.Y. Times*, 17 August 1955.

[3] *The Times*, 16 September 1955. As Japanese socialists pointed out, the Soviet Union could hardly be expected to give up the Kurile islands, which were strategically important, while the United States still held possession of Okinawa and the Bonin islands.

Korea. On 25 March it was made known that six further Chinese divisions were being withdrawn, and on 29 September Peking announced that six more were to go during October, making a total reduction of 19 divisions since September 1954. The significance of these withdrawals was, indeed, challenged by the South Korean government, which alleged that reductions were more than offset by re-equipment with modern weapons, and coupled these charges with allegations against the impartiality of the Armistice Commission. But it was evidence of the new atmosphere in the Far East that neither the manœuvres of Synghman Rhee nor the inspired outbreaks of mob violence in South Korea succeeded in provoking the communists or upsetting the *status quo*. When, on 10 August, Mr. Dulles expressed general agreement with a statement issued by the British government on 8 August deploring the South Korean threats and demonstrations, President Rhee was forced to climb down. Finally on 22 November, the United Nations Assembly passed a resolution, declaring that the armistice should remain in force until it was superseded by an agreement for a peaceful settlement, which meant, in effect, that the question of Korean reunification was postponed indefinitely and the *status quo* formally recognized.

Much the same was the outcome of the Formosan question, which a few months earlier had seemed to threaten war. Here the gradual relaxation of tension was finally registered in an important speech which Chou En-lai delivered before the Chinese People's National Congress on 30 July, and which contrasted markedly in tone with his speeches of 24 January and 23 April.[1] After the Bandung conference, the Chinese government had stated that there were two possible ways for China to liberate Formosa; namely, by war or by peaceful means. Now, for the first time, Chou En-lai gave positive emphasis to the liberation of Formosa 'by peaceful means'.[2] It was, indeed, he still insisted, 'a matter of China's internal affairs'; but, 'provided that the United States does not interfere', the possibility of peaceful liberation, he predicted, would increase; and it was a major change when he announced his government's willingness 'to enter into negotiations with the responsible local authorities' in Formosa, i.e. with Chiang Kai-shek. At the same time, it was agreed to hold discussions on the international questions between China and the United States in Geneva, and these opened on 1 August. This *détente* was the result of the initiative of Great Britain and India, which, in Mr. Dulles's words,[3] had come to believe 'in the desire of the communists to pursue a peaceful path'; the fact that it was possible at all was due to the more conciliatory attitude expressed by Chou En-lai at and after Bandung.

A further factor of importance in reducing tension in the Far East was the progress towards the normalization of relations between Japan and the

[1] Cf. above, pp. 9, 12. [2] *Documents*, 1955, p. 461. [3] Ibid. p. 459.

communist world. The amicability of Japanese relations with North Korea was underlined by the continued friction between Japan and the Rhee régime in Seoul, in which the so-called 'Rhee line',[1] and the molestation of Japanese fishing craft by South Korean patrol-boats, continued to play a considerable role. Overtures in February 1955 by Mr. Hatoyama for the resumption of negotiations which had been broken off in October 1953, were brought to nothing by the intransigence of Synghman Rhee. By contrast, the North Korean government, which was making rapid recovery with Soviet and Chinese help from the havoc of the war years,[2] went out of its way to improve its relations with Japan. Japanese M.P.s visited Pyongyang and were received by Marshal Kim Il-sung; and in addition to the usual communiqués urging the development of cultural relations, freedom of trade, &c., North Korean officials appear to have intimated willingness to recognize the Japanese claim to Takeshima and to abandon or at least to modify the 'Rhee line'.[3] It is true that the Japanese government maintained an attitude of caution towards these advances; but unofficial response was considerable, and Mr. Hatoyama himself went so far—to the disgust of Synghman Rhee—as to say that time would show which of the two governments in Korea Japan would have to recognize.[4]

Far more important, however, than Japanese relations with North Korea were its relations with China. Immediately after the formation of the new government in December 1954, Shigemitsu had announced to the foreign affairs committee of the Diet that it was impossible to refuse *de facto* recognition to the Chinese People's Republic, and that he would take steps to develop trade with China, so far as Japan's international agreements allowed. This was carried a step farther when, on 16 February, Mr. Hatoyama suggested an exchange of trade missions with China; diplomatic and trade relations, he added later, were necessary to ease the cold war tension. The outcome was the signature on 4 May of a Sino-Japanese trade agreement, providing for an exchange of $30 million goods in both directions. In fact, during the first six months of 1955 Japanese exports to communist China were treble what they had been in the corresponding

[1] *Survey*, 1953, p. 258.

[2] Cf. the report of Japanese observers who visited the Hungnam and Hamhung districts, *Nippon Times*, 3 July 1955. In February 1955 it was reported that 40 new factories had been built during 1954, while 120 others had been wholly or partially restored. Production, it was claimed, had increased by 76 per cent. since the armistice, and slightly surpassed 1949 figures. North Korea had received goods to the value of 390 million roubles from the Soviet Union, and of 3,000 million dollars from China (*New China News Agency*, 1 February 1955). On 7 March a new trade agreement with the U.S.S.R., providing for a 25 per cent. increase over the 1954 level, was announced (*Soviet News*, 7 March 1955), and a further agreement was reported at the end of May (ibid. 31 May 1955).

[3] *New China News Agency*, 20, 24, 28 October 1955; *South China Morning Post*, 25 October 1955.

[4] *Nippon Times*, 8 June 1955.

period of 1954 and imports double; and although this represented only 2 per cent. of total Japanese foreign trade, its significance should not be under-estimated. The purpose of the new approach of the Hatoyama government was political as much as it was commercial. From the time of the Bandung conference it was in the interests of Japan to act (in Shigemitsu's words) as a 'mental bridge' or intermediary between Peking and the west, and to hold the balance between the two Chinas. As Hatoyama said, 'Asia is big enough for both'.[1] The strict dependence on the U.S.A., which had been characteristic of the Yoshida régime, was no longer apposite; and Japanese policy veered round in the direction of neutralism and Asian solidarity and peaceful co-operation. The line of development, here as elsewhere, was towards a lessening of tension; and although Japan's freedom of action was limited, and the offer by Chou En-lai to meet a Japanese representative with a view to restoring diplomatic relations was at this stage too dangerous to take up, the change of atmosphere in the Far East was nevertheless considerable.

*Jugoslavia*

Significant as the moves described heretofore may have been, none was comparable in the long run with the steps taken to normalize Soviet relations with Jugoslavia and with western Germany. As regards the former, it has already been seen that there had been some improvement in Russo-Jugoslav relations since October 1954;[2] but it was not until the mid-summer of 1955, as part of the Russian peace offensive, that the *rapprochement* finally came about. Probably the connexions which Tito had forged with the Bandung powers were among the factors contributing to the new amity; for it was important, from a Soviet point of view, to act in a way which commended itself to the uncommitted powers, and there is no doubt that the healing of the breach with Jugoslavia was regarded by them as an important step in the process of pacification. Nevertheless the main consideration was undoubtedly to demonstrate that Soviet policy was ready for conciliation, even if it meant condoning a long-standing breach in the unity of the communist front. In view of the degree to which Soviet *amour propre* had been injured by Tito's earlier insubordination, the lengths to which the new Russian leaders were prepared to go to secure reconciliation are a remarkable sign of the earnestness with which they were pursuing their new policy.

The significance attached to rapprochement with Jugoslavia was evident in the communiqué, issued on 14 May, announcing that the two governments had agreed to a meeting 'at the highest level', inspired by their common desire 'for a further improvement of relations between both countries and for the consolidation of peace'.[3] Not only did the Russians

[1] *Daily Mail*, 11 July 1955. [2] Above, pp. 54–55. [3] *The Times*, 16 May 1955.

select leaders of the highest rank as their delegates, while carefully excluding Molotov, who had been directly involved in the conflict of 1948;[1] they also made no difficulty about the meeting taking place on Jugoslav soil—a remarkable example of the mountain going to Mahomet. There are, indeed, good reasons to think that the initiative in the whole move came from the Soviet side, and that Tito—fearing adverse repercussions on his relations with the western powers—was at first cautious and reserved.[2] But if, when the project was first broached, the Soviet intention was perhaps to restore the communist front and win back Jugoslavia to the fold of the Cominform, by the time the preliminary negotiations had been completed the direction of Russian policy had passed into new hands, and the object was no longer to restore ideological unity but to establish a basis for 'peaceful co-existence', as part of the new political line Russia had adopted since the advent of the Bulganin–Khrushchev régime.[3] This fundamental change was made plain, a week before the Russian visit took place, in a significant article in *Pravda*, which smoothed the way for the subsequent negotiations. While admitting 'substantial differences in the understanding of a number of important questions of social development',[4] *Pravda* emphasized that the restoration of normal relations with the Soviet Union 'in no way implies, and cannot imply, a deterioration of Jugoslavia's relations with other countries'. The important point was rather the existence of a 'firm basis for wide and all round co-operation between the Soviet and Jugoslav peoples'. The apparent Soviet willingness to leave the ideological question in suspense was appreciated in Belgrade where President Tito welcomed the 'courageous decision' to make the visit as 'one of the most constructive' in the whole series of recent Soviet actions.[5] Jugoslavia, Tito repeated, would not join either bloc; on the other hand, he emphasized the need to develop a moral force for peace, and to start 'serious disarmament talks'. He also appeared to be in agreement with the probable Soviet design[6] to establish a belt of neutral countries across Europe with Austria and Jugoslavia at one end and Finland and Sweden at the other. In view of Jugoslav relations with the west, a meeting between Soviet and Jugoslav leaders on this basis might prove to be a step towards *rapprochement*, coexistence, and eventual co-operation between the two opposing blocs.

On his arrival at Belgrade on 26 May Mr. Khrushchev stated that the

[1] The delegation included Marshal Bulganin, Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Mikoyan, Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Kumykin (deputy minister for foreign trade), and Mr. Shepilov (chairman of the foreign affairs committee).

[2] Hence the prior notification of the forthcoming Soviet visit to the ambassadors of the western powers and of Greece and Turkey, accompanied by 'extremely firm assurances' that the talks would in no way affect Jugoslav foreign policy; *The Times*, 16 May 1955.

[3] The interpretation in *The World Today*, vol. xi (1955), pp. 326–7, is therefore unacceptable.

[4] *Pravda*, 18 May 1955.

[5] Speech at Pula; cf. *The Times*, 16 May 1955.

[6] Cf. above, p. 128.

aim of the meeting was to discuss a common approach to the question of relieving international tension. He emphasized that the Soviet Union based its foreign relations on the principles of equality and coexistence and recognized that any encroachment by states upon the territorial integrity of other states was impermissible.[1] More explicitly he acknowledged the part Russian intransigence had played in causing the break between the two countries. Nevertheless, it was evident that the Soviet leadership also hoped to re-establish contact with Jugoslav party officials. Khrushchev, who appeared, rather than Bulganin, to be the leader of the Russian delegation, stated that he considered it desirable to 'establish mutual confidence between our parties as well'. This feeling, however, was not reciprocated on the Jugoslav side. *Borba* omitted to report this aspect of Khrushchev's speech; and throughout the visit it was emphasized that the meeting was between two independent states and not an internal Communist Party affair. The final communiqué,[2] which was signed by Marshal Bulganin and President Tito, dealt with specific inter-state issues such as the question of nationality and economic relations, as well as the 'recognition and development of peaceful co-existence between nations, irrespective of ideological differences and differences of social systems'. It was agreed that there must be 'mutual respect and non-interference in international affairs for any reason, whether of an economic, political or ideological nature—since questions of the internal structure, differences of social systems, and differences of concrete forms in developing socialism are exclusively a matter for the peoples of the different countries'.[3] While Bulganin gave Tito satisfaction on this issue, the Soviet Union obtained Jugoslav support for its policy of securing the admission to the United Nations of the republic of China and other states meeting membership requirements; of limitation of armaments; and of a settlement in Germany and Taiwan 'in conformity with the wishes and legitimate rights' of the peoples involved.

The re-establishment of cordial relations between the Soviet Union and Jugoslavia enhanced Tito's prestige and increased his importance. The Soviet Union's gains were also clear. In the first place, it had improved

[1] Text of speech, *Documents*, 1955, p. 265.

[2] Text in *Documents*, 1955, p. 267.

[3] This did not end the ideological differences. Tito was still hesitant about the renewal of party relations. An article published in *Pravda* during July saying that the basis for a renewal of party contacts had been laid during the Belgrade talks six weeks earlier, was reprinted in *Borba* without comment. But when on 13 November *Pravda* said that the development of friendly relations between Jugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the popular democracies was one of the decisive conditions for a happy development of Jugoslavia towards socialism, *Borba* attacked the article. Co-operation with the Soviet Union was appreciated, but *Pravda* had made a mistake in supporting a policy which was at variance with the declaration signed by Tito and Bulganin which recognized the validity of different ways to the development of socialism and agreed that they were exclusively a matter for individual countries. Cf. *Le Monde*, 18 November 1955.

its moral standing by having once more renounced a policy of pressure on a small neighbour; while, on the practical side, the Soviet Union obtained Jugoslav support in foreign policy. On the other hand, the move could not be without effect on other communist states, especially those with a tradition of nationalism; while in other countries communist parties might feel less need for subservience to Moscow, especially if—as Tito predicted it would be—the Cominform were dissolved.

The impact, however, was scarcely less marked in western countries. The ambassadors of the United States, France, and Great Britain were informed of the results of the meetings shortly after the Soviet delegation had left. In Washington the greatest attention seems to have centred on those parts of the declaration referring to the admission of Peking to the United Nations, and irritation at Tito's 'ganging up with the Reds' seemed, temporarily at least, as if it might affect economic aid. While a good deal of scepticism was expressed in France as to whether the principles so loudly proclaimed would in fact have practical results, in Great Britain the spectacle of a pope (even a heretical communist one) recognizing virtue in a national church was viewed with some satisfaction.[1] In the Balkans interest had a more practical basis. Turkey was silent—perhaps not unnaturally, for the new turn in Russo-Jugoslav relations was clearly contrary to the view expressed by the Turkish prime minister less than a month previously, when, during a visit to Jugoslavia, he had spoken of the 'brotherly link' between the Atlantic pact and the Balkan alliance. Greece, which had sent a military mission to Jugoslavia at this very time, was openly annoyed by Tito's apparent readiness to put the Balkan alliance into cold storage at a moment when the Greeks were in need of at least moral support in the area. In Jugoslavia itself, there was judiciously expressed pleasure at the outcome of the meeting.

Nevertheless Tito's foreign policy continued to emphasize his expressed determination to belong to neither camp. Jugoslav officials met the ambassadors of the western powers from 24 to 27 June. The talks, which had been finally arranged when it was certain that the Russians would visit Belgrade, were intended both to reassure the west and to clarify future policy. The communiqué,[2] like that issued after the Soviet talks, confirmed the wide measure of agreement among the four governments in their approach to the international problems under review, and it further emphasized the contribution of the Balkan alliance to the stability of the area.

The prestige which Tito had won by his balancing role was confirmed by practical economic advantages. The Soviet Union cancelled an outstanding debt of £34,200,000 and it was expected that other east European countries would do likewise. Shortly afterwards a 60 per cent. increase in

[1] *Le Monde*, 4 June 1955.

[2] *Documents*, 1955, p. 276.

trade between Russia and Jugoslavia was announced—namely, a further £33 million's worth of goods in each direction during the current year. At the same time Tito criticized attempts by the American military mission to supervise the use of American equipment. While acknowledging that a continuation of American aid would be appreciated, he did not hesitate to say: 'they can stop it if they want; that does not depend on us'. Furthermore, he criticized the west German government which had, as yet, given no satisfaction over the question of war debts amounting to £35,700,000. Once again Tito's independent attitude paid off. On 1 September an agreement between the Soviet Union and Jugoslavia provided for the extension of mutual trade from nearly $40 million to $70 million over a period of three years, a Russian credit of $54 million for the purchase of raw materials, and a ten-year loan of hard currency and gold at 2 per cent. interest. On the other hand, Jugoslavia's behaviour was increasingly criticized in Washington and it was decided to send Mr. Murphy, deputy under-secretary of state, to explain the United States attitude. As a result of his mission, it was agreed that in future United States military missions would visit and observe solely to ascertain technical requirements. Furthermore, the United States agreed to release the $40 million aid already appropriated for the current financial year, as well as to deliver 600,000 tons of surplus wheat.

In foreign policy, also, Tito was taking a more independent line. Paradoxically, he criticized other east European countries for not following the initiative of Moscow and admitting their errors with communist courage. Rakosi, first secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party, assured Tito that both the party and government would do everything to make relations as friendly as possible. An agreement with Italy, by which each country would release groups of the other's nationals as proof of developing friendly relations, was made public at the beginning of September. An official visit of the king and queen of Greece did something to restore amity between the two countries, and a judicious statement on the importance of friendly relations between Greece and Turkey was followed by one on Cyprus, setting forth that a settlement of the conflict there was necessary to ensure peace and Balkan co-operation. Tito attacked Rumanian policy towards its Serb minority; he concluded a commercial agreement with Poland; and while Dulles was visiting Brioni early in November, Kardelj made an official visit to London. An official statement issued at the end of the talks stated that the two governments shared 'the same basic aims in the conduct of their foreign relations'.[1]

All in all, the change in the international position of Jugoslavia at this time was considerable. Tito had shown great skill in playing the neutralist cards and making the most of his position between the two power blocs.

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 19 November 1955.

It was not merely that he had again regulated his relations with the Soviet Union on what appeared to be satisfactory lines, thus providing a practical demonstration of the possibility of dealing with that country on a basis other than that of military force. In addition, he had shown that non-alignment was a feasible policy; indeed, the successes of Jugoslav policy were one of the factors contributing to the influence which the concept of non-alignment exerted at the period. The *détente* between Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union was also important for the stimulus it gave to the movement for a *détente* on a wider scale. The success of Jugoslavia in steering a course between the two contending power-blocs seemed to show the possibilities of a new approach to the issues dividing the world, and in this way it contributed to the pressures at work for a summit meeting.

*Germany*

The restoration of good relations with Jugoslavia was an important step in Soviet diplomacy; but it was more difficult, in view of all that had gone before, to see what could be done to establish normal relations with the German Federal Republic, which the Soviet Union had consistently refused to recognize. The solution of the new Soviet leaders was simply to cut through the Gordian knot. On 7 June the Soviet ambassador in Paris handed to the German ambassador to France a note addressed to the Federal Republic, calling for 'the normalization of relations' and inviting Adenauer to Moscow 'in order to consider the question of establishing diplomatic and trade relations'.[1]

This dramatic action was the most effective of all the Soviet moves to produce a change in the international atmosphere. Although there were attempts in the west to minimize it as a ruse 'designed to cause the west German chancellor the maximum political embarrassment', the impact both inside and outside Germany was sensational. Coming hard on the heels of the invitations to Raab, Tito, and Nehru, it was reported to have 'stunned' western embassies in Moscow and stilled 'any last, lingering doubts' whether the Soviet Union had embarked on a major reversal of policy. 'Neither a Talleyrand nor a Bismarck', it was said, 'could have exceeded this move in technical proficiency'; it was 'a diplomatic sensation of the first order', if not the greatest diplomatic sensation of post-war politics.[2] Furthermore, the official Russian comment,[3] which emphasized that the proposal was not bound to a specific time-table and that no prior conditions had been set, increased the belief that the Soviet government meant business. For the immediate preoccupation in the western camp —particularly (but not exclusively) in Paris, which had many reasons to be sensitive towards any suggestion of Russo-German *rapprochement*—was

[1] Full text in *Documents*, 1955, pp. 245 sqq.
[2] *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 June 1955.
[3] Reported in *Tagesspiegel*, 9 June 1955.

whether bilateral negotiations between Adenauer and the Soviet government might not jeopardize the prospects of a united western approach and perhaps even 'alter the balance and purpose of European politics'.[1] By leaving the date open, the Soviet leaders gave Adenauer the choice of visiting Moscow before or after a top-level meeting of the Four Powers. In fact the German Federal chancellor, who was on the point of leaving for the United States, immediately made it plain that he would take no step without consulting the western powers and that there were a number of preliminary points to be clarified before the Soviet note was answered. In Bonn there were inspired rumours that no meeting would take place until after the conclusion of the Four Power conference due to be held on 18 July, and that September was likely to be the earliest possible date. Meanwhile, the German government proceeded coolly and cautiously. Formal acknowledgement of the Soviet note was delayed until 12 June, and it was not until 30 June that Bonn dispatched its reply. It accepted the Russian proposal for discussions on the establishment of diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations; but it called for informal conversations 'first of all' to define the subjects to be discussed, and it made no mention of the possibility of Adenauer visiting Moscow.[2] On the other hand, contrary to expectation, the Federal German government avoided committing itself in advance to specific conditions on such matters as the German prisoners of war remaining in the Soviet Union, and its refusal to recognize either the German Democratic Republic or the Odra–Nyssa line. Dr. Adenauer was, in fact, in a very strong position. His visit to the United States had just demonstrated how high his stock stood in American estimation, and on the very same day upon which his reply was dispatched to Moscow, an agreement with the United States was signed in Bonn, covering the military aid to be provided by the Americans for the equipment of the new west German armed forces.[3] In these circumstances Adenauer could afford to go slow, and if necessary to see how things developed at the Four Power conference in July, before committing himself definitely to visiting Moscow.

On the other hand, pressure within Germany had been growing, since the Federal Republic acquired its sovereignty on 5 May. Soviet threats that west German rearmament might render German reunification impossible were not forgotten; and the unexpected offer of negotiations seemed a way out before anything irrevocable had actually been done. Hence the Social Democratic Party attacked Adenauer's policy as 'a programme against reunification',[4] and put a formal motion before the Bundestag

[1] Cf. *Le Monde*, 9 June 1955; *Figaro*, 10 June 1955; *Manchester Guardian*, 11 June 1955.
[2] *Documents*, 1955, pp. 249 sqq.
[3] Text in *Documents*, 1955, pp. 158–63; the actual extent and value of the aid was not disclosed.
[4] Cf. Ollenhauer's speech of 22 May; *The Times*, 23 May 1955.

proposing postponement of action on the military clauses of the Paris treaties until Four Power talks had been held. Although this motion was rejected by 244 votes to 145, the fear that the Germans were becoming 'the last Mohicans of the cold war' and that Adenauer was 'a captive of the Pentagon',[1] was not easily dispelled. If, as Adenauer had insisted, negotiations with the Soviet Union were possible only from a position of strength, the German public, now that the Paris treaties had established such a position, was naturally anxious for the promised results. The fact that Dr. Adenauer had at last decided to give up his tenure of the foreign office after the Paris treaty negotiations were completed, itself seemed to mark a break; and it was characteristic of the new situation that the foreign minister designate, Heinrich von Brentano, even before the Russian approach to the Federal government was made known, himself spoke of establishing 'some sort of political relations' with the Soviet Union and the states of eastern Europe as 'a legitimate task of German foreign policy', which might bring about a decrease in international tension.[2]

The sense that the time had come for a new direction in German policy was thus in no way a monopoly of the socialist opposition. Ollenhauer's view that the danger of Soviet aggression had lessened was shared by considerable elements among the German people, and the Free Democratic Party was even more critical of Adenauer's foreign policy than were the Social Democrats.[3] On 12 June the extreme right-wing (if not neo-fascist) Stahlhelm organization, addressed by Kesselring, also came out in favour of reunification. Although Adenauer rejected Ollenhauer's advice to go to Moscow before a Four Power meeting had taken place, the German press was strongly in favour of action. In the view of the Christian Democrat *Rheinische Post* there was 'no doubt' that a normalization of Russo-German relations was the way out of the 'dead end of the cold war' and in Düsseldorf *Der Mittag* urged the chancellor 'to show whether he can only think dogmatically or is capable of a flexible strategy'. Moreover, the pressure from business circles was considerable. Whether it was true or not that the German economy could not develop further without an outlet to the east, there were lively expectations of economic benefits, and the stocks of concerns with interests in the Democratic Republic rocketed as much as 20 per cent. in one day.[4]

There were other reasons for German interest in the Soviet overture. One was the growing doubt, in view of new strategic developments, of the efficacy of N.A.T.O. and of the validity of the whole conception underlying it. The controversy over Colonel von Bonin, which came to

[1] Cf. H. Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War* (New York, 1957), pp. 75, 91.
[2] *Tagesspiegel*, 7 June 1955.
[3] Speier, op. cit. pp. 74, 164.
[4] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 June 1955; *N.Y. Times*, 13 June 1955.

a head in the spring when he was dismissed from his post in the defence ministry on 22 March,[1] raised the whole question whether the proposed German contribution to N.A.T.O. could be constituted in the time set, and whether under current conditions it was the best form of defence from a German point of view. But even more thoroughgoing was the criticism of the military commentator of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Adalbert Weinstein, who published a widely read pamphlet, designed to demonstrate that, under modern conditions, neither side could win a war;[2] while von Bonin himself widened his attack and asserted his belief that the Supreme Command of N.A.T.O. shared his conviction 'that the defence of Europe in a new world war would be hopeless'.[3] These attacks on government policy were given actuality, in the eyes of an apprehensive public, by the singularly ill-timed exercise 'Carte Blanche', which the N.A.T.O. authorities decided to hold in June 1955.[4] Nothing was better calculated to stir German feeling than this atomic exercise. When the debates it unleashed in the Bundestag were broadcast to millions of Germans, it convinced them that disaster was imminent. If the 335 atomic bombings simulated in the exercise had really occurred, it was calculated, 1,700,000 Germans would have been killed outright and 3,500,000 incapacitated, leaving out of account the innumerable additional victims of radio-activity. In view of these facts, it was easy for Ollenhauer to advance the thesis that 'the military value of the rearmament of the Federal Republic is still more dubious than it used to be'.[5]

A further factor influencing German opinion was the fear among considerable sections of the population, particularly the younger people directly involved, that rearmament might lead to a revival of militarism and prove incompatible, under German conditions, with democracy. This issue came to the fore immediately the Paris treaties had been signed, and was crystallized in the controversy over the so-called 'Volunteers law', which graphically revealed the divisions within Germany. It had, indeed, been evident from the beginning that it would be necessary to reassure the war-weary Germans that the new military institutions would not simply be a revival of the old; and for that reason Adenauer selected a Catholic trade-union leader, Theodor Blank, as head of the agency that became, after the Federal Republic acquired sovereignty, the ministry of defence. Blank, who was formally appointed minister of defence on 7 June, himself admitted that it was understandable that German youth viewed military service 'with reservations';[6] but neither he nor Adenauer

[1] For the Bonin affair, cf. Speier, op. cit. pp. 75 sqq.

[2] A. Weinstein, *Keiner kann den Krieg gewinnen* (Bonn, 1955).

[3] B. von Bonin, 'Militärische Realitäten gegen Bonner Phantastereien', *Militärpolitisches Forum*, July 1955, p. 20.

[4] For 'Carte Blanche', cf. Speier, op. cit. pp. 144 sqq., 182–93.

[5] Ibid. p. 184.

[6] Ibid. p. 38.

can have been prepared for the clamour which arose among all parties when, on 27 June, the Volunteers Bill came before the Bundestag.

The need for the Volunteers Bill arose from the complications of reintroducing a military establishment, and it was only intended as a temporary measure until permanent legislation could be put through.[1] But behind this situation there were more fundamental questions. The one was whether the raising of armed forces did not require an amendment of the Basic Law of 1949. The other was the agreement of 26 February 1954 between the coalition parties that certain matters, the foremost of which was the position of the commander-in-chief, should be determined by constitutional law. Implicit in this was the determination that the fighting forces should accept the primacy of the political and civil authority; that they should never again constitute a state within a state; and that they should be subject to parliamentary control. Furthermore, as a result of the Nuremberg trials, the whole question of the guilt and responsibility of subordinates acting in obedience to orders was acute; while, on the other side, there was the practical question of finding sufficient officers and non-commissioned officers without Nazi antecedents to staff and train the new echelons. When the Volunteers Bill came before the Bundestag, it was soon evident how deeply these questions were agitating parliamentary and public opinion. On 10 June the Bundesrat decided by a unanimous vote that it was unable to take a decision on the issue; and although the Bill passed its first reading in the Bundestag on 28 June, it was necessary in view of opposition from all sides to withdraw it and substitute a revised version drafted by the security committee. This Bill, which was completed on 9 July, vested in parliament the authority to determine the higher structure of the armed forces and the final organization of the defence ministry, and imposed a strict limit of 6,000 on the number of volunteers to be enlisted. At the same time a Military Appointments Committee was set up, to examine candidates for senior posts. This done, the Volunteers Bill in its modified form finally passed its third reading on 16 July, against the votes of the Social Democrats; but the crisis was postponed rather than solved. Rearmament in any effective way could not begin until 1956; and the necessary legislation, according to the plan finally evolved, would require changes in the Basic Law. Meanwhile, Adenauer's coalition had been weakened by the withdrawal, on 23 July, of the All-German bloc, which deprived it of the two-thirds majority necessary for constitutional measures. That tension continued was evident, among other things, from the disputes which arose between the defence ministry and the civil committee charged with the selection of senior officers. When the committee rejected two members of Blank's ministry and then went

[1] For a brief account of the controversy, cf. R. Hiscocks, *Democracy in Western Germany* (1957), pp. 286 sqq.

on to declare that General Heusinger, who with Speidel was one of the first two senior officers to be appointed on 10 November, was 'unsuitable to be Supreme Commander', its action was widely regarded as a challenge to the political competence of the defence minister.[1] But even more it expressed the underlying anxiety about rearmament, and the hope, even at this late date, that its practical implications could somehow be avoided.

It was this feeling that lay behind the pressure within Germany for negotiation, both directly between Bonn and Moscow and indirectly between the Four Powers. Whatever else happened in the event of war in Europe, and whatever its outcome, it seemed evident that Germany would be turned into an atomic battlefield and an atomic graveyard. In spite of the non-committal character of Adenauer's reply to the Russian note, therefore, the belief was general that negotiations would be pursued. By now, however, the Four Power conference in Geneva was under way, and the question of direct Soviet-German talks was postponed until its outcome was known. In fact, events in Geneva soon showed that the easy optimism which had been felt in western Germany immediately after the Russian overture was far from justified. Any idea that the position of strength established by the Paris treaties was so overwhelming that the U.S.S.R. would be prepared to accede to German views on such matters as reunification was quickly shown to be illusory. Although the Russian government issued a formal denial of a statement made by Dulles on 28 June, that the Soviet Union had lost interest in German reunification now that Bonn had joined the western alliance, it was made plain even before the Geneva conference met, that reunification depended on a *rapprochement* (which Adenauer had categorically rejected) between the Democratic and the Federal Republics. This view, made public on 12 July, was reiterated even more pointedly after the Geneva conference in speeches by Bulganin on 24 July and by Khrushchev on 26 July.[2] Any solution of the problem of German unity, the former stated, must take into account the views of both German states; and the latter, emphasizing the unreality of 'mechanical union', laid down that there could be no solution at the expense of the Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, he added, the Soviet Union still desired to establish normal relations with the Federal German government.

It was in this spirit that, after more than a month's delay, the Soviet government replied on 3 August to the German note of 30 June.[3] Although the German foreign minister had declared on 27 July that the expected visit to Moscow was to be regarded first and foremost as a means of discussing reunification, the Soviet note not only made no mention of the subject, but expressly laid down that 'the establishment of diplomatic relations,

[1] Cf. Hiscocks, op. cit. p. 289; Speier, op. cit. p. 43.
[2] *The Times*, 25 and 27 July 1955.
[3] Text in *Documents*, 1955, pp. 249–50.

trade relations and cultural relations' should 'not be made dependent on any preconditions by either side'. Nevertheless the German government, in its reply, raised the questions both of reunification and of German prisoners alleged still to be in Soviet custody, maintaining that 'an understanding' on these questions was necessary for 'a satisfactory solution of the questions put in the foreground by the Soviet government'.[1] This statement called forth the rejoinder, in the Soviet note of 19 August, that 'the attitude of the U.S.S.R.' on reunification was 'no doubt' 'known to the government of the German Federal Republic', but that the Soviet Union had no objection to an 'exchange of views'; the question of prisoners, on the other hand, was simply ignored.[2]

This was the background of the Russo-German talks which opened in Moscow on 9 September. Already by this date there was evidence that the expectations raised in June were excessive, and Adenauer, speaking on the eve of his departure, had sought to forestall German disappointment by expressing the opinion that no solution of the problem of German unity could be expected from his visit. Nevertheless, he could not ignore the expectation in Germany that more would come of the talks than a formal establishment of diplomatic relations. Hence at the first session he sought to widen the basis of discussion, declaring point blank that 'the establishment of normal relations' between the two countries was 'unthinkable' so long as 'two groups of questions' remained unsolved. The one was German disunity which (he said) was not only 'abnormal' but 'against human and divine law and against nature'. The other was the German prisoners in Russian hands.[3] Although, in making these remarks, he was careful to safeguard himself by stating that they were not 'pre-conditions', they had the appearance of going against the spirit, if not the letter, of the notes exchanged between the two countries; and when they were followed by injudicious comments on the behaviour of Soviet troops in Germany in 1944 and 1945, they not unexpectedly provoked a stiff rejoinder. In the first place Adenauer's accusations were hotly rejected by Khrushchev as 'injurious to the Soviet Union'; in the second place, Bulganin stated categorically that there were no German prisoners-of-war in Russia, only war criminals sentenced 'for particularly serious crimes'.[4] By the end of the second day there was an open rift in the conference, and it was widely expected to end in deadlock. In particular, the Russians challenged Adenauer's competence to speak (as he had claimed to do) for all Germans, and refused to discuss the question of prisoners-of-war except in the presence of representatives of the German Democratic

[1] *Documents*, 1955, p. 249. [2] Ibid. p. 251.

[3] For the text of Adenauer's statement, cf. *Tagesspiegel* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10 September 1955; English translation in *N.Y. Times*, 10 September 1955.

[4] For the text of Bulganin's statement, cf. *N.Y. Times*, 11 September 1955.

Republic. The Soviet Union, Khrushchev added, wanted diplomatic relations and trade with western Germany; but if the Germans were ready for neither, the Soviet Union could wait.

By this time it was clear that the Federal chancellor had overplayed his hand, and unless he were prepared to return to Germany empty-handed and face the consequences, it was left to him to find a way out. If, as has been said, 'Adenauer left Bonn certain that the pre-Geneva policy of strength would pay off, and that the Soviet leaders, aware of their "weakness", would in the end surrender to the west on the German question', it soon transpired that Moscow had only to call his bluff for these views to be shown up 'as the rhetoric they had always been'.[1] Thereafter the German leader had no option save to climb down. This was evident when he requested a private meeting with Bulganin to repair the damage done in open session, at which 'apparently' they 'came to an understanding of some sort'; and subsequently the two foreign ministers, Molotov and von Brentano, were given the task of drawing up concrete proposals.[2] The result was described as a compromise, but in effect it recognized the point of view to which the Soviet Union had adhered from the beginning —namely, that diplomatic relations should be established immediately and outstanding questions discussed afterwards. As it was freely stated that Adenauer had earlier rejected this solution, and refused even to consider an exchange of ambassadors unless the question of German prisoners were resolved, the outcome, as registered in the communiqué of 13 September,[3] must be regarded as a victory for Soviet diplomacy.[4] All the points to which the German negotiators had attached importance—in particular, the return of prisoners—were left to an unwritten understanding; and although Adenauer may have been right in saying that it would have been a mistake to reject the Soviet leaders' 'word of honour', and to insist on written undertakings,[5] it is still true that, from a German point of view, the agreement was a one-sided document and that Adenauer had failed to obtain explicit recognition of any of the points which he had set out to secure. From this point of view he was criticized in Germany, particularly by the Free Democrat members of the Bonn coalition.

More important, perhaps, were the misgivings which the Russo-German agreement caused in the west, particularly in the United States.[6] It was

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 11 September 1955; Speier, op. cit. p. 180.

[2] *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1955; *The Times*, 12 September 1955; *N.Y. Times*, 13 September 1955.

[3] Cf. *Documents*, 1955, pp. 251–3.

[4] A 'triumph' was the description of the *N.Y. Times*, 14 September 1955. Another commentator (*N.Y. Herald-Tribune*, 20 September 1955) went so far as to say that Adenauer had 'cracked under intense pressure'.

[5] *The Times*, 21 September 1955.

[6] *N.Y. Times*, 19 September 1955; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 September 1955; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 20 September 1955.

to meet these misgivings that Adenauer wrote and made public a statement to Bulganin, reaffirming that nothing which had been done denoted recognition of either the existing German frontiers or the east German government, and insisted that the negotiating position of the western powers had not been weakened in any way by what took place in Moscow.[1] Nevertheless there was little doubt, in fact, that the negotiations had strengthened the Soviet position; and this became clear when, only two days after Adenauer's departure, an east German delegation arrived in Moscow for what were described as 'extraordinary and weighty talks'.[2] These, it was soon evident, were intended to establish parity between the two German governments by according to the Democratic Republic the same sovereign status as the west had accorded to the Federal Republic in the Paris treaties. On 20 September, after the Soviet High Commission had been disbanded, a treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic,[3] by which the latter gained its sovereignty, including freedom to develop its relations with the west German régime and with other states. Thus, in fact, the division of Germany—far from being brought nearer to solution, as German opinion had hoped, by the Moscow talks—was consolidated; and already there was talk of countries, such as Finland and Jugoslavia, which were ready to follow Moscow's example, and enter into relations with both of the German governments.

On the whole, therefore, the outcome of the negotiations was more advantageous to Russia than to the west German government, and the view expressed by the opposition before the Moscow meeting, that it was likely to perpetuate the partition of Germany and lead to the *de facto* recognition of the east German government, was largely borne out. Once again, German critics said, the Russians had got what they wanted, and had got it cheap. These criticisms perhaps overlooked the fact that it was not easy for the representative of a small unarmed state to refuse an offer of diplomatic relations with a powerful state, which had also an important say in the problem of German reunification; they also minimized the difficulty of resisting the popular appeal of the issue and the fact that most Germans thought diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union desirable. But the action of the Soviet government has to be viewed not only in terms of its outcome, but also in relation to the line of Soviet policy in the summer and autumn of 1955. If from a German point of view the negotiations were the beginning of a new chapter of foreign policy, from a Soviet viewpoint they were part of the campaign, waged relentlessly since the spring, to normalize relations everywhere and in particular to create a new relationship with the western powers.

[1] *Documents*, 1955, pp. 253–4; cf. *The Times*, 21 September 1955.
[2] Ibid. 16 September 1955.
[3] *Documents*, 1955, pp. 200–2.

At the time the second aspect of Soviet policy was probably more immediately important than the first; and here again the measure of success was considerable. Dr. Adenauer himself, on his return from Moscow, declared his conviction that the Soviet leaders earnestly desired a period of peace. He thought that the Soviet government was confronted with vital internal problems which were extremely difficult to solve, and which were absorbing all the energies of the Russian government and people. Therefore, he said, 'they want a period in which they can spend less on armaments', and this very fact gave hope of a period of peaceful development in the world which should be exploited to the full; it was the duty of the west to take cognizance of these facts and to allow a period of peaceful development to get under way.[1] Such statements, contrasting markedly in tone with the chancellor's attitude before his departure for Moscow, could not fail to have effects on German and on world opinion. As a result of Adenauer's visit, there was from the autumn of 1955 a change of attitude in Germany, 'not only by members of the opposition, but also by journalists, bankers, academicians, former officers and even government officials'.[2] The numerous German journalists who visited the Soviet Union at this time, came back claiming that the western 'cold war' image of Soviet society had distorted the reality of Russian life and policy; the famous journalist, Silex, who had been in Moscow at the time of Adenauer's visit, wrote that 'no serious politician could now aver that it is heresy to think about possibilities of a solution of the reunification issue outside the Atlantic Pact'.[3] Although, from a German point of view, the practical results of the meeting may have appeared meagre, opinion was more impressed by its wider connotation. Like the Austrian state treaty, the meeting with Tito, Nehru's visit to the Kremlin and the meetings with Finnish, Scandinavian, and French statesmen which were expected to follow, it was 'a station on the road' to a settlement in the 'spirit of Geneva', and the fact that Adenauer and Khrushchev could reach at least partial agreement was taken as a hopeful sign.[4]

The picture of Soviet diplomatic activity which emerges from a survey of its multiple aspects in the summer of 1955 is one of resource and flexibility. Few of the specific moves were probably conceived of as important in themselves; what mattered in Soviet opinion was rather their effect in their totality on the climate of international affairs. Behind them all, without much doubt, was the purpose of demonstrating Soviet reasonableness in action and so of creating an atmosphere in which the western powers, despite their suspicion of Soviet moves and Soviet sincerity,

[1] *The Times*, *N.Y. Times*, *Manchester Guardian*, 17 September 1955.
[2] Speier, op. cit. p. 88.
[3] Ibid. pp. 86 sqq.
[4] *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 17–18 September 1955; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 17 September 1955.

would find it hard to refuse to negotiate at a high level. Soviet diplomatic activity, in short, must be seen as a background to and concomitant of the Geneva conference of heads of government. What the ultimate purposes were, other than to set a term to the nuclear armament race, can only be a matter of speculation. In Bonn and Washington and London, it was the official view that the object was to split the western alliance. Whether this was true or not, it seems probable that the moves which have been described were linked with the changes in internal policy which followed the advent of the new Soviet government under Bulganin and Khrushchev, and with the shift of policy in China, where Mao Tse-tung was embarking on a vast campaign of collectivization. It was clearly consonant with both policies to take steps to avoid military conflict and to reduce tension with the west. Whether or not this implied a change of heart, which Mr. Dulles denied, no one can know, but it certainly implied a shift in Soviet methods away from military pressure to political manœuvring.

Soviet policy was helped by the fact that the international atmosphere, partly as a result of the Bandung conference, was unusually favourable at this period to a policy of active coexistence. The Soviet leaders were not slow to see the advantages of this, and in addition to their own measures to reduce tension, lost no opportunity of forming links with the uncommitted powers. Mr. Nehru, who visited Europe in June, was invited to Moscow, where he was welcomed with great enthusiasm, and his subsequent visits to Warsaw, Vienna, Belgrade, and Rome helped to strengthen the links between the different capitals. In a joint statement issued at the end of his visit to Russia,[1] Nehru and Bulganin affirmed their determination to build their relations on the five principles of coexistence, and spoke of their value as a means of 'banishing fear and mistrust' and 'lowering world tensions'. More specifically, the communiqué welcomed the results of the Bandung conference, the advent of Austrian independence, and the improved relations between Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union. It looked forward to a reduction of tension by a peaceful settlement of the dispute over Formosa and by the entrance of China to the United Nations. Finally, it condemned 'the tendency to build up arms and armaments, conventional as well as atomic'. 'Nothing', the two prime ministers insisted, 'should be allowed to stand in the way of the imposition of a complete ban on the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons of war', and at the same time there should be a 'substantial reduction in conventional armaments', coupled with 'effective international control'.

Reactions to this statement were mixed. In the United States, where the references to Formosa were deeply resented, Nehru was accused of

[1] *Documents*, 1955, pp. 472–5.

having 'walked all the way' into the communist camp 'and closed the door behind him'.[1] In Great Britain the reception was uncertain. But these hostile reactions seem to have been exceptional. In the Far East great interest was aroused; in Germany it was agreed that the statement was 'of the highest importance', and that it represented 'a great success for the policy pursued by India of remaining independent of power blocs'. Nehru himself summarized his general impressions when he left London airport on 10 July, a week before the opening of the Four Power conference in Geneva. He was convinced, he said, that the Soviet leaders desired to work for a lessening of tension. 'Not only in Europe but perhaps in the world we have reached a psychological moment of history . . . a turning away from the tense atmosphere of the so-called cold war towards peace. I do not suppose that real peace . . . will arise suddenly, but . . . there is a very strong feeling among the peoples of all countries, and I believe even politicians are being affected by it.'[2] To what extent this was true was to be shown at Geneva, where on 18 July the heads of the governments of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States gathered together for 'a new effort to resolve the great problems' confronting them and 'to remove' the 'sources of conflict' dividing them. As Mr. Nehru flew back home to India, while in Geneva the last-minute preparations were concluded, the world waited with high expectations, inward misgivings and bated breath.

[1] The comments from the world press are summarized in *Hindu*, 25 June 1955.
[2] *The Times*, 11 July 1955.

## CHAPTER X

# DISARMAMENT AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCES

By the spring of 1955, as realization of the implications of nuclear warfare became widespread, the view took hold that the time had come for a summit meeting to break through the deadlock which, like an Arctic winter, was holding the world frozen and immobile. To many people the rapid developments in the technology of destruction meant that it was more imperative than ever to find a new approach to the question of disarmament. It is true that the disarmament sub-committee, set up in pursuance of a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1953,[1] was still in being and, following a resolution of 4 November 1954,[2] had resumed its discussions in London on 25 February 1955. But it was here that the deadlock seemed at its worst; indeed, it seemed largely to exist for the airing of irreconcilable views, and it was widely felt that it had not sufficient authority to give a lead. On the other hand, there had been no summit conference of heads of government since 1945, and it now seemed that conditions were again favourable. The Soviet Union had been pressing for a meeting since the autumn of 1954, but its proposals were resisted by the west on the grounds that a conference would be inopportune before the ratification of the Paris treaties. But once that obstacle was out of the way, an attempt to reach agreement on disarmament seemed an obvious next step. It was demanded by considerable sections of public opinion in the west, and had, in fact, already been conceded in principle by the western governments. As far back as 1953 Churchill and Eisenhower had expressed their interest in a top-level meeting; and on 29 March 1955 the former reiterated that he had never departed in any way from his view that such a meeting might be a hopeful way of approaching the solution of world problems.[3] In fact, one justification advanced for the Paris treaties was that their conclusion, and the practical demonstration that the western powers could not be divided, would make a new approach to the Soviet government possible. The Russians, for their part, contributed to the new atmosphere. Whatever their other merits or demerits may have been, the Soviet moves described in the preceding chapter, beginning with the discussions in April leading to the Austrian state treaty, were all part of a sustained campaign to bring the west to the point of negotiation. The upshot was that, by May, a new

[1] Cf. *Documents*, 1953, pp. 114–16.
[2] Ibid. 1954, pp. 296–7.
[3] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 539, col. 199.

approach was virtually inescapable; and the western governments, reaffirmed in their confidence in the possibility of progress by the completion of the Paris treaties, took the initiative. In a note to the Soviet government, dated 10 May, they formally proposed a meeting of heads of government, to be followed by a second conference in which the issues formulated by the heads of government 'would be examined in detail by such methods, organs and participants as it appears will be most fruitful'. By this 'new procedure' in two stages, it was hoped, 'a new impetus' would be provided.[1]

In view of the known Soviet desire for *détente*, it is not surprising that the initial reaction from Moscow was cordial. Marshal Bulganin immediately indicated that his government had 'a positive attitude' towards the idea.[2] In fact, on the very day on which the western proposal for a conference was issued, the Soviet government had put before the Disarmament Sub-Committee meeting in London a comprehensive disarmament programme, which marked the biggest advance to date towards agreement and seemed to augur well for the future. The new Soviet proposals were welcomed by western spokesmen as constituting an encouraging and important step forward.[3] In the words of the American representative, 'the gaps between us' seemed 'to have been lessened'; and a few weeks later the British foreign secretary, referring to the 'new look' both in the west and in Soviet policy, urged the necessity of taking advantage of the new situation and warned of the danger of procrastination. Not since 1946 had the outlook for disarmament been more hopeful.

In fact, the Soviet proposals of 10 May went surprisingly far to meet earlier western objections. In the first place, the Soviet government gave up its earlier demands for an immediate unspecified ban on nuclear weapons, and accepted the western point of view that the implementation of a disarmament programme must be dependent on the development of international confidence. Hence the new Soviet plan[4] began with a declaration of measures—including the liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of occupation forces from Germany—'the implementation' of which 'would promote the creation of the necessary confidence between states' and 'thereby facilitate the carrying into effect of a broad disarmament programme'. Thereafter it went on to outline the terms of an international disarmament treaty, and concluded by setting out the principles of international control. Here again, the Soviet government made notable concessions to the western point of view. In the first place the U.S.S.R. abandoned its proposal for a one-third reduction of conventional arma-

[1] Cf. *Documents*, 1955, pp. 2–3.

[2] *Soviet News*, 18 May 1955.

[3] 'Disarmament: Proposals and Negotiations, 1946–1955', *The World Today*, vol. xi (1955), p. 345. Cf. also *The Disarmament Question, 1945 to 1956* (London, Stationery Office, 1957), a statement of the official British point of view, and Hugh Thomas, *Disarmament: The Way Ahead* (Fabian Society, 1957), the best short independent analysis at present available.

[4] Text reprinted in *U.S. Documents*, 1955, pp. 417–30.

ments and accepted the figures for ceiling levels which had been put forward by England and France on 8 March.[1] In the second place it accepted the timing for the prohibition of nuclear weapons three-quarters of the way through the reduction of conventional forces, as had been proposed by the representatives of the same powers on 19 April.[2] And, finally, it agreed to the establishment of a single permanent control organ operating throughout the programme. As envisaged in the Soviet plan, disarmament was to be carried out in two stages, each of one year's duration. During the first stage, while conventional forces were being reduced by 50 per cent., all tests of nuclear weapons would be suspended and states would undertake not to use nuclear weapons, unless the Security Council decided otherwise. During the second stage (i.e. in 1957) the production of nuclear weapons would cease altogether, there would be a complete prohibition of their use, and the destruction of nuclear stocks would be carried out. Finally, a control system was to be introduced, with powers which would increase as the disarmament programme progressed. The Soviet government frankly recognized—the first time that any of the great powers had made the admission—that no system of international control could prevent completely the clandestine manufacture of nuclear weapons, and therefore concentrated realistically on 'effective' measures, i.e. such as would prevent a surprise attack by one state upon another. During the first stage the main provision was the establishment of control posts at large ports, railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes 'to ensure that no dangerous concentration' of forces should take place. During the second stage the control organ's powers were to be expanded so that it could 'exercise supervision, including inspection on a continuing basis, to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all states' through its own 'permanent staff of inspectors having unimpeded access at all times . . . to all objects of control'.

In spite of the concessions contained in this plan, it was soon apparent that, even at this stage, the path to the summit was not going to be straightforward. In the first place, western expressions of satisfaction at the advance marked by the Soviet proposals were offset by reserves and criticisms directed in particular against the alleged defects of the suggested control organization. This, in the view of the western powers, was the crux of the whole problem, and the British foreign secretary, Macmillan, insisted that it was essential to decide in advance 'what action the control organ must be able to take in the event of a breach of the treaty', though he did not attempt to explain how such a body could be provided with effective sanctions.[3] In the second place, it soon became apparent that the west was not minded to discuss disarmament measures separately, without

[1] *U.S. Documents*, 1955, p. 402.
[2] Ibid. pp. 413–14.
[3] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 542, pp. 606–7.

discussion of contingent political problems. In the British view, indeed, as expressed by Macmillan, it was necessary 'to go into the question of what political problems need to be settled *before* disarmament can take place' at all.[1] This was perhaps more than was considered necessary by the other western powers; but anything less than simultaneous discussion was evidently regarded as unsatisfactory in their eyes. Already before formal Soviet acceptance of the proposal for a conference on 26 May, a heated controversy had broken out as a result of efforts by Eisenhower and Dulles to raise the question of eastern Europe. These were described by *Pravda* on 22 May as 'foolish proposals' which cast doubt on American intentions and suggested that the United States wanted 'simply to talk about negotiations in order to wreck the negotiations, blaming the Soviet Union and proving that collaboration with the U.S.S.R. is out of the question'. Mr. Dulles's subsequent speech on 24 May, in which he forecast that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria was bound to have consequences unfavourable to Russia in neighbouring territories, particularly Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and hinted that this would give 'new opportunities' for the west to make a political advance, did nothing to mollify the situation.[2]

Meanwhile other difficulties had arisen. On 18 May President Eisenhower had made a notable proposition, which seemed to open new possibilities of agreement. Pointing out that the agreement for the neutralization of Austria did not mean a disarmed Austria or a 'military blank', and was 'a far different thing from just a military vacuum', he went on to suggest the possibility of a series of neutralized states stretching from north to south through Europe.[3] This important statement, which seems to have been made without prior consultation, made a favourable impression generally, but was less welcome in the State Department. Within a week[4] the secretary of state thought it necessary to whittle down the impact of the president's initiative, insisting in particular that the policy of neutrality, as proposed by the latter, 'had no application to a country of the character of Germany', i.e. in the only place where, in terms of east–west relations, it had immediate significance. When he went on to say that the United States would welcome a group of independent states in eastern Europe playing an independent role, it was difficult to escape the conclusion that his conception of neutrality applied only to the Soviet Union's allies and excluded any notion of reciprocity. Not surprisingly his interpretation of President Eisenhower's words was endorsed in categorical terms by Adenauer. Germany, the latter informed the Bundestag on 27 May, would neither voluntarily nor involuntarily adopt the status of neutrality, even of armed neutrality—an unusually pointed rejection of

[1] Ibid. p. 607. The italics are not in the original.
[2] *N.Y. Times*, 25 May 1955.
[3] Ibid. 19 May 1955.
[4] Ibid. 25 May 1955.

the president's words—nor would it allow itself to be neutralized.[1] Furthermore, he alleged, he had secured the agreement of the western powers to the thesis that European security and the reunification of Germany by 'free' elections were inseparable. This was a major victory for west German diplomacy, which Dr. Adenauer had a good opportunity to drive home when he visited the United States in June.[2] At this stage President Eisenhower himself was induced to modify his neutrality proposals, and to state explicitly that they were 'in no way applicable to Germany',[3] while Adenauer reiterated his hypothesis that German reunification was an 'absolute necessity' for Europe and the peace of the world.[4]

The success of Adenauer, now at the height of his power, in pushing the question of German reunification into the forefront of negotiations reduced the prospects of progress at the Geneva meeting and emphasized in advance the elements of disagreement between the parties to the negotiations. These divergencies were evident even in the note in which the Soviet Union agreed to a conference, and thereafter never disappeared from sight. The Soviet note explicitly put disarmament in the first place, and warned of the dangers which would ensue if the United States persisted in introducing the question of the communist states of eastern Europe or attempted to negotiate 'from a position of strength';[5] to which Vice-President Nixon replied that it would be the fault of the Russians if the talks failed.[6] When on 13 June the Soviet government finally accepted the proposal that the talks should open in Geneva on 18 July, its terms were carefully chosen so as to emphasize that the paramount objective was 'to lessen international tension',[7] and two days later *Pravda* complained that the topics mentioned by leading Americans as appropriate for discussion made it clear that the intention in the United States was the very opposite. The Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the United Nations Assembly at San Francisco between 20 and 26 June gave Mr. Molotov an opportunity to return to the charge; and after a series of platitudes from Eisenhower and Macmillan, he put forward a seven-point plan, as a basis for arms reduction and the prohibition of atomic weapons.[8] He then referred specifically to the Soviet disarmament plan of 10 May, to which, despite its importance, the western powers had still not replied in detail. As the levels for the armed forces of the major powers there proposed were in full agreement with the levels suggested by the west, any western

[1] How, if the president had persisted in his policy, a Germany which was still unarmed could have prevented neutralization, was not explained. Cf. *The Times*, 28 May 1955.

[2] For his visit and its significance, cf. above, pp. 104–5.

[3] *The Times*, 15 June 1955.

[4] In his address at Harvard University on 16 June; cf. *N.Y. Times*, 17 June 1955.

[5] *Documents*, 1955, pp. 3–5.

[6] *N.Y. Times*, 31 May 1955.

[7] *U.S. Documents*, 1955, pp. 175–6.

[8] *Tenth Anniversary of the Signing of the United Nations Charter, Proceedings of the Commemorative Meetings* (United Nations, New York, 1955), pp. 103–15.

objections on this score (he argued) should now be withdrawn. Moreover, the Soviet Union had met the west half-way over the question of atomic weapons, and had accepted the western proposal that, pending the establishment of complete prohibition, atomic weapons might be used, in exceptional cases and by decision of the Security Council, for defence against aggression. Now, therefore, it was for the west to make the next move.

But this attempt to bring discussion back to the central issue of disarmament failed completely. Mr. Dulles replied that there was no need for Molotov's plan; in his view all would be well with the world if everyone observed the United Nations Charter. Thereafter, he referred to the 'unnatural division' of Germany and the 'servitude' of some east European nations.[1] No doubt, by its own lights, the United States was entitled to draw attention to these aspects of the situation; but it might also have been expected that they would balance them against the risks of atomic war, and it seemed useless, from a practical point of view, to raise issues over which there was no likelihood that Soviet policy would budge. In fact, Mr. Dulles's speech was regarded as throwing down the gauntlet to the Soviet Union, and the only hopeful sign was that the Russians declined to pick it up. Even this moderation, however, was misunderstood as a sign of weakness; and when high-ranking Soviet leaders attended the Fourth of July reception at the American embassy in Moscow for the first time since the war, Mr. Khrushchev felt it necessary to issue a warning that the Soviet Union was not driven by weakness or by western policies to seek agreement. 'We are not going to Geneva with broken legs', he said, 'but we are going upright like soldiers to meet worthy partners, and that is the only right way.'[2] Nevertheless, although expectation was high when the conference opened on 18 July, those who had taken stock of the events and pronouncements of the past two months were aware of the problematical nature of the meeting. It was already evident that the two sides started from different premisses with different objectives and priorities, and in spite of professions of good will, it was hard to see where compromise could occur.

### *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Governments (18–23 July 1955)*

The divergencies which had been visible earlier were immediately apparent in the opening session of the conference on 18 July. The opening speeches[3] of the American, French, and British delegates all emphasized

[1] Ibid. pp. 216–19.

[2] *The Times*, 5 July 1955.

[3] The documentation for what follows is assembled in *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government* (Department of State, Washington, 1955); *Documents*, 1955, pp. 2–49; *U.S. Documents*, 1955, pp. 171–232.

the known western view—to which, as has been noted, Dr. Adenauer had secured agreement in advance—that German unity, secured by 'free' elections, was the primary question. Mr. Bulganin, on the other hand, put his finger on security as the central issue, a solution of which was 'expected of us by the people whose eyes are focussed on this conference in Geneva'. More specifically, he picked out the need 'to establish a system of collective security' and measures 'to put an end to the arms race, to ban atomic weapons, and to limit atomic energy to peaceful uses'. Since the incompatibility of these lines of approach was evident, and it was unlikely (as President Eisenhower frankly stated at the conclusion of the first day's work) that any delegation would 'recede easily from a stated position in order to find some common ground with other delegations', hope of progress really depended upon the introduction of new factors, or new proposals, opening up fresh angles of approach.

In fact, each of the western governments made new proposals, while the Soviet Union, which was still awaiting a reply to its plan of 10 May, and was therefore scarcely likely for the present to embark on anything radically new, nevertheless produced some important modifications. These new factors were as follows:

1. M. Faure, on behalf of the French delegation, suggested that armaments should be restricted by budgetary control carried out by an International Secretariat, on the basis of a 'percentage reduction of military expenditure in any annual budget in relation to a preceding budget'. This proposal was accepted on the Soviet side as 'worthy of careful examination', but less well received by Great Britain and the U.S.A. which regarded it as open to evasion. In any case, it seemed unlikely to achieve decisive results, and it fell into the background when more spectacular plans were put forward.

2. The first of these, put forward by Sir Anthony Eden on behalf of the British delegation, envisaged 'a simple joint inspection of the forces now confronting one another in Europe'.[1] It had been preceded by what Sir Anthony called a 'wider proposal for a possible limitation of forces', 'subject to reciprocal supervision', 'in Germany and in the countries neighbouring Germany', which was put forward on the British side as part of the framework of German reunification.[2] Sir Anthony was careful to emphasize that the two plans were 'not of course connected'. Nevertheless, if 'over a specified area . . . extending perhaps for a fixed depth on either side of the line which now divides East and West Europe', supervision and inspection could be agreed, it might contribute 'to establish a sense of security in Europe and begin the process of reducing tensions here'. In fact, what became known as the 'Eden plan' made an immediate

[1] *Documents*, 1955, pp. 41, 43.

[2] Ibid. pp. 19–20.

impact on opinion, and marked the practical starting-point of what became known as 'disengagement'. But it would appear that it had been put forward without American assent, and it met with stubborn opposition from the United States administration and from the government of western Germany, mainly on the political grounds that it tended to stabilize the existing territorial *status quo* and to give implicit recognition to the division of Germany, and in the course of time it was tacitly discarded. If it had been considered on its merits, it might have marked a new point of departure; but, as it was, it turned out, contrary to its author's intentions, to be rather in the nature of a diversion which attracted attention but, in terms of the immediate issues, led into a cul-de-sac.

3. Much the same proved true, in the upshot, of President Eisenhower's even more spectacular 'open skies' plan, which Sir Anthony Eden described as bold and imaginative. There is no doubt about its impact, even on Soviet statesmen, since the sincerity behind the president's words was manifest to all. But once again, it would appear, in his sincere desire to make a practical step forward, he had gone beyond his brief and struck a personal note which was not entirely reciprocated by other members of the United States delegation. He had, he said, been searching his heart and mind; and the outcome was a proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union should 'give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from one end of our countries to the other', and 'next' that each should provide within its own territory 'facilities for aerial photography to the other country'. By this step they would 'convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension'. But that was not all. What he proposed was intended merely as a beginning, to make it more easy to attain 'a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament'. Nevertheless the Eisenhower scheme was perhaps more attractive at first glance than on fuller inspection, and for this reason it was received with some scepticism both in Congress and in the Defence Department. In the first place, it would have required very considerable changes in American legislation, which would not be easy to obtain. In the second place, any form of direct negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union was suspect to the western powers, who feared that it might leave them out in the cold. Furthermore, the plan offered no real security to the Soviet Union, since the immediate threat to Russia came not from the U.S.A. but from American bases in Europe and the Middle East. Hence, though it remained on the agenda and was taken up in various forms at the Disarmament Sub-Committee later, it could fairly be said that, in effect although not in intention, it was more 'a stalling move than a genuine attempt to solve

the disarmament question';[1] at any rate, as an American commentator observed, it was likely to 'lead off on a tangent'.[2]

4. The Soviet contribution, as already indicated, was different in character, and included no basically new suggestions.[3] Of only secondary interest was the proposal, put forward by Bulganin on 21 July, for a European security treaty. This was, in substance, an expansion of the Soviet plan submitted at the beginning of 1954, and amounted to little more than an undertaking by the constituent member-states of N.A.T.O. and of the Warsaw pact 'to refrain from the use of armed force against one another'. In western eyes, this was at best a moral injunction of little, if any, practical value. On the other hand, the proposals on disarmament submitted on the same day had a positive content. Their basis was the Soviet plan of 10 May, to which Mr. Bulganin specifically referred, requesting the western powers to make known 'their views on the questions we have raised'. Nevertheless the new Soviet draft marked an advance towards the western position, in so far as the first section of the earlier document, setting out the political problems which the Soviet Union thought it imperative to tackle in order to restore confidence, was now omitted.[4] As this section included proposals unlikely to commend themselves to the west, the change implied that it would have been possible to concentrate on disarmament without getting embroiled in preliminary political issues, such as German reunification; and this, there is no reason to doubt, was the purpose of the Soviet modification. On the other hand, precisely because it was practical in character, the Soviet draft contained a number of points of detail which it would have been difficult and perhaps dangerous to decide finally in a short meeting by the heads of government. For this reason alone there were adequate grounds for referring it either to the subsequent meeting of foreign ministers or to the Disarmament Sub-Committee, or to both. Nevertheless it is not easy to see why the scheme did not receive closer attention at this stage, and why the western governments, without committing themselves, were so chary of exploring the Soviet proposals. One explanation, perhaps, was a basic difference on the question of control. The west, as has been noted, took its stand on a cast-iron control system. The Soviet government, on the other hand, insisted that 'there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for

[1] Thomas, *Disarmament, The Way Ahead*, p. 16. It was known that the plan had been prepared by Nelson S. Rockefeller, President Eisenhower's special assistant for psychological warfare (*N.Y. Times*, 1 August 1955).

[2] *N.Y. Times*, 31 July 1955.

[3] Eisenhower's 'open skies' plan also, it should be emphasized, was not fundamentally new; all previous western plans had included the use of aerial photography for control (*N.Y. Times*, 22 July 1955).

[4] Mr. Bulganin also made the new (but secondary) suggestion that, in addition to the ceilings for the level of forces of the great powers set out in the original document, all other states should accept a ceiling of 150,000–200,000 men.

evading this control . . . even if there is a formal agreement on international control'.[1] If this were true—and scientific opinion was coming round to the view that it was—the position was clearly changed from a western point of view, and it is possible that the western governments required time to take stock. Even so, it might have been possible, as Mr. Bulganin indicated in his closing statement on 23 July, to have registered agreement at least 'on the questions in regard to which our positions either fully concurred or came considerably closer together'. This, however, was not done. Indeed, it was noteworthy that the question of disarmament received little attention in the closing statements of the western leaders, and that German unity and European security took the first place. Furthermore, the statement on the subject in the directive which was issued to the foreign ministers was vague and imprecise; indeed, it suggested by implication that it was doubtful whether the four governments could 'take any further useful initiative in the field of disarmament'.

The basic difference between the Soviet delegation and the west on the question of the priority to be given to disarmament was probably the cardinal fact in the history of the conference. Some of the reasons for this difference have already been briefly indicated. But, in addition, there were deeper underlying causes. The agenda, as drawn up on 19 July, comprised four points: German reunification, European security, disarmament, and the development of contacts between east and west. On the last item it was not difficult to discover an area at least of superficial agreement, and some progress was made.[2] But on the main political issues it was soon apparent that the two sides were approaching the questions from almost diametrically opposite points of view. The west, it appeared, was not interested in disarmament, unless preceded by German reunification on terms agreeable to themselves. The Soviet Union on the contrary, was not interested in German reunification except as a consequence of agreement on disarmament. From this point of view, President Eisenhower was certainly correct when he said that, in his assessment, 'the principal point of difference between the thinking of the Soviet delegation and the thinking of the United States delegation is the urgency with which we view the need for a reunified Germany'. On the other hand, it was not explained and was not immediately clear how the reunification of Germany would contribute to the solution of the disarmament question, except perhaps in the vague sense of creating a better atmosphere. Furthermore, although President Eisenhower after the conclusion of the conference stated that 'at first' the Americans had thought that German reunification and European security 'could be dealt with separately',[3] it was certainly not long before they changed their attitude. Already on

[1] Cf. Thomas, op. cit. pp. 14, 16–17.

[2] Cf. above, p. 76.

[3] *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government*, p. 85.

20 July Dulles asserted the opinion that the two issues were 'inseparably connected'.[1] This, perhaps, represented no more than deference, in the interest of solidarity, to Adenauer's well-known tenets; but, unless it was suggested that a Germany which was still unarmed might somehow endanger the peace of Europe by seeking reunion by its own unaided efforts, it was never made crystal clear precisely how the two questions were linked, and there were those who thought that a Germany divided was less likely than a Germany reunited to disturb European security. On the other hand, if the west insisted on linking German reunification and European security, they were adamant in their refusal to fit in the third major issue, viz. disarmament. Yet there seems to have been no inherent reason, granting the linking of the first two, as the west desired, why an attempt should not have been made to bring together all three in a package-deal which, with concessions on both sides, might have led to positive results.[2] A package-deal of this sort was, in fact, almost certainly what most people had expected and desired; but, although the Soviet disarmament proposals were admitted to be 'conciliatory and realistic',[3] this did not occur. In sum, if the Soviet Union stalled on Germany, the west stalled on disarmament. Neither was prepared to take the calculated risks which would have been necessary for a break-through.

*Between the Conferences*

The practical results of the summit conference were thus disappointing; but, from a less tangible point of view, it was not a failure, in so far as it indicated that statesmen on both sides could meet together without recrimination, and part, in spite of the lack of positive agreement, on a friendly note. Furthermore, as President Eisenhower had pointed out before leaving for Geneva, it was manifest that in the time available it would not be possible to 'settle the details of the many problems that afflict the world'.[4] The purpose, rather, was 'to change the spirit that has characterized the inter-governmental relationships of the world during the past ten years'; and in this respect something, at least, was achieved. Moscow claimed that the conference had 'changed the world's political climate'; but it was easy, for propaganda purposes, to exaggerate the impact of 'the Geneva spirit'. In fact, there was little, if any, concrete evidence of a change of position on any side, and—perhaps more ominously—little indication that 'the spirit of Geneva' had penetrated into the foreign offices and chancelleries of the leading powers. As President Eisenhower stated after his return to the United States,[5]

> the acid test should begin next October because then the next meeting occurs.

[1] *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government*, p. 70.
[2] Thomas, op. cit. p. 19.
[3] Ibid. p. 14.
[4] *U.S. Documents*, 1955, p. 177.
[5] Ibid. p. 231.

It will be a meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Its principal purpose will be . . . in translating those generalities that we talked about into actual, specific agreements. Then is when real conciliation and some giving on each side will be definitely necessary.

Meanwhile, however, the need for clarification was evident, and from this point of view the period between the two meetings proved to be of great importance. The west still had to indicate its attitude towards the Soviet proposals of 10 May and 21 July. When the latter had been put forward by Bulganin at Geneva, Eisenhower, while registering the 'impression that many past proposals on disarmament are more sweeping than can be insured by effective inspection', had promised that the United States would 'proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system'; and the interval that now opened was clearly the opportunity for this. Furthermore, he had proposed to recall the Disarmament Sub-Committee with this object in view; and in fact the sub-committee resumed its deliberations on 29 August and remained in session until 7 October, when it again adjourned in order to allow unimpeded discussion of the question at the foreign ministers' conference.

Even before the sub-committee reassembled there had been important developments. Soviet reactions to the Eisenhower 'open skies' plan had initially been cool, and Marshal Bulganin's report on the Geneva conference to the Supreme Soviet on 4 August was interpreted at first as a rejection of the Eisenhower proposals. But this interpretation was categorically denied by both the Soviet and the American heads of state, and President Eisenhower, going farther, gave a specific assurance that the United States was willing to accept the Soviet plan (by which, presumably, he was referring to control-posts) if the Russians would accept the American plan for aerial inspection. In this way the issue was kept open. But more important was the revelation that a new plan had been prepared by Mr. Harold Stassen, the President's special assistant for disarmament. The importance of this plan lay in the fact that, for the first time, the United States recognized the validity of the argument that absolute control, such as had hitherto been advocated by the American government, was in practice impossible. Hence the plan implied that the United States had shifted its position, and was prepared to give up the impossible aim of absolute international control in favour of relative control, together with the kind of inspection system that would ensure detection of any military build-up and the prevention of surprise attacks. These proposals, it was obvious, narrowed—if, indeed, they did not entirely obliterate—the gap between the American position and the Soviet scheme of 10 May, and when they were made known hopes of settlement rose.[1]

[1] For the Stassen plan, cf. *N.Y. Times*, 1 and 21 August 1955; *Manchester Guardian*, 2 August 1955; *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, 16 August 1955; *The Times*, 17 and 25 August 1955. It was reported

It was known that British officials had spoken highly of the scheme and regarded it as workable, and it was confidently expected that it would be put forward as a working draft by the American delegation, when the Disarmament Sub-Committee resumed its work on 29 August. It was also believed by this time that the United States government would agree to extend the Eisenhower 'open skies' plan on a world-wide scale, to cover American and Russian foreign bases and those of their allies.

When the Disarmament Sub-Committee reassembled at United Nations headquarters in New York on 29 August, however, it was soon apparent that the distance between the different points of view was still considerable. In the first place, although it was thought that the views of the western governments had been harmonized, it became evident that there was some difference between the American and the British attitudes. The latter still placed emphasis on the so-called Eden plan, which had played no part in American post-Geneva reassessment and had no place in Stassen's proposals; and Nutting, the British representative, while conceding that the Russian scheme of 10 May had widened the area of agreement, returned to the old British charge that it did not go far enough, in respect of control, to meet the requirements of security. What was significant about this criticism at this juncture, however, was that it could also be applied to the American proposals as formulated by Mr. Stassen, since (as has been seen) these tallied over considerable areas with the Russian suggestions, and as a matter of fact the Stassen plan had already been criticized from this point of view by American military experts in the Pentagon, who claimed that it did not provide for sufficiently comprehensive inspection.[1] Behind the tug-of-war in the sub-committee, therefore, there seems at a deeper level to have been a tug-of-war within the United States administration; and it would seem that the military case had British sympathy, if not support, and perhaps that of the State Department as well, where the independent position of the president's adviser on disarmament was looked on without enthusiasm. The upshot was a gradual shift in the American position, the steps and stages in which it is unnecessary to follow in detail. In the first place, it was very noticeable, when Stassen put forward the American proposals on 30 August, that their subject-matter was limited to exchange of military information, control and aerial reconnaissance, and did not go on to the substance of disarmament.

to comprise: (i) aerial inspection; (ii) the right to check on nuclear facilities and industrial plants; (iii) inspection of ports, railway centres, airfields, and other points of military concentration; (iv) access to budgetary information; (v) the establishment of a functioning inspection machinery before any actual cutback in armaments would begin. Thereafter the United States would be prepared to join in an international agreement to halt nuclear tests and introduce progressive reductions in atomic stockpiles and conventional armaments. The plan was apparently envisaged originally as a bilateral arrangement; but by 25 August, it was reported that it was intended to extend and apply it on an international scale.

[1] Cf. *N.Y. Times*, 1 August 1955.

When, after a few days, it became clear that the United States was not disposed to go farther, and statements were put about that America was 'not offering any actual arms reduction, let alone prohibitions',[1] the Soviet delegation began to get restive. Hence, while admitting that the tasks confronting the sub-committee were complex, the Soviet representative, Sobolev, on 1 September presented five questions to which his government expected a reply before proceeding to a discussion of measures for controlling disarmament. These questions were, in fact, only a restatement of known Russian arguments;[2] but the fact that it was necessary at this stage to emphasize them again was an indication of divergence rather than *rapprochement*. Nevertheless they were put forward in a moderate tone without recrimination, and though discussion had not brought progress, there was still no immediate cause for pessimism.

At this stage, however, the United States' attitude hardened. The fact was not concealed that this was the outcome of pressure from the military side, exerted through General Twining and the new secretary of the air force, Donald A. Quarles; and the result was a sudden and fundamental change in the American approach to the whole disarmament problem, as a result of which all previous discussion was superseded. Mr. Quarles roundly asserted that 'the United States was going to rest its security not on the abolition of power but on the retention of overwhelming air-atomic power; not on disarmament, but on the capacity to retaliate; not on banning or destroying atomic bombs but on retaining them in such quantities that no nation could hope to start a major war without being destroyed; not on international systems, but on mutual surveillance designed to prevent surprise attack by either side'.[3] Since hitherto the United States had taken the lead in proposing an international nuclear agency and in insisting upon a foolproof international inspection system, this statement implied that the whole basis of American thinking had shifted; and this was made clear on 6 September, when Stassen announced to the sub-committee that the United States would henceforward reserve its position, neither withdrawing nor affirming, in regard to all disarmament proposals it had made at any time prior to the summit meeting at Geneva. As a result the Eisenhower inspection plan was all that was left upon which the United States was ready to talk, although it was widely recognized that the plan did not 'go far' below the surface and that, taken

[1] E.g. in the *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 September 1955.

[2] They comprised: (i) reduction of armed forces to the level proposed on 10 May; (ii) a ceiling for the forces of other powers of 150,000–200,000 men; (iii) prohibition of nuclear weapons after the reduction of conventional armaments by 75 per cent., and complete elimination when the remaining 25 per cent. reduction had been put into effect; (iv) pending prohibition, an immediate ban on their use except in defence against aggression; (v) prior to the prohibition of nuclear weapons, a ban on tests (*Soviet News*, 5 September 1955).

[3] *N.Y. Times*, 6 September 1955.

alone, it was likely to 'benefit most greatly' the United States.[1] Such an approach was 'not inspiring'.[2] It meant, in fact, that disarmament, in any exact sense of the word, was being shelved; and, from this point of view, the new attitude of the American administration was as fatal to the projects of control put forward from the British side and to the elaborate and careful French plan proposed by M. Moch on 2 September as it was to the Soviet proposals.[3] In fact, at this stage it became clear that the Eden plan, put forward with such éclat at Geneva, but never congenial to German-American thinking, was for all practical purposes dead and buried. More important, however, was the fact that the western powers were at odds on the whole subject. The British government had little sympathy with American endeavours to put all disarmament projects into a 'deep-freeze' and concentrate instead on the Eisenhower reconnaissance scheme; on the contrary, it was of the opinion that 'the situation demands more than mere confidence-inspiring measures, and that side by side with progress on control and inspection there must be progress with the question of levels of disarmament'.[4]

The Soviet reaction was similar. As Mr. Sobolev put it, the American attitude meant 'abandoning everything that had been done earlier by the sub-committee'.[5] And yet, as *Pravda* pointed out, it was unrealistic to suppose that a power stalemate between east and west—which was what the American proposals in effect contemplated—could provide an alternative to an international settlement based on the 'spirit of Geneva'.[6] This view was widely shared, even on the western side. It was no secret that there was a 'lack of general support in the west for the American proposal'; and even American observers stressed the vulnerability of the American position, since it did 'not include any specific provision for arms cuts—though it might be the "gateway" to them'—and since it 'specifically excludes nuclear disarmament'.[7] In these circumstances a good deal of attention was paid to the attitude of the Canadian minister, Lester Pearson, when he visited Moscow at this time. Since this was the first official visit to Moscow since 1947 by a minister of one of Russia's western allies during the Second World War, the mere fact that it took place was of some significance as a measure of the change in atmosphere; and Lester Pearson's own utterances were revealing as an indication of western second thoughts. While affirming that N.A.T.O. was 'not negotiable', Mr. Pearson was equally clear that negotiations between Russia and the west over such questions as the level of armaments were feasible and

[1] *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 September 1955; *Manchester Guardian*, 2 September 1955.
[2] *N.Y. Times*, 8 September 1955.
[3] For the French working paper, cf. *Documents*, 1955, pp. 129–32.
[4] *Sunday Times*, 25 September 1955.
[5] *Soviet News*, 12 September 1955.
[6] Cited in *Manchester Guardian*, 14 September 1955.
[7] *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 September 1955; *Manchester Guardian*, 26 September 1955.

desirable; and on his return to Canada he expressed the view that the Soviet Union was genuinely perturbed by American bases abroad and its policy of rearming western Germany, and begged the United States to 'avoid provocation and provocative statements like the plague'.[1] There is no doubt that Lester Pearson's moderating influence and his demand for a reappraisal of western policy helped to keep optimism alive, in spite of the failure of the Disarmament Sub-Committee to progress. Furthermore, there was, at least on the Soviet side, no inclination to slam doors. In spite of the shock aroused by the American decision to place all existing proposals for large-scale disarmament in cold storage,[2] Sobolev continued to ask for clarification of the American proposals, of which (he said) the Soviet delegation was 'making a most attentive examination'.[3] It was, indeed, rumoured that Stassen and Sobolev were engaged 'in total privacy' 'behind the scenes' in 'cordial, candid and highly useful' bilateral discussions, and that the former had arranged to report direct to President Eisenhower on their outcome.[4] But, if the report was true, the outcome, so far as can be judged from events, was totally negative, and no change in the situation occurred. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that, on 19 September, Bulganin decided to address a letter to Eisenhower, setting out the objections to the American point of view, and the points of substance which it left uncovered.[5] This document summarized skilfully the position that had been reached. 'The United States representative', Marshal Bulganin pointed out,

> has kept aloof from the question of the reduction of the armed forces, armaments, and the prohibition of atomic weapons, expressing the desire to discuss first of all . . . your proposals on the exchange of military information . . . and . . . on . . . mutual aerial photographing . . . The impression is thus created that he reduces the whole of the disarmament problem to these two proposals only. It seems to me that such an approach would not be in keeping with the desire of the peoples.

He then went on to argue that the exchange of military information 'would only become of any importance if agreement were reached on the reduction of armaments and on taking measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons'. People were 'asking more and more often what the proposal for aerial photography and the collection of such information would really do to end the arms drive'. But he concluded by emphasizing that these observations did not mean 'that we cannot achieve an agreement on important aspects of the disarmament problem', and he

[1] *The Times*, 30 September 1955; *N.Y. Times*, 20 November 1955.
[2] To adopt the formulation used by *The Times*, 16 September 1955.
[3] *Soviet News*, 14 and 20 September 1955.
[4] *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 September 1955.
[5] *Documents*, 1955, pp. 139–44.

drew attention to 'very substantial aspects' where the positions of east and west were so close that definite agreement was possible.

The impact of the Bulganin letter was considerable. In London it was described as 'adroit', 'reasonable', 'moderate in tone', and 'logical in substance'. Although (it was said) the Eisenhower plan had always been 'highly regarded' in Britain, the fact could not be hidden that it was 'not really a disarmament plan at all'. It was therefore the view in London that the next move would have to come from the United States, which would have to prove that in pressing for aerial inspection and exchanges of blueprints 'it had not forgotten the deeper problems that remained unsolved'. This, in British opinion, could only be done by making clearer the American views on reduction of forces and on the abolition of nuclear weapons.[1] No steps were taken, however, on the American side to meet these British arguments. Partly, perhaps, this may have been an incidental consequence of the heart attack which Eisenhower suffered on 24 September, and which, by incapacitating him at the critical moment, made it virtually impossible, even if he had so wished, for him to seize such chances for initiative and leadership as still persisted. Hence the brief reply to Bulganin's letter, which he dispatched on 11 October, merely reiterated the United States offer to 'trade' inspection posts and inspection teams against aerial inspection and exchange of blueprints, and added nothing new or positive which might have suggested a way out of the impasse. By this time, indeed, it was coming to be widely believed that the United States had lost interest in disarmament—a view which the speeches of Mr. Quarles, the American secretary of the air force, did nothing to dissipate—while in the United States a similar view was taken of the Soviet position. Although American spokesmen at the Disarmament Commission protested that the United States still wanted disarmament and that they were 'as strong for it as we have ever been', provided that 'a workable and effective plan for inspection control' could be agreed upon, there seemed to be a gap between profession and practice and Mr. Quarles's pronouncements appeared to belie the official hypothesis that the Eisenhower plan, if only it were accepted, might be a 'gateway' to real disarmament. The western powers continued to reiterate their view that the controls proposed by the Soviet Union were inadequate;[2] but as the American plan did not extend so far in any case, and made no counter-proposals on the subject, this began to sound more like a debating-point than a serious objection. By this stage, indeed, it was generally assumed that both sides were playing to the gallery and seeking,

[1] *The Times*, 26 September 1955; it was becoming increasingly clear (the same source added a few days later) 'that it is time for some further step by the western powers' (ibid. 30 September 1955).

[2] Ibid. 18 October 1955; and notably in a long and detailed speech by Mr. Anthony Nutting on 21 October; cf. *Manchester Guardian*, 22 October 1955.

with an eye on the forthcoming foreign ministers' conference, to set the scene to their own liking. When Mr. Sobolev called for an immediate full-dress debate on disarmament in the United Nations Assembly, it was denounced by the west as a propaganda move, and the proposal was rejected by 49 votes to 5.[1] Such a discussion before the foreign ministers' meeting, Nutting argued, would only lead to confusion, since the whole subject necessarily had high priority on the foreign ministers' agenda. In short, the ball was passed from New York back to Geneva, from optimistic Mr. Stassen to the cool, determined hands of Mr. Dulles. But it returned to Geneva under conditions which had certainly deteriorated since 23 July. It was not only that attitudes on disarmament itself had hardened, but also that events outside the conference chamber were detrimental to the Geneva spirit. The Czech-Egyptian arms deal,[2] which was given prominence in the western press, appeared to many people in western countries to be an extension of the cold war into a new area, in flagrant contradiction with the spirit of Geneva; while Soviet dealings with the two Germanys[3] were regarded as evidence that Russia did not really desire a *détente* in Europe. How far these interpretations were correct is not here a matter for discussion; but there can be no doubt that they powerfully affected the atmosphere in which the foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva was held.

*The Foreign Ministers' Meeting (27 October–11 November 1955)*

Whereas in the sub-committee the question of disarmament had been considered independently, when it returned to Geneva it was once again bound up, as at the summit meeting during the summer, with the intricacies, real or artificial, of German reunification and European security. For this reason alone, as well as because of the sterility of the interchanges which had taken place in the intervening months, there was little surprise when it became apparent that the foreign ministers were making no progress. The high expectations aroused five or six months earlier had by now subsided; and when on 11 November the ministers announced—practically the only point on which unanimity was speedily reached—that they would suspend the conference at the end of its third week, it was all too obvious that none of them had any constructive proposals in his dispatch-box. In fact, no new ground was opened up, and for that reason it is unnecessary to consider the plans of the two sides in detail;[4] the four governments had taken up their prearranged positions, and stuck grimly to them.

The stumbling-block was the joint problem of Germany and European

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 29 October 1955. [2] Cf. above, p. 95. [3] Cf. above, pp. 143, 146.

[4] For the main texts, cf. *The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27–November 16, 1955* (Washington: Department of State, 1955); *U.S. Documents*, 1955, pp. 232–93; *Documents*, 1955, pp. 50–89.

security, which—perhaps unwisely—Mr. Bulganin had agreed at the summit conference to treat as closely linked, if not inseparable. As Mr. Dulles candidly admitted, 'the indispensable premise' of the western security proposals 'was the reunification of Germany, without which', he said, 'we feel there can be no solid peace in Europe'. Since, however, the reasons why Germany should be accepted as the key were not easy to explain, it is understandable that Molotov viewed the western proposals with some suspicion. What the western powers were seeking, he said, was 'to obtain our consent, not only to the remilitarisation of Western Germany, but also to the remilitarisation of Eastern Germany, and the integration of the whole of Germany in military groupings of the western powers'. For this reason, the western proposals of 27 October, which sought to make German reunification palatable to the Soviet Union by combining it with a 'treaty of assurance' and a limitation of armaments 'in a zone comprising areas of comparable size and depth and importance on both sides of the line of demarcation between a reunified Germany and the Eastern European countries' were less attractive to the Soviet Union than the western powers seem to have assumed. Three main objections were raised on the Soviet side. First, the proposed treaty of assurance did not materially contribute to the security of the U.S.S.R., which could not in any case possibly have accepted western guarantees without losing face as a great power. Secondly, the western proposals assumed that—and, indeed, were only intended to become effective when —a reunified Germany decided 'to enter N.A.T.O. and the Western European Union'; thus not only did they prejudge the outcome of 'free elections' in Germany, but also the proposed undertaking by the western powers 'to refrain from the use of force and to withhold aid from an aggressor', which was the assurance offered to the Soviet Union, was made contingent upon this outcome. And finally the proposed zone between east and west implied an extension eastwards of the western sphere of influence which, as Mr. Molotov pointed out, in no way corresponded 'to what everybody knows to be the actual state of affairs'. It implied a retreat by Russia from the Elbe and an advance by the west to the Odra–Nyssa line without any visible compensations for the Soviet Union. There can hardly have been much surprise when it was rejected out of hand.

There is no doubt that the British foreign secretary was right when, in summing up the outcome of the conference, he said that 'the real problem' was 'our radically different approach to German reunification'. If the western powers had not, in Dulles's phrase, made German reunification 'the indispensable premise' of their proposals, it was probably true, as Macmillan admitted, 'that, on the question of security, we could have made considerable progress'. This was, in fact, the position taken by the Soviet delegation. The course of discussion, Molotov argued, had 'shown

that even with two German states in existence, European security can be safeguarded'. The real question was the question of priority. In the Soviet view, 'for the peoples of Europe the problem of European security holds first place', while 'the German question' was 'subordinate to this problem'. If, therefore, European security were safeguarded, that result would 'also ensure security for the German people'; in fact, 'without settling it', Molotov argued, it was 'impossible to solve the German problem either'. The American view, and that of the governments associated with the United States, was diametrically opposed, and this without doubt was the basic reason for the stalemate.

When the foreign ministers passed on from the German and European questions to disarmament, the stalemate over the former reacted unfavourably on the latter, and no real attempt was made to break the deadlock which, as we have seen, already existed before the conference met. It was not long before it became evident that neither side was 'truly straightforward' and that 'subterfuge' was the keynote of the discussion'.[1] In fact, the plans immediately tabled by the western and the Soviet delegations[2] registered no advance, and the discussion simply churned over the old grounds of discord. The British foreign secretary complained of the Soviet 'failure to reply to my questions about the rights and powers of the international control organ, which is an essential part of any disarmament agreement'. Molotov, on the other hand, rejected the western proposal because it said 'nothing about ending the arms drive', or about 'the reduction of armaments', or 'the need to ban atomic weapons, although the United Nations went on record in favour of this as early as 1946'. Molotov would not accept the Eisenhower plan independently of a disarmament agreement; but he offered to give favourable consideration to it, if it formed part of a comprehensive disarmament programme. That was not a particularly enterprising offer; but it was the nearest approach to compromise that was reached. However, Molotov's suggestion was not taken up. The western governments, it would appear, had reached the conclusion that (in Mr. Harold Macmillan's words) 'the total abolition of nuclear weapons' was not 'a realisable goal in our present state of knowledge',[3] and from this they deduced that disarmament, except perhaps in the field of 'armed forces and conventional armaments', was an impracticable aim.[4] To expect the Russians to agree to

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 29 November 1955.

[2] For the texts, cf. *The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers*, pp. 184–6, 199–201.

[3] i.e. until such time as 'the brilliant men who ushered in the nuclear age' succeeded in discovering 'ways of providing fully adequate control over all nuclear materials' (ibid. p. 197); this was formerly more tersely described as the Greek Kalends.

[4] The French foreign minister, Pinay, crossed the t's and dotted the i's. 'We are bound to admit', he said (ibid. p. 193), 'that we are not yet in a position to put into effect a *general* disarmament plan.'

a reduction of conventional forces without some corresponding measure of nuclear disarmament was, however, clearly unrealistic.

There was, therefore, no more to be done;[1] and it is a measure of the deterioration which had set in that the four Ministers did not even attempt to devise an agreed statement on disarmament or on the other topics of discussion. Nor did they resort to the familiar subterfuge of referring disputed questions to a working group for study and report. On the contrary, they merely agreed to report the result of their deliberations to their governments, recommending at the same time that any further discussions should take place through normal diplomatic channels. The brief communiqué[2] announcing these decisions was the best comment on the failure of the attempt to break through the routine of diplomacy by a summit conference. As the British foreign secretary put it, the four powers still stood 'looking at each other across the Great Divide'.[3] The reasons for this failure are implicit in the preceding account of the diplomatic exchanges of the period and it is perhaps hardly necessary to look farther. Nevertheless contemporary observers believed they could see more remote causes, accounting not so much for the failure to agree as for the apparent failure even to wish to agree. A competent American source reported that 'Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' was 'understood to believe that Soviet desire for relief from the burdens of the arms race' was 'an important bargaining asset in political negotiations with the Kremlin', and therefore that 'arms cuts should not be lightly conceded'.[4] If true, this report would indicate one reason for the refusal to get down to the substance of disarmament, and the insistent demand for 'German unification and other political settlements' as 'part of the price' the Soviet Union would have to pay before the United States would even consider disarmament plans. In any case, the immediate result of the conference, as Mr. Macmillan said, was 'that, instead of taking another step forward, at the best we are locked again in a stalemate; at the worst, we have taken a step backward'.

Nevertheless the negative conclusion to the high-level conferences of which so much had been hoped, was not the end. Although there was not much sign by this time of the Geneva spirit among the four great powers, it was still alive among the smaller nations, who feared for their own safety and were not prepared to stand aside while the situation once

[1] The foreign ministers also discussed 'east–west contacts'; but here also there was 'a retreat from the spirit of co-operation which marked the discussion of the question' in July. This was attributed by Dulles to Russian 'sensitiveness . . . to the introduction into the Soviet Union of any ideas which conflict with the official ideology', by Molotov to western attempts to intrude into matters concerning 'domestic policies', which 'were entirely within the competence' of each individual government. Cf. *Documents*, 1955, pp. 71, 82.

[2] Ibid. p. 88.

[3] Ibid. p. 75.

[4] *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 November 1955.

again deteriorated. The questions of Germany and European security, which had brought the conference to nothing, were of little more than secondary interest to most members of the United Nations whose immediate concerns lay in other parts of the world; but on disarmament, which affected all, feeling was still high, and for many of them the failure of the 'big four' to reach any agreement was unacceptable. Canada warned the United Nations of the 'grim prospect' of a world-wide thermonuclear weapons race on a vaster scale than any previous arms race, and implicitly criticized the negative attitude of the United States by calling for 'a measure of disarmament which would substantially alter the international situation'. Sweden, also, 'deplored Washington's decision to "reserve" its attitude towards arms reduction'; but it divided the blame for lack of progress impartially between the United States and the Soviet Union, and urged that the Disarmament Sub-Committee be given a 'prolonged mandate'.[1] India, on the other hand, called for the suspension of nuclear tests and urged the Disarmament Commission to submit proposals without delay for the establishment of an armaments truce, pending international agreement on disarmament. 'In view of the urgency and grave importance of the problem', the Indian resolution added, 'the present Assembly session should be recessed rather than adjourned'.[2] All this was evidence that, in spite of disagreement between the great powers, the issue was not dead; and the United Nations was in a position to make its influence felt because both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were aware of the importance for their own purposes of winning the support of the other fifty-eight member-nations.

In these circumstances one final effort to break the deadlock was made by Jules Moch, who was widely considered to be the world's most knowledgeable expert in the field of arms control. In the past he had been responsible for compromises which had brought agreement closer, and he had been one of the most outspoken critics of the Eisenhower plan on the grounds that it was not a disarmament plan at all, but a means of stabilizing the existing balance of power. The new plan he put forward in the United Nations' Disarmament Commission on 23 November, unlike most of the proposals propounded after 10 May, was definitely a programme of conciliation and compromise.[3] Contrary to what had been said or implied by the foreign ministers, it was, Moch declared, 'an incontrovertible fact' that it was 'possible to reconcile in a single logical system theories ostensibly as divergent as that of preliminary control before signing the disarmament agreement, and that of the prior negotiation of a general

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 2 December 1955; *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 December 1955.

[2] *The Times*, 2 December 1955.

[3] For the Moch plan, cf. *Combat*, 24 November 1955; *The Times*, 24 November 1955; *N.Y. Times*, 24 November 1955.

treaty, partially uncontrollable'. What he proposed, therefore, was a synthesis of the Franco-British memorandum of the previous April and the Soviet proposals of 10 May, together with the Eisenhower plan put forward in July. Such a synthesis was possible, he argued, on the basis of three fundamental principles: (i) 'no control without disarmament'; (ii) 'No disarmament without controls'; but (iii) 'progressively, all disarmament that can be currently controlled'.

The Moch plan represented a return to calm analysis after what M. Moch himself described as the 'alternate hopes and disappointments, advances and set-backs' of the preceding six months. His third proposition evidently challenged the view, put forward only a couple of weeks earlier by his own foreign minister, Pinay, and by Macmillan, that as total control was impossible, disarmament was unfeasible. His first proposition amounted to an unspoken condemnation of the United States' position.[1] As he himself later explained, his object was 'to realize without delay and simultaneously what could be done in the way of controllable disarmament in the existing political climate'.[2] 'We have not the right', he added, 'to await the conclusion of current research, in order to defer all disarmament on the pretext that one part of it is uncontrollable'.[3] But it soon transpired that neither the U.S.A. nor the U.S.S.R. was prepared to budge in any essential point. The Soviet delegate, while not rejecting the principle of a synthesis of previous plans, objected that the French suggestions envisaged a 'preparatory stage' in which controls would be established but no specific measures of disarmament taken; he was obviously suspicious lest, if the first stage were agreed to, pretexts might be found for not proceeding to the second. The State Department, on the other hand, took objection to the suggestion of a reduction of conventional armaments, and was openly hostile to the proposal that the final step in the disarmament process should be an unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, since this implied a fundamental change in the strategic plans of N.A.T.O. at a time when nuclear weapons were being integrated into virtually every important branch of the American armed forces. When the United States decided once again to press its 'open skies' plan, although by this time competent observers regarded it as dead,[4] the United Nations, perceiving that progress was impossible, contented itself with an innocuous resolution[5] referring all the proposals back to its Disarmament Sub-Committee, which was expected to meet again in London in February or March 1956.

[1] The second proposition was, of course, directed against the Soviet proposals; here, however, it was not a question of proposing disarmament without controls, but of the adequacy of the controls proposed.

[2] *Le Monde*, 8 December 1955.

[3] *Le Populaire*, 8 December 1955.

[4] *N.Y. Times* and *Manchester Guardian*, 6 December 1955.

[5] Text in *Documents*, 1955, pp. 144–6.

The result was meagre. And yet the Moch plan was not without consequences. In the first place, it brought disarmament back into the picture from which the State Department's recent pronouncements seemed to have banished it. Faced by criticisms in the United Nations and by the danger of alienating neutralist opinion and creating a rift among the western allies, the United States saw the wisdom of modifying its stand against disarmament, though what armaments cuts it would accept was still not specified.[1] In the same way and for the same reasons Great Britain abandoned the standpoint that technical and scientific uncertainties precluded disarmament altogether.[2] The implication was that future negotiations would have to go beyond mere measures for controlling existing armaments and once again tackle the question of disarmament *au fond*; and this, in fact, occurred when the Disarmament Sub-Committee reassembled in March. It was largely due to M. Moch's clarification of the situation that even this small step was achieved, or (perhaps it might be more accurate to say) was salvaged from the wreck of the summer's hopes. By establishing first principles, M. Moch made a new start possible; but it was nevertheless true, as a result of the sterile debates of the autumn, that it was virtually necessary to go back to the beginning. The fruitless attempt to introduce control without disarmament, which had been the main feature of proceedings from July onwards, had cut across all possible lines of advance, and dashed the hopes of a real measure of disarmament which had been so widespread before the heads of government met. By the time the Moch plan was tabled, on the other hand, the political situation had deteriorated to such a degree that any hope of reopening the question in a constructive spirit was for the time being illusory. The final sessions at the United Nations were punctuated by accusations and counter-accusations which had little, if anything, to do with the immediate problem of controlling nuclear weapons. The head of the Soviet delegation denounced the attitude of the United States and Britain, which had 'put the disarmament problem back by at least ten years'.[3] On the other side the British delegate, Nutting, condemned 'itinerant Soviet leaders' for reviving 'the familiar Soviet technique, which he hoped had been abandoned last summer . . . of diplomacy by accusation', and then went on himself to pour scorn on the Soviet abandonment of the Porkkala and Port Arthur bases, to attack Russia for its policy in eastern Germany,

[1] Even so, 'the American bargaining position' was 'still regarded as too severe to be negotiable'; *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 December 1955.

[2] This was made plain by Mr. Nutting's statement that it was out of the question to let 'the problems of disarmament . . . go on compounding themselves for another ten or more years while we seek for ways and means to break down the political and scientific barriers which stand in the way of a comprehensive disarmament agreement' (*Manchester Guardian*, 3 December 1955). This statement was in marked contrast to Mr. Macmillan's scepticism on 10 November; cf. above, p. 169.

[3] *Soviet News*, 13 December 1955.

and to point an accusing finger at the Soviet Union on account of the arms deal in the Middle East.[1] This attack brought a heated rejoinder from the Arab delegates, who pointed out that 'the Soviet Union has not a single military base in the Middle East', and maintained that it was the western powers which were causing tension and creating disturbed conditions in that area.[2]

This outbreak of acrimony and vituperation was not an edifying spectacle; but it had its significance as marking the end of a chapter. It signified the final dissipation of the spirit of Geneva. It would seem that the western powers, in part or in whole, had gone there in the expectation, despite preliminary Soviet warnings to the contrary,[3] that Soviet acceptance of a conference indicated readiness to accept (or at least to negotiate upon) western proposals for the reunification of Germany. Soviet tractability, it would seem, had been mistaken for weakness. If so, the situation had been miscalculated. The Soviet Union, for its part, seems to have sensed at an early stage, probably at the conclusion of the summit meeting in July, that agreement was unlikely, and to have begun a reorientation of policy, of which the Czech-Egyptian arms deal was an early indication. Finding that there was little hope of settlement among the four major powers, it turned its attention increasingly to the smaller nations, particularly those which had proclaimed their neutrality, and which were already playing an active role in the United Nations. Thus, while four-power negotiations were still proceeding, there was a gradual evolution of policy and a change of position. The outcome, in December, looked superficially like, and was not infrequently referred to as, a return to cold war attitudes; but in fact it marked the opening of a new phase, in which, since the deadlock among the great powers had not been dispelled, effort was concentrated on making headway in other directions. With this new phase, which began with the journey of the Soviet leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev, to Asia, it is now necessary to deal.

[1] *The Times*, 3 December 1955.

[2] 'It is not the Soviet Union', Mr. Ahmed Shukairy declared, 'which is suppressing the liberation movement in North Africa. It is not the Soviet Union which has created this great tragedy of the Palestine question. It is not the Soviet Union which is bombarding the southern territories of Yemen. It is not the Soviet Union which has raided the Buraimi oasis, a territory of Saudi Arabia' (*Manchester Guardian*, 8 December 1955).

[3] Cf. above, p. 155.

# PART III

## DECEMBER 1955–JULY 1956

# CHAPTER XI

## INTRODUCTION

THE negative conclusion of the heads' of state and foreign ministers' conferences marked the end of a chapter. It showed that the issues dividing the world, and in particular the atmosphere of mistrust, were not to be overcome by a direct approach. The division between the communist bloc and the western world was as wide as ever. On the other hand, its character had changed. While neither side was ready, on terms which satisfied the other, to renounce the ultimate weapon, it had become more clear than ever, as developments in nuclear armaments forged ahead, that neither side would have recourse to its world-destructive armaments except over an issue of life and death. This position of atomic stalemate created a new situation, in which, in effect, there were only two alternative policies. The one, which had been tried during the summer and autumn of 1955, and had failed, was to reach agreement between the two sides. The other was to carry the conflict into new fields, in which military superiority was not a decisive factor. It was, in a well-worn phrase, the pursuit of policy by other means. From November 1955 the latter alternative was put into effect; and therewith a new chapter in international relations began.

The symbol of the new period was the journey paid by the Soviet statesmen, Bulganin and Khrushchev, to India, Burma, and Afghanistan between 18 November and 19 December 1955. So far as India was concerned, the initiative for this journey reached back as far as June, when Nehru visited Moscow and invited Bulganin to pay a return visit to the Indian republic. At this stage, however, the invitation was not made public. When, on 26 September, it was officially announced in Moscow that the journey would take place, and that both Khrushchev and Bulganin would participate, it was not unreasonable to suppose that the announcement corresponded to an evolution in Soviet policy, which in all probability reflected the deadlock already visible in east–west relations. The Soviet Union, in other words, in view of the failure of moves for a *détente* with the western powers, was setting out to woo the uncommitted powers of Asia, which had proclaimed their independent policy at Bandung in the previous April. Therewith began the struggle for the hearts and souls, and also for the more healthy material appetites, of the Asian peoples; or, put in less grandiloquent terms, the peaceful but active competition of two conflicting political and economic systems, by which each hoped to demonstrate to the neutral peoples its ideological and economic superiority.

It is true, of course, that the question of the under-developed regions

did not emerge suddenly out of the blue as a major issue of international politics in November 1955. Already in the spring there had been major adjustments in the United States' aid programme, which showed clear realization of the shift in the centres of world interest. During the last six months of 1954, President Eisenhower pointed out in a letter transmitting to Congress the report of the Foreign Operations administration, there had been 'a significant acceleration of operations in Asia', where 'communism is stepping up its efforts of expansion'. This new concentration on Asia, or 'the so-called "arc of freedom" that stretches from Japan to Pakistan', was the keynote of the 1955–6 programme; little attention, on the other hand, was given to Africa, which in the president's message was dismissed in a brief paragraph. Nevertheless the switch away from Europe was significant. Whereas in 1952 Europe had received 75 per cent. of the allocations and the Far East only 12 per cent., in the current budget funds earmarked for Europe were down to 25 per cent., and those for Asian countries accounted for over 60 per cent. of the total.[1] This represented an advance of 70 per cent. on the previous year's figures and was designed as a first move to raise productivity in non-communist Asia by one-third in a period of eight years, and the president suggested that the best means of achieving a 'maximum return' would be to set aside $200 million 'for the establishment of a President's fund for Asian Economic Development'. Similarly an International Co-operation administration, replacing the Foreign Operations administration, was to be set up within the Department of State, and it was stated that the United States would contribute to the International Finance Corporation, to encourage private enterprise abroad, as a matter of 'enlightened self-interest'.

The foreign aid programme outlined above was passed without important changes on 30 June. Nevertheless there were certain features which made it less incisive than might have seemed to be the case. In the first place, the drop in the total outlay was considerable, amounting to 62 per cent. by comparison with 1952. In the second place, the allocation of the total sum of $3·5 billion, asked for by the president, showed that the purely economic consideration of raising the standard of living of the underdeveloped Asian lands was still only of secondary importance. While the sum of $712,500,000 was specifically listed as required for economic programmes, this contrasted with the sums of $1,717,200,000 allocated to military assistance and 'direct forces support' of the United States' allies, in the form of aircraft, tanks, guns, and the like, and $1,000,300,000 for 'defence support', i.e. to enable countries, especially in Asia, to carry out defensive measures beyond their current financial capacity. Thus, in effect, some three-quarters of the total was earmarked for purposes which

[1] Cf. *American Documents*, 1955, pp. 33 sqq.; *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 March 1955; *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, 15 March 1955; *N.Y. Times*, 21 April, 4 May, 5 June, and 1 July 1955.

did not directly alleviate the general economic needs of Asian peoples. Furthermore, although the aid programme was stated to extend to all fifteen countries of 'free Asia', in fact it was made publicly known that the bulk of Asian funds would go to Korea, Formosa, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, with Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines as second strings.[1] In other words, the requirements of such major Asian countries as India and Burma were unlikely to be fulfilled.

There was thus considerable room for Soviet intervention, and the significance of the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, Burma, and Afghanistan lay in the demonstration which it provided that the possibilities in Asia were being taken seriously by the Soviet government. In itself, the journey was in the nature of a good-will visit to prepare the way, and its effects were largely psychological. Nevertheless there was no doubt in any quarter of its immense success as a propaganda move. If, in fact, the larger part of the statements made by the two Soviet statesmen[2] was taken up by political pronouncements, such as endorsement of the five principles of coexistence propounded at Bandung, professions of peaceful sentiments, and support for Indian claims to Goa, they also took care to leave no doubt in their hearers' minds that they were well aware of the economic problems confronting the new independent peoples of Asia and ready to offer co-operation in overcoming them. Furthermore, they emphasized that they were willing to do this without 'political strings' and without 'trying to export communist ideas to other countries'. India and the Soviet Union, Bulganin freely admitted, 'have different social and political systems'; but this should not be allowed to stand in the way of co-operation. The Soviet government was sometimes accused of setting east against west; but in fact the Soviet Union represented both Europe and Asia, and was 'against the domination of one continent over another'. On the other hand, India, although 'one of the mightiest states in the world', was 'officially not regarded as a great power' by the west. 'To recognize India as a great power—for them this means changing their attitude.' 'We', however, Mr. Khrushchev affirmed, 'consider that India is a great power and that she should take one of the first places among the great states of the world.' But, in order that this should be the case, it was necessary for India to have 'a developed national economy and a high enough living standard'. This was a task which the Soviet people fully understood and with which they sincerely sympathized; and therewith the speaker went on to offer 'Soviet-Indian co-operation, in economy and culture, in scientific and technical research'.

[1] This was stated by Stassen, as director of the Foreign Operations administration, on 6 May; cf. *Manchester Guardian*, 7 May 1955.

[2] The *Full Texts of Speeches and Statements* made by N. A. Bulganin and N. S. Khrushchev in India, Burma, and Pakistan were published by Soviet News (London), 1955.

In Burma it was the same. In both countries 'the main thing' was 'to train your own cadres, to have engineers, scientists, specialists in every branch of the economy'. Here the Soviet Union, which boasted 5½ million specialists, 3,796 technical schools and a plethora of other scientific institutions, was an example and an incentive; and in order that the Asian countries might have 'more of such people', the Soviet Union was 'willing to share our knowledge and experience with you'. It was ready to provide technicians; it was also ready to help in 'the construction of industrial establishments, power-stations, hydro-projects, the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and other achievements'. As Mr. Khrushchev pointed out, there were close parallels between the industrial development of Asia and the process by which the Soviet Union had become 'a highly developed industrial power', standing 'on the same level of economic development as the technically most advanced capitalist countries'. The question for Asia was 'to verify in practice whose system is better'. This meant, in effect, that the Soviet Union was ready to meet the west on the ground of economic proficiency; and the Soviet leaders did not hesitate to throw down an open challenge to the capitalist world to 'enter into competition with us' and to 'compete without war'. In this way, and through the speeches of Bulganin and Khrushchev in Asia, the slogan of 'competitive competition' entered as a real force on to the stage of world politics.

The emphasis during the Bulganin–Khrushchev tour in Asia on peaceful competition and the highly successful attempt to convince the peoples of Asia of the economic advantages to be derived from peaceful co-operation with the U.S.S.R. did not, of course, represent a completely new phase in Soviet policy. Their significance, rather, lay in the far more important rôle now assigned to economic competition as the best means of taking advantage of post-Geneva conditions. This competition might take either of two forms: an increase of foreign trade in its normal patterns, or the extension of aid and credit and technical assistance in special circumstances and on special terms.[1] In fact, long before the tour of Khrushchev and Bulganin in Asia, both forms had been used; and the change that followed was less one in volume than in psychological impact. In global figures, the volume of Soviet trade with the non-communist world as a whole, and with Asia in particular, was not large, and the same applied to assistance granted. In spite of recent increases, most countries of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America conducted only from 1 per cent. to 5 per cent. of their trade in 1955 and 1956 with countries of the Soviet bloc, while the total assistance programme extended to only some £500 million,

[1] For the following, cf. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955* (Geneva, 1956), pp. 178 sqq., supplemented by the following articles in *The World Today*: 'The Soviet Bloc and Under-Developed Countries' (vol. xii, June 1956, pp. 222–39), 'The Political Aspect of East–West Trade' (ibid. October 1956, pp. 409–17), and 'Soviet Russia and the Underdeveloped Countries' (vol. xiii, May 1957, pp. 207–19).

spread over five years. When Bulganin and Khrushchev spoke of economic competition, therefore, they were really referring to the timely and strategically placed use of small amounts of resources designed specifically to enhance the Soviet economic and political position. On the other hand, the economic and political implications of even a small shift in the foreign trade pattern were great, particularly at a time when many underdeveloped nations needed the kind of capital goods which the U.S.S.R. was able to export, and in view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. was in a better position than capitalist countries to absorb their products. It was for these reasons, and also because of the resistance which the pattern of the American aid programme had bred in many countries of Asia, that the impact of the Bulganin–Khrushchev mission was so great.

The first development in the new Soviet bloc trade offensive to impress world opinion was, of course, the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, which apparently was concluded in July 1955, although not officially revealed until the end of September. Since here, however, the political reaction against the Baghdad pact alliance and the 'northern tier' was clearly an important factor on the communist side, the arms deal cannot be regarded as a normal element of the new Soviet bloc trade policy. Nevertheless other evidence showed that the Soviet Union was interested in developing a trade drive in the Middle East, even if its political impact was 'restricted'.[1] Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in particular, made great efforts to get larger slices of the Egyptian market, and Egypt for its part concluded trade agreements with most of the popular democracies, including a tripartite agreement with Rumania and the U.S.S.R. for the supply of petrol at prices 15 per cent. below the world market. Furthermore, it was noticeable that the Soviet Union was tending, in the place of ordinary trade agreements—frequently on a barter basis—to substitute comprehensive agreements covering grants of credit, delivery of blueprints for plants, their construction, and technical assistance, including the training of local workers and putting the plants into operation. The immediate result of the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to Asia was the conclusion of further agreements of this sort. The Indian-Soviet communiqué of 13 December 1955 included arrangements for Soviet aid in the construction of a steel plant, and in January 1956 it was followed by an offer to lend money and technicians for the construction of an aluminium plant and of hydro-electric works in southern India. In Burma the Soviet delegation reached agreements whereby the U.S.S.R. would aid in the construction of Burmese industrial plants and the development of agriculture in exchange for Burmese rice; and the U.S.S.R. also offered to set up a technical institute in Rangoon, simply 'as a further token of good-will'. In Kabul, finally, the Soviet leaders extended a $100 million credit to Afghanistan for economic purposes.

[1] 'Soviet Policy in the Middle East', *The World Today*, vol. xi (December 1955), p. 523.

Many western economists and commentators have pointed out the limited nature of these undertakings. How, then, is their disproportionate impact to be explained? In the first place, there seems little doubt that the Soviet leaders were more skilful than their American counterparts in understanding Asian psychology. The United States, it has been well said,[1] warned 'the Asians to defend themselves' and pressed 'swords into their hands for a crusade against an unrecognized Communism in the name of a Democracy they have never known'. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was offering 'ploughshares'. And it was ploughshares which Asia needed, or was convinced that it needed. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. could profit from the fact that the principal recipients were newly independent countries which fiercely resented any hint of western domination. But more practically important was the fact that the Soviet Union was prepared to grant more favourable terms than were obtainable either from western countries or through the World Bank, including interest at 2–3 per cent. and long repayment periods ranging up to thirty years with no payment in the initial years. The attraction of such terms, and of the absence of political conditions, is too obvious to need emphasis. In addition, the conditions obtaining in Asia in the latter part of 1955 and in 1956 were favourable to the Soviet offensive. The economy of most parts of the Asian continent, largely dependent upon the prices of primary products, had been artificially buoyant as a result of the inflow of western support during the Korean and other emergencies; their ending was accompanied by a downward drift, to which many of the countries of the area were vulnerable. The result was a short-term economic embarrassment, which made Soviet offers particularly attractive. A notable instance was Indonesia, where the U.S.S.R. stepped in with a loan of £36 million, while at the same time trade between Indonesia and the eastern bloc rose between 1953 and 1955 on the export side from $4·6 million to $36·5 million, and on the import side from $4·2 million to $31·2 million.[2] For the countries concerned, the importance of trade connexions with the communist world lay not least of all in the willingness of the latter to take over surpluses not otherwise easily disposable on the open market, with the result that trade with the Soviet bloc became a significant stabilizing factor from the point of view of the seller. The clearest and best known example is Egyptian cotton, of which, as a result of the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal, Czechoslovakia became the second largest purchaser after India; but many countries in Asia found themselves similarly placed. Afghanistan exported to the Soviet Union half its cotton, three-quarters of its wool, one-fourth of its hides, and more than nine-tenths of its oil-seed. Barter and bilateral agreements were entered into by India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Burma,

[1] 'Soviet Political Strategy in Asia', *The World Today*, vol. xii (May 1956), p. 193.

[2] Cf. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955*, table 87, p. 181.

enabling Pakistan to find new outlets for jute and cotton and Burma for rice. In the latter case the agreement of July 1955 provided for Soviet purchase of 150,000–200,000 tons, amounting to about one-tenth of the total Burmese rice exports; but it was estimated that in due course the communist bloc would buy as much as 50 per cent.[1] Meanwhile India, with a foreign exchange gap of nearly £400 million in its second five-year plan, had been able to borrow between a fourth and a third of that amount from the U.S.S.R.[2]

If the change of front which was symbolized by the Bulganin–Khrushchev tour of Asia was to be interpreted primarily as a reaction to the failure of the Geneva conferences and the decline of the so-called 'Geneva spirit', it also fitted in with other changes in the communist world. In the first place, peaceful competition was undoubtedly more consonant with the new line in Soviet policy, both internal and external, which was characteristic of the Bulganin–Khrushchev régime, and which was to find clear formulation, only three months later, at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. The relaxation of internal pressures, which had been evident for some months, the concentration upon accelerating the rate of growth of the Soviet economy, which was a feature of the new five-year plan for 1956–60, together with the certainty expressed so frequently and so confidently by Mr. Khrushchev that the socialist mode of production possessed such decisive superiority over the capitalist mode of production that its peaceful victory was assured, all implied a change in the direction of policy. In the second place, there is good reason to think that peaceful competition also suited the needs of communist China. Whether or not the Korean war and the subsequent military emergency off Formosa had imposed a strain on the Chinese economy, it was clear by the end of 1955 that the Chinese government wanted 'a relaxation of tension in order to push on with its internal changes'.[3] In speeches delivered on 31 July and 29 October, Mao Tse-tung called for a speeding up of collectivization in agriculture and the eradication of private enterprise. This, together with the massive development of heavy industry, which was given precedence when the first five-year plan was revised and overhauled in the summer of 1955, implied a concentration on the economic field, to which the new policy of economic competition was well adapted.[4] In so far as both the Soviet Union and China were preoccupied with the development of their internal resources, and with overhauling the industrialized capitalist lands, it was all to the good to switch their main effort away from military to economic and politico-economic pressure. In addition, this new com-

[1] Cf. *The World Today*, vol. xii (1956), p. 226.

[2] Ibid. vol. xiii (1957), p. 213.

[3] *Manchester Guardian*, 25 November 1955.

[4] For the changes in the Chinese five-year plan, which followed the suicide of the state-planner, Kao Kang, cf. *Financial Times*, 10 October 1955.

munist offensive raised fundamental problems for the west, which was still geared to military defence policies rather than to economic competition. Although in all fundamental ways the capitalist west may have been better placed than the communist east for an economic contest, it was not easy for the western powers, with a free economy, to mobilize their economic superiority, and the new Soviet policy uncovered a number of weaknesses in the western position. Although, as we shall see,[1] Washington and London were by no means unaware of this situation, and of the measures needed, it was easier, in a loose alliance, to see what was required than to do it.

One particular, but important, aspect of this situation was the debate on the position of the British Commonwealth, which came to a head during and immediately preceding the Commonwealth prime ministers' conference on 27 June 1956. Dissatisfaction with the nebulous and inconclusive character of these meetings had already found expression earlier; but the new Soviet policy in Asia, and the question how the countries of the Commonwealth would react to this policy, and whether the Commonwealth was in a position to react as a unit, gave the question a new urgency.[2] More fundamentally, the Commonwealth was divided on the two main issues confronting the non-communist world, viz. the attitude to be adopted towards the communist political threat, and the attitude to be adopted towards problems of race. Added to this was the potentially serious question of minority communities.[3] Furthermore, the Commonwealth bond was no longer the principal guarantee of its members' security, and such defence arrangements as A.N.Z.U.S. and S.E.A.T.O. had already cut across Commonwealth ties. Australian policy showed up many of these differences: for example, its preoccupation with the question of defence in Asia, its 'white Australia' policy, and its attitude to Indonesian claims on Western New Guinea. In these circumstances, such questions as availability of bases, transit of troops, priorities for supply of armaments, became points of contention, because the guiding principles of foreign policy were no longer uniform. A case in point was the opposition in Ceylon to the retention by Great Britain of the Trincomalee base, on which, in fact, a rather indefinite agreement was reached at the prime ministers' conference.[4] Such issues showed up the inherent difficulties of the situation. And yet, looking ahead, it was not easy to see what steps could be taken

[1] Below, pp. 189, 200 sqq.

[2] Cf. the important series of articles in *The Times* on 12, 18, 25–27 June 1956 under the general titles: 'The Changed Commonwealth' and 'Commonwealth Changes'.

[3] E.g. the dispute between India and Ceylon over the Tamil minority in the island, which came into the foreground in 1956, and the problem of the Chinese and Indian communities in Malaya. The decision taken on 8 February 1956 to grant independence to Malaya, as from 31 August 1957, meant in all probability an intensification of such problems.

[4] For the official statement, cf. *The Times*, 7 July 1956.

to create greater cohesion. The Australian prime minister, Menzies, spoke of thinking 'furiously' about 'where we are going and what road or roads we should take'; but *The Times* pointed out that 'schemes for closer centralization' were 'impractical'. On the other hand, if nothing were done, there was a possibility either that some Commonwealth countries would 'stop being members', or that the whole association would loosen to the degree that it would become 'meaningless except as an occasional talking-shop'. In fact, perhaps wisely in view of the divergencies of opinion, no steps were taken to devise remedies, and it seems tacitly to have been admitted that events must be left to take their course. But one result was that there was no overall Commonwealth attitude towards the new developments of Soviet policy in Asia.

A further important factor in the new situation was the change in composition and membership of the United Nations, which took place in December 1955, and which enhanced the importance in world-affairs of the Afro-Asian bloc. It is unnecessary here to go back over the long history of the attempts to 'universalize' the membership of the world organization.[1] Hitherto, owing to the post-war conflict between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and the determination of each to prevent the other securing the entry of new client-states to the Assembly, only 9 of the 31 states seeking membership since 1945 had succeeded in gaining admission to U.N.O. But in the summer of 1955, as part of the attempt to bring about a *détente* between the two conflicting power blocs, a new initiative was taken, which after hard bargaining led to success. At the instance of Mr. Molotov, 16 new members were proposed; and though the Formosan government used its veto against Outer Mongolia, the feeling in favour of an extension of membership was so strong that on 14 December agreement was reached, and as a result of a 'package deal' 16 new members were admitted.[2] The political consequences were important. Hitherto the United States, with the support of the western powers and of Latin American countries, had been able to count on a majority. The increase in membership from 60 to 76—which rose in the following year to 80, making an increase of one-third in all—marked the end of American and European hegemony. It also marked the beginning, at least, of a process of depolarization, in so far as a third force, in addition to the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., now made its influence felt in the United Nations. The inclusion of representatives of some 260 million new people in the world-organization shifted its balance. Hitherto the Latin American states had occupied a key position. Now that position was occupied by the Afro-Asian bloc, which had started to work

[1] Cf. L. Gross, 'Progress towards universality of membership in the United Nations', *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 1 (1956), pp. 791–827.

[2] They were: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Rumania, and Syria.

more closely together as a consequence of the Bandung conference and was already an influential factor, as has been seen,[1] in the tenth session of the United Nations Assembly. Although there were many issues on which the 'uncommitted' powers might be expected to side against the communist members, the fact nevertheless remained that, after the admission of the 16 new members, the Afro-Asians and the communists together could easily find the 27 votes necessary to block any decision in the General Assembly. Nor was there any doubt that the governments of Asia and Africa were conscious of their enhanced importance and ready to make the most of it. The result was that both the Soviet Union and the United States had to pay greater attention to the voice of the rising Afro-Asian powers, and compete for their vote. In the context of the United Nations, this competition was largely political; but it fitted in well with the policy of economic competition and was a further factor leading to a change of direction in methods and policy.

Active, peaceful competition, as propounded by Bulganin and Khrushchev on their Asian tour, thus opened a new phase in international relations. It is often said that its main result was to enable Moscow to vault over the defensive perimeter built up by the western alliance, and to exert influence in areas hitherto excluded from the cold war. So far as it goes, this observation is not incorrect. But the change of direction was more fundamental. The doctrines propounded by the Soviet leaders in Asia meant, in effect, that what had previously been the official line of Soviet policy—namely to heal the breach between east and west—had been abandoned. Instead the Soviet Union had decided to accept and manœuvre within the *status quo*, confident that the opportunities thus presented offered ample prospects of improving its world position. The effect, from the end of 1955, was to swing the balance of politics in new directions. The east–west contacts, and the efforts to achieve *détente*, which had been the dominant feature of the second half of 1955, continued, for neither side could afford to incur the odium of breaking them off; but they no longer had decisive importance. Instead, the two camps drew back on themselves, and braced themselves for competition, above all in Asia and in Africa. Nevertheless, in political practice peaceful competition was a peripheral theme, invoked only in test-cases, such as the Egyptian project for the Aswan Dam—a testing-ground where each side somewhat tentatively tried out the other's preparedness. Economic competition on a massive scale was not in evidence; but, on the other hand, the military aspects of the east–west rivalry, which had loomed so large only a year

[1] Cf. above, p. 171. Early signs of the new cohesion among the Afro-Asian powers were the fact that Turkey, which previously had been on the Dutch side, gave its vote to Indonesia after Bandung on the question of West New Guinea; similarly the same country and Ethiopia, previously friendly to Israel, joined the anti-Israelite Arab bloc.

earlier, receded somewhat into the background. In this sense, as a switch from military to economic, the new course marked a definite change of direction. But the detail of policy ran in narrower channels, with few immediate interconnexions. Both sides, perhaps, after the inconclusive meeting at Geneva, were waiting for a crack in the other's armour; both sides were adapting themselves to the new conditions. In what follows we shall take the west first, and then the east, before going on to the situation in the Mediterranean and Africa and the Middle East, which proved —though few would have anticipated it six months earlier—to be the crucible from which a new crystallization of forces was to evolve.

## CHAPTER XII

# WESTERN POLICIES AND PROBLEMS

By the end of 1955 there was a widespread feeling that, confronted with Moscow's initiative, the western alliance had failed to hold its own. If there were conflicting views as to the reasons and responsibility for this failure, there was little divergence of opinion as to its reality. During 1956, therefore, the western powers, sometimes together, but more usually separately, sought to remedy the situation. Events during 1955 had shown that disharmony existed even if for the most part confined to subordinate issues; the first part of 1956 was characterized by a groping for a common policy which could be safely pursued without bringing to light the existence of internal divergencies. There was, at least until July, some measure of success in harmonizing conflicting views and policies; but if this was achieved without undermining the alliance it was due to a greater extent to the absence of action rather than to success in hammering out a new diplomatic line.

As previously, the decisive factor in the planning of western activities was the policy of the United States. The fundamental question which underlay discussion about American policy during the year was the extent to which military measures were sufficient in the short run to deter aggression, and in the long run to win the cold war. It is doubtful whether any definite decision was taken on the issue. There are, however, indications that the two groups—those who said no, and urged a supplementary policy, and those who said yes, and discussed what type of military activity was most likely to be effective—both had protagonists in Washington. Statements during the early part of 1956 provided little evidence that the encounter with the Russians at Geneva had stimulated a new American approach to world affairs. Indeed, the official line continued to be that the new Soviet emphasis on economic and political competition merely demonstrated the strength of the existing American position. The change in Soviet tactics, Eisenhower asserted as late as 21 April 1956, from 'depending on force and the threat of force only' to 'going into the economic and political fields' and 'wearing smiles around the world instead of some of the bitter faces to which we have become accustomed', was due to the failure of previous Soviet policy; for 'any time a policy is winning and the people are completely satisfied with it, you don't change'.[1]

But if the new Soviet approach served in the first instance only to con-

[1] Eisenhower's address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 21 April 1956; *American Documents*, 1956, p. 30.

firm Washington's confidence in its former policies, the reaction throughout Asia—including even those Asian countries committed to American defence policy—to the specific promises and personal diplomacy of Bulganin and Khrushchev gave new force to the view of those who had already urged Washington to revise its approach. Indeed, as early as 5 January, the president, in his State of the Union message, had spoken of the need for a new western initiative. He described his administration's task as being both to meet new communist tactics and 'at the same time our policy must be dynamic as well as flexible, designed primarily to forward the achievement of our own objectives rather than to meet each shift and change on the communist front'.[1] The succeeding months gave evidence of this dual approach. There was no thought of a complete break with former policies, but attention in Washington was being concentrated more than in the past on a search for new patterns of American economic investment overseas and on a reassessment of the neutralist position. At the same time Washington undertook a thorough review of the technical military questions concomitant with a state of mutual deterrence, and attempts were made to find new forms of co-operation with existing allies. Nevertheless it was the new factors and the search for new patterns, rather than the reassessment of military policies, which were the significant feature at the time, and which, therefore, demand attention; moreover, it was in relation to the former that divergencies of policy and opinion among the western powers were once again brought to light.

Perhaps the most pertinent statement made public in Washington in the early part of the year was the recommendation signed by the United States delegates to the Tenth Session of the United Nations. This statement emphasized the advantages the Soviet Union was gaining from its economic offensive and urged that the United States should counter these moves 'not by outbidding Communism in sheer amounts of economic aid, but by making newly independent and newly articulate peoples feel that they can best satisfy their wants by becoming and remaining part of the community of free nations'. The signatories urged more emphasis on economic and educational enterprises and stressed the need for 'the country *as a whole*' to wake up to the implications of the new situation, if the United States were not to lose the 'economic contest'.[2] This statement, in which Egypt, with India and Burma, was specifically cited as a beneficiary of Soviet economic attention, was nevertheless followed by continuous congressional opposition to Eisenhower's proposals for improving the efficiency of the distribution of American aid; and subsequently it was capped by the State Department's decision to withdraw the American offer to help finance the Aswan Dam.[3] Taken together, no three facts

[1] Cf. ibid. 1956, p. 2.

[2] Ibid. 1956, p. 69 (the italics are in the original).

[3] Cf. below, p. 309.

summarize more cogently the dilemma of American leadership and of western policy.

In his State of the Union message, Eisenhower emphasized that 'strong economic ties are an essential element in our free world partnership', and in his budget address[1] he suggested, in order that confidence should be re-established in American trade policy, that Congress should authorize the U.S.A. to become a member of O.T.C.[2] He also proposed a simplification of customs legislation, increased mutual security spending, and limited authority to make longer-term commitments towards specific enterprises. In the event, Congress took no action on the first request; introduced a new Customs Simplification Act; reduced the Mutual Security programme grant; and failed to authorize long-term obligations.[3] It would seem that the appeal by the American United Nations' delegates had not even been heard in the capital.[4]

Throughout the spring, however, the theme which they had propounded was taken up and repeated in public by western statesmen. Sir Anthony Eden, addressing the United States Senate on 2 February, said: 'we know that we can neither hold communism nor beat it back by force of arms alone. Friendship and freedom, and help of all kinds on which to base a rising standard of life—these are what we offer.' Furthermore, while 'it would be a useless exercise to chase Soviet activity all around the world, in the sense of trying to cap every offer they profess to make, by a better on our own account'. . . . I am convinced . . . that we should continue to give economic help in those areas where it is most needed, putting first the reasonable requirements of our own friends, but not forgetting others.'

In so far as he was reinforcing the position of those who advocated the allocation of economic aid on a revised basis, Eden's statement may be

[1] 16 January 1956; see *American Documents*, 1956, pp. 8–20.

[2] The agreement establishing the Organization for Trade Co-operation had been concluded at Geneva on 10 March 1955 as a supplementary organization for implementing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, by encouraging trade consultation. O.T.C. would not come into being unless the United States decided to take part in it. On 14 April 1956 Eisenhower recommended congressional action to enable American participation. Failure to participate would (he asserted) 'be interpreted throughout the free world as a lack of genuine interest . . . in the efforts to expand trade'. Nevertheless Congress took no action on the measure during 1956.

[3] The administration had requested mutual security aid totalling 4·9 billion dollars. This included 100 million dollars for the president's Asian economic development fund (authorized but not appropriated in 1955) and a further 100 million dollars for a similar fund for the Middle East. Three-fifths of the total was for military assistance; 60 per cent. of the remainder for defence support and only three-quarters of a billion for economic assistance in the proper sense. Congress authorized approximately 3·9 billion dollars.

[4] Congressional behaviour was undoubtedly influenced not only by Republican reluctance to vote increased appropriations in election year and by Democratic dislike of so large an expenditure on military measures, but also by the growing belief that tension had slackened and by traditional jealousy of adminstrative independence.

taken as a contribution to the making of western policy. But as soon as recommendations ceased to be specific, western policy was subject to misconstruction and contradictory interpretations. It was relatively easy to reaffirm an Anglo-American moral position as was done in the Declaration of Washington and to outline the generalities of co-operation as in the accompanying joint statement.[1] But in a world which knew no common morality and in which all countries either sought or offered peace, freedom, and economic development, such terms had long ceased to have any inherent meaning. Moralistic statements of intention had become part of the ritual of top level meetings in every country of the world. Indeed, in February 1956, their reiteration seemed to indicate a lack of coherent thinking on such specific issues as whether to supply arms to Israel or to revise the list of goods covered by the strategic embargo on trade with China, rather than to inject a new impetus into western policy. Indeed, it was this failure to come to grips with the specific problems that were causing difficulties, that, perhaps more than anything else, prevented a reorientation of western policy in a direction which many western statesmen were beginning to realize was necessary. This can be seen in western policy in Asia and towards the uncommitted world, and in a somewhat different context in its European policy.

*Asia, the West, and the Uncommitted Nations*

Although by now tension was greatly reduced and there was little fear of the outbreak of hostilities or even of incidents in the area, western policy in eastern Asia continued to be hampered by fundamental differences of opinion on the official attitude to be taken towards China. Incidents between Nationalist aircraft and gunboats based on Formosa, and the merchant shipping of countries trading with mainland China, continued intermittently. In London it was necessary to state unequivocally that the British navy would be used to protect British vessels against attacks by the Formosan ally of the United States. Moreover, there were indications that Ottawa, although not contemplating immediate action, was reconsidering the question of recognizing Peking. Speaking to the Canadian House of Commons on 31 January 1956, Lester Pearson reaffirmed his government's view that although some people might feel that moral considerations were involved, 'the decision remains predominantly a political one to be taken on the basis of enlightened self-interest, as in many other cases where we have recognised totalitarian regimes'. Canadian recognition of the Peking government would not extend to Formosa; but Lester Pearson affirmed that Canada should not base its policy 'on the likelihood of the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek returning to power on the mainland'. Furthermore, the anomaly of the Formosan government

[1] Issued 1 February 1956; cf. *Documents*, 1956, p. 657.

representing China at the United Nations, 'with a veto that can block any action desired by 52 other members, is becoming increasingly apparent'.[1]

Lester Pearson succeeded in making his point clearly without arousing the House or the country. A speech made by the British high commissioner at the beginning of February, which was rather more direct, was less readily received. Sir Archibald Nye pointed out that throughout Asia 'it is almost universally believed that those western powers who did not recognise the new Chinese Government made a great mistake'. This statement, together with remarks on the instability of the area, and the gains the communists had made, aroused protests in Ottawa which were officially muffled during Eden's visit. The British government, however, reaffirmed its confidence in its representative; and Sir Anthony Eden, speaking in Ottawa on 7 February, said that British diplomatic contacts with the Peking government 'have certainly been useful—and not only to us'. Nevertheless such statements, however true, were bound to provoke criticism; and it was scarcely accidental that, almost simultaneously, the Chinese Nationalist foreign minister in Formosa put forward a diametrically opposed interpretation. Commenting on 3 February on the Washington Declaration, Mr. Yui called for an intensified trade embargo against the mainland, the end of United States diplomatic talks with Peking, more joint action by the United States and Great Britain against Peking's activities, and active 'free world support for free China's counter-attack on the mainland'. These differences illuminated the conflicting views in which Washington was embroiled between its allies, and it did not require any great thought for commentators to point out that there was no agreed western policy in east Asia, any more than there was in west Asia.

Nevertheless, there was little sign, now that the situation in the western Pacific had quietened down, that the United States government would allow itself to be stampeded into ill-considered action by the Nationalists in Formosa. Indeed, one of the main American preoccupations during the year was to be a reassessment of who in fact were friends, and of the amount of independent action they might be allowed in the new situation. At the beginning of the year, for example, the United States held economic discussions with Jugoslavia, although the latter was also negotiating in Moscow—a degree of toleration which Congress later sought to modify.[2] It was, however, particularly in regard to Asia that evidence of a new approach was visible. Mr. Dulles, reporting to the nation on 23 March, after attending the S.E.A.T.O. Council meeting in Karachi,[3] warned Americans to

[1] Cf. *Government of Canada Information Division, Department of External Affairs*, No. 56/2, for the full text of Lester Pearson's speech.

[2] Cf. below, p. 271.

[3] Mr. Dulles had also visited New Delhi, 9 March; Djakarta, 12 March; Bangkok, 13 March; Saigon, 14 March; and Manila, 15 March.

remember that while we think first of the danger that stems from international communism, many of them think first of possible encroachments from the west. . . . Many of the countries feel that their independence is better assured if they participate with us in arrangements for mutual security. . . . Others have preferred not to join regional security arrangements. That choice also we respect.[1]

This statement appeared to show a considerable change of attitude in State Department thinking. But older conceptions were not dead, as was demonstrated on 2 February when the Thai government invited S.E.A.T.O. members to participate in a combined 'operation-demonstration' to show 'the mobility and effectiveness with which various members of S.E.A.T.O. can co-operate in mutual defence'. This move, to be called 'Operation Firm Link', was intended to show that the anti-communist alliance was more than the 'paper tiger' at which Peking radio jeered. It was also hoped that a demonstration of this kind would discourage further neutralist thinking in the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan, and offset the effects of the Bulganin and Khrushchev tour which were permeating the Asian continent. But it is questionable how far a parachute assault by American marines was an apt response to Soviet peace proclamations, and the United States was the only member of S.E.A.T.O. immediately ready to respond to the Thai initiative. In London it was said that the matter was under consideration; in Paris that participation was doubtful; Karachi stated categorically that too little notice had been given; and three days before the start of the operations there had been no reply from Australia or New Zealand. In the event the Commonwealth governments joined the United States, Thailand, and the Philippines in the exercise; but it is doubtful whether American energy succeeded in dispelling the sombre thoughts which this first appearance of Honest John rockets on the Asian mainland aroused in thinking people. The concluding parade may have been the most splendid Bangkok had ever seen; but was there perhaps some significance in the report that a kilt-clad contingent had earned the loudest applause?

If on this occasion a level-headed view was taken in New Delhi and the enterprise dismissed as a badly managed public relations episode, S.E.A.T.O. itself was not spared more searching criticism. The existence of the alliance was perhaps the greatest single hindrance to a wider development of American friendships in the area. It offended those who deplored mili-

[1] *Department of State Bulletin* for 2 April 1956, p. 539. Though Mr. Dulles spoke of 'many of the Asian countries participating in 'security arrangements', in fact the only Asian participants in S.E.A.T.O. (unless New Zealand and Australia were included) were Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. S.E.A.T.O. included less than half the countries and less than a quarter of the people in the area it had been designed to defend. South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were protected areas, not full members. There were, however, also bilateral agreements between the United States and Korea, Formosa, and Japan.

tary alliances, those who rejected cultural colonialism, and those who, perhaps less altruistically, disliked it as a ready source of arms for their less friendly neighbours. The results of the council meeting which took place in Karachi from 6 to 8 March were meagre. It was hoped both to stimulate interest in the alliance without antagonizing non-members, and to mollify the Pakistani government which, it was believed, had taken offence at the unceremonial invitation to the Bangkok manœuvres. But the final communiqué showed little sign of fresh thinking.[1] On the one side, it reaffirmed the need for 'creating and maintaining powerful deterrents against aggression, and for continued co-operation to combat subversive activities'; for which purpose the central organization in Bangkok was to be strengthened. On the other hand, keeping in mind opinion in the area, 'the Council members severally affirmed that their countries' would 'never commit aggression'; and the value of economic development was once again emphasized. It was hoped that there would be increased stability and further integration of members' economies; but there was an understandable reluctance on the part of the United States, which would have to foot the bill, to go as far as Asian members wanted in promising further economic aid .

From the point of view of those Asian countries which stood outside the alliance, however, the most objectionable feature of S.E.A.T.O. was the way it could be used to support the national claims of member-states. Thus the council, at its meeting in Karachi, endorsed the Pakistani stand in the dispute with Afghanistan over the border territory, and asserted that the treaty area extended to the Durand line. On Kashmir, however, the council was less categorical, noting that the United Nations resolutions remained in force and affirming the need for an early settlement through the United Nations or by direct negotiations. Even this carefully phrased equivocation, however, raised protests in New Delhi. Nehru, speaking in the Lok Sabha on 20 March, asserted that the council statement 'confirmed our worst apprehensions about the organization which it represents', and could only mean that the alliance was backing Pakistan in its dispute with India. He deplored the association of other Commonwealth countries with the resolution, especially Great Britain, since Selwyn Lloyd had previously said that the United Kingdom did not consider Kashmir a suitable topic for discussion at the Karachi meeting. Furthermore, Nehru added, in talks with Mr. Dulles, he had told the United States secretary of state that 'whatsoever the object of the United States in giving military aid to Pakistan, in Pakistan itself the resulting acquisition of military strength has been generally welcomed not because it will increase Pakistan's defensive capacity against a potential aggressor, but because

[1] Text in *Documents*, 1956, p. 756.

they hope thereby to be able to settle disputes with India from what is called a position of strength'.[1]

Indian sensitivity was probably due in part to the fact that the Indian government had recently taken a further step in order to consolidate its claim on Kashmir. On 22 February an agreement had been signed in New Delhi confirming the integration of Kashmir in the Indian Union and setting out the economic relationship between the two. On 9 March the Kashmiri prime minister explicitly rejected the idea of a plebiscite in the territory, at the same time urging all Kashmiris to avoid falling prey to the intrigues of foreign powers in favour of such a move. But Indian irritation at the alleged backing which S.E.A.T.O. had given to Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, was also an expression of more general disagreement with the policies of the western bloc. In fundamental opposition to the official western view, Nehru had asserted his belief that the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party had adopted a new line and a new policy which appeared 'to be based upon a more realistic appreciation of the present world situation' and to represent 'a significant process of adaptation and adjustment'. In spite of Selwyn Lloyd's explanatory mission[2] Nehru was still fundamentally opposed to alliances—in particular to the Baghdad and Manila pacts which, he maintained, had only succeeded in dividing the areas they were meant to unite.

Moreover, while Nehru could not assert that the North Atlantic treaty directly affected Indian interests, it could not be ignored in so far as it provided what he considered an unfortunate opportunity for reactionary powers to get United States support for their policies. The joint Portuguese-American statement on Goa issued in December 1955 was one such instance, which had 'caused a deep feeling of resentment throughout India', coming as it did when border tension was again being punctuated by sporadic fighting.[3] Not unexpectedly Nehru replied by repeating that in 'no circumstances will we tolerate the continuance of the last remnants of Portuguese colonialism on Indian soil', and by announcing on 17 February that Portuguese violations of Indian territory would be met by force. On the other hand, the *de jure* transfer of the former French territories in India was welcomed in New Delhi and the Indian government, contrasting the French and Portuguese attitudes, showed its appreciation by agreeing to the maintenance of French educational establishments in the area concerned. The strong nationalist spirit which motivated these reactions did not pass unobserved in Washington, where attention hitherto had been almost entirely concentrated on the neutralist aspect of uncommitted

[1] Mr. Nehru to the Lok Sabha, 20 March 1956. Nehru's assertion, not unnaturally, was immediately denounced in Karachi, where it was again stated that Pakistan was always ready for direct negotiations with India over Kashmir. See *Documents*, 1956, p. 760.

[2] See below, p. 286.

[3] For the text of the American-Portuguese statement, cf. *U.S. Documents*, 1955, p. 169.

opinion. Determination to secure and maintain independence, the United States government began to see, not neutrality between east and west, was the characteristic Asian attitude; and this independent spirit was worth encouraging. Hence United States impatience with the neutrals, particularly India, diminished and it was an indication of a new attitude to the uncommitted world when, on 14 March, it was announced from the White House that Mr. Nehru had been invited to pay an official visit to the United States.

Nevertheless it was probably still true that criticism from an avowed neutralist, such as Nehru, was more to be expected and less likely to cause rethinking than signs that dissatisfaction was growing among allied Asian powers, such as Japan. Here the Hatoyama government, in office since February 1955, had already given evidence of a desire for reduced dependence on Washington by opening negotiations for a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.[1] A further step was taken in January 1956, when Japanese diplomatic representatives in Asia and the Pacific were recalled to Tokyo for a major policy conference. The main topics for discussion were the importance of China, the communist peace offensive—particularly the economic concessions made by communist countries to states in the Middle East and Asia—and the development of Japanese economic relations in the area. Mr. Shigemitsu, addressing the conference, called for the development of a 'more positive' Japanese foreign policy in Asia, reinforced by closer economic collaboration. 'The time has come', he said, 'for Japan to play a full and active role as a great Asian power.' The diplomats, for their part, recommended the early settlement of reparation claims as a basis for further collaboration; and in line with this policy, negotiations for an agreement on Japanese reparations to the Philippines, which had been allowed to lapse in 1955, were resumed in March 1956. Discussions were based on President Magsaysay's proposals of 13 August 1955 and an agreement was signed on 9 May.[2] It was hoped that this would not only lead to better political relations but that it would also give Japanese manufacturers an opportunity to improve their position in the Philippine market.[3]

The Japanese attempt to improve inter-Asian relations was both a result of and was further stimulated by increasing uneasiness at United States policy. In 1955, Mr. Hatoyama had already sought a revision of

[1] Cf. above, pp. 129–30.

[2] The agreement provided that Japan should supply the Philippines with goods and services to the value of 550 million dollars and extend loans to the value of 250 million dollars during the next twenty years. Diplomatic representation between the two countries was to be raised to ambassadorial level. The text is in *Contemporary Japan*, vol. xxiv, nos. 4–6, 1956, pp. 363 sqq.

[3] No goods supplied under the agreement were to be re-exported from the Philippines (article ix, ibid. pp. 365–6). The reparations agreement was ratified in Japan on 3 June and in Manila on 16 July. The ratifications were exchanged in Tokyo on 23 July and at the same time the Philippine government deposited its ratification of the San Francisco treaty in Washington.

the security treaty with the United States and had been promised that it would be replaced. He had also been assured that American troops would be withdrawn as Japanese defensive capacity increased.[1] In January 1956 agreement was reached whereby the Japanese contribution to the upkeep of American forces in Japan was to be reduced to an amount equal to one-half of the increase in the total Japanese appropriation for defence purposes.[2] At the same time an attempt was made to placate public opinion. Admiral Radford, visiting Tokyo during his tour of American defence forces, when asked whether, if so requested, the United States would withdraw its troops 'tomorrow, next week, or next month', replied: 'yes, I think we would'. But, he added, he felt such a course of action was unlikely because he doubted whether Japan would be able to defend itself even after 1960, the date set for completing the defence build-up.

It was current United States defence policy, however, rather than future American intentions, which was the immediate cause of dissatisfaction. Japanese opinion was showing increasing interest in the island of Okinawa, the main United States base in the area, and the people there were clearly anxious to return to Japanese rule. The United States, on the other hand, had announced its determination to retain the island as long as international conditions demanded. Moreover the decision to extend United States airfields over valuable agricultural land had given rise to popular demonstrations.[3] On other issues, too, there was little sign of harmony.[4] There was still much popular apprehension at the continuance of nuclear tests in the Pacific, and fear of the long-term and short-term consequences. On 20 January the Japanese foreign office asked Washington to give due notice of the date and place for forthcoming thermonuclear experiments; to take full precautions against disasters; and to agree to compensation in the event of damage or suffering. There had still been no reply from Washington when on 10 February the Japanese Lower House passed unanimously a resolution calling on the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain to stop such experiments. The resolution pointed out that all the people of the world earnestly desired the cessation of tests and

[1] Joint communiqué of 31 August 1955; see *American Documents*, 1955, p. 327.

[2] This meant that for every extra dollar Japan spent on her own defence fifty cents would be deducted from the amount she contributed to American forces stationed in the country. The Japanese defence forces continued to expand slowly. At the end of 1956 the army numbered 160,000 men, the navy around 26,000, and the air force 22,000. But much of the equipment was obsolescent, and in August 1956 the vice-director of the National Defence Agency went to Washington to negotiate for supplies of more modern weapons.

[3] The shortage of cultivable land had long been a source of weakness in the Japanese economy, and one of the causes of its dependence on foreign markets. Comparable figures of land per head with other Asian countries are Burma 2 acres, India 1·1 acres; Pakistan 1 acre; Ceylon 0·8 acre; Japan 0·2 acre.

[4] In the economic field, for example, discontent was rife because textile interests in the United States had succeeded in establishing new measures of anti-Japanese discrimination.

none more than the Japanese who had already experienced radiation from atomic and hydrogen bombs.[1]

Nor was Japan the only country where opinion sought a policy more in line with independent nationalist interests, in the neutralist sense, and less determined by Washington's world-wide preoccupations. In the Philippines the 1954 decision by the United States attorney-general that America would retain ownership of the land covered by bases established before the recognition of Philippine independence in 1946, had had a deeply disturbing effect. Negotiations for the revision of the United States bases pact were to be reopened during the spring of 1956 and in January it was officially stated that should the Philippines get no satisfaction on the issue, they would take the question to the International Court. In the event talks produced agreement. The United States consented to return any land which was no longer required, reaffirmed full recognition of Philippine sovereignty over the bases, and agreed to turn over to the Philippine authorities 'all titles, papers and title-claims held by the United States to all land areas used either in the past or present as military bases, except those areas which may now or will be used by the United States for its diplomatic and consular establishment'.[2]

This settlement with the Philippines was matched by a new American approach to Indonesia—a move all the more significant in that it came at a time when Dutch relations with Indonesia were again strained. The talks between Dutch and Indonesian officials which had opened at The Hague on 10 December, continued at Geneva during January. Each side was willing to compromise on economic matters; but an insurmountable lack of trust precluded agreement on political issues.[3] The Dutch refused to admit that their sovereignty over New Guinea could be questioned and no agreement could be reached on arrangements for the arbitration of disputes. Hence the talks, after an earlier suspension, ended in a deadlock on 11 February, and this was immediately followed on 12–13 February by the Indonesian abrogation of the Union—a move which had been decided on in principle during the Hague conference in the summer of 1954—and on 20 February by the annulment of financial and economic agreements.[4]

[1] This was not a party move; the resolution had originally been introduced by the socialists but had been taken up by the conservatives and was passed unanimously by both Houses.

[2] Text of joint statement made on 3 July 1956 in *American Documents*, 1956, p. 389.

[3] The negotiations on both sides were hampered by political considerations at home. The Dutch appreciated the attitude of Harahap's caretaker government—the friendliest for some time—and had been ready to open negotiations; but an election was due in Holland in May. Dr. Harahap had already had trouble with Moslem opinion and other political opponents who accused him of selling out to the Dutch by agreeing to talks. Early in February four ministers resigned from his cabinet.

[4] These had given Holland the position of most-favoured nation in Indonesia; restricted the participation of Indonesian capital in Dutch concerns; and bound Indonesia to ensure the perpetual well-being of 'existing and new enterprises'.

These events, and the close association between the United States and Holland in Europe, did not, however, prevent President Soekarno from paying an official visit, three months later, to the United States where he was greeted as being 'truly welcome'. For his part the Indonesian president sought to emphasize how much his country's current policy had in common with that of the United States. African and Asian nationalism, he told his American listeners, did not result from chauvinism or a sense of superiority but from concern for 'the rebuilding of our nations'.

> It means efforts to provide equal esteem for our peoples; it means the determination to take the future into our own hands. For us nationalism is the love of country and the determination to improve it which, not so very long ago, illuminated the founders of your Nation.[1]

Moreover Indonesia was not anti-western in its policy. 'We may, in fact we do, sometimes oppose what is called the west. But that is not dictated by a feeling of being anti-west.'[2] In reality both Indonesia and the United States shared a common policy of 'seeking a larger freedom for mankind', and while one saw the defeat of communism, and the other the ending of colonialism in all its forms, as the immediate aim, neither limited its policy to these ends. President Soekarno also emphasized Indonesia's need for political and economic stability.[3] 'Military aid', he told Congress, 'is no substitute for Asian stability', and 'dollars and roubles will mean nothing unless they respect the national aspirations of the people' in the area.

It was a significant indication of the change of atmosphere in Washington that such views were more acceptable there in 1956 than they had been previously. Nevertheless there was still room for wide divergences of opinion on method, and on certain fundamental issues. A power with world-wide responsibilities, such as the United States, could not easily condone the unilateral abrogation of treaties, even if it understood the motives, and such a step was more difficult to accept when it directly involved the interests of America's ally, Holland. Nor was it easy for Americans to share Soekarno's overriding fear of that 'shadow pregnant with horror, which hangs over the future'—'a man-made shadow' whose 'mushroom shape colours all our thoughts and all our dreams'.[4] Washington might be ready for a reappraisal of the international situation, and might earnestly seek to pursue a more flexible policy in its dealings with the new nations; but even if President Soekarno's suggestion of the identity

[1] Address to Congress, 17 May 1956, in *D.S.B.*, 1956, p. 929.

[2] Address to the National Press Club, 18 May 1956, in *D.S.B.*, 1956, p. 937.

[3] In reference to Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea President Soekarno said that both the Indonesian declaration of independence and the agreements by which Holland had recognized it, referred to the Netherlands East Indies as a whole and made no distinction on an ethnical or any other basis.

[4] Address to Congress, 17 May 1956, in *D.S.B.*, 1956, p. 933.

of the two countries' long-term aims was correct, there was little to show that the United States and Indonesia could agree on current policies or shared the same immediate hopes and fears.

Nevertheless there was evidence during the spring and summer that Washington was re-examining the meaning and content of neutralism. The acceptance of the formula of 'different roads to socialism' in the U.S.S.R. was matched in the United States by a reassessment of the necessary qualifications for an ally. In his address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, which has already been cited,[1] President Eisenhower said:

> The new nations have many of the sensitivities that marked our own early years as a free Nation. They are proud of their independence and quick to resent any slight to their sovereignty. Some of them are concerned to avoid involvement with other nations, as we were for many years.
>
> Certainly we Americans should understand and respect these points of view. We must accept the right of each nation to choose its own path to the future.[2]

These sentences seemed to indicate that, in the view of the United States administration, it was no longer necessary to be an armed ally to win American support, and that the fundamental American tradition of interest in progress and in the improvement of the human lot was reasserting itself.[3] A still clearer indication of this rethinking was evident when on 6 June Eisenhower made a prepared statement on the difficulties involved in waging peace.[4] He emphasized the importance of mutual security and continued: 'If you are waging peace, you can't be too particular sometimes about the special attitudes that different countries take.' The United States was neutral in European wars for 150 years and

> today there are certain nations that say they are neutral. This doesn't necessarily mean . . . neutral as between right and wrong. . . . They are using the term 'neutral' with respect to attachment to military alliances. And may I point out that I cannot see that that is always to the disadvantage of a country such as ours.

Meanwhile Mr. Nixon, speaking in Pennsylvania on 7 June, pursued a similar line of thought:[5]

> Approximately 600,000,000 people live in the so-called uncommitted or neutral nations. It is easy to see that the world struggle will be determined by

[1] Cf. above, p. 188.

[2] Text in *American Documents*, 1956, p. 22.

[3] This was seen in Eisenhower's further statement that 'arms alone can give the world no permanent peace, no confident security. Arms are solely for defence—to protect from violent assault what we already have. They are only a costly insurance. They cannot add to human progress. Indeed, no matter how massive, arms by themselves would not prevent vital sections of the world from falling prey to Communist blandishment or subversion'.

[4] Ibid. p. 27. Full text in *N.Y. Times*, 7 June 1956.

[5] Full text in *N.Y. Times*, 8 June 1956.

what happens to these people. . . . Of this we can be sure. The uncommitted nations are not going to be frightened into alliances with the West by military power, nor can their allegiance be purchased by dollars. What will probably be decisive in this struggle is not how much each side does but how it is done.

Once again, however, there were indications that President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon may have overstepped their briefs. When Mr. Dulles spoke on 9 June in amplification of the president's statement, his talk was supposed 'to bring all the details out', and to 'etch them clearly in simple form for us so that we can all understand exactly what it is we are trying to do in waging the peace'.[1] In fact, however, it dealt less with the value of friendship, even with uncommitted peoples, than with a detailed account of American military and economic aid. A number of America's allies had reacted unfavourably to the indulgent tone of Eisenhower's statement on the position of neutrals and it may well have been that this reaction had already been felt in Washington.[2] In any event, when he spoke, Dulles referred pointedly to the forty-two treaties the United States had made with countries in America, Europe, and Asia, and concluded by saying:

> These treaties abolish, as between the parties, the principle of neutrality, which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This has increasingly become an obsolete conception and except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and short-sighted conception.

From a strictly juridical point of view it was, of course, possible to maintain that, at least since the establishment of the United Nations, there was no longer any legal basis for neutrality among members in the event of aggression. But the secretary of state's condemnation of the conception of neutrality as immoral and short-sighted could not fail to revive former controversies and arouse doubts whether the purpose and aims of United States foreign policy had changed. It is true that the wide publicity accorded to the different statements probably exaggerated their differences. Eisenhower had spoken in favour of non-military aid and had referred to neutrality in a strictly military sense, without moral overtones.[3] Mr. Dulles, on the other hand, had become involved with the moral position. Moreover, the secretary of state probably had in mind the situation which

[1] Eisenhower on 6 June.

[2] German official opinion was particularly sensitive in this respect; cf. H. Speier, op. cit. pp. 92–93.

[3] 'If a nation is truly a neutral', he said in his speech of 6 June, 'if it is attacked by anybody—and we are not going to attack them—public opinion is outraged. If it has announced its military association with another great power, things could happen to it, difficulties along its borders and people would say, "good enough for it. They asked for it." So let us not translate this meaning of the word "neutral" as between contending military forces, even though the conflict is latent, and neutral as between right and wrong.'

would result if America's existing allies were led to believe that they could continue to get the same economic aid without carrying out their military obligations. Nevertheless the discrepancy, though glossed over,[1] was too apparent to be ignored; and the administration's position on the whole issue of neutrality, which was so vital for its relations with Asian countries, was still far from clear. On 13 June the chief American delegate to the United Nations added his views. He urged that the uncommitted nations of the world should not be viewed with 'petulance or impatience'; even if the so-called neutral were occasionally irritating, he was certainly to be preferred to the enemy who aimed to conquer. The uncommitted countries had promising prospects, if they could overcome famine and disease, and he thought they should be helped 'to the point where they are able and eager to stand on their own feet'. His words, like those of Eisenhower, seemed to imply that humanity and the self-interest of the United States coincided with the interests of the neutrals in this respect; and commentators suggested that Mr. Cabot Lodge had been brought in by an administration anxious to retract some of the damaging implications of Mr. Dulles's speech, and to prepare opinion for the arrival of Mr. Nehru in Washington.

*Western Europe, N.A.T.O., and the Atlantic Alliance*

The difficulties experienced in adapting policy to changed conditions were also in evidence in a somewhat different context in Europe. In spite of the changes by now generally apparent in the balance of world forces, Europe still remained the most important factor in Washington's calculations. On the other hand, owing to changes in Soviet policy, the stimulus of military necessity which had previously favoured political cohesion had diminished; and the countries of western Europe were no longer under the same compulsion to subordinate individual national interests to a common line of action. The effects of this reduced interest in existing military arrangements were reinforced by the absence of a clear alternative policy. Thus the period was characterized, on the one hand, by attempts to rekindle enthusiasm for the current, or a slightly modified form of the current relationship; and on the other hand by efforts, largely uncoordinated, to find a way out of the apparent stagnation of the existing situation. This dilemma was particularly in evidence in discussion of western defence policy.

Speaking at Chicago on 8 December 1955 Mr. Dulles repeated what he had said five years previously in favour of an American policy, which provided 'the capacity to counter-attack'. That was still, in his view, 'the ultimate deterrent'; hence the existence of 'collective defence policies',

[1] Cf. *U.S. Documents*, 1956, pp. 34–35.

including 'on the one hand, a political warning system, and on the other hand, selective retaliatory power'. But this policy and its implications were no longer accepted unquestioningly as the only practical course for the west. The burden it placed on western countries was a serious economic handicap, and as the implications of the strategic revolution became clearer, doubt was expressed whether it was as necessary as before. By this time there were other methods of defence; and it was widely believed that cuts in manpower together with technological advance would lead to increasing reliance on nuclear weapons. Such a policy, however, implied Anglo-American supremacy in the field of delivery, and raised the question of the most advantageous use of ground forces; and both these questions had internal and external political repercussions.

In the first place, it was pointed out that most of the targets which would have to be reached if deterrence were to work lay far beyond the range of any British bombers then existing or projected. Furthermore, even after the U.S. Strategic Air Command had received the 500 B. 52s due to come into squadron service late in 1958, to replace the already obsolescent B. 36, American delivery strength would depend on B. 47s for upwards of three-quarters of the bombing power which deterrence required. Technically, therefore, complete reliance on strategic retaliation was impossible. In addition, there were political complications. In order to carry out longer sorties it was necessary for the B. 47 to be twice refuelled in the air, which meant that the United States would have to continue to maintain bases in foreign countries around the Soviet periphery. This implied a wide dispersal of servicing personnel, and meant that in the current international political situation the vital strategic requirements of the U.S.A. were exposed to volatile expressions of local feeling, while in the event of war its defences would be widely extended.

Nor was the development of an adequate means of delivery the only problem which faced the western powers in their reliance on the threat of deterrence. International political complications apart, there had, ever since 1945, been many who questioned the morality of the use of nuclear weapons. By the spring of 1956 their number had been augmented by those who believed that in the current state of technological advance the employment of the hydrogen-bomb would mean risking the end of civilized society. Furthermore, as the number who questioned the moral justification for employing nuclear weapons increased, there was widespread doubt whether their use was a question which it would be for the western powers to decide. Eminent scientists warned that the unexpected rapidity with which the Soviet Union had developed atomic weapons and high performance aircraft, indicated a large supply of highly trained scientists and engineers. The Soviet higher education system, it was apparent, enabled it to turn out far more graduate scientists and engineers

each year, than the United States and Great Britain together.[1] The implications of this situation were many. Was it perhaps the case, people began to ask, that the current high standards of living in the west were to a greater extent the result of scientific and engineering achievement than of the individual values and free economy of which western statesmen prided themselves? Was it possible, contrary to western opinion, that in the technological civilization of the twentieth century scientific achievement was independent of its cultural context?[2] In any case, the western 'technological superiority complex' to which Professor Blackett referred in his Lees Knowles lectures in March 1956, was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. In May investigations by a Senate sub-committee revealed that the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States in the production of the Bison, the equivalent of the B. 52 intercontinental bomber. In June representatives of western air forces, visiting the Moscow air show for the first time, were shown seven new jet fighters, three of them delta types never seen before, with an estimated speed of 680 m.p.h. In all the Soviet air force was estimated to number some 22,000 operational aircraft of which 80 per cent. were jets. The power of nuclear deterrence, it was evident, was not a western prerogative.

Even those who took a less gloomy view of the implications of western reliance on atomic deterrence were disturbed by other factors. The Soviet Union and its European allies had a total population of 300 millions and together they maintained some 260 active divisions. The North Atlantic treaty countries, on the other hand, had a population of 400 millions and had barely managed to raise twenty divisions for service with N.A.T.O. Although, in view of Soviet air power, the United States was now devoting major efforts to building up the defences of its northern, or polar approaches, great military importance was still attached to holding Europe. Nevertheless General Gruenther, speaking in Washington in February, stated that in spite of a fourfold increase in its resources since 1951, N.A.T.O. would 'probably not' be able to repel an all-out act of aggression. A 'positive answer' to the question of defence in Europe would only be possible on two conditions: first, when the German contribution of twelve divisions, due in midsummer 1959, was effective; and secondly, 'if we can use atomic weapons, which we feel are an essential part of our armament'.

In fact, the military situation in Europe was in some respects weaker than the figures made it appear. In March the North Atlantic Treaty

[1] The figures were 140,000 graduates a year in the Soviet Union compared to 75,000 in the United States and 12,000 in Great Britain. Moreover, the Soviet output was increasing by some 8 per cent. a year whereas the American output had fallen considerably since the war, and been stationary since 1953.

[2] In 1929 Soviet steel production was 5 million tons; in 1954 it was 45 million tons, with a target of 68 million tons for 1960. Coal and oil which had already in 1954 exceeded the 1960 target of 60 million tons, by 10 million tons, showed similarly impressive increases.

Council had once again to note the withdrawal of French troops for Algeria. In the second place, the Cyprus question was a threat to the effectiveness of N.A.T.O. on its south-eastern perimeter. From a military point of view there had, since September 1955, been the ever-present, if unlikely, possibility of Greek defection from the organization. In March 1956, when this issue was raised again, General Gruenther admitted that such a move would be a serious, although not irreparable setback. Nevertheless the Greek-Turkish quarrel over Cyprus meant that there was no basis for confidence in the eastern Mediterranean and reinforced the arguments of those in northern Europe who had always opposed the extension of N.A.T.O. obligations to that area. It was, however, western Germany which was the most serious cause of disquiet. Here, dissatisfaction with Adenauer's policies was rife, both on the right and on the left. On the right, a strong group within the Free Democrats believed that Adenauer's policy of solidarity with the west, and particularly the rearmament of Germany as part of N.A.T.O., was a main obstacle to German reunification. As a result of their activities the party was split, and on 24 February it withdrew from the government coalition. Although this still left the government in control of approximately 282 out of 487 seats in the Bundestag, it meant that Dr. Adenauer had lost the two-thirds majority necessary to revise the constitution so as to introduce arms legislation; and this was serious since the Social Democrats had declared their intention of opposing both the 'Soldiers' Law', permitting the recruitment of 150,000 volunteers, and the introduction of conscription. Here, indeed, although the F.D.P. declared its intention of supporting arms legislation, the two wings of the opposition seemed to meet on common ground. The F.D.P. leaders, Dr. Dehler and Dr. Mende, both favoured the idea of a modified neutralization of a reunited Germany, and for that purpose all that was required was a small regular army and some form of militia. Adenauer, on the contrary, believed that an army of 500,000 producing 150,000 trained reservists a year after 1959, alone would induce the Soviet Union to negotiate for the reunification of Germany.

It is unnecessary to follow in detail the acrimonious debate on conscription and related issues which began in Germany around the beginning of March 1956.[1] There is no doubt that disquiet at Adenauer's policies extended beyond the S.D.P. and F.D.P., though the lead was taken by the S.D.P. opposition. The latter recognized, of course, that western Germany could not avoid the international commitments entered into in the Paris treaties; but it queried whether the figure of 500,000 men, mentioned first in the defunct E.D.C. treaties and reiterated in Protocol II on the forces of W.E.U., was obligatory, and whether it was the best way of meeting Germany's commitment in the conditions of warfare obtaining in 1956.

[1] It is briefly reviewed by H. Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War*, chap. xi.

In the view of the S.D.P. it would be militarily advantageous to have a smaller, more compact regular army. There was also widespread popular objection to the period of eighteen months' military service stipulated in the government bill on conscription. The Social Democrat military expert, Erler, argued that Adenauer's policy, which dated from 1950, was no longer valid; military commentators took the view that technological developments had rendered conscription obsolete. In March the Bundesrat recommended twelve months' military service, instead of the eighteen months proposed by the government; to which the N.A.T.O. commander-in-chief, Gruenther, retorted in April that the German conscription period should be two years.

A further complicating factor was the knowledge that N.A.T.O. planned to use atomic weapons in the defence of Europe. Apart from the disquieting effects this was bound to have on German opinion, it provided further reasons for questioning whether conventional armaments on the scale proposed were any longer likely to be of much value. Nevertheless on 7 July the Bundestag passed the conscription law by 276 votes to 174, with 22 abstentions. The passage of the law was, however, by no means the end of the government's difficulties, and it became increasingly a matter for speculation whether western Germany would provide twelve divisions and half a million men to the N.A.T.O. forces, as originally envisaged. Even within the coalition, opposition was strong by this time to the defence ministry's plans. Theodor Blank came under fire from Franz-Josef Strauss and Richard Jaeger, the chairman of the defence committee of the Bundestag; and as the summer passed into the autumn of 1956 it became evident that pressure of opinion was compelling Adenauer at least to modify his defence policies. In short, the hope of the advocates of the Paris treaties that the inclusion of western Germany would solve the manpower deficiencies of N.A.T.O. failed to materialize.

Further criticism of N.A.T.O. planning was aroused when General Gruenther, speaking on 3 April, asserted that in the event of a land battle, it was clear that N.A.T.O. would not be strong enough to hold the existing line in Europe, and would have to defend itself from the hinterland in western and southern France. In these circumstances it would be necessary to abandon western Germany and similarly placed territories until final liberation could take place. The prospect of being twice fought over in an atomic war pleased no one, and reports of this interview raised protests in the Netherlands as well as in Germany. In The Hague it was asked how Gruenther could expect the Dutch parliament to continue to support N.A.T.O., if, as he said, its 'position would be sacrificed'; and whether, if this were a correct appraisal, Holland would do well to modify its policy. When on 13 April Gruenther announced his resignation, and was succeeded by his air deputy, General Norstad, some commentators suggested

that his resignation had a political background. Whether this was so, remains an open question. Gruenther himself stated that three years as supreme commander seemed 'the most suitable period, for a longer stay might mean stagnation of ideas'. Nevertheless the fact remains that while throughout his last year of office he had continually urged the need for a full complement of ground troops, including a 500,000 strong German contribution, by April 1956 this seemed as far off as ever. The French contingent was reduced to a skeleton force; Great Britain was reconsidering the strength and composition of her obligatory four divisions; and German defence plans were far behind schedule. More important was the fact that the character of defence was changing. Few people any longer believed in the likelihood of a massive Soviet onslaught with overwhelming forces of ground troops; few, indeed, any longer believed that the territorial *status quo* in Europe was likely to undergo any immediate change. Hence strategy was increasingly a question of air power, and conventional forces on the ground were relegated to a secondary role. This change was aptly illustrated by a revision of terminology: whereas in 1953 the troops in western Europe were described as a 'police force', by 1956 the N.A.T.O. contingents were regarded, somewhat uncomplimentarily, as no more than a 'trip-wire'. It was true that bases would still be required, whether for manned aircraft or for inter-continental missiles, but there were many who felt that this no longer necessitated the large-scale stationing of troops overseas. Moreover, where bases were required, might they not be acquired by bilateral agreements? That such possibilities were under consideration was denied in Washington; but the administrative and technical advantages of straightforward two-power treaties over complicated multilateral alliances were obvious. Italy and France with their social problems, and the latter with its preoccupations in Africa, both with a high percentage of unreliable voters, were thought of in some quarters as more a liability than an asset. Federal Germany under Adenauer, on the other hand, could provide a suitable territorial basis for a European early warning system, while other bases were maintained in a scattered hinterland. Since 1953, American relations with Franco's Spain, a country outside N.A.T.O., had become increasingly cordial. By January 1956 the construction of military bases at San Pablo and Moron de la Frontera and of a naval base at Rota was well under way. On 10 June it was announced that Spain would benefit from unspent appropriations, making a total of $60 million aid during the year.

The possibility that this sort of relationship would replace the looser and wider existing system seemed to be considerably enhanced when during July the so-called 'Radford plan' suddenly attracted public attention. This mythological conception of the future lines of United States defence policy, which certainly anticipated conclusions its supposed author had not yet

reached, was analysed at length by commentators during the summer. Speculation started from the report that, during consideration of the joint strategic objectives plan, Admiral Radford, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, had proposed considerable cuts in manpower to become effective during the next three years.[1] The leak was immediately denied by Radford and his statement was supported by a letter from the secretary of defence, Mr. Wilson. Nevertheless speculation and discussion of the ramifications of the alleged proposals was world-wide, and considerable anxiety was felt in some European countries, particularly in Federal Germany. The obvious implication was that the U.S.A. would concentrate on defence of a 'Fortress America', build up its powers of retaliation, and limit itself to token forces overseas.[2] When the Eisenhower administration had made its first defence estimates in the autumn of 1953, it had stabilized expenditure at about $35 thousand million, and initiated reductions in army manpower. General Ridgway, then army chief of staff, had protested bitterly and argued that Mr. Wilson's proposals for reducing the strength of combat divisions overseas, inactivating certain units and reducing others to a cadre basis, would leave the United States dangerously over-extended geographically with the alternatives of partial withdrawal from Europe or from the Far East. Now another chief of staff was reported to be reasoning on exactly the same lines, and it was difficult to believe that the same secretary of defence was opposing him.

During 1956 reductions in army strength were, in fact, in fashion.[3] Cuts in the British army of 400,000, of which 198,000 were regulars, would (it was estimated) reduce total strength to 367,500, including 192,000 regulars. As was pointed out, commitments under the current British defence policy, which envisaged the simultaneous production and maintenance of hydrogen bombs, V-class bombers, and guided missiles, together with a multi-purpose navy, a major scientific research programme, and an active army of nearly ten divisions, meant that British resources were considerably over-stretched. In the strategic situation of 1956, when the political reasons for maintaining the Paris treaty commitments were no longer so self-evident, the view was gaining ground that the Rhine army was becoming an obsolescent luxury. Indeed, in Great Britain as in other countries of western Europe, discussion of defence was no longer limited to the imme-

[1] Various figures were mentioned as to the extent of the cuts. One suggestion was that the army would be cut by 80,000–100,000, beginning 1 July 1957, and by a total of 450,000 by 1960; the navy and marine corps by 200,000; and the air force by 150,000 (almost entirely from cuts in the Tactical Air Command). Existing estimated strengths were the army: 1,030,000, the navy and marine corps: 863,774, and the air force 916,000 out of a planned establishment of 970,000. The 1960 figures envisaged by the plan were an army of 580,000; a navy of 663,774; and an air force of 820,000.

[2] Of the estimated reduction of 100,000 in the strength of the army during 1957, 40,000 would, if proportions were maintained, be from troops stationed overseas.

[3] For Soviet reductions, cf. below, p. 257.

diate military issues. In London, where the balance of payments remained a continuous preoccupation, the question of defence on the Elbe was balanced against the economic disadvantages sustained in maintaining four divisions and a tactical air force in Germany. Eden, speaking at Bradford on 18 January, once again reminded his audience that 'we must be economically sound at home so that we can continue to play our special part in world affairs'.[1] Since the previous autumn, and the Istanbul meeting of the International Monetary Fund, Great Britain had undergone certain restrictions of credit, cuts in civil service expenditure, and 'drastic economies in defence expenditure'. But there remained the problem of re-equipment which, with 'the complexity of modern weapons, each one of which is more expensive than the one it replaces', and 'the personal problems of pay and conditions for the Services', meant (the prime minister stated) constantly increasing expenditure. His arguments were reinforced in the statement on defence presented to the British parliament in February. It emphasized that the 'continued economic strength of the free world is an essential element in our ability to resist Soviet aggression', and that, this being the case, the 'burden of defence cannot be allowed to rise to a level which would endanger our economic future'.[2] Defence, it was added, not only entailed a direct burden in the form of high taxation, but by diverting production in the metallurgical industries, adversely affected the re-equipment of British industry, and by limiting goods available for export weakened the balance-of-payments position. In these circumstances the maintenance of four divisions and the second tactical air force in Germany, which cost annually some £70 to £80 million a year in foreign exchange, was a matter of some importance.

Germany's entry into N.A.T.O. in 1955 had been accompanied by an agreement, valid for one year, to replace the payment of occupation costs by the payment of support costs on a sliding scale. This agreement was, however, due to come to an end on 5 May 1956, and discussions were necessary to establish long-term arrangements. The United States and France were in agreement with Great Britain that the negotiations envisaged in article two of the 1955 Finance Convention should cover a German cash payment towards support costs as well as contributions in the form of goods and services. Moreover, it was felt that German arguments to the contrary were weakened by the evident falling behind in its own rearmament. In the discussions which followed, however, the question how best to conduct a common policy of western defence was submerged by internal party political considerations within Germany, which led to embittered exchanges between the Federal Republic and its allies.

The exchanges were opened by a categorical refusal on the side of the Federal finance ministry even to consider negotiations for a cash payment.

[1] *Daily Telegraph*, 19 January 1956.

[2] *Statement on Defence*, 1956, Cmd. 9691.

This was made known through the press before a cabinet decision had been taken; but its effects were somewhat mollified by the intervention of von Brentano, who, as foreign minister, was more concerned with the diplomatic repercussions of the decision than his colleague, the minister of finance. Nevertheless, it would appear that the majority of the cabinet supported Herr Schaeffer's stand, and when quadripartite talks finally opened in Bonn on 1 March, the Germans remained adamant. At the beginning of April the Federal finance minister addressed a formal refusal to the three governments concerned to contribute towards the maintenance costs of N.A.T.O. troops on German soil. He was, however, prepared to make various alternative suggestions such as arms purchase agreements, the use of railway and telephone services, and the 'free assistance' of the German police. Disagreement and a good deal of unpleasantness continued throughout the spring and negotiations seemed to be leading with a certain sour inevitability towards a series of June crises. Nor was the situation greatly improved when, suddenly, on 7 June, a mere 48 hours before Adenauer's departure for the United States, it was announced that Germany would pay £55 million, about a third of the amount contributed the previous year, towards the upkeep of American troops. What was noteworthy about this announcement was the fact that, whereas negotiations to date had been multilateral, it carefully avoided any mention of French and British claims. Not unnaturally, foreign commentators regarded the concession with a certain degree of suspicion. It was, they concluded, a tactical manœuvre, designed to help Adenauer in his endeavours to keep the United States interested in the subject of German reunification.[1] Indeed, in spite of the German-American agreement, it soon appeared that there was little readiness on the German side to conclude negotiations with the other allied powers, and on 13 June *Die Welt* was the first of a number of papers to carry leading articles inspired by the Federal finance ministry opposing any other settlements.[2] This method of scoring a hit at the foreign ministry which wanted a 'generous' settlement for political reasons, caused considerable irritation in allied circles. It was felt to be an indiscretion which inspired little confidence in German methods and a somewhat unscrupulous way of putting pressure on the Bundestag which would have to sanction any final agreement. In the event negotiations were concluded on 29 June.[3] Announcing the decision in the lower house, von Brentano urged the adoption of the measure on the grounds that 'we

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 8 June 1956.

[2] Articles later appeared in other newspapers, e.g. *Westdeutche Allgemeine*, and *Frankfurter Allgemeine*; and the leak was traced to a finance ministry memorandum prepared for a Bundestag committee. Cf. *Manchester Guardian*, 14 June and 20 June 1956, and *The Times*, 29 June 1956.

[3] The Federal Republic agreed to pay 1,455 million marks in all, of which 650 million would go to the United States, 400 million (about £34 million) to Great Britain, 278 million to France, and 127 million to be divided among Belgium, Denmark, Holland, and Canada.

cannot seriously deny that the defence of our country still lies entirely and exclusively in the hands of our Allies'.

The issue, perhaps only of secondary importance in itself, was a striking example of the way in which non-military considerations were taking precedence over purely military considerations in matters of defence. The preponderance which the defence policy of the western powers had given to purely military considerations since the early fifties was being modified by a more far-reaching evaluation of the broader requirements of national strength. Germany, while still undecided as to the nature and value of its defence contribution, was using the issue as a means of retaining its importance as a political factor in the western alliance. For Great Britain, on the other hand, economic considerations were once again of fundamental importance. In June the government announced measures to produce £76 million of the promised £100 million saving in government expenditure and most of the economies were in defence spending. In Iceland the military advantage accruing from the presence of foreign troops was being critically examined against the social and psychological disadvantages; and in this respect opinion in Iceland was probably only formulating a feeling fairly generally held elsewhere.

Iceland had subscribed to the North Atlantic treaty in 1949 under rather different conditions from those governing other members.[1] Moreover the bilateral defence agreement made with the United States in 1951, in the special circumstances of the Korean war, which permitted the stationing of American troops in the country, provided for review by the North Atlantic Council and, after notice, for unilateral termination. By the spring of 1956 Icelandic public opinion was increasingly in favour of the withdrawal of troops. It was felt that with the relaxation of tension following the 1955 Geneva conference, the defence agreement should be revised in line with the original declaration that foreign armed forces should not be stationed in Iceland in time of peace. Furthermore, it was pointed out that, in the event of a missile war, the base in Iceland would be of limited value, and that the presence of foreign troops on the island would not prevent its destruction. In these circumstances the Althing, on 28 March, adopted a resolution in favour of revision of the defence agreement by 31 votes to 18, thus splitting the coalition of progressives and independents, and bringing about the resignation of the prime minister. Elections were held during the summer and produced a solid popular vote in support of the earlier demands in parliament for the withdrawal of American forces. Steps were taken to implement this wish. Iceland's foreign minister notified the United States ambassador that his government proposed to open discussions after 1 August and, in compliance with the

[1] Cf. the letter from Iceland's representative to the secretary-general of N.A.T.O. on 22 June 1956, in *Documents*, 1956, p. 665.

defence agreement, he asked the North Atlantic Council for an opinion as to its continued necessity.

Iceland's request was but one of the reasons for a good deal of hard thinking about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which was going on in Paris, London, Washington, and Bonn. The most fundamental problem at this stage for N.A.T.O. policy, and to some extent for western policy as a whole, was a reassessment of the political position and military importance of the Federal Republic of Germany within the alliance. Adenauer was one of the foremost advocates of the policy of developing greater political unity and economic cohesion among N.A.T.O. members. At a specially summoned conference he called for the expansion of N.A.T.O. into a 'political instrument for the free world, capable of a uniform defence against Soviet cold war manœuvres, or, even better, of forestalling such manœuvres'. But views held in Bonn were not necessarily echoed throughout Europe. In some quarters Adenauer's plans were regarded with undue suspicion as opening the way for the eventual establishment of German economic hegemony in western Europe. Others, perhaps more rationally, took the view that Germany's alleged enthusiasm for the development of Europe and for European integration would best be tested by seeing how far the Federal Republic was prepared to go in the settlement of outstanding issues. Of these one of the most tedious, which had dogged European statesmen for many years, was the future status of the Saar territory. It appeared that a final settlement was now within reach.[1]

The result of the elections held in the Saar on 18 December 1955 had caused surprise, in so far as the expectation that Dr. Schneider's extremist German Democratic Party would secure an overall majority, was proved false. In the event, his faction secured 24·2 per cent. of the votes and twelve seats, while Dr. Ney led with 25·4 per cent. and fourteen seats; the party of Herr Hoffmann, although the subject of hostile propaganda which denigrated it as pro-French, still retained thirteen seats.[2] In the upshot, after an agreement between the parties of the Heimatbund, Ney was elected prime minister and Schneider, the chief spokesman of pro-German opinion, became president of the diet. Ney, like Schneider, was in favour of the integration of the Saar into the Federal Republic. Where he differed was in maintaining that this could only occur as a result of agreement between France and Germany; and this, despite some extravagant statements by various Saarlanders, remained the official policy of all three governments.

Interest thus moved from the Saar to Paris, where Franco-German

[1] For previous negotiations, see above, pp. 38–39, 101–4.

[2] The voting was as follows: Ney, 149,516 votes; Schneider, 142,593 votes; Hoffman, 127,648 votes. In addition, the German socialists won 6 seats, the European socialists 2 seats, and the communists 2 seats.

negotiations were opened on 20 February. But little progress was made. One cause, without doubt, was the overall deterioration in Franco-German relations as a result of widely publicized statements by the French prime minister, Mollet, in which, in flagrant contradiction to Dr. Adenauer's policy, he treated the issue of German reunification as subordinate to disarmament and European security;[1] another was the extravagant statements made by Schneider, and others during the campaign for the municipal elections in the Saar, which irritated French opinion. Nevertheless, better progress was made when the negotiations were transferred to Bonn on 3 March, and a five-point directive was drawn up for discussion by experts.[2] The French attitude, in the meantime, was undergoing modification. While maintaining that the results of the referendum were not legally binding on France, Pineau left no doubt that France was sufficiently realistic to accept its implications, provided that French economic interests were adequately safeguarded.[3] Finally, after further Franco-German talks in May, agreement was reached early in June.[4] The Saar was to be reincorporated politically into Germany at the end of 1956, and economically three years later. Part of the Saar coal output would automatically be allocated to France, and in addition further quantities of German coal would be sold to France at cost price. The project of the canalization of the Moselle, on which France set great store, both for economic reasons and as a test of German 'Europeanism', would be carried through, Germany contributing 300 million marks and France 250 million towards the cost; and work on the Alsatian canal, which had been a source of irritation to German farmers, would be modified. This agreement settled a long outstanding issue, which had been a source of western discord. But this was not all. During the long negotiations attempts were made to broaden the scope of the discussions, and also to present the talks as a phase in the natural development of consultation between allies. Thus the Saar agreement had a twofold significance: it was seen, first, as a basis for greater Franco-German understanding, and secondly as a contribution to the closer integration of Europe.

During the preceding months increasing attention had been given to this problem and proposals put forward for developing a closer economic relationship in Europe. These took various forms. On the one hand, it

[1] The statements were published in *U.S. News and World Report*, 6 April 1956; cf. below, pp. 263–4.

[2] Topics specified were: French rights in the Warndt coalfield; guaranteed deliveries of Saar coking coal to the French steel industry; the transitional economic status and the final economic status of the Saar; and the canalization of the Moselle.

[3] The prospect of a bilateral Franco-German agreement not unnaturally aroused anxiety in Belgium and Luxemburg, and talks were held with the ministers concerned. In Luxemburg concern was felt for the anticipated loss in rail freight dues. Maurice Faure met M. Beck on 12 March. In Belgium it was maintained that the use of Rotterdam in place of Antwerp would result in a loss of 1,400,000 tons of port traffic a year.

[4] For the text of the agreement, cf. *Journal Officiel: Lois et Décrets*, 10 January 1957.

was suggested that N.A.T.O. should be developed as an economic unit, as well as a military alliance. On the other hand, there were ambitious plans for economic development under the auspices of the Six and of O.E.E.C. The Canadian prime minister, Mr. Lester Pearson, had long advocated action on the basis of article 2 of the North Atlantic treaty, which pledged the members to 'seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies' and to 'encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them'.[1] There was, indeed, little new in such proposals; but the situation which had developed in 1956, in particular the growing doubts whether N.A.T.O. as a military alliance was a sufficiently firm foundation for western co-operation, gave them a new urgency. Mr. Pearson did not envisage any new machinery, but merely suggested that at future N.A.T.O. ministerial meetings, which in his view should occur more frequently, more time should be spent on co-ordinating the members' economic policies. Mr. Dulles was more cautious, and as the May meeting of the Atlantic Council approached, stated only that he would do more listening than proposing in Paris, and that the United States had an open mind on the best means of developing the alliance. Indeed, Washington's attention at this time was probably concentrated more on giving defence policy a new look than on broadening the basis of the alliance. On the other hand, the foreign ministers of Norway and Belgium also had ideas on the subject of general development and those of Italy and Greece on specific problems. In the event, after several proposals had been discussed, it was decided to appoint a committee of three 'to advise the council on ways and means to improve and extend N.A.T.O. co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic community'.[2] The committee was to report back as soon as possible and meanwhile the Council would attempt to strengthen economic co-operation between members. These measures did something to satisfy opinion but were unlikely, and probably not intended, to present any serious challenge to the functioning of existing European economic organizations. In fact, by this time the activities of the Six and of O.E.E.C. members were already showing results.

In the first place, the intergovernmental committee established under M. Spaak after the Messina conference concluded its discussions early in 1956. At a conference held in Brussels on 11–12 February M. Spaak outlined the conclusions reached on the economic and political implications of the establishment of a common market and of a common programme for the production of atomic energy, and suggested the immediate integration of power resources and communications. In the discussions which followed the foreign ministers of the six powers found it easier to reach agreement on Euratom than on the common market, and greater attention

[1] Cf. *Documents*, 1949–50, p. 258. [2] Cf. *Documents*, 1956, p. 679.

was therefore given to the latter problem. Attempts were made to persuade France in particular to lower its protective customs tariff. But while M. Pineau acknowledged the advantages of such a move, he emphasized the necessity of co-ordinating economic and social policies, if a common market were to operate fairly, and also the value of a common investment fund. The foreign ministers affirmed their belief that attempts to develop closer co-operation among the Six were compatible with the less ambitious plans of O.E.E.C.—a view confirmed by the O.E.E.C. Council on 29 February.[1]

The final report of M. Spaak's committee was published in April, and representatives of the Six met in Venice on 29–30 May to discuss it.[2] Since the Brussels meeting divergencies of opinion had become more apparent. Political and social commitments made France less ready than earlier to lower its customs barriers. German industry, on the other hand, favoured a common market and regarded Euratom with less interest.[3] There was, however, no wish to delay discussion by experts any longer, and the Spaak report was accepted as a basis for the negotiation of a treaty. M. Pineau suggested only that French overseas territories should be included in a common market area, and urged that the timing for all the stages of implementation should not be finally decided upon until it had been seen how the first stage worked out in practice. The foreign ministers were all agreed that experts should start work on the two treaties, and that representatives of the Six should meet in Brussels on 26 June; M. Spaak was once again to co-ordinate the work of the two groups. Although the foreign ministers would continue to meet from time to time to discuss political aspects, the elaboration of the treaties was thus placed in the hands of technical experts.[4] The outcome of the Venice meeting was in fact a clear indication that the Six intended to convert plans into projects.

The most important question still outstanding was whether Euratom products should also be made available for military purposes. This possibility had preoccupied the countries concerned for many months. In January the Intergovernmental Committee of Action for the United States

[1] See below, p. 217. For the communiqué from Brussels, cf. *Le Monde*, 14 February 1956.

[2] *Rapport des chefs de délégation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangères* (*Comité intergouvernemental créé par la conférence de Messine*), Brussels, 1956. The report was divided (on the pattern of M. Spaak's address in Brussels) into three parts: the first deals with a common market, the second with Euratom, and the final chapter with those sectors of the economy which would be helped by immediate integration.

[3] The divergence between French and German points of view involved prestige and politics as well as economics and was unlikely to be resolved by discussion. German industry believed that with United States and British aid it could surpass French nuclear production, and was not therefore as interested in Euratom as in a common market which would give increasingly greater scope for German exports. France, on the other hand, was unwilling prior to agreement on the international control of nuclear energy to allow Germany to produce nuclear energy independently.

[4] Cf. the text of the Venice communiqué in *Combat*, 31 May 1956.

of Europe—the Monnet Committee, which had been formed to co-ordinate the activities of 'pro-European' organizations—had expressed the opinion that the most important section of the Spaak report was that concerned with atomic energy.[1] Moreover, since the production of nuclear energy for industrial purposes gave rise to the possibility of its military use, Europe should decide to produce nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes and under strict supervision. Here, they felt, was an occasion when inter-governmental co-operation was not enough; on the contrary, the countries concerned should delegate all necessary powers to a common authority—a European Atomic Energy commission. During the spring similar resolutions were passed by the parliaments of the Six,[2] and the question was once again debated during the meeting in Brussels on 13–16 March of the Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. In spite of M. Spaak's suggestion that it should withhold comment until official decisions had been taken on his report, the Assembly decided to discuss both the common market and the project for joint European production of atomic energy. Agreement was reached fairly easily on the text of a resolution approving the idea of a common market, which took into account the special position of agriculture and the need to equalize social services. But no agreement could be reached on the use of Euratom products, although many of those present felt that they should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The debate continued inconclusively when the E.C.S.C. Assembly met in Strasbourg on 8–11 May and again in June.

The activities of the Six subsequent to the Messina conference had encouraged O.E.E.C. to make similar investigations, and a Commission on Energy had been appointed to examine the whole energy field, particularly the effects of nuclear power, in order that member countries might be made aware of the new problems to be faced. This Commission reported in December 1955 and its conclusions were discussed at the O.E.E.C. Council meeting in Paris on 28–29 February.[3] As a result of these discussions it was decided to establish a Special Committee for Nuclear Energy in which all who were interested and prepared to take part in a European nuclear energy organization, might participate.[4] This committee would consider the need for security control among members, the institution of joint energy undertakings, and interim measures necessary for the control of intra-European trade in nuclear materials and equipment. It was also to consider the setting up of a Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy and the tasks assigned to it, and other measures necessary to co-ordinate the

[1] Text in *La Documentation française, Articles et Documents*, 21 January 1956.

[2] By the Italian Senate on 22 March; the Bundestag on 22 March; the Belgian Chamber on 28 March; and by the Second Chamber of the Dutch States General on 11 April 1956.

[3] Cf. O.E.E.C. Commission on Energy: *Europe's Growing Needs of Energy, How can they be met?* (Paris, 1956).

[4] O.E.E.C.: *Information Division, Press Release*: Press/A (56) 9.

activities of existing bodies concerned with nuclear development. Nevertheless it was specifically emphasized during the Paris meeting that O.E.E.C. had no intention of providing a substitute for national initiative but rather that its purpose was to strengthen it. The aim of O.E.E.C. was to co-ordinate programmes of legislation and training, and to encourage standardization and liberal trade policies in this new field of enterprise. Similarly the activities of O.E.E.C. were not regarded as incompatible with other European projects: in the words of M. Spaak, the Six would 'go faster and farther among themselves', or, as Mr. Thorneycroft put it, Euratom would subsist within the general European pattern. At the same time the continued association of Canada and the United States with European economic development was urged, and President Eisenhower's offer on 22 February 1956 of 20,000 kilograms of uranium for overseas nuclear development was welcomed.[1]

The special committee established in February reported on 17 July;[2] and a further O.E.E.C. Council meeting was held in Paris on 18 and 19 July. As a result of the report and the discussions which followed it, it was decided to establish a Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy with which Canada and the United States would be associated and which would be informed of negotiations for, and further developments in, an International Atomic Energy Agency and Euratom.[3] It was also decided that member countries should refrain from applying further restrictions on intra-European trade in respect of goods necessary for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.[4]

Meanwhile the interest and plans of the Six had veered away from nuclear energy production projects and were concentrated on the development of a common market.[5] At the O.E.E.C. Council meeting in July the same tendency was evident and attention was given to the further development of trade liberalization among members. It was decided to set up a committee to study the possibility of an agreement between the proposed

[1] Cf. *American Documents*, 1956, p. 544.

[2] O.E.E.C.: *Information Division, Press Release*: Press/A (56) 26; later incorporated in O.E.E C.: *Joint Action by O.E.E.C. Countries in the Field of Nuclear Energy* (Paris, 1956).

[3] O.E.E.C.: *Information Division, Press Release*: Press/A (56) 30. Following discussions among representatives of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States in Washington, resumed on 27 February 1956, an agreed statute for an International Atomic Energy Agency had been published on 18 April 1956, for submission to a larger conference during the autumn session of the United Nations. Cf. the text in *American Documents*, 1956, p. 507.

[4] O.E.E.C.: *Information Division, Press Release*: Press/A (56) 31.

[5] This switch of interest was undoubtedly related to the inconclusive disarmament negotiations and the bilateral arrangements made by national authorities in the field of nuclear research, among which were the agreements between the United States and France on 19 June 1956, for 40 kilos of uranium 235, and the agreement between the United States and the German Federal Republic on 13 February 1956; these were similar to twenty-four other agreements which the United States had previously signed with European and other governments.

common market and the other members of O.E.E.C. which would 'take into account the creation of a free trade area which would include the Customs Union and such Member countries' as were interested.[1] But once again the inherent weaknesses of a loose organization composed of a considerable number of independent governments with divergent interests made themselves felt. An O.E.E.C. resolution in February had declared that the 'achievement' of 'the target of 90 per cent. liberalisation' of trade in Europe by 30 September 1956 was 'essential'. But an exception was immediately made for Greece, and Turkey and Iceland were authorized to suspend measures temporarily on account of balance-of-payment difficulties. Finally, in July, the Council of O.E.E.C. was compelled to extend the period for liberalization from 30 September 1956 to 31 December 1957.[2] Thus O.E.E.C. was left limping behind the more Spaakly pace of the Six. Nevertheless these new ventures in economic co-operation were one of the more hopeful signs for the future; they provided a foundation for continued co-operation in western Europe at a time when military pressure to co-operate was no longer strong and divergencies in the political field seemed to be weakening the alliance.

[1] O.E.E.C.: *Information Division, Press Release*: Press/A (56) 32.

[2] Cf. O.E.E.C.: *Information Division, Press Release*: Press/A (56) 33. It should be remembered that liberalization measures only applied to imports on private account. But the Steering Board for Trade was to report to the Council of O.E.E.C. before 1 April 1957 on the possibility of including imports on governmental account in the computation of liberalization percentages, and was to give attention to other restrictive practices.

## CHAPTER XIII

# SOVIET REAPPRAISALS

THE first six months of 1956, which found the west groping rather incoherently towards new policies, saw a not dissimilar position in the communist world. It is true that it was more difficult, owing to the greater secrecy surrounding policy decisions in the Kremlin, to trace the continuity of events in the history of those regions where Soviet Russia and China were predominant; but the proceedings of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in Moscow between 14 February and 25 February, provided a point of crystallization, from which at least the main trends could be observed with some degree of assurance. Certain aspects of the proceedings at the Congress, in particular the denunciations of Stalinism, made a deep impression on opinion throughout the world, though interpretations of their significance differed widely. But trained observers were quick to point out that the 'public stock-taking' aspect should not be exaggerated, and that, far from indicating a sudden change in orientation, the Congress 'confirmed and systematized trends which were already strongly evident in the preceding months'.[1] In fact, these trends went back to the beginnings of the 'new course' after the death of Stalin, and there can be no question of recapitulating them here. But three developments during the year 1955 were particularly relevant for the future. The first was the restoration of good relations with Jugoslavia in May 1955, and the recognition on the part of the Soviet Union of the legitimacy of a distinct and separate Jugoslav road to socialism.[2] Secondly, in spite of certain variations and fluctuations at the time of the supersession of the Malenkov by the Bulganin-Khrushchev government, including in particular a readjustment of economic planning in favour of heavy industry,[3] there is no doubt that in the main the economic and social policies of the 'new course' continued to hold sway, both in the Soviet Union itself and in the countries of eastern Europe. Thirdly, the policy of coexistence actively pursued by the leaders in the Kremlin for the greater part of the year, was a conditioning factor on the communist, no less than on the western side. In combination these factors produced a change of atmosphere in the communist countries which helped to shape policy in 1956; indeed, it is not impossible that the policy of peaceful competition, propagated by the Soviet leaders in the winter of 1955–6, conformed as much to

[1] Philip E. Mosely, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. xxxiv (1956), p. 553.
[2] Cf. above, pp. 133–5.
[3] Cf. above, p. 45.

internal requirements within the communist bloc as to calculations on the best methods of challenging the western powers in the new period of nuclear stalemate.

Ever since 1953 a process of 'loosening up' had been under way in the communist world, and particularly in the Soviet Union itself, which both reflected and at the same time furthered structural changes within communist society. As a result of the process of intensified industrialization after the war, new social groupings—in particular, the managerial class and the technologists—had come to the fore, whose views and interests it was necessary to take into consideration; and it seems clear that the policy of the new course, with the greater latitude permitted to all branches of thought, was designed to meet this situation. On the one side, the maintenance of the strict, central control of the Stalinist period was likely to alienate the new social forces; while, on the other side, it was obvious that, by adopting a policy suited to their needs and interests and aspirations, the state might rally to its side important elements which, though not hostile, had been left politically out in the cold. Since it was on these groups that the government relied for technical advance, the most advantageous results could only be obtained if they were offered inducements to give of their best; and it is clear that the rigid dogmatism and strict party control enforced during the later years of Stalin's régime were not working well from this point of view. All in all, it was a process of necessary adjustment; but the reconciliation with Tito in May 1955 gave it new headway, particularly in the countries of eastern Europe. Once it was recognized, contrary to Stalinist theory, that there were different ways of progressing towards a socialist society, it was difficult to deny the possibility, within the broad framework of Marxism and Leninism, of different interpretations of the best course to take, particularly as there was ample evidence that the prohibition of criticism and the unquestioning adoption of superimposed plans in eastern Europe had, in some cases at least, brought the countries concerned near to economic collapse. Once Soviet Russia had come to terms with Jugoslavia, the other countries in the communist bloc were not long in following suit;[1] but it was not surprising if, in the process, they asked themselves why what was good for the Jugoslavs might not also be good for them. Particularly in Poland the result was increasing criticism of the communist party and of the government, which reflected the precarious state of the Polish economy, and led to various concessions (lowering of prices, moderation of the policy of collectivism in agriculture). At the same time there was criticism of the too rigid copying of the Soviet example. In Hungary the existence of internal strains was indicated by the fact that the Hegedus government, which had assumed power on

[1] For example, Bulgaria on 3 June 1955, Rumania on 4 June, Poland on 11 June, cf. *Pravda*, 5, 6, and 11 June 1955.

18 April 1955,[1] was reconstructed in the latter part of August and again on 13 November.

At the same time the new trends in Soviet foreign policy worked in the same direction. If the main object of Soviet policy in 1955 was to create a 'climate of peace', the consequent change of atmosphere made itself felt within as well as outside of the communist bloc. Throughout 1955 the popular democracies of eastern Europe had sought, following Soviet example, to improve their relations not only with Jugoslavia but also with their western neighbours—Poland, for example, with Germany, Czechoslovakia with Austria, Bulgaria and Rumania with Greece—and the gradual relaxation of tension had internal as well as external consequences. It was not only in the west that concentration on building a strong front against the hostile powers outside, and the need for internal solidarity, were felt to be no longer the overriding factors in the situation. One immediate consequence, in the Soviet Union itself and in eastern Europe, was that it was difficult any longer to justify on grounds of military necessity the sacrifices which the population had been called upon to make, by the concentration of industry on capital instead of consumer goods. In these circumstances a new ideology was necessary; and this was provided by the slogan 'competitive coexistence', which supplied the stimulus otherwise lacking for the maintenance of internal cohesion and a consolidated effort. The argument that it was only necessary for the Soviet Union and its associates to work hard and forgo luxuries for a few years, in order to overtake even the most advanced of the capitalist countries, provided a new motive force for communist society. This was particularly important when, on 17 April 1956, the 'Cominform' (Communist Information Bureau), which had taken the lead in formulating communist doctrine and propaganda, was dissolved.

Nevertheless competitive coexistence was not merely a slogan: behind it was the stark fact that, as a result of the industrialization programmes in earlier five-year plans, the Soviet leaders now believed in their capacity to compete on an equal footing with the west. On the other hand, the adjustments required within Soviet society by the new policies were not easily made. In particular, there was obviously a risk that the process of internal relaxation, which was necessary in the new circumstances as a means of securing full voluntary co-operation, might go too far and get out of hand. Already at the Third Plenum of the Polish Communist Party in 1955 this possibility had evidently weighed heavily in the minds of the Polish leaders, particularly Boleslaw Bierut, and by the beginning of 1956 it seems probable that the problem was general in the communist world. There is little reason to doubt that awareness of its existence affected, and perhaps tempered, Soviet foreign policy. Once it had become clear, as a result of

[1] Cf. above, p. 52.

the failure of the Geneva meetings, that the solidarity of the western powers was unlikely to be shaken by direct attack at the highest level, internal considerations imposed limits on Soviet initiative. The task of maintaining the planned level of output, not merely in the Soviet Union itself but still more in the associated countries, and keeping the economy of the eastern bloc on an even keel, of overcoming the shortage of labour and providing for the consumption-needs of the population, was sufficient to commend a policy of limited risks, such as peaceful competition implied. Such a policy suited better than any other the period of transition through which the Soviet Union was passing. It was not that Khrushchev lacked confidence in the future; on the contrary, every statement made by him and Bulganin during their tour in Asia reverberated with power, confidence, and drive. But the process of internal adjustment was a fact, and its problems—both on the economic and on the human level—were real. The new principle of collective leadership, proclaimed earlier, was not a mere form of words; but the experiment it implied had to be tested, and until that had been done, caution was necessary. This, in broad terms, seems to have been the spirit underlying Soviet policy at the beginning of 1956; and its effects were seen when the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party assembled on 14 February. This was the first party congress to be held since the death of Stalin, and it therefore had unusual importance—apart from its more sensational aspects, notably the attack on Stalin and the demolition of the Stalin legend—for the light which it threw on the new lines of Soviet policy.

*The Twentieth Party Congress, 14–25 February 1956*

The tone of the congress was set, from the beginning, in the speech in which the first secretary of the party, Nikita S. Khrushchev, delivered the report of the Central Committee on the work of the party since the preceding congress in 1952.[1] The events of these years, Khrushchev said, made them 'one of the important periods' in the party's history. They were years in which the party had 'made a critical appraisal of the situation in agriculture and industry', boldly uncovering 'shortcomings', discarding 'outdated conceptions' and, 'resolutely sweeping aside everything that had become outmoded'; while abroad the steps taken with the support of 'all peace-loving forces', had resulted in 'a certain *détente*' and opened up 'real prospects for improvement . . . in the international arena'.

Khrushchev's report established the framework and determined the limits

[1] The full text of the report is in *Soviet News Booklet*, No. 4 (February, 1956); for excerpts, cf. *Documents*, 1956, pp. 355–63, and *American Documents*, 1956, pp. 180–96. Among many reports and assessments, cf. *The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. An Appraisal* (R.I.I.A., March 1956); 'The Soviet Communist Party's Twentieth Congress', *The World Today*, vol. xii (1956), pp. 134–44.

of later discussion. Subsequent speakers picked out and elaborated particular aspects of his survey, but none added any important new theme. No new international policies were proclaimed, but the changes of the past two years were explained and justified in the context of world events. The emphasis was on internal affairs, and this was reinforced by the introduction of the sixth five-year plan, which Prime Minister Bulganin brought forward as the second main feature of the agenda. But the discussion of internal affairs was not confined to the exposition of economic planning, but spread over the whole field of social and constitutional policy, and in particular the relationship between the leadership and the party; and this review, and the conclusions drawn from it, were certainly the distinctive feature of the Congress.

In the first place, great emphasis was laid on the principle of collective leadership, which, as Mikoyan said,[1] had been established during the past three years 'after a long interruption'. This principle, he affirmed, was 'elementary for a proletarian party'; but it had to be stressed 'because for some twenty years we actually had no collective leadership', and instead 'the cult of the individual' prevailed, with effects which he described as 'extremely adverse'. This was an unspoken but unmistakable condemnation of Stalin's methods of government, and it was repeated in great detail, and with a wealth of circumstantial evidence, in a lengthy secret speech delivered by Khrushchev on 24 February.[2] That such a speech should be made at all was undoubtedly a major event; as Khrushchev himself said, it was 'evidence of the great moral and political strength' of the party that it was able to 'present in all their ramifications the basic problems of overcoming the cult of the individual'. But more fundamental, if less sensational, than the attack on Stalin as a person, and on his methods of government, was the fact that the question of leadership did not stop at the top. It was freely recognized that an over-centralized top-heavy bureaucracy had impaired efficiency, especially in agriculture, and therefore that some measure of decentralization was necessary in the interests of efficiency, flexibility, and greater incentive. For this reason factories and collective farms had been allowed a greater say in the management of their affairs; the civil service was being cut; and the powers of the constituent republics were being 'considerably broadened', instead of being strictly tied to directives from the ministries of the U.S.S.R. In this way the principle of collec-

[1] The *Speech by A. J. Mikoyan* was printed as Soviet News Booklet No. 8 (London, 1956).

[2] This famous speech was secret in the sense that publication was withheld. Subsequently what purported to be a copy was obtained through secret sources by the United States government, and was published in the *N.Y. Times*, 5 June 1956. It was republished in pamphlet form by the *Manchester Guardian*, under the title: *The Dethronement of Stalin* (Manchester, June 1956). The question of the authenticity of the document is open to dispute; but there seems little reason to doubt that the speech was made, although the published text may not be complete or literally accurate.

tive leadership was being extended at all levels, central and local, with the object of encouraging initiative and avoiding mistakes. The new policy, Khrushchev said, had already been justified by results: 'the direction of enterprises' had 'become more concrete and more operative', and there had been 'a noticeable increase in the initiative shown by the republican organisations and in their responsibility for the work of industry'.

But such a change of direction required concomitant changes in still broader spheres. If initiative were to be stimulated—and there was no doubt that initiative was a condition of further economic progress—the individual must have greater liberty. Hence the state security agencies—in other words, the feared and hated secret police—had been brought under 'proper control', the judicial system had been improved, and steps had been taken to prevent abuse of authority by police and administrative organs. On the other side, it was essential, within the limits imposed by Marxist-Leninist thought, to give greater scope to art and literature and intellectual life. Khrushchev frankly admitted that 'things are not well in economic science', and that, so far as literature was concerned, there were too many 'pallid works bearing the stamp of haste'; and he called for an end to 'pointless political phrasemongering'. The important point was that 'revolutionary theory' should be 'applied creatively, not dogmatically', and developed 'on the basis of . . . the latest historical experience and analysis of living realities'. Owing to the rigidity of the previous regime this had not occurred, and therefore it was necessary both to revise textbooks and to draft a new programme. But the necessary revision could not take place without greater freedom for constructive thinking and a relaxation of external control, or (as Khrushchev put it) without the development of 'inner-party democracy'. For this reason the central committee had 'urged party organisations to develop criticism and self-criticism in every way' and 'to review the results of the work done with a critical eye'. 'Many of the shortcomings' which had to be eliminated, Khrushchev stated, 'would never have arisen if it had not been for the complacency that at one time gained currency in some sections of the party, and for the tendency to give a doctored picture of the real state of affairs'. Hence 'open criticism' was 'the surest means of further strengthening the party' and of 'registering fresh successes in all sectors'.

This attempt to chart a road by which freedom would gradually be extended without jeopardizing the basis of socialist society, and the announcement of principles and methods basically different from those that held in the Stalinist era, was the distinctive feature of the Congress. The question of practical application remained, of course, to be solved, in particular the question whether the experiment in greater freedom might get out of hand. Many who hitherto had accepted the word of the Kremlin as gospel truth may (as western commentators were inclined to suggest)

have lost faith in the communist leadership as a whole, after hearing the vehement denunciations of Stalin. But whether (as some western commentators concluded) the process of liberalization would eventually get out of hand, with each concession leading to fresh demands, until the whole edifice of communism was swept away, was another question.[1] On the whole it seems more plausible to suggest that 'only a Soviet leadership confident of the stability of its rule . . . could have undertaken such a drastic operation as the direct repudiation of the Stalin myth'.[2] In any case, Khrushchev was surely right in claiming that the new lines of policy followed from the progress already made, and were essential for further advance. 'Under the new conditions', as he said, 'the old methods of running the economy require considerable revision.' If the slackening of control entailed risks, they were calculated and necessary risks, with the object of carrying forward more quickly the process of internal development, and this in its turn was the necessary precondition for the success of Soviet foreign policy in the era of 'peaceful coexistence'. From this point of view, the policies propounded at the Twentieth Party Congress formed a coherent whole, and by casting aside the ballast of obsolete ideology, which had stultified Soviet policy and encumbered it with outmoded cold-war attitudes, the Soviet leaders were freeing their hands to press forward in new directions. At the same time the new five-year plan was designed to provide the material basis for such a development. The intention was that, by 1960, the Soviet Union should produce more steel, electric power, cement, and fuel than were at present produced in Great Britain, France, and western Germany combined; and this would be achieved, in part, by an ambitious scheme for industrial development in eastern Siberia, where the main resources, all largely unexploited, of coal, hydro-electric power, timber, and non-ferrous metals were situated. These developments, supported by a vast agricultural expansion, including the cultivation of some 80 million acres of virgin and derelict land, would enable the Soviet Union to play the role in world politics which its resources made possible. As Khrushchev said, 'high rates of development of industrial production are a guarantee of new successes for socialism in its economic competition with capitalism'.

It was the economic situation which, in the view of all the principal speakers at the Twentieth Congress, was the dominant factor in the international situation; and this emphasis, even though characteristic of Marxist interpretation in general, was in itself an indication of the current trends of Soviet policy. The economy of the Soviet Union and of the People's Democracies, the speakers set out to demonstrate, was steadily advancing;

[1] This seems to have been the view of the United States secretary of state, Dulles; cf. his speech of 26 February in *American Documents*, 1956, p. 198.

[2] Cf. Mosely, op. cit. p. 542.

that of the capitalist countries, on the contrary, was 'developing extremely unevenly' and becoming 'still more unstable'. For this reason alone, it was unnecessary to count on war and military aggression as factors in Soviet policy; for, as Khrushchev said, 'armed interference' was unnecessary, since the 'certainty of the victory of communism' was based on the conviction that 'the socialist mode of production possesses decisive advantages over the capitalist mode of production'. The Soviet Union, in other words, did not need war to achieve its objects.[1] But, in addition, there were two other points. In the first place, war was not in the Soviet Union's interest, since (in the words of Mikoyan) 'the interests of successful communist construction' and 'the struggle to raise the standard of living' were 'in direct contradiction with the policy of the arms drive and of expending human and material forces for war purposes'. In the second place, under the new conditions, there could be no victor in any future war. It is true that Khrushchev, Zhukov, Mikoyan, and others all took the line that, if war came, its effects on capitalist countries would be more dire than its effects on socialist countries; but it could not benefit the U.S.S.R. and for that reason the U.S.S.R. had renounced it. In short, the policy of coexistence, which was now officially proclaimed as the central principle of Soviet foreign relations, fitted in both with internal needs, and with the existing world-situation, as well as with the long-term requirements of the struggle against capitalism.

Soviet foreign policy was therefore based on four principles. The first was the strengthening of relations with China and the other states of the eastern bloc, both politically and economically. This was basic, because (in Khrushchev's words) 'the stronger the entire socialist camp, the more reliable will be the guarantee of freedom, independence and economic and cultural progress of each of the countries making up this great camp'. The second was the cultivation of ties with the 'uncommitted' countries, since it was the post-war emergence of this group which had transformed the international situation. The third was recognition of the possibility of different 'forms of transition to socialism in different countries'; otherwise, there was the risk of alienating the rising states of Asia and Africa, which claimed the right to develop in their own way. This applied in the first place to Jugoslavia, since Soviet-Jugoslav relations were the touchstone by which Soviet policy was apt to be judged; but it applied also (although this point was not specifically singled out) to Asian countries, such as India and Indonesia, whose development had followed neither capitalist nor communist patterns. Only on the basis of the principle of different roads to

[1] This was the answer to the 'enemies' who argued (as Mikoyan put it) that the People's Democracies were 'in the last analysis . . . for war, that we want to spread communism throughout the world by means of war, that at the moment we are not ready for this and that we only want peaceful co-existence until such time as we are fully prepared'; cf. Mikoyan, op. cit. p. 18.

socialism could close relations with the 'peaceloving European and Asian states which have proclaimed non-participation in blocs as a principle of their foreign policies', be developed; and this was of basic importance since they comprised 'nearly 1,500 million people—that is, the majority of the population of our planet'—whose alignment (in Mikoyan's phrase) determined 'the correlation of the forces of peace and the forces of war' throughout the world. Finally—the keystone in the arch—there was the principle of 'peaceful coexistence between different states, irrespective of their social systems'. Its enemies had alleged that the Soviet Union had put forward this principle 'merely out of tactical considerations' or 'considerations of expediency'. In reality, under world-conditions as they were, no other policy (the Soviet leaders affirmed) was possible. In Khrushchev's words, there were 'only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history', and as no one wanted the latter, coexistence was the only alternative. 'No third way' existed. Indeed, coexistence was not enough, for coexistence was not incompatible with an armaments race, which would enhance the danger of war. Hence Khrushchev insisted that it was 'necessary to proceed further' and 'to improve relations' and 'strengthen confidence between countries' as a stage towards disarmament. But 'peaceful coexistence' remained the basis and for this reason took a central place in Soviet policy.

These pronouncements indicated with unmistakable clarity the lines Soviet statesmen intended to pursue in the coming months. There was no reason to doubt their reiterated assertions of their anxiety to avoid war. On the other hand, the inescapable conclusion presented by an analysis of the proceedings of the Twentieth Congress was that the U.S.S.R. intended to embark on an intensified drive on all other fronts. After Geneva, the wheels had ground to a standstill, so far as direct diplomatic negotiations were concerned; and what was said of Germany indicated plainly that the Soviet leaders were content on that and related issues to remain at a standstill, to accept the separate existence of two Germanies, and to wait on events. The question of reunification had evidently lost urgency in their eyes. In the same way, while protesting their desire for disarmament, they appear, having satisfied themselves that they had achieved nuclear parity, to have accepted in practice the concept of 'mutual deterrence', on which they accused the U.S.A. of relying. The speech of Marshal Zhukov left no doubt that, in the event of war, the U.S.S.R. would use all the weapons at its disposal, and rejected any attempt to differentiate between 'tactical' and 'strategic' nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, he and his colleagues apparently regarded the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb, which the Soviet Union had 'the means of delivering to any point of the globe by plane and by rockets', as a defensive shield which would hold the other side in check while the contest continued in the political and above all in the economic

fields. Here again, there is evidence of a new sense of realism in Soviet policy, and of adaptation to conditions as they had developed since the death of Stalin. This realism was seen in the frankness with which the Central Committee confessed to earlier 'mistakes', 'faults' and 'shortcomings', particularly in the conduct of relations with Jugoslavia. It was seen also in Khrushchev's revision of Lenin's statements about the inevitability of war under an 'imperialist' system. This, Khrushchev said, was no longer true; for when Lenin wrote, imperialism had been 'an all-embracing world system', but now the situation had 'radically changed', the colonial revolt had weakened imperialism irremediably, and there were 'mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war'. In the same way the Stalinist doctrine of 'socialism in one country' had been overtaken by events. 'The main feature of our era', Khrushchev laid down, which 'capitalism' had 'proved powerless to prevent', was 'the emergence of socialism from within the bounds of a single country and its transformation into a world system'. From one point of view, the Twentieth Party Congress can be summed up as an adaptation of Soviet policy to fit that transformation. The time 'when the Soviet land of socialism was isolated', when (in Mikoyan's words) 'we were an oasis in the capitalist encirclement', was past. But this basic change required a reappraisal of policy, in the light of new conditions; and such a reappraisal, which had been going on piecemeal since 1953, received theoretical formulation at the Twentieth Party Congress. This, we may say, both in so far as it set out to define the new policy and in so far as it set out to contain the new forces, was its historical significance.

Nevertheless to define policy was one thing, to apply it was another. If the policy formulated at the Twentieth Party Congress, channelled along economic lines and exploiting colonial conflicts and the movement of neutralism, could be applied consistently, there was no doubt that it would constitute a formidable challenge to the west. The record of economic achievement produced by Mr. Khrushchev at the Congress may have been weighted for propaganda purposes; but the reality was impressive enough and set a standard which, at any rate in the eyes of the underdeveloped peoples, capitalism would find it difficult to emulate. If the objectives of the new five-year plan could be only approximately accomplished, the international position of the U.S.S.R. was bound to become even stronger; and for this reason it was correct, with Bulganin, to regard the plan as significant not merely for the internal development of the Soviet Union but as a factor in the international situation. But it still remained to be seen, first, whether and to what degree the sixth five-year plan could be implemented, and secondly how the countries of the communist bloc would react to the new policies set out in the report of the Central Committee. Hence, after the conclusion of the Congress on February 25, the world

waited with unusual interest to see what its impact in the communist world would be. Now that the most obvious features of the preceding dictatorial regime had been relaxed, what line of development would follow? Would the change of orientation lead, as the Soviet leaders evidently hoped and expected, to the alleviation of discontents and an improvement of the communist system, or would it, on the contrary, prove difficult, or even impossible, to guide the forces newly released from constraint into constructive channels? The answers to these questions were only to a very limited extent connected with foreign relations; but on them the role played by the Soviet Union in international affairs was bound to some considerable degree to depend.

*Eastern Europe after the Twentieth Party Congress*

As the delegates who had attended the meetings of the Congress in Moscow returned home and reported to their constituent parties, it quickly became evident that the principles enunciated by Khrushchev had created a ferment both in the countries of the communist bloc, and also in communist parties elsewhere.[1] In particular, news of Khrushchev's secret attack on Stalin soon leaked out, and caused heart-searching among other communist leaders whose own position was in many cases compromised. Outside the Soviet bloc, the communist leadership was thrown into considerable confusion. In Norway, for example, while praising the Soviet government for bringing the facts to light, it frankly admitted that 'the text of Khrushchev's speech will both frighten and shock those who read it'.[2] In Italy, the communist leader, Togliatti, argued forcefully that the revelations of 'bureaucratic degeneration' in the U.S.S.R. showed that it was no longer fitted to be the sole model for communism, and that the whole system had become 'polycentric'.[3] Elsewhere, criticism extended to Khrushchev and the new Soviet leadership, which was accused of attempting 'to circumvent the core of the problem' and avoiding 'a deeper explanation of the errors and crimes ascribed to Stalin'; indeed, the Twentieth Congress, far from setting the seal on a period of change, was regarded in some quarters as only a beginning, and 'a deeper probing of the errors in the

[1] The reactions of the Italian, British, and United States Communist Parties to Khrushchev's secret denunciation of Stalin are collected in *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*. Edited by the Russian Institute, Columbia University (Columbia U.P., 1956). Further documents for the period February–November 1956 are assembled in a second volume, *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe*, ed. P. E. Zinner (Columbia U.P., 1956).

[2] *The Anti-Stalin Campaign*, p. 97.

[3] 'Today, the front of socialist construction in countries where the Communists are the leading party has been so broadened . . . that even for this part the Soviet model cannot and must not any longer be obligatory. . . . The whole system becomes polycentric, and even in the Communist movement itself we cannot speak of a single guide but rather of a progress which is achieved by following paths which are often different' (op. cit. pp. 138–9).

Soviet Union' was called for, with the object of 'speeding the profound changes already getting under way in that country'.[1]

Within the countries of the Soviet bloc the reaction was more uniform, at least on the surface, but here also differences gradually made themselves felt. Certain measures occurred everywhere, notably the release of political figures imprisoned during Stalin's purges, the posthumous rehabilitation of those who had been executed as 'deviationists', and general amnesties covering thousands of detained persons. These amounted to 11,298 in Hungary according to a statement issued on 8 July, 11,896 in eastern Germany according to a statement of 20 June, and some 80,000 in Poland according to an announcement of 27 April. Among those posthumously rehabilitated were the former Hungarian communist leaders, Bela Kun and Lazlo Rajk, and the Bulgarian Traicho Kostov, who, like Rajk, had been executed in 1949. More significant for the future was the release and return of many who had been incriminated in the Rajk and Slansky trials in 1949 and 1952. They included in Czechoslovakia Arthur London, a former deputy foreign minister condemned to life imprisonment in 1952, and the former minister of state security, Joseph Pavel; in east Germany Max Fechner, former minister of justice, and Franz Dahlem; and in Poland Marian Spychalski, former deputy minister of national defence, General Komar, and Wladyslaw Gomulka, who, after losing his official and party posts in 1949, had been deprived of his parliamentary immunity and imprisoned in 1951 and thereafter detained under house-arrest. In Hungary the archbishop of Kalocsa, Mgr. Josef Groesz, was not only pardoned but received in audience by the prime minister, Hegedus, who informed him that he was at liberty to reassume his functions both as provincial and as president of the Hungarian bishops' conference.

These measures went some way to restore normality. So also did the reform of the police and judiciary, which was given particular prominence in east Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, where 'abuses in the security organs' were admitted by the party secretary, and in Bulgaria, where the Central Committee ordered measures to be taken 'for the further strengthening of socialist legality' and 'the strict implementation and observance of the laws'.[2] Such measures were in accordance with Russian example; here also, on 23 April, a commission was set up, in pursuance of the recommendations of the Twentieth Congress, to supervise the activities of the state security organization and the secret police. But, in the end, the decisive factor was the attitude of the party leadership and the spirit in which it approached the question of reform. Nowhere, of course, could the new trends initiated at the Twentieth Party Congress be ignored, and they were duly registered in resolutions of the various central committees.[3]

[1] Op. cit. pp. 314–6.

[2] *Documents*, 1956, p. 376.

[3] Cf. *Documents*, 1956, p. 365 (Hungary); p. 368 (Czechoslovakia); p. 374 (Bulgaria).

But the manner and degree in which they were put into effect varied greatly in different countries, in accordance with the national background, the standing of the communist leaders themselves, the existence of alternative forces, and similar factors. Not unnaturally, the party leadership was concerned to safeguard its own position; not unnaturally, also, it was aware of the ferment released, and of the possibility of losing control. In different countries different methods were used to meet these problems with different results. In east Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria the leadership was successful in riding the storm, and in the Soviet Union itself signs of dissatisfaction were slight and localized;[1] in Poland and Hungary the situation proved more difficult to master.

In view of the international situation and of the precedent provided by the riots of June 1953, the situation in the *German Democratic Republic*[2] was widely felt to be the touchstone by which the success of the new policy would be measured, particularly as the Third Party Conference of the Socialist Unity Party, held in Berlin from 24 to 30 March, was the first major party event to occur since the Twentieth Congress. The new lines enunciated in Moscow created special difficulties for the German leaders, since the principle of coexistence implied acknowledgement of the division of Germany. Furthermore, Ulbricht, the first secretary of the party, was known as a Stalinist of long standing. Nevertheless, in a speech on 4 March, reiterated and expanded on 17 March, Ulbricht attacked Stalin for the harm he had inflicted on the party and the state,[3] and took the lead at the party conference in calling for the establishment of a commission to revise the proceedings taken against party members in the past, while the prime minister, Grotewohl, denounced the minister of justice for illegal arrests. Wollweber, the minister of state security, however, had no hesitation in defending the police; and it soon became clear that the change-over to collective leadership was not going to lead to changes in the personnel of government. Already in the third party conference, it had been made clear by Schirdewan that collective leadership did not imply an anarchical attitude towards the existing régime, and that any attempt to belittle the achievements of Ulbricht, Pieck, and Grotewohl would be resisted. The nervousness visible in the discussion of collective leadership and the personality cult proved, however, to be unnecessary. In the first place, after the disillusionment in 1953, the population remained apathetic, and there was little evidence of pressure from below; in the second place, the amnesties did not bring any personalities to the fore, who might have challenged the leadership. The result was that Ulbricht had little difficulty in holding his ground.

[1] There were reports, early in March, of demonstrations in Tiflis by students loyal to Stalin, casualties in which were said to amount to a hundred. But resistance to the attack on Stalin appears to have been confined to Georgia.

[2] Cf. 'New Policy Trends in Eastern Germany', *World Today*, vol. xii (1956), pp. 173–81.

[3] Cf. *Neues Deutschland*, 4 and 18 March 1956.

The outcome in *Czechoslovakia*[1] was little different, though here the difficulties to be overcome were greater. The leadership began by admitting 'that in our Party, too, we all, without exception, not only succumbed to the cult of personality, but also spread it'.[2] But from the beginning the Czechoslovak leaders realized the danger that too much criticism and relaxation of control might give a handle to the opposition and undermine the position of the party, and already in his first report to the Central Committee on 6 March the first secretary, Novotný, emphasized that indiscipline would not be tolerated. Hence, although the new trends could not be ignored, they were applied with considerable restraint, and in fact the leadership never lost control of the situation. Nevertheless pressure from below was stronger in Czechoslovakia than in the German Democratic Republic, and concessions had to be made. Already early in April it was admitted that a number of party members had 'lost their bearings' in the new situation,[3] and later in the same month and in May there was unrest in the universities, particularly in Prague and Bratislava, where the students demanded the abolition of compulsory lectures on Marxism-Leninism and a return to academic and political liberty. At the Writers' Congress in April speakers not only denounced the chairman, Jan Drda, a spokesman of the government, and rejected the agenda issued from the platform, but called for the resignation of the government and of the central committee of the party. In face of this potentially dangerous situation the government had to yield some ground, and on 25 April Alexei Čepička, a vice-premier and minister of defence, who had long been regarded as one of the most ruthless exponents of the preceding policy, was dismissed. But, although a few minor officials shared his fate, this was as far as 'destalinization' in the upper ranks was allowed to go; even the universally disliked Kopecký, another vice-premier, retained his post.

Moreover, the government avoided compromising its position by ostentatiously rehabilitating the victims of earlier purges. Whereas the Hungarians rehabilitated Rajk and the Bulgarians rehabilitated Kostov, the Czech leaders maintained that Slánský, whose arrest and execution in 1952 had been the sign for a major purge, had been justly accused. He had not, it was admitted, been in conspiracy with Tito, as had previously been alleged; but he had been an agent of Beria and had 'introduced the violation of socialist law into the organs of security and justice'. Similarly, there was no rehabilitation of Dr. Clementis, who was executed with Slánský. In fact, by claiming that the removal of Slánský and his accomplices was part of the process of eradicating violations of 'socialist legality', the Czech leaders vindicated themselves as the original opponents of the police-state

[1] Cf. 'Caution in Prague. Reactions to the Khrushchev Report', *World Today*, vol. xii (1956), pp. 339–48.

[2] *Documents*, 1956, p. 368.

[3] *Rudé Právo*, 11 April 1956.

represented by Beria. How far this version of events was accepted in Czechoslovakia, is another question; but there is no doubt that by their handling of the Slánský case, and by sacrificing Čepička, the Czech leaders saved themselves the unpleasant task of public recantation and rehabilitation. Thereafter also they avoided further concessions. In this they may have been helped by the personal popularity of President Zápotocký, by the introduction of price cuts to date from 1 April, of promises to raise pensions, and plans to introduce a seven-hour working day, and by the inception of the second five-year plan. By the middle of 1956 the Czechoslovak economy was 'in a healthier state than at any previous time since the communists seized power in 1948';[1] and this was certainly a factor to be counted with.

In any case, by the time the party conference met between 11 and 15 June, the leadership appeared to be in control of the situation again. Originally summoned to discuss economic questions, its agenda was extended, in view of the preceding ideological ferment, to include a debate on the internal condition of the party; and the communist leaders emerged successful, staunchly defending the line adopted by the party since 1952. Novotný, the party secretary, asserted that the party line had always been correct, attacked the Writers' Congress for 'unprincipled liberalism' and denounced 'reactionary attempts' to make use of the students. He was seconded by Kopecký, who abused the writers for their 'passionate transports of liberalism' and refused the demands of the students. Party branches, chiefly in Prague, had asked for an extraordinary party congress to be convened; but this was turned down by Novotný as unnecessary. Nevertheless the pressure which had made itself felt in the press had positive results: the conference decided to introduce a policy of decentralization, conferring wider powers on ministers and others, and the Slovak National Council was given greater legislative authority. Although the leadership had stood its ground, there was undoubted relaxation of the strict control which had characterized the preceding period and life in Czechoslovakia was easier.

In *Rumania* there was no sign of a serious challenge to the party leadership. It is true that on 7 May the vice-president of the Council, Petrescu, was dismissed and the president suspended; but Gheorghiu-Dej, in spite of his reputation as a Stalinist, retained the key office of party secretary, and was able to steer a steady course. In *Bulgaria* ferment was greater, without bringing decisive changes. Although the Central Committee, in the statement issued after its meeting between 2 and 6 April, denounced the prime minister, Chervenkov, for indulging in 'the cult of the person', it took care at the same time to stress the fact that the policy of the party

[1] Cf. 'Economic Prospects in Czechoslovakia. The Second Five-Year Plan', *World Today*, vol. xii (1956), pp. 201–9.

as a whole had been 'correct' and to call for an intensification of the struggle 'against the harmful influence of the bourgeois ideology in all walks of life'.[1] In fact, Chervenkov asked, on 17 April, to be relieved of his functions in view of his 'incorrect methods', and was replaced by Anton Yugov, a former minister of the interior, who had been dismissed in 1950 for alleged negligence in dealing with the Kostov conspiracy; and his resignation was followed by a reconstitution of the ministry. But as Chervenkov was retained as vice-premier, and all the members of the former presidium had places in the new, the situation was not radically altered, and Yugov's policy did not differ noticeably from that of his predecessor in office. It was admitted by the party secretary, Bulgaranov, that 'liberalization' had resulted in a weakening of party discipline; but the government remained in control and Professor Khristanov, a prominent member of the academy of sciences, and Topencharov, the editor of the government newspaper, *Otechestven Front*, who had demanded a free press and greater intellectual liberty, were dismissed and expelled from the party.

If, in this way, the situation was gradually stabilized in most of the people's democracies, developments in Poland and Hungary gave cause for greater anxiety. In *Hungary* the Central Committee, while endorsing the resolutions of the Twentieth Party Congress, took care, like its opposite number in Bulgaria, to insist that the 'political line . . . worked out by the Third Congress of the Hungarian Workers' Party' in May 1954 had 'proved to be correct', and that all the Twentieth Congress had done was to give 'fresh impetus to the enforcement of the fine policy' laid down in 1954.[2] But although a few days later, on 25 March, the prime minister, Hegedus, publicly condemned the cult of personality in a speech over the Hungarian radio, neither these measures nor the announcement of a reduction of prices covering no less than 6,500 different articles of consumption, sufficed to still the ferment. There were probably two main reasons for this difference in the situation. In the first place, the national background in Hungary was different from that in countries such as Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, which had a pan-Slav and pro-Russian tradition, whereas in Hungary, as in Poland, anti-Russian sentiment had been strong, both in Czarist times and later. In the second place, Hungary had been affected more fundamentally than any of the other people's democracies by the transition to the 'new course' during the period of Malenkov's government in the Soviet Union. Imre Nagy, who had taken over the government in July 1953, had been regarded as a special protégé of Malenkov; he had denounced the 'serious errors' of the preceding government, abandoned the forced collectivization of agriculture, and permitted the re-establishment of the Popular Front in October 1954. He had also released a number

[1] Cf. *Documents*, 1956, p. 376.

[2] Cf. *Documents*, 1956, pp. 366–7.

of alleged Titoists, including Janos Kadar and Julius Kallai, and the Social Democrat, Anna Kethly, and had resisted the pressure of the left wing of the communist party under Rakosi and Gerö. Although Nagy had been displaced as prime minister in April 1955 as a sequel to the fall of Malenkov,[1] his period of government left a tradition behind, and when less than a year later the Twentieth Party Congress inaugurated a policy of 'destalinization', Nagy provided a rallying-point for the opposition. The result was that, just at the time when the ferment was dying down in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, it took a new lease of life in Hungary.

The centre of agitation was the so-called 'Petöfi Circle', a branch of the Communist Youth League organized in March, as part of the process of stimulating discussion within the party, as a club for young Budapest intellectuals. As in Czechoslovakia, the Writers' Union also played a leading role. Here at a meeting held on 30 March, the party candidate for the post of secretary was rejected by 100 votes to 3, and in his stead a former member of the Peasant party, the poet Geza Kepes, was elected by a vote of 103 to 2.[2] The detail of the subsequent agitation cannot be recorded here. It was conducted largely in *Irodalmi Ujsag*, the organ of the Writers' Union, but soon moved over also into the national press, including the central organ of the party, *Szabad Nep*, where it exercised an even wider influence. Already at the beginning of May, in face of the mounting demands for freedom of the press, the party secretary, Rakosi, sought to define the limits of permissible criticism.[3] But neither this statement nor Rakosi's own admission, on 18 May, of his past mistakes and his promises of improvement, stilled the growing wave of criticism. It was, however, the Petöfi Circle which broadened the debate, carrying it far beyond the question of the freedom of artists and writers to central points of policy. In mid-May, the Circle discussed the second five-year plan; on 1 June the failings of Marxist historiography were debated, on 22 June the better exploitation of natural resources. On the whole, the government accepted the criticisms with good grace, agreeing that the intellectuals as a whole were genuinely trying to improve conditions within the framework of the communist state. But, as early as April, the suggestion that the line followed by the Nagy government was simply 'a particular application of Marxism-Leninism' was repudiated,[4] and it was made clear that there would be no compromise over this issue.

When the Petöfi Circle assembled again on 27 June, however, it became clear that Nagy's supporters were still strong. The meeting was summoned to discuss problems of the Hungarian press and information services; but the audience, estimated at 6,000, quickly directed attention to other subjects. The director of the official communist daily, *Szabad Nep*,

[1] Cf. above, p. 52. [2] Cf. Zinner, op. cit. p. 323. [3] Ibid. pp. 325–7.
[4] *Szabad Nep*, 15 April 1956.

declared that the guiding principles of the Hungarian state should be fixed at Budapest, not in Moscow. Responsibility for failures was attributed directly to the party leadership, and demands were made for the readmission of Nagy to the party and the displacement of Rakosi. This meeting was in the nature of a direct challenge to the government, which reacted more sharply, particularly as by this time the Poznan riots in Poland[1] had indicated how easily the situation might get out of hand. While still recognizing the positive value of 'fruitful debates', the Central Committee issued a resolution[2] declaring that those of the Petöfi Circle, although they had 'had a sound tendency at the beginning', had been increasingly exploited by 'certain elements opposing the policy of our party'. This opposition was 'mainly organized by a certain group which has formed around Imre Nagy', and on 3 July Nagy's exclusion from the party was reaffirmed.

But the government, while active against 'rightist deviationists' and 'demagogic conceptions', was careful not to provoke disturbance by blatant reaction. Accordingly, on the same day it was announced that 'Hungary, while retaining the basis of Marxism-Leninism, would henceforth pursue an independent policy, inspired by national traditions'. This shift alarmed the Soviet leaders, who summoned Rakosi and Gerö to Moscow; and on their return, at a meeting of the Hungarian Central Committee on 18 July attended by the Soviet deputy-premier, Mikoyan, Rakosi handed in his resignation. There is no doubt that the resignation was forced,[3] and that Rakosi was sacrificed with the hope of thereby salvaging the régime. The same applied to Farkas, dismissed on 22 July. But since Rakosi's successor was his close associate, Erno Gerö, it seemed that there was no intention of making fundamental changes, although the new Central Committee included a number of personalities, such as Janos Kadar, who had been imprisoned and tortured under Rakosi for nationalist and Titoist sympathies. Nevertheless the new government made 'further democratization' one of the main planks in its policy,[4] and enacted a number of reforms, and it is possible that Hungary—like the other popular democracies—might have settled down on a new and more liberal basis, if at this juncture the effects of the changes had not been nullified by a series of economic misfortunes. Chief among these was a catastrophically bad harvest, due to a hard winter and to bad weather throughout the summer. Crops of wheat and rye were 20 per cent. below the figures for 1955, when Hungary had been compelled to import grain; fodder crops were in an even worse plight. On top of this the difficult economic situation in Poland had

[1] Cf. below, pp. 239–40.

[2] Zinner, op. cit. pp. 328–31.

[3] Cf. the observations from *Nepszava* of 14 October 1956 reprinted by Zinner, op. cit. pp. 338–9.

[4] Cf. the policy statement, ibid. pp. 346 sqq., particularly pp. 357 sqq.

immediate repercussions, for Poland now defaulted on its deliveries of coal. On the other hand no hard currency was available to make up the deficiencies by imports from western Europe. Hence at the very moment when some sort of stabilization seemed likely, the internal situation again deteriorated, with results that were to be seen in the autumn; and Hungary, instead of working out a new balance on the lines of Czechoslovakia, became, like Poland, a centre of tension in the communist world.

In *Poland* the situation from the start was even more precarious than in Hungary. Here the policy of easing restrictions was taken more seriously than elsewhere, and the intellectual circles which had conducted an oblique and rather theoretical criticism ever since the Third Plenum in February 1955, treated Khrushchev's statements at the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress as a licence to speak out. Already as early as 23 April the Polish prime minister, Cyrankiewicz, was speaking of 'the great wave of political activity embracing our whole country', the 'new spirit' and 'creative search' which had 'penetrated Polish parliamentarianism' and 'the entire Polish nation', and the 'great debate in which practically all of us are participating'.[1]

There is no reason to doubt that the government encouraged this debate, both as an answer to the criticisms made by the intellectuals and as a means of restoring popular faith in both the party and the system. This change of attitude was facilitated by the death of Boleslaw Bierut, the dominant figure in post-war Poland, and latterly first secretary of the Polish Workers' Party, which occurred on 12 March. Like the death of Stalin in 1953, this fortuitous event opened the way for a change of personnel and made it easier to break with the past. Although the new first secretary, Edward Ochab, was a Soviet-trained communist who had been prominent in the attacks on Gomulka in 1948 and 1949, and may have been personally installed in office by Khrushchev,[2] the evidence does not suggest that the changes which occurred after his installation were merely tactical manœuvres. Early in April, it is true, Ochab protested that 'some comrades seem to be losing their sense of balance and their sense of proportion, as between justified criticism and utterances from positions which cannot be of advantage to the party'.[3] But the fundamental position of the government was expressed by Mr. Cyrankiewicz when he stated that the 'process of democratization' which had been inaugurated was an 'irreversible' expression of 'lasting transformations'.[4] The thoroughgoing reorganization of the government, which followed four days later, was calculated to bear out this statement. Already on 30 March the removal of the head of the state

[1] Zinner, op. cit. pp. 85, 87, 91.

[2] Cf. *World Today*, vol. xii (1956), p. 301. Mr. Khrushchev was in Warsaw at the time for the burial of Bierut, and attended the sesssion of the Central Committee on 20 March, at which Ochab was appointed.

[3] *Documents*, 1956, p. 372.

[4] Zinner, p. 87.

security had been announced; during the meeting of the Sejm between 23 and 28 April other dismissals followed. They included Radkiewicz, who had been minister of state security until the end of 1953, his two notorious subordinates, Fajgin and Romkowski, the minister of justice, Swiatkowski, and two state attorneys, as well as the ministers of culture, higher education, and foreign affairs. In the new government, announced on 27 April, Adam Rapacki came to the fore as foreign minister. A few days later, on 6 May, Jakub Berman, long regarded as the *éminence grise* of the régime, resigned from the Politburo and the government. He had been the chief ideological expert since 1945, and his fall from high office was the most important and decisive change at the top level of the party hierarchy, consolidating all that had gone before.

At the same time it was made known that a number of important personages, imprisoned during earlier purges, had been rehabilitated and released. These included General Komar and General Spychalski, former deputy minister of national defence; but the outstanding figure was Wladyslaw Gomulka, first party secretary from 1945 to 1948, who in 1949 had been expelled and imprisoned for 'nationalist deviation'. It was announced that Gomulka's arrest had been 'unjustified'. On the other hand, his rehabilitation did not imply that the party now endorsed the political opinions for which Gomulka was criticized, and it was emphasized that the struggle 'against the ideological conceptions' which he represented would be continued.[1] Nevertheless, in view of the grave economic and other practical problems, this ideological struggle does not seem to have been pressed very hard. As Cyrankiewicz admitted on 23 April,[2] Poland was confronted with 'a whole sea of problems'. Owing to 'delays' and 'the slow functioning of the bureaucratic apparatus' many 'economic and social problems which had existed for a long time' had 'not been dealt with', particularly the question of raising living standards and wages; this, in Cyrankiewicz's view, was 'the foremost' among the 'economic tasks now facing us'.[3] The other issue which received emphasis was the need 'to restore and develop intra-Party democracy'.[4] But this need was not confined to the Communist Party; it extended to 'all state organs', and particularly to the Sejm, which was defined by the constitution as 'the supreme legislative organ, supervising the activity of all lower state organs'.[5] The practice of legislation by decree, without discussion by the Sejm, was condemned; there must be 'frequent sessions', 'the maximum of facts and the maximum information', and free discussion.[6] 'Political consciousness', it was stated, 'is an integral part of the development of the initiative of individuals and masses', and this consciousness was imperatively necessary

[1] *Documents*, 1956, p. 371; Zinner, op. cit. pp. 58–59; 81–82.
[2] Zinner, op. cit. p. 85.
[3] Ibid. pp. 62, 101.
[4] Ibid. p. 73.
[5] Ibid. p. 96.
[6] Ibid. pp. 85, 86, 97.

to overcome the problems which confronted Poland in 'the economic sector'.[1] Here, as Cyrankiewicz admitted,[2] 'the results achieved' were 'unsatisfactory' and lagged 'a great deal behind the requirements'; to carry out the current programme would 'demand incomparably better management, full utilization of all resources, and a stubborn struggle in every field of life for the best economic results'.

As part of the new programme it was announced that there would be an adjustment of wages, covering 3·4 million workers and involving a yearly increase in the wage-bill of 5 billion *zloty*, and an increase of the minimum monthly wage to 500 *zloty*.[3] Though substantial, this increase, amounting to 5·7 per cent. over the preceding year, was scarcely adequate to still discontent, since the increase in consumer prices during the period 1950–5 had amounted on the average to 11 per cent. per annum. Any hope that the wage-fund increase would improve the standard of living depended, therefore, upon halting the inflationary trend and holding prices steady; and this, in the difficult economic situation facing Poland, was unlikely. The situation was made worse by bureaucratic defects, the existence of which had been admitted in April;[4] and the result was the outbreak of the famous Poznan riots on 28 June. These riots, there is no doubt, were directly due to material causes, and were not originally political in character. They arose because of protests by the workers, numbering some 14,000, in the Stalin engineering works (ZISPO) against bureaucratic misapplication of wage regulations, as a result of which wages had declined.[5] The workers had complained through local channels. When this produced no result, they sent a deputation to Warsaw, which apparently won some concessions, but not full satisfaction. On 27 June a mass meeting was held at the factory, at which a representative of the ministry announced an increase in norms. This increase, it was officially admitted, brought discontent to a head, and on the following day, 28 June, the workers walked out. There is no doubt that the walk-out began as a peaceful demonstration; but as the demonstrators marched towards the centre of the city they were joined by other groups, until in the end a crowd estimated at some 30,000 was assembled, and the wage-strike turned into a

[1] Ibid. p. 106. [2] Ibid. pp. 103, 110.

[3] For the budget speech of the minister of finance, Tadeusz Dietrich, containing the detail; cf. *Trybuna Ludu*, 25 April 1956.

[4] Cf. Zinner, op. cit. 63, 108–9.

[5] The situation was accurately described by Ochab at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party on 19 July (*Trybuna Ludu*, 20 July 1956). 'As a result of ill-considered measures', he said, 'the wages of some groups of ZISPO workers declined.... Owing to changes made in work norms during 1953, to a revision of norms in 1954, and partly to a revision of the organisation of work in 1955, a rise in labour productivity of nearly 24·6 per cent was achieved in the ZISPO works. This, however, was not properly reflected in the rise of wages. As a result of the elimination of progressive piecework rates in the second half of 1955 earnings began to decrease. About 75 per cent of the workers were affected. Contrary to binding regulations, income tax ... was assessed at excessively high levels.'

political demonstration. Shortly afterwards, fighting broke out, attacks were made on public offices, and troops were called in. By the evening of 29 June order had been restored. The official figure of casualties was 53 dead and over 300 wounded, and 323 people were arrested, including 33 who had escaped from prison during the riots.

The Poznan riots were inspired by economic rather than by political grievances, and there was no convincing evidence of organized political direction. It is true that the first official reaction was to attribute them to 'imperialist agents' and 'provocateurs'.[1] But within a few days the government admitted that the workers had legitimate grievances,[2] and Ochab, addressing the Central Committee on 19 July, said that it 'would be erroneous to concentrate attention' on 'the machination' of 'imperialist agents' and that the important thing was 'to look first of all for the social roots of these incidents, which have become a warning signal for the whole of our party'. In fact, it was announced on 6 July that the ZISPO workers would be given most of what they had demanded. But the riot was significant as an indication of the economic plight of Poland, and how easily economic might bring political discontent to a head. Unrest was reported from other areas, particularly Silesia, and it was soon evident that the Russian leaders took the situation seriously and were disquieted by the course of events. This was a further factor in the situation. While the seventh plenum of the Central Committee was still in session (18–28 July), a powerful Soviet delegation led by Marshal Bulganin and Marshal Zhukov arrived in Warsaw to attend the celebration of the Polish National Day on 22 July, and the former used the occasion to put out a version of the Poznan events different from that of Ochab and the Polish government. The riots, Bulganin insisted, were the work of 'hostile agents'; he refused to admit the reality of the economic grievances, and sharply criticized the laxity permitted in the Polish press.[3] But the Central Committee, while paying conventional deference to Bulganin's views, stuck to its guns. 'The tragic events in Poznan', they emphasized, 'cast a new light upon the political and social situation of the country', and it was the party's duty to carry out 'a profound evaluation' of their 'sources and causes'. They made no attempt to hide the 'dissatisfaction in many workers' centres', and concluded by resolving that earnings must be increased by at least one-third and the wages of the lowest paid workers by even more.[4]

Whatever pressure may have been brought to bear by Bulganin and Zhukov, there is no sign that the Polish government was prepared to change its course, and, convinced that the economic crisis was such that still more far-reaching measures were needed, it proceeded to broaden the basis of government. As *Trybuna Ludu* said, 'in the present situation it

[1] Zinner, op. cit. pp. 126–7.
[2] Ibid. p. 131.
[3] Cf. Zinner, op. cit. pp. 143–4.
[4] Ibid. pp. 145–86.

has become clearer than ever before that socialism cannot be built by the hands and brains of party members alone'.[1] What was needed was 'the unification of all the nation's forces', and with this in view an appeal was made for the revitalization of the National Front as a means of stimulating economic revival.[2] By this time, in fact, steps had already been taken to put the process of national consolidation, which the Poznan riots had shown to be necessary, into effect. The question was evidently discussed during the seventh plenum, representatives of which went immediately afterwards to interview Gomulka. The result was that, on 4 August, his reinstatement in the party was publicly announced.[3] It was the first of a number of significant changes, which rallied possible critics to the government. The next day Zenon Kliszko, who had been expelled from the Central Committee with Gomulka in 1949, was appointed deputy minister of justice. Later in the month, on 24 August, General Komar, another of Gomulka's supporters, who had been rehabilitated in the spring at the same time as General Spychalski,[4] was appointed commander-in-chief of the security forces. In this way a new spirit was infused into the government and a group was formed which could take over control, if further measures proved necessary. In this respect development in Poland differed from that elsewhere in eastern Europe: the men were there and the way was open for great changes.

*Soviet Foreign Policy after the Twentieth Party Congress*

There can be little doubt that the sense of instability and insecurity within the communist bloc during the summer was a factor in Soviet policy. From the time of the Poznan riots, if not earlier, the question was raised in acute form, how far the process of liberalization could be permitted to go without endangering communist control of national life and the whole system which had been built up in the post-war years. As already noted, Soviet anxieties were openly expressed during the visit of Bulganin and Zhukov to Poland. The new dogma that 'every country should go its own way to socialism', was still upheld; but the danger, as Bulganin emphasized, was that this argument would be 'used to break up the solidarity of the peace camp . . . under the pretext of extending national peculiarities or extending democracy'. Bulganin's insistence, contrary to all the evidence, on the responsibility of foreign agents for the Poznan riots, evidently sprang from this fear. 'The enemy', he argued, was seeking 'to estrange us from one another, so that he may then deal with the socialist countries one by one'—an interpretation to which some more ingenuous American statements lent an air of plausibility[5]—and he accord-

[1] *Trybuna Ludu*, 18 August 1956. [2] Ibid. 15 August 1956. [3] *Documents*, 1956, p. 425.
[4] Cf. above, p. 230. [5] Cf. *American Documents*, 1956, pp. 202, 205, 207.

ingly called for a consolidation of Soviet-Polish relations. Similarly, the meeting between Soviet and east German leaders in Moscow on 16 and 17 July was undoubtedly intended to reaffirm and strengthen the bonds between the two countries.[1]

In fact, there is little doubt that the course of events in Poland led to criticism and questioning in Moscow of the new trends propounded at the Twentieth Party Congress. Khrushchev's policy came under attack from members of the Stalinist old guard, led (it would seem) by Molotov, who had been released from his position as minister of foreign affairs on 1 June, and by Kaganovich. As a result, the Central Committee found it necessary to redefine its position; and a lengthy resolution published on 30 June set out in detail the new orthodoxy.[2] Stalinism and the cult of the individual were again condemned; the 'multiplicity of forms of the transition of nations to socialism' was reaffirmed; but the manifesto revealed a significant change of emphasis by concluding with a lengthy statement insisting on the necessity for 'fraternal solidarity' between the different countries ranged under the Marxist banner. Although 'in the new historical conditions, such international organisations of the working class as the Comintern and the Cominform' had 'ceased their activities', this did not mean—in the face of 'aggressive international coalitions and blocs, such as N.A.T.O.'—that 'international solidarity' had 'lost its significance'. On the contrary, incidents such as 'the anti-popular riots in Poznan', paid for (it was alleged) by American funds,[3] proved that it was more necessary than ever for all the countries of the communist world to close their ranks and strengthen 'their contacts and co-operation among themselves'.

The first object of Soviet policy during the months following the Twentieth Party Congress was, therefore, to ensure that internal relaxation and recognition of national differences between the communist states did not break up the international solidarity of the communist bloc. Until this question had been solved to Russian satisfaction, there was little likelihood of major developments. Hence Soviet policy during the first half of 1956 was subdued and, on the whole, distinctly conciliatory. Although the proceedings of the Twentieth Party Congress had seemed to presage a new Soviet drive in the Middle East, not only in respect of trade and industrial development, but also on the political side,[4] in fact, right down to July, Moscow acted with circumspection, refrained from exploiting the obvious opportunities which Middle Eastern discontents afforded, and counselled

[1] Cf. the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the talks, *Soviet News*, 18 July 1956, and the full reports in *Neues Deutschland*, 19 July 1956.

[2] Text in *Documents*, 1956, pp. 394 sqq.

[3] The United States had appropriated 'an additional 25 million dollars for subversive activity, under the cynical pretext of "stimulating freedom behind the "iron curtain" " ' (ibid. p. 410).

[4] *The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. An Appraisal*, p. 3.

the countries of the communist bloc, on the basis of 'co-ordination of economic planning' and specialization, was reiterated in a leading article in *Pravda* on 27 July. Meanwhile, as a result of the discussions between the two governments in Moscow referred to above,[1] it was made known on 17 July that the Soviet Union would grant eastern Germany long-term credits on favourable terms and make foreign exchange available; in addition, economic and technical exchanges between the two countries would be stepped up, and the Democratic Republic would be given supplementary aid for developing its industry between 1957 and 1960. More widely interesting was the aid offered by Moscow to other communist countries in developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. A conference with this end in view was held early in the year, and on 27 March the eleven countries there represented issued a communiqué stating that they had agreed to set up a joint institute for nuclear research. On 4 June it was announced that an atomic experimental centre, equipped with a 22,000 kilowatt reactor supplied by the Soviet Union, was in process of construction in Sofia. One month earlier a group of Soviet atomic scientists and engineers arrived in Belgrade to arrange for the construction of a nuclear reactor in Jugoslavia.

This evidence of more intensive co-operation on an economic level between communist countries was, however, less indicative of the new directions of Soviet policy than the rapid extension of diplomatic and commercial relations with the non-committed nations of Asia and Africa. The scale on which this was done was perhaps the most impressive feature of communist policy in the period. Both the U.S.S.R. itself and the popular democracies of eastern Europe took part. Rumania, for example, entered into trade agreements with Burma, India, Ceylon, Syria, and Egypt; in February Bulgaria made an agreement to take Egyptian cotton in exchange for tobacco; the German Democratic Republic made an industrial agreement with North Vietnam; Poland entered into diplomatic relations with Cambodia and Albania with Egypt. In a wider context Soviet Russia itself put forward a general project for aid to the underdeveloped countries;[2] but more immediately significant, both in numbers and in geographical distribution, was the long list of new connexions Moscow now formed. Diplomatic relations were established with Liberia (20 January) and Cambodia (18 May), and a proposal for establishing diplomatic relations was made to Nepal (3 May). The heir-apparent of Yemen visited Moscow on 11 June, followed on 2 July by prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and on 10 July by the Shah of Persia. The latter visits were primarily political, all three rulers protesting their friendly sentiments and their

[1] Cf. above, p. 242.

[2] This project was submitted to the 39th Session of the International Labour Organization, held in Geneva between 6 and 28 June 1956; cf. *Industry and Labour*, vol. xvi, p. 81.

. . . Today it is no longer necesssary for each socialist country to develop all branches of heavy industry, as had to be done by the Soviet Union. . . . Now, when there is a powerful community of socialist countries. . . each European people's democracy can specialize in developing those industries and producing those goods for which it has the most favourable natural and economic conditions. This at the same time creates the necessary prerequisites for releasing considerable resources to develop agriculture and the light industries, and on this basis to satisfy more and more fully the material and cultural requirements of the peoples.

The basis for co-ordination, as outlined by Khrushchev, was the dovetailing of the new five-year plans of the people's democracies with the sixth five-year plan of the Soviet Union. It is evident that such dovetailing could be implemented in a way detrimental to the countries concerned; but in practice it seems to have been carried out with some measure of success, and in Czechoslovakia, at least, and in east Germany the results, from an economic point of view, were 'not . . . unsound'.[1] The engineering industry of Czechoslovakia, which accounted for almost one-third of the country's industrial production, was an important factor in the trade offensive of the Soviet bloc. Production in the German Democratic Republic was concentrated on lignite mining, to provide raw materials for the chemical industry, and on potash mining, but above all on the construction of machinery and other equipment required by other communist states. Agricultural countries, on the other hand, such as Bulgaria, were importers of machinery. At the meeting of the Bulgarian Central Committee on 6–7 July it was announced that, in pursuance of the economic agreement concluded with the Soviet Union on 3 February, Bulgaria was being supplied with 22,000 tractors, 8,000 lorries, and more than 13,000 combine-harvesters and other agricultural machines. The most important single agreement within the communist bloc, however, was that concluded on 7 April between the Soviet Union and China. By the terms of this agreement the Soviet Union was to supply equipment and technical aid for the construction of fifty-five new industrial enterprises, including engineering plants, power stations, and chemical factories, over and above the 156 enterprises in the construction of which it was already assisting. The cost of the new plants, estimated at 2,500 million roubles, was to be repaid by the delivery of Chinese raw materials over a period of years. The U.S.S.R. also agreed to help China to complete the railway from Lanchow to the Soviet frontier by 1960. That connecting China and the Soviet Union via Ulan Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia, was officially declared open on 4 January. Thus the transport links in the economic network were gradually being improved.

The policy of building up 'new forms of economic co-operation' between

[1] Cf. *World Today*, vol. xii, pp. 181, 209.

the countries of the communist bloc, on the basis of 'co-ordination of economic planning' and specialization, was reiterated in a leading article in *Pravda* on 27 July. Meanwhile, as a result of the discussions between the two governments in Moscow referred to above,[1] it was made known on 17 July that the Soviet Union would grant eastern Germany long-term credits on favourable terms and make foreign exchange available; in addition, economic and technical exchanges between the two countries would be stepped up, and the Democratic Republic would be given supplementary aid for developing its industry between 1957 and 1960. More widely interesting was the aid offered by Moscow to other communist countries in developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. A conference with this end in view was held early in the year, and on 27 March the eleven countries there represented issued a communiqué stating that they had agreed to set up a joint institute for nuclear research. On 4 June it was announced that an atomic experimental centre, equipped with a 22,000 kilowatt reactor supplied by the Soviet Union, was in process of construction in Sofia. One month earlier a group of Soviet atomic scientists and engineers arrived in Belgrade to arrange for the construction of a nuclear reactor in Jugoslavia.

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determination never to join a hostile bloc directed against the U.S.S.R. But commercial interests were also involved in the case of Yemen and Cambodia. Already in January the Soviet Union had offered to provide Yemen with equipment for road-building, &c., in exchange for tobacco, coffee, and other agricultural produce, and this resulted in the conclusion of a treaty on 8 March. In the case of Cambodia a Soviet offer of unconditional aid was announced on 7 July. In the case of Liberia also diplomatic negotiations were accompanied by offers of economic and technical assistance. Other countries which were approached with offers were the Sudan, whose minister of commerce visited Moscow at the end of May, and Siam, and on 3 June a commercial mission visited Pakistan; while earlier in the year, on 3 March, it was made known that Indonesia was interested in obtaining financial and economic aid from the Soviet government.

A further feature of these attempts to normalize and extend relations with the countries of Asia was the resumption on 17 January 1956 of negotiations with Japan, which, as has been seen,[1] had been broken off in September of the previous year. Once again, however, the negotiations broke down over the questions of the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin, and on 20 March discussions were again adjourned. When, however, the very next day the Russians announced restrictions upon Japanese fishing—restrictions which, if fully implemented, would have constituted a shattering blow to Japanese salmon fishing interests—it was evident that the Japanese government had no practical alternative save to resume negotiations, and in consequence a Japanese delegation arrived in Moscow at the end of April. Its purpose was to discuss a fishery treaty and a provisional agreement to cover the 1956 fishing season; but it soon became evident that the Soviet government was unwilling to make any definite decisions unless Japan agreed to resume the suspended conversations on a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. In the event, however, after the Japanese delegate had threatened to withdraw, the Soviet Union consented to conclude a provisional agreement for 1956. On the other hand, it was stipulated that the long-term fishing agreement, which was signed together with the provisional agreement and a further convention on 14 May,[2] was not to come into operation until a peace treaty had been concluded and put into force, or at least until diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan had been restored. A joint communiqué issued at the time of the conclusion of the treaties announced that negotiations for the establishment of normal relations would be resumed not later than 31 July,[3] and in fact Shigemitsu accompanied by Matsumoto left for Moscow on 25 July. Once again, however, it proved impossible to reconcile the position of the two countries on the territorial issues. As in the previous negotiations in February, the

[1] Cf. above, p. 130.

[2] 15 May, Tokyo time; cf. *Nippon Times*, 16 May 1956.

[3] *Soviet News*, 16 May 1956.

Soviet government offered to cede the Habomai islands and Shikotan to Japan, but this was as far as they would go; they were also unwilling to release the remaining Japanese prisoners-of-war prior to the signing of the draft treaty. As all other matters had been agreed upon, Shigemitsu was inclined to take what he could get and sign; but he was opposed by Hatoyama and Kono, who were afraid of domestic repercussions, and in mid-August negotiations were again suspended.

The inconclusive negotiations with Japan showed the limits of Soviet conciliatoriness where its strategic and territorial interests were involved. But the position of Japan was exceptional, and elsewhere Soviet initiative found more rapid response. In the Middle East, in particular, a co-ordinated effort was made to develop economic contacts. Early in the year it was decided to send a technical mission to this area with the task of determining what part Soviet commerce could play in its development. This mission, which arrived in the Lebanon on 22 February, was empowered to negotiate commercial agreements and to offer a wide variety of equipment. Equally important was the visit paid in June by the new foreign minister, Shepilov, to Egypt, Syria, Greece, and the Lebanon, which, like the visit of Mikoyan to Pakistan, India, and Burma in March, served commercial as well as political objectives. The equipment sent by the U.S.S.R. to Pakistan as a contribution to the technical aid provided by the United Nations was perhaps only a token to indicate that Moscow was ready for friendly relations, in spite of Pakistan's adherence to S.E.A.T.O. and the Baghdad pact; but the visit of Shepilov to Damascus was used for the discussion of economic questions, and the joint Syro-Soviet communiqué issued on 25 June emphasized the development of economic relations. Mikoyan's visit to Burma resulted in a major commercial agreement, signed on 1 April, by which the Soviet Union was to provide machinery in exchange for 400,000 tons of Burmese rice. The other country closely involved was Afghanistan, with which an agreement was concluded on 28 January at Kabul for a loan of $100 million, at the low interest rate of 2 per cent. repayable by instalments over a period of thirty years, commencing after the eighth year. This was a classic example of the type of loan offered by the Soviet bloc to underdeveloped countries, and its attractions and inducements are self-evident.

All in all, these agreements show clearly enough that the Soviet Union was making considerable efforts to consolidate and broaden its foothold in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. A statement by prime minister Bulganin on 16 January, on the other hand, announcing that Moscow was also ready to provide economic aid to countries in Latin America, was probably made more with a view to its propaganda value than in anticipation of immediate results. It is true that on 23 January a commercial agreement with Uruguay was stated to be imminent; but

other Latin American countries, including Haiti, showed little enthusiasm. A commercial agreement with Canada for deliveries of corn was concluded on 29 February and ratified by the Canadian parliament on 19 April, and in Europe there were agreements with France (31 March) and Sweden (4 April). The background of both the latter, however, was somewhat different from that of the commercial treaties considered so far. In the case of Sweden, the main purpose of negotiations was to strengthen the good-neighbourly relations between the two countries, and to confirm Sweden's determination to remain outside all systems of alliances; the development of commercial relations, although specifically mentioned, was only a secondary consideration. In the case of France, the commercial treaty, covering transactions to the value of 35 million French francs, was part of the more far-reaching negotiations conducted at that time for a general improvement of Franco-Soviet relations, and must be seen against the background of the wider political exchanges between the two countries dating from President Auriol's visit to Moscow at the beginning of March.[1]

These exchanges took place in the context of the Soviet endeavour, announced by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress, to fortify the principle of 'the peaceful coexistence of the two systems' by taking positive steps to establish 'firm friendly relations' with the countries of the west. The outstanding example of this policy in action was Bulganin's famous letter of 23 January to Eisenhower.[2] But throughout the spring and early summer other efforts were made to keep personal contacts alive. On 1 February Mikhailov, the Soviet minister of culture, left for Great Britain; he was followed on 15 March by Malenkov and a delegation of technologists, and between 18 and 27 April by the more famous visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev. In the opposite direction there was the visit of President Auriol to Moscow on 1 March, followed by the French ministers, Mollet and Pineau, on 16–19 May, and by President Tito on 2–13 June. The visit of Mikoyan to Asia to take part in the ceremonies accompanying the proclamation of the republic of Pakistan on 23 March, has already been noted. These high-level meetings were perhaps significant less because of any practical results achieved than as gestures indicating Soviet willingness to reduce international tension; but they serve to round off the picture of Soviet policy in the period immediately following the Twentieth Party Congress.

This policy, it has been seen, had three sides. On the one hand, it was necessary to proceed slowly and cautiously while adjustments were being made within the communist world. On the other hand, the Soviet Union began immediately to press on with its policy of active economic competition in the underdeveloped lands. It sought both to extend its sphere of action by establishing diplomatic relations with new countries, and to

[1] Cf. below, p. 265. [2] Cf. below, p. 251.

build up relations in the economic field. But, in the end, the question whether the policy of peaceful coexistence and of 'preventing war in the present era' would succeed, depended on the course of relations between the communist bloc and the western powers. 'We believe', Khrushchev had announced at the Twentieth Party Congress, 'that countries with differing social systems can do more than exist side by side. It is necessary to proceed further, to improve relations, strengthen confidence between countries and co-operate.' The various visits carried out by Soviet statesmen in the spring of 1956 can be interpreted as tentative steps in this direction; so also can the Soviet decision, on 17 February, to participate in the forthcoming conference on nuclear research at Geneva, to send delegates to a similar conference at Washington on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and to set up a special department under the minister of culture, Mikhailov, to deal with UNESCO affairs. These were evidently intended as indications of Soviet goodwill and co-operation. But, in the view of the western powers, and in particular of the United States' administration, the real testing-ground was elsewhere. Soviet intentions, they held, could only be assessed by positive evidence of a readiness for compromise on the major questions at issue between east and west. These were the questions of European security and disarmament, which, as we have seen, were regarded by western governments as indissolubly connected, and the question whether the danger-zone in the Middle East, about which the western powers were particularly sensitive, could be insulated from inter-bloc rivalries. So long as these major issues were outstanding, the western powers regarded the Soviet trade and economic offensive, particularly where it affected the Middle Eastern countries, with increasing alarm, and were unwilling to accept at face value either the slogan of peaceful competition or Soviet protestations of readiness for a lessening of tension. It is true, as we have seen, that the western alliance was subject to internal strains and that there were pressures within the western camp for a détente; but unless something positive could be achieved on the higher level of inter-bloc relations, the responsible statesmen in Washington and London were unwilling to depart from the plotted course, or to place their faith in Soviet assurances that the Twentieth Party Congress marked the definite adoption of a new course. It is not necessary to discuss whether this view was correct or incorrect; it is sufficient if it indicates that, despite the change in the climate of international affairs and the new directions in Soviet policy, western governments still regarded inter-bloc relations as the decisive factor.

## CHAPTER XIV

# EAST–WEST RELATIONS

WHILE the Soviet Union, as we have seen, was preoccupied with the aftermath of the Twentieth Party Congress, and the western powers were coping with tensions and difficulties of their own, there was little prospect of further progress in the relations between the two great alliances, whose differences threatened the peace of the world. The beginning of 1956, in fact, found inter-bloc relations once again at a standstill. There were many reasons for this. First of all, the spirit of Geneva had evaporated during the cold winter of the foreign ministers' conference, and a reaction, affecting public opinion as a whole, had set in against the optimism which had characterized the summer of 1955. The disarmament negotiations had petered out in a way which made it difficult to know where to pick up the threads again. In Washington there was a disposition to wait and see what the full effects of Moscow's new line in eastern Europe would be, before embarking on any major decisions. Moscow, on the other hand, had apparently decided that the existing situation in Germany was not disadvantageous, while Soviet policy in the uncommitted world got into its strides. The sense of urgency to make great decisions about great issues, which had been so marked in 1955, was no longer there.

On the other hand it would be an exaggeration to suggest that relations between the two blocs had deteriorated. No new problems had emerged; there were no new sources of disagreement. It was rather that both sides had tacitly agreed that they had come to the end of the road leading from Geneva, and that it would be pointless, and perhaps detrimental, to keep on thrashing out the old issues. All in all, the climate was less tense as a result of the Geneva meeting. Moreover, there were certain positive factors in the situation. One was the fact that the uncommitted countries at the United Nations were unwilling, as we have seen,[1] to accept as final the negative outcome of the disarmament negotiations in the preceding November. Secondly, on the Soviet side there was a strong disposition to maintain the view that, in spite of the failure to reach agreement, the 'spirit of Geneva' still subsisted. This may have been a fiction—or, at least, it was regarded as such in United States' governmental circles—but it meant at least that the Soviet government was encouraged to maintain a conciliatory tone in its relations with the western powers. Furthermore, the whole tone of Soviet policy, as outlined at the Twentieth Party Congress, with its insistence upon the possibility of peaceful coexistence,

[1] Cf. above, p. 171.

implied readiness to exploit opportunities for *rapprochement*. And finally, on the western side, the growing sense of dissatisfaction with existing defence policies produced in some quarters at least a conviction that the only way out of the impasse into which western policy seemed to be running was to seek a new basis for a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union. These pressures for peace (as they may be called) were an important factor in the situation, although the fact that they were sponsored by certain western powers, notably France, and resisted by others, meant that their main effect was to introduce a new element of divided counsels into the western alliance.

The sense of frustration which had overhung inter-bloc relations following the foreign ministers' conference at the close of 1955 was relieved by a number of developments, which made it possible, in March, to resume the meetings of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in a more hopeful atmosphere than that which had obtained in the previous December. Of these the first was a series of messages exchanged between Mr. Bulganin and President Eisenhower which began on 23 January with a conciliatory letter from the Soviet prime minister.[1] Mr. Bulganin, 'genuinely convinced that an improvement in Soviet-American relations was urgently needed', suggested that 'this purpose could be served by the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and co-operation between our countries'. The draft of the proposed twenty-year treaty was brief and cogent.[2] He postulated that relations between the two countries should be based on 'equal rights, mutual respect for state sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs'; that disputes should be settled by peaceful means in conformity with the United Nations' Charter; and that the two countries should develop economic, cultural, and scientific co-operation. President Eisenhower, replying on 28 January, questioned whether the bilateral reaffirmation of pledges covered by the United Nations' Charter would in fact contribute to an easing of international tension. He looked, he said, for deeds and added bluntly that it appeared that since the July meeting the Soviet Union had 'embarked upon a course which increased tensions by intensifying hatred and animosities implicit in historic international disputes'. In spite of this far from encouraging reply, Bulganin assured Eisenhower that his offer of a treaty with the United States and its allies was still open. Moreover, as he emphasized, 'the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and co-operation between the two strongest powers in the world would contribute enormously to a healthier international situation'. As far as deeds were concerned he pointed to reductions in Soviet forces and in the military budget. But the United States was not interested in a bilateral agreement, and when the disarmament talks reopened it was soon

[1] For the texts, cf. *U.S. Documents*, 1956, pp. 214 sqq.

[2] Ibid. pp. 219–20.

apparent that even if positions had altered and some gaps been narrowed, substantial differences of viewpoint remained.

On the other hand, the exchanges, even if repetitive, had served to underline the long-term needs of the international situation at a time when policy was dominated by immediate short-term problems. Bulganin's letter may be taken as no more than a prelude to the meeting of the Disarmament Sub-Committee, and the tone of the exchanges certainly deteriorated afterwards; but at least his initiative had the appearance of activity and as such did something towards filling the psychological need for a break through.

This need was emphasized, during the spring and summer, by a number of statesmen and other leading personalities, who voiced the widely held fear that, on present showing, the powers would drift into war without purpose or intention. The Pope in his Easter Sunday message spoke of the 'melancholy steps' taken each day in the arms race so that 'the human race almost loses hope of being able to stop this homicidal, this suicidal madness'.[1] The Swedish foreign minister referred to plans for a temporary standstill, and emphasized that 'although such provisional measures may have only a rather limited importance, they would certainly be greeted with great satisfaction by public opinion in all countries as a first positive result'.[2] In France, in particular, there was a good deal of disillusionment with western policies, and the French socialist ministers, Pineau and Mollet, made considerable efforts to find a new way out.[3] It was widely believed that the west should at least show itself more ready to test Soviet intentions both in the United Nations and outside it. In the words of Sir Anthony Eden, it was felt that, 'in the long history of diplomacy, suspicion has done more harm than confidence. Believe me, that's true.'[4]

Holders of this view were encouraged when Sir Winston Churchill, speaking at Aachen on the occasion of his acceptance of the Charlemagne prize, spoke of the new challenge to Europe. The principle of the N.A.T.O. treaty, he said, was 'simple and imaginative. We all join hands together in our wish to avoid the aggressor, whoever he may be.' If the Russian repudiation of Stalin were sincere, 'we have a new Russia to deal with, and I do not see myself why, if this is so, the new Russia should not join in support of this solemn agreement. We must realize', he continued, 'how deep and sincere are Russia's anxieties about the safety of her homeland from foreign invasion. In a true unity of Europe Russia must have her part.' But there remained many who did not share Sir Winston's recognition of the Soviet Union's legitimate interest in European settlements, and who still appeared to believe that the way to secure an 'agreed settlement' was to negotiate from a position of strength. In Bonn at least there had been

[1] *Osservatore Romano*, 2 April 1956.
[2] Statement to the Riksdag, 7 March 1956.
[3] Cf. below, pp. 263 sqq.
[4] Broadcast, 27 April 1956.

no advance from Geneva; reunification and security were still placed before disarmament and a general relaxation of tensions. In these circumstances the activities and pressures of the 'lunatic fringe' (as 'realists' liked to regard them), the individual appeals of churchmen and statesmen, and the journeys undertaken by such personages as Pineau and Mollet, were of little avail in breaking the deadlock on major issues which had been evident at the close of 1955. In the settlement of the perennial questions of German reunification and European security, on one side, and of disarmament, nuclear and conventional, on the other, no amount of goodwill could take the place of practical concessions. This was once again proved when the Disarmament Sub-Committee reassembled in London on 19 March.

*Disarmament Negotiations*

When the Disarmament Sub-Committee resumed its work on 19 March, it was in a more sober and cautious spirit than had marked the exchanges of the previous year. In 1955 both the public and the governments concerned were keyed to the belief that a comprehensive agreement was within reach. In 1956 it was felt that more modest measures had greater prospect of success, and the dangers of waiting for a comprehensive plan, which had found expression in the previous December, were increasingly in people's minds. As the Canadian delegate pointed out on 5 July, time was by now 'crucially short', and there were therefore 'compelling reasons' for seeking agreement 'on the immediate initial steps'.[1] As a result of the failure to make progress in 1955, in other words, interest was turning from the idea of a comprehensive to the idea of a partial disarmament agreement. The choice, Mr. Norman Robertson stated on 23 April, was between no agreement at all and a limited agreement based on a highest common factor analysis of the proposals presented by the great powers. Already as early as 9 April the same point had been made by the French delegate, M. Moch.[2] So long as each side insisted rigidly on its own plan, he said, no progress would be made: the correct procedure was, first, to define the areas of complete agreement, and then to pass on to minor points of difference and to enlarge the area of agreement by attempting to resolve them. The practical questions, however, were whether it was possible to isolate particular aspects of the disarmament question without detriment to the whole, and whether any practical solution would not favour one side more than the other.

Although at the November conference of foreign ministers the western powers had taken up the position that abolition of nuclear weapons was not 'a realisable goal' and had therefore advocated limiting discussion for

[1] Cf. *The Disarmament Question*, 1945–56 (London: Stationery Office, 1957), p. 30.
[2] Ibid. p. 28.

the time being to the field of 'armed forces and conventional armaments',[1] nevertheless at the first meeting of the reassembled sub-committee on 19 March the British and French governments tabled a complicated, overall 'working paper', which was little more than a revision of the Anglo-French plan of June 1954, based on a comprehensive scheme for disarmament in three stages.[2] It is unnecessary to review this plan in detail, since its reception showed that there was little enthusiasm left for schemes of such complexity. Even so, there was little likelihood of its satisfying Soviet requirements. In the first place, it postponed the prohibition of nuclear tests and of the manufacture of nuclear weapons to the third stage, whereas the reductions of conventional forces were to start immediately; and secondly, the proposals for the transition from the first to the second and from the second to the third stages were too imprecise to create confidence.[3] More significant, however, was the fact that this 'new, modified and creaky comprehensive plan . . . pleased no one'.[4] The United States government, which had also put forward an elaborate draft working paper on 3 April,[5] seems to have gauged the change in atmosphere towards wide-ranging schemes, and withdrew its proposals one month later, substituting in their place a summary memorandum containing 'eight interrelated points' reflecting 'the basic policy of the United States Government on disarmament'.[6] Its proposals, in any case, were more in the nature of a 'confidence-building' scheme than a direct attack on the problem of the arms-race,[7] and as such failed to meet the Soviet complaint that the west was avoiding the crucial issues. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, to the surprise of the world in general, put forward a plan confined exclusively to the limitation of conventional armaments, thereby reversing the attitude that it had adopted over the past ten years, that conventional and nuclear disarmament must be linked.[8] The reasons for this abrupt change were the subject of considerable speculation. In the west, it was thought that it

[1] Cf. above, p. 169.

[2] *Documents*, 1956, pp. 552 sqq.

[3] In the first place, they required 'a unanimous decision'; in other words, any single power represented on the proposed executive committee could employ a veto. In the second place, one of the stipulations, before embarking on a new stage, was 'that the necessary conditions of confidence exist'. This might mean almost anything, but in practice was evidently intended to introduce political factors about which unanimity was unlikely. Cf. *Documents*, 1956, p. 554.

[4] H. Thomas, *Disarmament. The Way Ahead* (1957), p. 18.

[5] *U.S. Documents*, 1956, pp. 450–6.

[6] Ibid. pp. 456–7.

[7] They harked back to the Eisenhower 'open skies' plan of 1955 in combination with Bulganin's ground control and inspection proposals—a combination which the Americans had more than once proposed during and since the autumn of 1955—and added two new features: (i) 'a limited technical exchange mission for the analysis of problems of control and inspection of conventional armaments, designed to facilitate the study and negotiation of a disarmament agreement'; (ii) 'a small demonstration test of control and inspection, including ground posts and aerial survey in a limited non-sensitive area in the United States and the U.S.S.R. of 20,000 to 30,000 square miles'. These proposals, however interesting in themselves, evidently did not necessarily imply any immediate reduction in armaments.

[8] *Documents*, 1956, pp. 555–9.

reflected the rapid progress of the Soviet Union in the production of thermo-nuclear weapons, and the switch-over of Soviet strategy from conventional to nuclear patterns. The Soviet government itself, on the other hand, maintained that its action was due to the apparent impossibility of making progress in nuclear disarmament, and Mr. Gromyko, in a supplementary statement, while protesting that Soviet interest in the prohibition of atomic weapons had not diminished, emphasized this point of view. 'If', he said, 'we once again lump these two questions'—i.e. conventional and nuclear disarmament—'together, then the difficulties we have met with hitherto will be bound to arise' again 'in an aggravated form'.[1] This observation seemed to have been amply borne out by past experience; but the Soviet proposal found little favour in the west, although the ceilings proposed—1,000,000–1,500,000 men for the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and 650,000 for Great Britain and France respectively—were those put forward by Great Britain and France in May 1955 and earlier by the U.S.A. The two cases, the western powers argued, were not parallel since the reductions envisaged by the west were intended to be part of a comprehensive agreement, covering nuclear weapons as well, whereas the Soviet Union was envisaging only conventional forces. But the real reason for western opposition seems to have been the fear that a reduction of the United States military establishment from its current figure of 2,800,000 million to the suggested level of 1,000,000–1,500,000 would have necessitated the liquidation of the far-flung American network of foreign bases.

The arguments put forward by the western powers against the Soviet plan were important in so far as they revealed the real issues, over which the different unilateral proposals had skated. At first sight, western opposition was unexpected since, as the Soviet government pointed out,[2] the western powers had previously been hesitant about nuclear disarmament on the grounds that the Soviet Union had 'an advantage over the western powers in conventional armaments and that they could agree to the prohibition of atomic weapons only after a substantial reduction of conventional armaments'. Now, it was added, it seemed 'that the western powers were speaking about giving priority to the reduction of conventional armaments only so long as they thought that the U.S.S.R. would reject such a proposal'. Moreover, even when at a later stage, on 12 July, Mr. Gromyko suddenly agreed to accept the levels of armed forces proposed by the U.S.A.—namely 2,500,000 for the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, and 750,000 for Great Britain and France—Soviet agreement seemed only to make the proposals unacceptable to the west. The reasons adduced were numerous and considered by themselves not inadequate. First was the Soviet refusal to consider the American proposals for aerial

[1] *Documents*, 1956, p. 559. [2] Ibid. p. 567.

inspection which, in the view of the western governments, was essential, if supervision were to be efficient over vast territories, but which, in the view of the Soviet government, was little more than an excuse for collecting material for the western intelligence services.[1] More widely, the western powers were critical of the Soviet proposals because, as they alleged, they failed to provide for adequate control. The reduction of forces was to take place automatically in the period 1956–8, whether or not control was functioning effectively, whereas in the western view progress in actual disarmament should proceed *pari passu* with the establishment of an effectively functioning control organization. Although the Soviet proposals made the important concession that the control organ should be established 'within two months following the entry into force of the agreement'[2]—thus, in effect, admitting that it should be in position before disarmament actually began—in the western view this did not imply that it would necessarily be effectively in operation, and they objected that the inspectorate had no powers of enforcement and could only refer contraventions to the Security Council, where (western experience indicated) action might be prevented by the Soviet veto. Finally, the western powers declined to accept the Soviet argument that, since the difficulties of nuclear disarmament were so great, conventional disarmament should proceed independently and that the one, in Mr. Gromyko's words,[3] should 'in no circumstances' be 'made contingent upon' the other. Although, as the Soviet government complained,[4] they thereby appeared to have 'contradicted what they themselves had said only the day before', the position maintained by the western governments was that 'any large-scale disarmament agreement should include a nuclear component which would at least represent a beginning of nuclear disarmament'.[5]

[1] 'Much is being said about the so-called aerial photography in which certain intelligence services are known to be interested. It is perfectly obvious, however, that all this aerial photography has nothing to do with the reduction of armaments or the establishment of control over the reduction of armaments. On the contrary, it can only increase the apprehensions of the peoples concerning the plans of the aggressive circles and bring about a further intensification of the arms race.' *Documents*, 1956, pp. 567–8.

[2] Ibid. p. 557.

[3] Ibid. p. 559.

[4] 'Last autumn, at the four-power Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva, the western powers made a proposal to begin settling the disarmament problem by reducing conventional armaments, without tying this up with the prohibition of atomic weapons. Such was the proposal of Britain. The British Foreign Secretary made this proposal in the House of Commons last February . . . When the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee met in London two months ago, the Soviet Union submitted for its consideration a plan for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces which could be carried out without waiting for agreement on atomic weapons. . . . But . . . as soon as we submitted a concrete plan for reducing conventional armaments the western powers, including Britain, which had formerly made this proposal, retreated and refused to accept the proposals designed to implement these measures. This time they began to say that the question of reducing conventional armaments could not be examined without settling the question of atomic weapons. They contradicted what they themselves had said only the day before' (ibid. p. 566).

[5] *The Disarmament Question*, p. 38.

In these circumstances, it soon became clear that no advance was possible, and on 4 May the Disarmament Sub-Committee again adjourned. The four western delegates took the opportunity to submit a joint declaration which, while acknowledging the failure of the talks, set out the western conception of the requirements of the situation.[1] These included a stage-by-stage correlation of any disarmament programme with 'the development of confidence through the settlement of major political problems' and stood firm for 'a strong control organisation with inspection rights, including aerial reconnaissance, operating from the outset and developing in parallel with the disarmament measures'. The Soviet government replied on 14 May with a lengthy exposé of their interpretation of the situation.[2] They declaimed against 'the futility of the entire work' of the Disarmament Sub-Committee and asserted that 'the present state of affairs in the sphere of disarmament does not correspond either to the present state of international relations or to the demands of the peoples, who are vitally interested in a further easing of international tensions'. But, unlike the western declaration, the Soviet statement went beyond a mere analysis of the situation. Insisting on the need for 'practical measures that would lift the question of the reduction of armaments from the plane of general and sterile talk to that of concrete deeds', it announced that the Soviet government had decided unilaterally to reduce its armed forces during the coming twelve months by a total of 1,200,000 men, including 63 divisions and other units amounting to over 30,000 men stationed in eastern Germany. This was in addition to the reduction of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. by 640,000 men, which had been carried out in 1955.[3]

In this way the Soviet Union once again stole the limelight by taking the initiative and introducing a new factor into the situation. Not unnaturally the American secretary of state tried to pour cold water on the Soviet action, seeking to minimize its significance and noting that there could be 'no verification' whether reductions had actually taken place, 'since there will be no inspection of the proposed reductions'.[4] Certainly the importance of the reductions was open to discussion. Without much doubt they reflected changes in the character of warfare and the decreasing reliance on conventional forces, and they were also probably introduced to meet the manpower needs of the Soviet economy, as recently re-geared under the sixth five-year plan in the light of the policy changes announced at the Twentieth Party Congress. Furthermore, Soviet military strength even after the cuts was probably still roughly equivalent to that of the United States. Nevertheless the impression made by the

[1] *Documents*, 1956, pp. 561–2. [2] Ibid. pp. 562–70.
[3] In addition 375 naval vessels were to be put into reserve (ibid. p. 569).
[4] *U.S. Documents*, 1956, pp. 469–71.

announcement was considerable. In England Sir Anthony Eden said that 'if it so happens that everybody catches this habit, we shall have no objection',[1] and even in the United States the secretary of defence committed himself to the opinion that the Soviet move was a step 'in the right direction'.[2] In France the prime minister, Mollet, and the foreign minister, Pineau, who had already been outspoken in their criticism of western rigidity,[3] were strengthened in their views. Nor was this the only step taken by the Soviet government to keep the exchanges going and at the same time to capture public sympathy. When the Disarmament Commission met in New York from 3 to 16 July to consider the report of the sub-committee Mr. Gromyko, as we have seen,[4] made the surprise announcement that the Soviet Union was now ready to accept the western figures for the levels for the armed forces of the great powers. Then, on 16 July, the new Soviet foreign minister, Shepilov, announced that, even without agreement on other phases of disarmament, the U.S.S.R. was prepared to negotiate directly with the United States and Great Britain for an agreement to refrain from further testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons.[5] Once again, the Soviet proposal was well calculated to attract sympathy. The testing of nuclear weapons by the United States in the Pacific islands had been condemned in the U.N. Trusteeship Council, and Japan had come out, for obvious reasons, as the protagonist of a widespread Asian reaction against American reliance on thermonuclear weapons. In February the Japanese diet had approved a resolution demanding a suspension of atomic tests,[6] but these protests had not prevented the U.S. administration from launching a new series of tests over the Pacific Ocean in May. Meanwhile India had indicated that it was prepared to take the whole question to the world court.[7] Subsequently the publication of reports on the biological and genetic hazards resulting from test explosions had added to world-wide apprehension.[8] As a result the Indian government, representing uncommitted opinion, again took up the cudgels, and its representative, Mr. Krishna Menon, appeared before the Disarmament Commission on 12 July to advocate the abolition of tests.[9] The western powers, however, objected to any proposal for the abolition of tests independently of other measures. To be effective, they argued, a ban on nuclear tests would have to be accompanied by a ban on future production; otherwise powers which had done all the testing they required would

[1] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 552, col. 2210.
[2] *N.Y. Times*, 16 May 1956.
[3] Cf. below, p. 263.
[4] Cf. above, p. 255.
[5] For the text of Shepilov's speech, cf. *Soviet News*, 17 July 1956.
[6] *Nippon Times*, 10 and 11 February 1956; cf. above, p. 197.
[7] *Hindu*, 2 March 1956.
[8] A report by the Medical Research Council had been published in Great Britain on 12 June (Cmd. 9780); cf. *The Disarmament Question*, pp. 40–41.
[9] *Documents*, 1956, pp. 573–5.

be able to go on piling up large quantities of nuclear weapons of proved design.

In the end, therefore, none of the new Soviet proposals sufficed to still the doubts of the western powers or to open up a new road forward, and the Disarmament Commission concluded its session on 16 July without making progress. Nevertheless the impact of the Soviet moves was not inconsiderable. It was felt, in particular, that a new situation had been created by Gromyko's speech of 12 July which required further study in the sub-committee, and for this reason a western resolution endorsing the four-power declaration of 4 May,[1] was not put to the vote. Instead the Commission passed an innocuous Peruvian resolution, which welcomed 'the narrowing of differences on certain aspects of the disarmament problem' which had occurred, and referred back the whole question once again to the Disarmament Sub-Committee.[2]

If, by this time, a weary public had ceased to expect a more positive outcome, it is fair to say that the proceedings of the Disarmament Sub-Committee and Commission had not perhaps been quite so futile as the Soviet government alleged. A narrowing of differences had occurred in certain respects, at least on paper. More important, as has already been noted,[3] discussion for the first time revealed a tendency on all sides to move from wide general propositions to more limited and practical objectives; and although it failed to produce immediate results, this change of attitude at least provided grounds for hoping that at a future date a limited measure of agreement might be possible. That being the case, the question remains why the exchanges in the spring and summer of 1956 proved, in fact, to be unproductive.

The first major stumbling-block, without doubt, was a fundamental difference of opinion whether control of nuclear explosions was within the realm of possibility. When, on 12 July, Mr. Gromyko again proposed an unconditional ban upon nuclear weapons, the U.S. delegate on the Disarmament Commission, observing that 'nobody can verify' their elimination, said that Gromyko's position could be summed up in the words: 'ban the bomb and trust the Soviet Union'.[4] In the Soviet view, it was 'quite possible to ensure complete control over observance of an agreement on the publication of atomic weapons tests', since it was 'well known that at the present time it is impossible to blow up an atomic or hydrogen bomb without this explosion being detected elsewhere'.[5] The western position, on the other hand, was that, although 'it is true that tests of very large weapons would probably be detected when they occur', it was impossible —particularly 'in view of the vast Soviet land mass that can screen possible future tests—to have positive assurance of such detection, except in the

[1] Cf. above, p. 257. [2] *Documents*, 1956, pp. 572–3. [3] Cf. above, p. 253.
[4] *U.S. Documents*, 1956, p. 473. [5] *The Disarmament Question*, p. 42.

case of the largest weapons'.[1] Even here, however, the conflicting statements show that the difference was marginal rather than fundamental, and it would therefore seem that it could have been overcome in a better international atmosphere. In the end, therefore, what divided the parties was lack of confidence. The same applied to other issues. Although, for example, the western powers, as we have seen, had taken up the position that the banning of nuclear tests without other measures of disarmament was not a feasible proposition, in fact Sir Anthony Eden announced on 23 July that 'we are quite ready to discuss that matter'—i.e. 'an agreed limitation of test explosions'—'separately from the disarmament convention'.[2] In the same way, although the western powers had objected to the Soviet plan of 27 March on the grounds that it placed control in the Security Council, where the Soviet veto would be operative,[3] it was a fact that the Anglo-French proposals of 19 March also made the Security Council the arbiter.[4] Here again, therefore, many of the objections raised on both sides appear to have been of a tactical rather than a fundamental nature; in other words, they were valid less on their own merits than as an index of the lack of mutual confidence, and it would be fair to say that it was this lack of confidence, rather than insuperable technical difficulties, which prevented progress.

In the second place, however, the two sides were still at loggerheads over political questions, and the western powers still maintained the view, expressed in their declaration of 4 May,[5] that confidence could only be developed through 'the settlement of major political problems'. In the last analysis this could only mean that it was the intention of the western powers to postpone disarmament until outstanding political issues had been settled to their satisfaction—an intention implicit already in Mr. Dulles's much publicized statement at the beginning of 1956 that the United States would 'accept no compromise with the Soviet Union which implies acquiescence in the subjugation of the satellites'.[6] The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had changed its position since 1955 when, at the summit conference in Geneva, it had broadly accepted the view that disarmament and the solution of outstanding problems in Europe and Asia were linked. Under questioning in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, Mr. Gromyko made it plain that the Soviet government, in its plan of 27 March, was proposing that full-scale conventional disarmament should be completed in the next three years regardless of progress towards solving outstanding political problems.[7] Probably this change of attitude reflected the conviction, springing from the debates of 1955, that dis-

[1] *The Disarment Question*, p. 43. [2] Ibid. p. 42. [3] Cf. above, p. 256.

[4] 'Failing a unanimous decision, the matter shall forthwith be referred to the Security Council of the United Nations' (*Documents*, 1956, p. 555).

[5] *Documents*, 1956, p. 561. [6] *N.Y. Times*, 10 January 1956.

[7] *The Disarmament Question*, p. 27.

armament would be held up indefinitely, if it had to await a solution of the complex political problems of Europe; it also corresponded to changes in Soviet policy towards the reunification of Germany.[1] The weakness in the western position, on the other hand, lay in the fact that, while postulating the necessity for a settlement of political problems, it never specified 'what solution of what problem would be needed before confidence could be expected'.[2] Convinced of the need to maintain the link between the political problems and those of disarmament, the western powers also resisted any proposals which might have diminished their connexion. Thus the subsidiary proposal in the Soviet scheme of 27 March for the 'creation in Europe of a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments'—in other words, for an area of disengagement 'including territory of both parts of Germany and of states adjacent to them'[3]—was turned down, although it reflected and evidently drew upon proposals made by Sir Anthony Eden at Geneva in the previous year. It was, of course, possible to argue that 'the context' of the Soviet scheme was 'very different' from that of the Eden plan; and this in fact was done. But the real reason for the western refusal to take up the Soviet suggestions at least as a basis for discussion was revealed in the official comment that it would 'have tended to perpetuate Soviet domination of Eastern Germany'.[4] Precisely what steps the western powers intended to take to undo 'the subjugation of the satellites' and to change the status of eastern Germany was not made plain; but it was all too easy to draw the conclusion that these objectives had priority in their minds and policy over disarmament. In the same way, the American representative on the Disarmament Commission made it clear that the real objection of the west to the revised manpower ceiling proposed by Gromyko on 12 July was not any quarrel over the figures suggested for the great powers—which were, in fact, those already proposed by the United States—but the fact that Moscow proposed also to 'limit the forces of all other countries, including some vitally important members of the free world alliance, to 250,000 men'.[5] No one had any doubt that this statement referred to western Germany; in other words, that the objection to the Soviet proposal was that it would prevent the restoration of western Germany to the status of a considerable military power. The basic issue was, indeed, put with great clarity by the British representative at the first meeting of the Disarmament Commission on 3 July. 'It was not', he said,[6] referring to the different ceilings proposed for the armed forces of the great powers,

> a simple question of figures which divided us. The real division was revealed in an exchange between Mr. Gromyko and myself. . . . I asked the Soviet

[1] Cf. below, p. 266.
[2] Thomas, *Disarmament. The Way Ahead*, p. 19.
[3] *Documents*, 1956, p. 558.
[4] *The Disarmament Question*, p. 27.
[5] *U.S. Documents*, 1956, p. 473.
[6] *The Disarmament Question*, p. 29.

representative to confirm . . . that the actual fulfilment of the new Soviet disarmament programme was intended to proceed hand in hand with the making of political settlements. . . . But Mr. Gromyko replied categorically that the measures set out in the new Soviet proposal . . . should be carried out in full, regardless of whether any political settlements had been made or not. Thus it became tragically clear that . . . the Soviet Union had retracted its clearly expressed declaration of 10th May last year, that the fulfilment of disarmament must proceed hand in hand with the removal of the causes of tension. Any of us can make a disarmament agreement tomorrow without any political settlement to accompany it. . . . But what we cannot do, what nobody in the world will do, is to carry through to the very end a full-scale disarmament programme—conventional or nuclear, or both—unless real confidence exists between nations; and you can only get real confidence by real settlements.

The western governments were, of course, justified from their own point of view in adhering to this attitude; they were also at liberty to hold out for the remilitarization of western Germany and to insist that disarmament must await the reunification of Germany on terms which satisfied them. What is more difficult to understand is how it can have been believed that insistence on 'real settlements' in this sense represented a basis of negotiation likely to be acceptable to the Soviet Union or to contribute to a *rapprochement* between east and west.[1] It is also difficult to see how the admission that 'any of us can make a disarmament agreement tomorrow', provided that it were disentangled from such contentious issues as German reunification, could leave other than a damaging impression on a world opinion increasingly intent on banning the horrors of nuclear war and only secondarily interested in the niceties of the German question. For this reason, although neither party emerged from the disarmament negotiations with enhanced reputations, on balance the outcome was to strengthen the impression that the western powers were engaged on a stubborn defence and that the Soviet Union was seeking ways out of an impasse. Uncommitted opinion, noting that it was the Soviet Union which made new proposals, and that Russia advanced —at least in appearance—towards western positions, whereas the western powers appeared to draw back, formed its own conclusions. Hence, although the disarmament negotiations produced no definite results, on the whole they were profitable to the Soviet Union in its policy of winning the sympathy of the peoples of Asia and Africa. Soviet flexibility was contrasted, to the latter's disadvantage, with the intractability of the west, the apparent eagerness of the Soviet Union for disarmament with western hesitations. And since few people outside the western camp shared fully in the west's political preoccupations, the importance attached by the west to purely European issues such as German reunification tended to

[1] Cf. *Documents*, 1956, p. 551.

alienate sympathies in the wider world. In the psychological field, at least, the Soviet Union was drawing ahead.

*The German Question*

The sense that the west, however justified its policies might be, was slowly losing the psychological battle by clinging to out-moded positions, was by now a political factor within the western alliance. Originating among the left-wing intelligentsia, by the spring of 1956 it was invading government circles. Following upon the initiatives for peace which have been discussed above,[1] it canalized criticism into political channels; in particular it led to a questioning of the policies hitherto pursued by the western powers towards the German Federal Republic, which were seen as the main stumbling-block preventing better relations between the two great power-groupings.

The leadership in this demand for a new departure in western policy, particularly in regard to Germany, was provided by France, which had many reasons to question the prominence which the German Federal Republic was assuming in American political calculations. The starting-point was a speech made by the French foreign minister, M. Pineau, before the Anglo-American Press Association on 2 March.[2] Opening with the statement that there was no such thing as a common Franco-American-British policy, M. Pineau went on to express 'profound disagreement' with the policy the western powers had pursued in recent years. They had made a 'gigantic error', he claimed, in believing that security problems predominated over everything else, and that policy should be concerned with these problems alone. Between the two conceptions of 'security at any price' and peace, public opinion would opt for those who offered solutions of peace, even if they were not sincere, rather than for those who spoke incessantly of a military solution. It was necessary, he said, to seek some form of active coexistence with the communist world, and he emphasized the 'immense echo' in French public opinion, whenever the government expressed itself in favour of negotiations and contacts with the east. In particular, he endorsed M. Mollet's remark that the way to German reunification lay along the path of disarmament, thus implicitly accepting the Soviet thesis and criticizing the view that reunification was a precondition without which disarmament measures could not be entertained. These views, which made a considerable stir at the time, were reinforced a month later by an even more outspoken interview which the French prime minister, M. Guy Mollet, published in the American periodical, *U.S. News and World Report*.[3] Here again, the whole field of east–west relations was covered in a world-wide

[1] Cf. above, pp. 252 sq.

[2] *The Times*, 3 March 1956.

[3] *U.S. News and World Report*, 6 April 1956, pp. 46–54.

context; but the point which attracted most attention was the criticism of the German policy hitherto pursued by the western powers. M. Mollet began by pointing out that at the Geneva conference in the previous November, the western foreign ministers had placed the questions of German reunification and European security in the first and second places, and disarmament third. From this point of view he dissociated himself completely; the approach, in the opinion of his government, was 'a bad one'. It was by no means certain, he said, whether the Soviet Union was interested any longer in the reunification of Germany; but it was certain that they would not grant it on the terms and by the methods desired by the west. 'On the contrary, if we begin by solving the problem of general disarmament, the problem of European security becomes easier . . . and within the framework of security the unification of Germany becomes easier to achieve.' Once the level of armed forces was settled by a disarmament convention, the whole question of the size of a future German army would take on a different aspect; while if Germany were not totally rearmed, the difficulties in the way of reunification would be considerably diminished. Finally, M. Mollet refused to accept it as axiomatic that a reunified Germany would necessarily be a member of N.A.T.O.; it was impossible, he said, 'at the present moment to determine what the future status of Germany will be'.

The repercussions of Mollet's statements were very considerable.[1] In the Soviet Union, not unexpectedly, they were welcomed as endorsing Moscow's view of the relationship between the German and the disarmament questions; the French prime minister, Mr. Khrushchev said, had spoken 'more sensibly than anyone we have heard up to now'.[2] In the west, and particularly in Germany, the reaction was nearer to consternation. In Bonn, where the recent Soviet proposals for disengagement in central Europe had already caused anxiety, the Federal foreign office issued a stiff rejoinder. M. Mollet, it was alleged, had expressed open disagreement with the position adopted at this very moment by the western powers in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, and had 'indicated a degree of readiness to accept the order of priorities established by the Soviet Union'.[3] 'No German government', on the other hand, would 'be prepared to discuss proposals which provide for the relaxation of tension on the basis of the continuing—even if only temporary—division of Germany'. Disarmament and relaxation of tension, it was stated, should not take place 'at the expense of the German people'.

From this time forward it was one of the first objects of the west German government to prevent a 'weakening' of western policy (as it appeared in German eyes) towards the Soviet Union and to secure a reaffirmation

[1] The reactions were summarized in *U.S. News and World Report* the following week, pp. 102–7.
[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 4 April 1956.
[3] *Manchester Guardian*, 6 April 1956.

of the principle that German reunification held the first place among western objectives. With this object in view the German foreign minister deliberately slowed down negotiations over the Saar in order to put pressure on the French government.[1] But the visit of the French ministers to Moscow, arranged for early May, caused continued anxiety in Bonn, in spite of the specific assurance that France would remain faithful to its alliances. In fact, however, the French ministers found the climate in Moscow less favourable than they may have imagined. Already before their departure from Paris, Bulganin had made it clear that the Soviet government would not accept the plan worked out by France for combining German reunification with general disarmament;[2] and in the final communiqué, issued after the close of the conversations on 19 May, which made it plain that no agreement had been reached on European problems, German reunification, as such, was ignored.[3] Thus the hopes of the French ministers of reaching a compromise with the Soviet Union by striking a more independent line, were dashed. The Federal German government, on the other hand, alarmed by the French initiatives, sought to reinforce its contacts with the U.S.A. and to secure American support for its views. The occasion was provided by Adenauer's visit to the United States in June which, once again, as in 1955, provided the opportunity for a reaffirmation of the Bonn–Washington axis. Although it was reported that the talks between Adenauer and Dulles had opened with 'differences between us',[4] the concluding statement issued on 13 June showed full agreement on all important points. 'German reunification', it was announced, remained 'a major objective of the west', and no doubt was left that 'the attitude of the west toward the Soviet Union' would 'be determined by the endeavour to promote the reunification of Germany in freedom'.[5] This statement represented a resounding victory for German policy; and this victory was rubbed home when, immediately afterwards, the French foreign minister visited the United States in an attempt to persuade the American government to try the 'experiment' of friendlier relations with the Soviet Union. Unlike the Adenauer visit, the Pineau visit was far from successful; indeed, it only served to show up the identity of view between the Federal German chancellor and the United States secretary of state. Not only did the French foreign minister fail to carry Dulles with him in his interpretation of the international situation, but in the cool and measured statement issued after the conclusion of the 'discussion' he was forced to subscribe to the German-American thesis that there could be no disarmament without a simultaneous solution of the problem of German reunification.[6] This was widely interpreted as a

[1] *Frankfurter Allg. Zeitung*, 5 May 1956.
[2] *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15 May 1956.
[3] Text of communiqué in *Le Monde*, 22 May 1956.
[4] *Manchester Guardian*, 15 June 1956.
[5] *U.S. Documents*, 1956, p. 158.
[6] For the text of the communiqué, cf. *Le Monde*, 22 June 1956.

French 'concession', if not a defeat; and, in fact, it marked the end of the attempt, on the western side, to secure a revision of the existing western attitude towards German reunification. In spite of misgivings within the western alliance, the old policy was categorically reaffirmed.[1]

On the other hand, the prospects of implementing this policy were by this time small. Ever since the Geneva conferences of 1955, evidence had accumulated that the U.S.S.R. was no longer seriously interested in German reunification, and this view was confirmed, when, at the Twentieth Party Congress in February, it was made clear that eastern Germany had been allotted an important role in the new economic policies of the communist bloc. One of the highlights of the Mollet visit to Moscow—and evidently a main reason for the failure to establish any point of contact between French and Soviet views—was the news, which leaked out, that Khrushchev had bluntly told the French premier that the Soviet Union was not interested in German reunification. Khrushchev, it was reported, said that he would prefer to have 17 million Germans on his side rather than 70 million in a reunified Germany; even if Germany were neutralized and disarmed, he would still not want to see it reunited. Furthermore, even if a reunited Germany remained neutral, that would not be enough for Moscow; 'we also require that the social and economic achievement of East Germany shall be retained'.[2] The authenticity of these reports was denied on the Soviet side; but there is no doubt that the French ministers found the Soviet officials unyielding on the German question. Whether the Soviet government was opposed to reunification upon any terms, is a question that may be left open in the existing state of knowledge; but they insisted on their thesis of 'the reality of the two Germanies' and were only prepared to talk on this basis.

'The reality of the two Germanies' was by now a corner-stone of Soviet policy. This had been clearly affirmed at the beginning of February in the correspondence already referred to between Bulganin and Eisenhower. 'Inasmuch', the former told the American President, 'as in the post-war period . . . there arose and were consolidated two German states having different social and economic systems and developing in different ways, the problem of establishing a unified Germany . . . cannot . . . be solved without an appropriate agreement between the Germans themselves.'[3] To emphasize this argument, the east German government took diplomatic measures to make its presence felt—intervening, for example, in the Saar negotiations, which (it claimed) were an all-German question which could not be settled without its participation.[4] Finally, the position

[1] *Frankfurter Allg. Zeitung*, 22 and 23 June 1956.

[2] Khrushchev's alleged remarks were variously reported; cf. *Manchester Guardian*, 12 and 23 June 1956.

[3] *U.S. Documents*, 1956, p. 230.

[4] *Le Monde*, 23 May 1956.

was defined, from a communist point of view, in the declaration issued after the discussions between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic held in Moscow on 16 and 17 July.[1] After denouncing the restoration of military service in western Germany, and calling upon the western powers to reduce their forces there, Bulganin and Grotewohl went on to state that German reunification could only be brought about in one way—namely, by direct negotiations between the two German governments.[2] This conclusion was reiterated on the same day by Mr. Khrushchev in a speech at the official reception in honour of Grotewohl.[3] Reunification on a basis acceptable to the Democratic Republic, he stated, was not currently practicable; on the contrary, it would require much work and much patience. But meanwhile there could be no question of capitulating to the western powers, who wished for reunification on a capitalist and imperialist basis. The undertones of this statement were obvious. It indicated, and was meant to indicate, that, in the Soviet view, reunification had been postponed indefinitely—a view which had already been clearly enough expressed in earlier east German pronouncements.[4]

So far, therefore, as the central issue of German reunification was concerned, the result of some six months of discussion was a definite hardening in the attitude of both sides. In the spring, there had been various suggestions of new west German approaches to Moscow;[5] but, rendered nervous by the French initiatives and by the Soviet proposals for a demilitarized zone, Bonn eventually decided to desist. This decision was not without repercussions within western Germany itself, where criticism of Adenauer's policies was growing, particularly among the Free Democrats and the B.H.E. refugee party. There had been no advance, Dr. Adenauer's critics complained, in west German political thinking since the Geneva conference of the previous year, although it was becoming increasingly clear that the western policy of strength could not in itself bring about German reunification. Thus the internal German situation was characterized by a struggle between Dr. Adenauer, with his conception of a continuing cold war, and those who had heard the rumblings of international political change and wished to achieve reunification by exploiting it.[6]

The detail of this debate does not concern us here. German restlessness at the failure to achieve unity, and German demands for a more flexible foreign policy were real, and the realization was growing that if the west German government made no move the only result could be to strengthen

[1] Cf. above, pp. 242, 245.
[2] For the text of the communiqué, cf. *Soviet News*, 18 July 1956.
[3] *Frankfurter Allg. Zeitung*, 19 July 1956.
[4] Cf. *The Times*, 26 June 1956.
[5] Ibid. 7 February 1956; *Tagesspiegel*, 12 February 1956; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 13 February 1956; *Manchester Guardian*, 14 April 1956.
[6] Cf. *The Times*, 26 June 1956; *Manchester Guardian*, 28 June 1956.

the east German régime and heighten the sense of the inevitability and permanence of division.[1] But Adenauer stuck firmly to his guns, and in the decisive vote on 29 June his foreign policy was approved by 220 votes to 135. This meant, and in the prevailing climate could only mean, that the issue of reunification was indefinitely shelved. When the German chancellor visited Eisenhower on 14 June the latter had 'expressed the hope that action would soon be taken to liberate the seventeen million Germans now in the east zone of Germany'.[2] What action could be taken, short of war, which was out of the question, was, however, not explained. On the contrary, if, as was alleged, German reunification was a 'major objective' of western policy, it was hard to resist the conclusion that nothing said or done by the western powers during the first half of 1956 was calculated to bring it nearer. Down to mid-summer 1955 there had seemed to be some prospect of an inter-bloc agreement which might have permitted German reunification. By mid-summer 1956, due to the hardening of attitudes on both sides, it appeared to have been indefinitely postponed. Both sides continued to pay lip-service to it, but it was scarcely any longer an immediate objective. It was, indeed, possible that this hard fact, and the continued existence of the two régimes side by side as independent entities in the political world, might eventually bring about a shift of attitude and a willingness to reconsider the whole problem from new angles; but for the present there was no sign even that this process was beginning. On the other hand, while the German problem remained as a stumbling-block between the great powers, particularly in the field of disarmament, the very fact that no solution was possible served to underline the Soviet thesis of coexistence. Since two Germanies existed in fact, the best course, it might seem, was to make the most of the existing situation. This argument had little attraction for the American, west German or British governments; but it appealed to a wider public, which still entertained some fears of what a reunited and remilitarized Germany might be capable of, and contributed to further the view that, in the present state of world politics, coexistence was the sanest and safest policy.

*Jugoslavia*

It was, however, in relations with Jugoslavia that the Soviet policy of coexistence made the greatest impact. The new lines of policy announced at the Twentieth Party Congress were, in fact, a concession to points of view long maintained by Marshal Tito, and they could not be other than welcome to the only communist country outside the Soviet bloc. The first half of 1956 saw in consequence a *rapprochement* between Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union going well beyond the restoration of good relations achieved

[1] *The Times*, 29 March 1956. [2] *Manchester Guardian*, 15 June 1956.

in 1955.[1] This began with a speech, on 2 March, by Edward Kardelj, the chief theoretician of the Jugoslav Communist Party, welcoming the results of the Twentieth Party Congress, which, he said, was important not only for its concrete results, but also and above all for the processes which it had initiated and accelerated; it had not only radically improved internal conditions for the development of socialism, but had created a new atmosphere within the international socialist movement, which would facilitate further friendly collaboration between Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union.[2] A further concession to Jugoslavia was the dissolution, on 17 April, of the Cominform, which had formerly led the struggle against Titoism; and a few days later, on 29 April, it was announced that Marshal Tito had accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union. This visit took place from 2 to 23 June, and was generally regarded as a triumph for the Jugoslav leader, who had been further propitiated, on the eve of his departure for Moscow, by the dismissal of Molotov from the ministry of foreign affairs.[3] In this way the path was cleared for progress from the 'normalization' of relations, as carried out in 1955, to 'all-sided friendly cooperation', and from 'coexistence' between two states with different internal systems to close co-operation in all fields between two countries which, though their roads might vary, were mutually engaged in the task of 'building socialism'. The new spirit of political agreement and co-operation, rendered possible by the evolution of Soviet thinking since February, was registered in two communiqués issued on 20 June; they had been preceded by an economic agreement signed on 6 June.

The agreements of 20 June[4] marked, without doubt, a high point in Soviet-Jugoslav relations, though, as Tito later made known,[5] some of the issues had proved 'a little difficult to settle'. The agreements covered three main points: the 'views of the two governments in evaluating the international situation', the relations between the two countries, and the relations between the Soviet and the Jugoslav Communist Parties. Of these, in many ways, the last was the most interesting. As to the relations between the two countries, it was noted 'with great satisfaction' that they had reached 'complete normalisation' on the basis of the agreement of 2 June 1955, which had 'provided a foundation for all-sided friendly co-operation'. But it had been a notable feature of the 1955 negotiations that the Jugoslavs, still suspicious of interference in their internal affairs, had resisted all Soviet suggestions for contacts between the Communist Parties of the two countries.[6] By 1956 this situation had changed. Now

[1] Cf. above, pp. 133 sqq.
[2] Cf. *L'Unità*, 3 March 1956; *Neues Deutschland*, 4 March 1956.
[3] Cf. above, p. 243.
[4] Texts in *Soviet News*, 25 June 1956; *The Times*, 21 June 1956; Zinner, *National Communism*, pp. 12–15.
[5] Cf. Zinner, op. cit. p. 520.
[6] Cf. above, p. 135.

that the Soviet Union was prepared to recognize different roads to socialism, and not to seek to impose a uniform party dictatorship directed from Moscow, the major obstacles had been removed, and accordingly a scheme for party co-operation was drawn up. It was specifically laid down that co-operation should 'be based on complete voluntariness and equality', and that there should be no 'tendency' on either side to impose opinions on the other; all 'contacts must be equal, frank, democratic, and accessible to world public opinion', and 'each and every participant' would retain 'freedom of action'.[1]

The restoration of amicable party contacts after so long an estrangement was a notable event, and showed how far the new Soviet policy had contributed towards improving Soviet-Jugoslav relations. At this period, in fact, they could scarcely have been closer, and the declaration on foreign policy showed a remarkable identity of views on all the major problems of international politics, particularly disarmament and the German question. Both governments concurred in considering that the time was now ripe for the 'elimination of the negative elements which have stifled co-operation between the European peoples during the cold war', and the Jugoslavs 'acclaimed the recent decision of the U.S.S.R. government to reduce its armaments and armed forces', which they considered to be 'a big contribution to the cause of facilitating the solution of the question of universal disarmament'. On Germany, both governments subscribed to the view that, having regard to the existence of 'two sovereign states' 'on the territory of post-war Germany', reunification required negotiations between the two German governments, and that this fact must be accepted by the great powers 'both in the interests of the German people and of the world'. Thus President Tito, while firmly insisting on his country's complete independence, and without joining the Soviet bloc, came out in effect as a convinced protagonist of the Soviet position in international affairs and a stern critic of western policies.

The restoration of cordial relations with Jugoslavia was a remarkable success for the new Soviet policies of Bulganin and Khrushchev, and inevitably it had repercussions in the west. It is true that Marshal Tito had gone out of his way, a few days before leaving for Moscow, to point out that Jugoslavia would 'continue' its 'independent foreign and internal policy'—'nobody', he added, 'has asked anything else from us'—and on the eve of his departure he again emphasized that relations between Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union were 'clear and stable, as between two equal powers' and that 'there was no ground for speculations that Jugoslavia was in danger of losing her independent status'.[2] Nevertheless the new developments caused considerable heart-searching in the United

[1] Zinner, op. cit. pp. 13, 15.

[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 25 May 1956; *The Times*, 31 May 1956.

States, especially since the political *rapprochement* between the Soviet Union and Jugoslavia was buttressed by substantial economic agreements which, as Tito himself said, were 'very useful to us' and 'on very favourable terms'.[1] The first was signed on 2 February, and provided for the grant by the U.S.S.R. of a credit in gold or hard currencies amounting to $30 million, together with a further credit of $54 million for the purchase of raw materials and equipment in the Soviet Union.[2] On 6 June, during Tito's visit to Moscow, this important agreement, which was then said to have been completed up to 70 per cent., was supplemented by a commercial agreement increasing the level of mutual trade by $20 million to a total of $55 millions in each direction, thus making the Soviet Union Jugoslavia's biggest trading partner.[3] In the United States—which had concluded an agreement on 30 January to sell surplus agricultural products to Jugoslavia in exchange for Jugoslav currency, and which on 8 February released $5 million of U.S. aid for road-building machinery and coal[4]—these competitive offers from the Soviet Union were viewed in a serious light, and there were widespread demands for a cessation of U.S. aid to Jugoslavia. Senator McCarthy, who held that it would be 'stark immorality' for aid to be continued, found support on the Democratic side, and from the beginning of June the whole matter was vigorously debated in the United States.

On the one side were those who argued that the apparent re-establishment of the Belgrade-Moscow *entente* automatically debarred Jugoslavia from aid; on the other side, the State Department argued that any attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Jugoslavs by cutting aid would inevitably boomerang, and that a continuation of aid would make it easier for Tito to maintain a position of independence between the two blocs. In the upshot the United States House of Representatives voted on 8 June by 183 votes to 3 to end all aid to Jugoslavia, but on 28 June the Senate reversed the decision. Nevertheless, the drive to cut aid to Jugoslavia was renewed in July, and when on 24 July the Senate finally voted the foreign aid appropriations, it was specified that none of it might be used for military aid to Jugoslavia. President Eisenhower, however, refused to accept this provision as a 'directive', and a decision was postponed until the autumn.[5] In fact, the new cordiality between Russia and Jugoslavia, which caused so much suspicion in Washington, soon passed its zenith. When the Poznan riots revealed the instability of the situation in eastern Europe, Soviet policy became more cautious, and, as Marshal Tito later revealed, some at least of the Soviet leaders took a more reserved attitude, blaming the

[1] Zinner, op. cit. p. 520.
[2] *Soviet News*, 3 February 1956.
[3] *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 June 1956.
[4] *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, 31 January and 9 February 1956.
[5] *Manchester Guardian*, 2 August 1956; cf. *U.S. Documents*, 1956, pp. 268–70.

Jugoslavs—or at least the Jugoslav example—for what had happened.[1] Thus a certain coolness again entered Soviet-Jugoslav relations. Nevertheless, the gains registered during the first six months of 1956 were real and substantial; and since Jugoslavia was closely associated with India and Egypt and other neutral nations, the cordial relations established between Belgrade and Moscow were a considerable asset for the Soviet Union in its policy of co-operation with the uncommitted nations of Asia and Africa. Here again it had stolen an advantage over the west.

*Indo-China*

A further sphere, in which the two great power blocs were involved, was Indo-China; for here, in accordance with the terms of the decision of the Geneva conference of 1954, 'free general elections by secret ballot' were to be held in Vietnam 'under the supervision of an international commission' in July 1956.[2] The Soviet Union, as a party to the 1954 agreement, was clearly interested in the implementation of the decisions of the conference and entitled to make its views heard. It was, however, no secret that the government of South Vietnam was unwilling for the elections to take place;[3] and already at the time of the summit conference in Geneva in July 1955 all four powers had sent messages to Ngo Dinh Diem, who had already rejected an approach on the subject from North Vietnam, asking him to comply with the provisions of the 1954 agreement.[4] Moreover, it had been suggested by Molotov that a Far East conference should be reconvened to deal with the matter. The western powers, on the other hand, were anxious in view of the consolidation of Diem's position in Vietnam, to do nothing to disturb him, and therefore wished the elections to be postponed; indeed, the British government parried every suggestion of a further conference. By the spring of 1956, however, conditions were changing. On the one side, the unexpected vitality of the Diem régime reduced communist hopes of securing control of the whole of Vietnam. On the other side, the new emphasis in Soviet and Chinese foreign policy on economic factors, together with the proclamation of the principle of coexistence at the Twentieth Party Congress, indicated that the communist bloc was no longer primarily interested in a political settlement, as it had been in 1954. Thus both the communist and the western governments were ready, for their own reasons, to reconsider the earlier arrangements.

Already in September 1955 there had been evidence of a change of policy at a local level. The Vietminh party—perhaps taking a cue from the

[1] 'When the Poznan affair happened', Tito said in retrospect, 'there occurred among the Soviet people a sudden change of attitude towards us. They started to grow colder. They thought that we, the Jugoslavs, were to blame' (Zinner, op. cit. p. 522).

[2] Cf. *Documents*, 1954, p. 139.

[3] Cf. above, p. 18.

[4] He had rejected approaches from Vietminh on the grounds that the Vietnamese government had not signed the Geneva agreements.

German Democratic Republic—now advocated direct negotiations between the governments of North and South Vietnam, as a preliminary to reunification through general elections. By the spring the Vietminh government was showing considerably less interest in a thrust against the south, although such a move was probably still militarily feasible and was certainly economically inviting.[1] Finally, on 9 March the British suggested to Moscow that the two governments, as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference, should seek a solution through bilateral talks. Although it was generally agreed that complete fulfilment of the original agreements would be to the advantage of Moscow's allies, the Soviet government readily accepted the proposal and discussions were held in London in April and May.[2] Here, the chairmen agreed to send three messages. The first, to the governments of North and South Vietnam, invited both governments to submit 'their views about the time required for the opening of consultations on the organisation of nation-wide elections in Vietnam and the time required for the holding of elections as a means of achieving the unification of Vietnam'; they also appealed for the co-operation of both governments with the International Supervisory Commission following the dissolution of the French Union High Command on 28 April. A second message was sent to the International Supervisory Commission expressing the hope that it would continue its efforts to 'maintain and strengthen peace in Vietnam'. A third was sent to the French government asking it to make its good offices available to the Commission after obtaining the agreement of the South Vietnamese authorities.

Together these letters were evidence of considerable concessions by the Soviet government to the western point of view. This, as expressed in the British note of 9 April, was that the talks should aim in the first place at preserving peace, and should be directed only 'secondly towards the eventual achievement of a political settlement in Vietnam'. This conception Moscow endorsed, since the communications to the governments of South and North Vietnam implied recognition, both by Moscow and by London, of the fact that the elections would not be held as originally provided for. In their replies both governments undertook not to have recourse to solutions of violence and to co-operate with the commission; although the northern régime added that it still looked forward to consultative meetings to consider reunification through free elections. The chairman of the International Commission replied on 29 May giving an undertaking that its work would continue; and the French government, although emphasizing that it had no responsibility for the implementation

[1] The relatively industrialized north still possessed no profitable line of exports and coveted the rich rice-growing Mekong delta which would make it independent of much otherwise necesssary economic assistance from Moscow and Peking; cf. B. Crozier, 'The International Situation in Indo-China', *Pacific Affairs*, December 1956.

[2] Cf. *Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements* (H.M.S.O.), Cmd. 9763.

of the Geneva agreements, offered to continue its assistance. In these circumstances the stability of the American-financed Diem régime in South Vietnam was virtually assured.

There remained, however, the question of the Vietminh-orientated Pathet Lao organization, which was entrenched in the two Laotian provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua. At Bandung the Vietminh foreign minister had formally disavowed before the Laotian prime minister any designs on the two provinces, and after some months of desultory fighting the Supervisory Commission had finally brought the two sides together in October 1955 in Rangoon. But prevarication prevented a settlement and the matter was again raised in the Commission, where on 7 January a strongly worded resolution called for the integration of the dissident provinces into the national community. The matter was then raised in London. Although the evidence is not definite, it would appear that the Soviet government again used its influence in the area in favour of a settlement. In any event contacts between the dissidents and the Laotian government were resumed and a settlement reached on 7 August. This provided that the two provinces would be administered by the royal government, and that Pathet Lao troops would be under the Laotian high command. The two sides accepted the five principles of coexistence and affirmed Laotian neutrality.[1]

The state of Cambodia was by this time already practising the neutrality which Laos proclaimed in August,[2] and it was exploited by Prince Sihanouk as a means of securing maximum economic benefits from both the western and the eastern blocs. Cambodia was already receiving about $50 million a year from the United States; but after a visit by Sihanouk to Peking in February 1956, where he denounced S.E.A.T.O., a trade and payments agreement was concluded between Cambodia and China in April, and in June the Chinese offered a 'free and unconditional gift' of materials and commodities valued at $22·4 million.[3] In July the Cambodian leader paid a visit to the Soviet Union, where he was offered technical and economic assistance to allow his country 'to develop her economy and continue to defend her policy of neutrality'.[4]

The determinative fact in South-East Asia was that, for different reasons, Sino-Soviet and western policies were moving at this stage in the same direction, and consequently practical measures of agreement were possible.

[1] Cf. *The Times*, 9 August 1956. The incorporation of the two provinces in the Laotian state had been agreed on at Geneva in 1954. This meant that the only outstanding issue was that of the elections. This topic was again taken up by the Vietminh on 10 August 1956 in a letter to the co-chairmen. Pressure for elections continued, but it was political instead of, as previously, military pressure.

[2] Since the Cambodian elections in June 1955 no one had questioned Cambodia's right to be neutral; see above, p. 20. But although both Laos and Cambodia had rejected the Manila pact, they were still considered in the west to be protected by it.

[3] *The Times*, 23 June 1956.

[4] Ibid. 9 July 1956.

Neither side had any reason to wish to disturb the *status quo* which had been established in 1954, and so the area settled down to an unforeseen period of stability and economic development. In this solution both China and the Soviet Union naturally consulted their own interests, as they saw them at the time; but the Soviet willingness to make concessions when it might have made difficulties with a good show of reason, was an encouraging feature. In this sphere at least there was evidence that it was possible for the two blocs to co-operate. One reason, no doubt, was that Indo-China was no longer in the forefront of international affairs, and that the issues had shifted elsewhere. The question in the first half of 1956 was whether the sort of *modus vivendi* which now obtained in South-East Asia could be achieved in the more acute and thornier problems of the Middle East.

*The Middle East*

Whereas the inter-bloc relations hitherto considered followed well-defined patterns in fields where the two camps had long been in conflict, the Middle East had for a number of years prior to the signing of the Baghdad pact remained surprisingly free from open and active inter-bloc rivalry. The western powers had acted on the assumption that the area was a western sphere of interests, and in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 set themselves up as arbiters of Middle Eastern affairs. When the Czech-Egyptian arms deal was announced in the late summer of 1955, therefore, the question arose whether this state of affairs had come to an end, and from that time forward the western powers showed themselves intensely sensitive to all indications of a revival of Soviet interest in the area, particularly as their own relations with the Arab world were far from stable. The consequence was that, by the beginning of 1956, the Middle East had become another touchstone of east–west relations, and it was 'being openly said', as the Soviet government pointed out in May,[1] that it was 'impossible to end the arms race' or to restore confidence between the two blocs 'without settling beforehand' not only—as had by now long been the case—'the German problem' but also the issues in the 'Near and Middle East'. Here again, however, as in the case of Germany, it was never made clear what specific solution of what specific problem would be needed before confidence would be established. The Soviet Union was evidently entitled, for geographical and strategic reasons, to interest itself in developments along its southern frontier; but the western powers seem to have acted on the principle that the only practicable policy was to quarantine the Middle East and keep Soviet Russia out of the area.

This attitude was expressed, early in the year, in the Washington

[1] *Documents*, 1956, p. 567.

Declaration, issued after the discussions between President Eisenhower and Sir Anthony Eden on 30 and 31 January.[1] Based on the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, which agreed on common action by England, France, and the United States in the event of war in the Middle East, the new declaration stated that the danger of war had increased and announced that the two countries had made arrangements for the action to be taken in such an eventuality. This announcement produced an immediate disclaimer on behalf of all members of the Arab League, including Iraq, who protested that any attempt by the western powers to pursue a particular line of policy in the Middle East without Arab agreement would not be conducive to stability, but would rather lead to instability.[2] No less significant, however, was the declaration published on 13 February by the Soviet foreign ministry. Already a few days earlier, on 9 February, the U.S.S.R. had served notice that if—as Eisenhower and Eden had suggested—the United Nations observers force in Palestine were reinforced as a means of preventing the outbreak of war, the Soviet Union would insist on participating.[3] Now, in its declaration of 13 February,[4] Russian opposition to any unilateral settlement of Middle Eastern affairs was openly proclaimed. All measures undertaken separately, 'without the knowledge of the United Nations and without the participation of the Near and the Middle East countries', the Soviet government declared, constituted a threat to peace and security. The actions proposed by the British and American governments should be brought to the cognizance of the United Nations, which ought not to tolerate the despatch of foreign troops to the Middle East without the sanction of the United Nations itself and of all interested countries.

These statements gave due notice that the Soviet Union was no longer prepared to see Middle East affairs discussed and settled without its participation, but at the same time they showed that it was willing, at any rate in principle, to work through the United Nations. The same point of view was expressed, on 17 April, in an important declaration issued on the eve of the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to Great Britain, which was evidently put out to prepare the way for the discussion of Middle Eastern questions with the British government.[5] After reviewing the situation, in particular the dangers arising from the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviet Union declared (i) that it would 'render the necessary support to measures of the United Nations aimed at exploring ways and means for strengthening peace in the Palestine area'; (ii) that in its view 'measures

[1] Cf. above, below, pp. 285–6.

[2] *The Times*, 3 February 1956.

[3] This was made known at an interview between the Israeli foreign minister, Sharett, and the Soviet ambassador to Israel, Abramov, which took place on 9 February; *Le Monde*, 11 February 1956.

[4] Text in *Soviet News*, 14 February 1956.

[5] Text in *Soviet News* and *The Times*, 18 April 1956.

must be taken in the immediate future to ease the existing tension . . . without interference from outside'; and (iii) that, if peace were to be maintained, 'the matter must be handled in such a way as to lead to a lasting settlement . . . on a mutually acceptable basis, taking due account of the just national interests of the parties concerned'. Furthermore, it urged 'the parties concerned to abstain from any actions which might aggravate the situation on the existing demarcation line established by the armistice agreements between the Arab countries and Israel', and expressed 'its readiness to facilitate, together with other states, a peaceful settlement of questions outstanding'.

Although the Soviet statements of 13 February and 17 April were couched in terms calculated to secure Arab approbation, the sentiments expressed were unexceptionable, and there was some hope, particularly on the side of France, which was critical of western policy,[1] that when Bulganin and Khrushchev visited London between 18 and 27 April the opportunity might be taken to come to an agreement over the Middle East. In fact, any such hopes were disappointed. As Bulganin stated at the conclusion of the visit, though there had been discussions, 'the British side does not share our views on this question' and 'we in our turn could not recognize as correct the view of the British representatives'.[2] Nevertheless, both sides expressed 'the firm intention to do everything in their power to facilitate the maintenance of peace and security' in the area, and reached agreement 'that effective measures should be undertaken in the immediate future to this end'; in particular, both sides would 'support the United Nations in any initiative to secure a peaceful settlement . . . of the dispute between the Arab states and Israel'.[3] In addition Bulganin expressly declared that 'the Soviet Union does not have, in the countries of the Near and Middle East, any other interests apart from the interests of peace and peaceful co-operation' and went on to emphasize the 'possibilities for our two countries to set an example of joint work' in this important area.[4]

It is, of course, impossible, on the basis of general statements of this sort, to assess how far the Soviet Union was prepared to go in putting its precepts into practice. The important fact is rather that, owing to western suspicions that the Soviet Union was fomenting trouble in the Middle East, particularly by arms shipments to the Arab states, little if any attempt was made to test Russian professions. Far from co-operating

[1] In his famous interview in *U.S. News and World Report*, 6 April 1956, p. 50, Mollet said that the west was 'in process of arranging to set fire to the entire Middle East', and warned his allies that 'if we continue like this, we will lose the game'.

[2] *Documents*, 1956, p. 650.

[3] Cf. the joint Anglo-Soviet statement issued in London on 26 April 1956; *Documents*, 1956, p. 639.

[4] Ibid. p. 651.

in a 'peaceful settlement', Mr. Dulles alleged, 'the Soviet bloc' had 'complicated the problem which the United Nations has sought to solve'.[1] In the American view, the Soviet Union was 'fishing' for an 'ambitious new role' as 'peacemaker' in the Middle East.[2] Nevertheless, it was significant that the Soviet proposals of 17 April were received with marked coolness in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, where it was complained that they took little account of the essential Arab preconditions for any settlement. Even in the United States it was admitted that Moscow was backing the United Nations, and some observers believed that the Soviet Union, precisely because of its friendlier relations with Egypt, was in a better position than the western powers to bring about a settlement of the Palestinian question acceptable to the Arabs. During an interview between the Soviet ambassador and Colonel Nasser on 17 May, the former made plain the Soviet Union's 'lively desire' to see peace re-established in the Middle East, and that it favoured a settlement by the United Nations.[3] A month later, when the new Soviet foreign minister, Shepilov, visited Cairo, the same point of view was maintained. Western diplomats regarded the visit with some foreboding, expecting him 'to produce some kind of diplomatic bombshell that would spell further trouble for western influence in the Middle East'.[4] But although, on his arrival, Shepilov made an obvious bid for closer Soviet-Arab friendship, asserting that 'the people of the U.S.S.R. look upon the people of the Arab countries as their brothers', at a diplomatic level he proceeded with great circumspection. According to well-informed Arab sources, he made it plain that the Soviet Union was not prepared to underwrite Arab claims for a settlement with Israel,[5] and in a speech delivered on 18 June, he specifically emphasized the fact that the Soviet Union had 'no intention of encouraging the hostile agitation of the peoples of the Arab countries against any of the western powers'. 'On the contrary', he added, 'we shall do all that is possible to bring about an international détente in this part of the world'; and, as if to reinforce his point that the Soviet Union did not intend to be drawn into Middle East rivalries, he went out of his way to indicate his country's desire to establish and consolidate friendly relations with the United States, France, and Great Britain.[6] These cautious sentiments were reinforced in an interview accorded a fortnight later by Mr. Khrushchev to the Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram*.[7] While denouncing Israel for its aggressive attacks on its Arab neighbours, and attacking the 'imperialists' who had created Israel as a centre of discord in the midst of the Arab

[1] *U.S. Documents*, 1956, p. 279.
[2] *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 May 1956.
[3] *N.Y. Times*, 18 May 1956; *Le Monde*, 19 May 1956.
[4] *N.Y. Times*, 17 June 1956; *The Times*, 18 June 1956.
[5] *Observer*, 17 June 1956.
[6] *Le Monde*, 20 June 1956.
[7] Cf. *The Times* and *N.Y. Times*, 2 July 1956; *Le Monde*, 3 July 1956; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 4 July 1956.

homeland, Khrushchev's final message to the Arab countries was a studied counsel of moderation and caution. Time, he believed, was on the Arab side; but in the present phase it was essential for them to exercise patience, because 'war between the Arab states and Israel would mean World War III'. Hence their immediate task was to be 'patient, strong and united', and 'to make every effort to preserve peace in the Near East'.

These Soviet statements were open to different interpretations, and it was not difficult to point to apparent discrepancies between Soviet words and actions. Nothing that was said on the Soviet side leaves any doubt that Moscow was determined to have a voice in any Middle East settlement, and it may be assumed that the Soviet Union felt that it was as entitled as the western powers to supply arms to (or withhold arms from) the different Middle East countries, and to compete with the western powers over such projects as the Aswan Dam. Soviet intervention undoubtedly had the object of demonstrating that the U.S.S.R. had a stake in the area. On the other hand, the statements issued were, on the surface at least, placatory in tone, and seemed to indicate that the Soviet Union might in the long run have preferred to negotiate, rather than to engage in out-and-out competition with the western powers for the favour of the Middle East countries. Whether or not this was the case could only have been tested by high-level discussions. None of the western powers, on the other hand, with the possible exception of France, appears at this stage to have been prepared to admit that the Soviet Union was entitled to a voice in Middle East affairs; they still hoped to be able to control the course of events themselves on the basis of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration. Whether this expectation was any longer realistic, is another question. On the contrary, it might have been thought, in view of the difficulties the western powers were encountering in formulating a valid Middle East policy, that the course of wisdom lay in engaging in discussions with Moscow before the situation had deteriorated further. The interchanges in the first half of 1956 indicate that such a course was possible, and perhaps even that it was what the Soviet leaders desired, though no one, of course, can say whether or not its outcome would have been successful. The fact remained, in any case, that the Middle East, which had so long remained outside the field of inter-bloc rivalries, was now as serious a cause of division and conflict as the German problem. The responsibility for this development was thrown by the west on the communists, because of the Czech-Egyptian arms deals of 1955. By the communists it was attributed to the Baghdad pact, and to western attempts to keep the Middle East as a close preserve for 'imperialist' manœuvres. In the eyes of the historian, it is perhaps of little importance which side was right. What was important was that the opportunity for a settlement, or at least for testing the possibilities of a settlement, was let slip. Probably it was

not realized how quickly time was running out. When, at the end of July, the Middle East situation exploded, it was too late; the opportunity had passed. The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Egypt on 26 July meant that the Middle East had been drawn irrevocably into the centre of inter-bloc conflict.

## CHAPTER XV

# TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

EVENTS in the autumn of 1955 had brought the Middle East into the forefront of diplomatic activity. At the same time it had become increasingly clear that the situation which had developed in the Middle East was not one which could be mastered by the traditional methods of diplomacy. The decisive communist move—namely, the agreement to supply Czech arms to Egypt—had broken through the existing Middle Eastern pattern; while the activities of Khrushchev and Bulganin in southern Asia drew another pattern which was as applicable in the Arab countries of the Near East and Africa as in India, Burma, and Afghanistan. Soviet offers of economic aid altered the angle of approach and challenged the west on new ground. In the United States, which had no direct territorial interests to defend in the Middle East, the new primacy of economic factors secured some recognition, particularly as it fitted in with an older American tradition of sympathy for 'exploited' peoples and hostility to 'colonial powers'; but the State Department was left with the difficult practical problem of reconciling this attitude with support for its 'imperialist' allies. The result was that American policy tended to be equivocal. In England and France, on the other hand, it was not so easy for governments to adjust their thinking to the new situation, and to transfer their calculations from a military to an economic plane. Conditioned by a long past experience, they appeared still to be thinking in terms of controlling the political and military balance among the small Middle Eastern powers, and in this way of maintaining a position of strength.

Evidence of this reluctance to accept the fact that the character of the struggle in the Middle East had changed was provided by the debates in the House of Commons in December 1955. The situation in the Middle East, the foreign secretary said, 'is still fluid. Into this area, therefore, the struggle for power has been transferred.' The statement was true so far as it went; but with its emphasis on power instead of upon economic penetration, it did not go far enough. Furthermore, Mr. Macmillan continued, 'the communists here as elsewhere are very clever at using nationalism as their tool'.[1] In these two statements he picked out the essential features of British and to some extent of official American thinking about the area. These were an unhappy puzzlement at the unwillingness of the Arab nations to take a clear stand in the world power-struggle, and

[1] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 547, col. 828.

a certain reluctance to consider indigenous nationalism in any but a communist context. At the same time there was concern that hostility between the Arab states and Israel showed no sign of diminishing.

The immediate objectives of British policy were therefore to prevent the further spread of Soviet influence in the area; to reduce the strength of the forces of disruption and to limit their sources of arms and money; and to bring about a modification of Arab and Israeli policy with a view to an early settlement of some aspects of outstanding differences. It was clear to London that American co-operation would be necessary to achieve these aims. But Washington was not entirely in agreement with the British analysis. The United States was increasingly mindful of neutralist feeling. On 6 November 1955 Dulles had met Tito at Brioni, his first visit to a communist state, and in the course of their discussion of the situation in the Middle East Dulles asked Tito to emphasize the value of moderation to Nasser during his forthcoming visit to Cairo.[1] Moreover, although Macmillan had emphasized that 'with the Baghdad Pact, both in its political, economic, and military aspects, the United States is now officially and effectively associated',[2] Washington showed little enthusiasm for the treaty which Nehru had described, as recently as 5 December, as 'deplorable from the point of view of peace and security'. Furthermore, the delicate balance which the United States was attempting to maintain between sympathy for Israel and an alliance with its richest enemy, Saudi Arabia, meant that positive American action would almost necessarily be of an economic rather than a political character.

In these circumstances Great Britain decided to take action without waiting for American agreement in what was felt in London to be a common policy. It had already been made known that Great Britain was willing to revise the 1948 treaty with Jordan if the latter country joined the Baghdad pact. But the Jordanian foreign minister had opposed the alliance because 'Turkey is an ally of Israel and an Arab proverb says the friend of my enemy is my enemy'.[3] At the end of October, however, the struggle over Jordan was re-opened. On the one side, King Saud made it known that he was willing to pay £7,500,000 to replace the British subsidy, and the Egyptian commander-in-chief visited Amman. On the other side, the Baghdad powers renewed their efforts. Early in November the Turkish president and foreign minister went to Jordan; and while King Hussein was on a state visit to Lebanon, Mr. Macmillan, speaking in Beirut on his return from the inaugural meeting of the Baghdad pact, told Lebanese leaders that Jordan would join the alliance.[4] It was an incautious statement, for it was acknowledged in London that Jordan would be unlikely to join the pact unless there were prior minis-

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 12 November 1955.
[2] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 547, col. 833.
[3] *N.Y. Times*, 1 May 1955.
[4] *N.Y. Times*, 26 November 1955.

terial changes in Amman, and it was also believed that popular opposition would prevent Lebanese adhesion.

In these circumstances the British government appears to have thought that further measures were necessary, and on 7 December General Templer, chief of the imperial general staff, arrived in Amman to discuss Jordan's defence needs. He was accompanied by the chief of the Levant Department in the Foreign Office, and it was announced that a gift of ten Vampire jets would shortly be made to Jordan.[1] However, this help was 'no longer received with the same unquestioning appreciation as in the past',[2] for opinion in Jordan was deeply divided, and the younger army officers and Palestine Jordanians were opposed to continuation of the British alignment. Nevertheless it was generally believed by 14 December that the pro-British party was in the ascendant and that Jordan had accepted the British offer to modernize its army in return for Jordanian adhesion to the Baghdad pact. Somewhat prematurely this was hailed in the western press as a 'blow for Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Nehru and Colonel Nasser, and a triumph for Sir Antony Eden and Mr. Macmillan'.[3] But at this stage calculations went awry. It was decided that General Templer should extend his stay in Amman to take part in the crucial cabinet meeting. But the way the wind was blowing was revealed when four of the eleven Jordanian ministers resigned. This was followed by strikes and demonstrations throughout the country and the resignation of two prime ministers. On 21 December a caretaker government headed by Ibrahim Hashem was sworn in. An attempt was made to calm the country by the immediate release of demonstrators and by a declaration that the government, since it was only temporary, had no right to commit Jordan to new pacts. Even so, disturbances continued throughout Jordan. But in spite of these events the British under-secretary for foreign affairs maintained that 'it is not at all the fact that the population of Jordan is hostile to the pact', and, he added, 'what is now happening in Jordan will pass over'.[4] Others, however, thought that unless more attention were paid to the presentation of the British point of view, 'the next elections may run against Britain'.[5]

It was in these circumstances that, at their meeting in January 1956, the countries belonging to the Baghdad pact decided that the moment had come to develop non-military aspects of the alliance. It was suggested that an economic committee should be established at ministerial level with the participation of a United States observer. This committee would increase and co-ordinate co-operation, including the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The needs of the area, it was main-

[1] *The Times*, 6 December 1955.
[2] *Daily Telegraph*, 7 December 1955.
[3] *News Chronicle*, 14 December 1955.
[4] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 547, coll. 2031–2.
[5] *Daily Telegraph*, 28 December 1955.

tained, were for technical knowledge and experience rather than for investment. Hence attention was concentrated on such matters as exchange of information on agricultural development, pest control, and the expansion of trade and communications. On 10 April it was announced that Great Britain was willing to provide facilities at Harwell for training local scientists, and money to provide an atomic energy training centre in Baghdad, as well as an additional £250,000 for technical assistance to pact members. The first six months of 1956 showed an increase in trade between the countries concerned. But these technical achievements did not compensate for the continuing political antagonisms in the area and for the hesitancy of United States policy.

The political divisions were the subject of a communiqué issued by Tito and Nasser after talks in Cairo in January 1956. To 'insist on a policy of military blocs and pacts', they stated, 'inevitably results in a suicidal armaments race, causes misunderstanding among nations and heightens tensions in the world'.[1] Practical evidence of this was soon available when the decision to develop the economic potentialities of countries which were members of the Baghdad pact was countered by parallel movements in the Arab League. On 26 January the League's Economic Council announced agreement on the establishment of an inter-Arab organization to finance economic development in the area. League members would contribute to the £20,000,000 envisaged as capital for the enterprise, in the same proportion as their contributions to the general funds. Other Arab countries which were not members of the League, were also invited to participate.[2] At the same time it was decided to set up a company with capital amounting to £4,500,000 with headquarters in Amman to develop the mineral deposits in the Dead Sea. The economic needs of the transit countries in the region were discussed and a plan approved for a simplification of tariffs.

This show of activity from non-Baghdad pact members gained in significance from the continued unwillingness of the United States to become a member of the alliance. The United States had joined the economic and the anti-subversion committees, but even there American participation was played down in the interests of relations with Nasser and King Saud. Not altogether surprisingly, America's allies found this attitude difficult to understand. In London, in particular, it was felt that there was need for 'a more direct interest in what is going on', and that 'dollars and sound advice from Washington are not enough'.[3] The British government,

[1] In addition, they emphasized that their policy of non-alignment was not a passive one but a 'positive, active and constructive policy aimed at realizing general collective security'. The solution of world problems, they believed, should be approached in a new constructive way by increasing the political independence of all peoples and the economic progress of under-developed countries. Cf. *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 6 January 1956.

[2] *Commerce du Levant*, 1 February 1956.

[3] *N.Y. Times*, 15 January 1956.

accustomed to giving its support to particular rulers in the region and thus directly involved in the local politics of the Middle East, could not rest satisfied with the United States government's more aloof and global outlook, and its tendency to regard the Middle East as merely one of several regions important in the world-wide power-struggle. Hence a great deal depended on the outcome of the high-level talks scheduled to take place in Washington at the end of January 1956. These were the first talks between the American president and the British prime minister after an interval of eighteen months, and all the indications were that the British government set great store by them. Detailed preliminary discussions took place with British diplomats from the Middle East, which left the impression that Eden was seeking to formulate a specific programme for common action with full American participation.

In the United States, on the other hand, there seemed to be little new thinking about the area and no distinct Middle East policy beyond, as Eisenhower put it, being 'friends with everybody'.[1] American interest lay in the broader issue of countering the communist economic offensive, as another aspect of a contest of world dimensions. Moreover, Congress was still reluctant to make modifications in the foreign aid programme which would have enabled the United States to make firm long-term commitments.[2] The absence of a specific American policy for the area, however, did not have the effect of stimulating any enthusiasm for the British line. Mr. Dulles's statement that the United States would only join the Baghdad pact 'when it can be seen to contribute to the general stability of the area', seemed to preclude early accession. At the same time, while Nasser's hostility to the northern tier was being given increasing consideration, his first flirtation with the communists had not resulted in an immediate stepping-up of American aid for Israel as some had expected. Nor did there seem any likelihood that the administration would ask American companies to influence Arab disposal of oil revenue in ways which precluded the subsidising of disruptive elements, as was hoped in certain British quarters. There was a genuine desire on the part of the United States to do something to lessen Arab-Israeli tension, but it was believed that a start should be made by practical assistance towards the resettlement of refugees and by schemes such as the Johnson water plan, rather than by the formation of a military force to be stationed along the Arab-Israeli frontier as a physical deterrent. Nevertheless in the communiqué issued on 1 February the western statesmen expressed support for the efforts of General Burns and offered to 'consider recommendations for any necessary enlargement of his organisation and improvement of its capabilities'.[3] For the rest, the Tripartite Declaration of 25 May 1950

[1] *The Times*, 28 January 1956.
[2] Cf. above, p. 190.
[3] *The Times*, 2 February 1956, citing the Washington declaration (Cmd. 9700).

which provided for action 'both inside and outside the United Nations', was resurrected and it was agreed to consult with the French 'to decide the nature of the action we should take'.[1]

The talks as a whole indicated that although there was considerable agreement on the general outline of Anglo-American policy, fundamental divergencies based on necessarily different evaluations of national interest precluded co-ordination in practice. The impression was left that the conference had never really 'come to grips with the kind of basic underlying differences in British and American policy which would blow the alliance right out of the water'.[2] Nor was opinion satisfied that the talks had revitalized western policy in the Middle East which had been described as 'obsolescent if not obsolete', and about which it was widely felt that 'fresh thinking must be applied if Moscow's gay initiative is to be matched by western action'.[3] Eden, it is true, claimed that the talks had far exceeded his expectations; but it remained to be seen what the 'very wide range of agreement' amounted to in practice, and what its effects in the Arab world would be.

It was perhaps for this reason, and in order to put forward the 'British point of view', that Selwyn Lloyd, who had succeeded Macmillan as British foreign secretary in December 1955, visited the Middle East and India in the course of his journey to and from the Karachi meeting of S.E.A.T.O. powers on 6 March. His task would seem to have been to justify the policy of military alliances, especially the Baghdad pact, both in Cairo and in Delhi; but he also stopped in Israel—the first visit a British foreign minister had ever made to the Jewish state—and in Ankara, where British negotiations with representatives of the Cyprus communities had caused misgiving. Little positive appears to have resulted. In Cairo Selwyn Lloyd appears to have found Nasser in a conciliatory mood, and ready to find a new basis for co-operation with the west, provided that it was compatible with the new era of Arab independence. But the prominence which the Egyptian press gave to Lebanese and Saudi Arabian declarations confirming their rejection of the Baghdad pact, showed clearly the limits of Egyptian co-operation. In Israel the courtesy of Selwyn Lloyd's visit was appreciated; but the British point of view (it was widely believed) was so far removed from the Israeli position that little could be achieved by discussion. Major-General Moshe Dayan was only summarizing a widely held opinion when he said: 'what Israelis are doing on the spot to fortify their homeland counts for more than all the visits of this country's ambassadors to the State Department and the Foreign Office'—and (it might be added) for more than visits in the reverse direction.

[1] Cf. above, p. 276.

[2] *N.Y. Herald Tribune*, 5 February 1956.

[3] *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 January 1956.

There was, in fact, nothing to show that either the Washington conference or Selwyn Lloyd's conversations had brought about a change in the situation in the Middle East. On the other hand, incidents in Bahrein, when Selwyn Lloyd stopped there on his way to Delhi, provided new evidence of instability, and this in an area which produced one-fifth of the daily oil output of the world. Whether the riots during Selwyn Lloyd's visit to Bahrein were intended simply to draw attention to the harshness of the government, or whether they were inspired by political nationalism, there is no doubt that they caused disquiet in London, since they implicitly called in question the British political and military position in the Persian Gulf. Even more serious, however, were two further incidents which occurred in the course of Selwyn Lloyd's travels and counteracted any positive impressions his contacts may have made. The one was the court revolution in Jordan which found expression in the sudden dismissal of General Glubb. The other was the abrupt ending of the negotiations between the British authorities and the representatives of the communities in Cyprus, which had been continuing since the end of the London conference in September 1955, and the deportation of archbishop Makarios. If the incidents in Bahrein had caused disquiet in London, the dismissal of Glubb brought momentary consternation, immediately reflected in the fall of government funds on the Stock Exchange.[1] At the same time the breaking-off of the Cyprus negotiations—though it pleased the Turks and contributed to the welcome accorded to Selwyn Lloyd when he arrived in Ankara on 11 March—showed that unrest and unsettlement was a continuing factor. By the middle of March it was clear that it was impossible to regard the Washington talks as marking a turn for the better in the eastern Mediterranean and the adjacent lands.

*Cyprus*

The sudden deterioration of the situation in Cyprus, which culminated in the deportation of archbishop Makarios, was perhaps not entirely unexpected. Negotiations had dragged on without result; far from demonstrating the existence of common ground between the parties, they provided rather an opportunity for adopting more rigid attitudes. The Turkish government, in particular, which initially had played a small part, defined its position more sharply, especially when events seemed to show that the British government, under pressure at home and from its allies abroad, might be preparing to make concessions to Greek and Cypriot sentiment. It was maintained in Ankara that the Cyprus dispute had been artificially provoked; that alteration of one aspect of the treaty of Lausanne might entail modification of other of its clauses; and that 'according to present-day legal rulings, the principle of self-determination

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 6 March 1956.

is not one which has crystallized to a sufficient extent and . . . its application to Cyprus is in no way possible from the point of view of the island's historical, geographical, political and strategic position, and of other characteristics peculiar to the island'.[1]

This being the tenor of Turkish opinion, the deportation of Makarios was received joyfully in Ankara. But in the wider context of the Middle East situation, there were few who echoed Turkish opinion. The British government had clarified its attitude on 5 March when Mr. Lennox-Boyd had told the House of Commons that 'it is not . . . their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition on account of the present situation in the eastern Mediterranean.'[2] Instead they proposed a 'wide measure of self government now' and were 'prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community'.

On 2 February Makarios had indicated that although he was not prepared to associate himself with the British position, he was prepared to co-operate in framing a constitution on certain conditions.[3] But by the end of the month, when Lennox-Boyd went to Cyprus, no further progress had been made. The archbishop stated that he could not accept the exclusion from the amnesty of those arrested for carrying arms, ammunition, and explosives. Furthermore he could not agree that public security should be reserved to the governor 'for as long as he thought necessary', or that the composition of the elected majority should be defined in advance of recommendations by a constitutional commissioner. Lennox-Boyd, on the other hand, would go no further than offering a partial amnesty and proposing that a constitutional commissioner should draw up a liberal and democratic constitution in consultation with representatives of all sections of opinion in the island. Foreign affairs, security, and defence, he maintained, should be reserved to the governor 'for as long as he thought necessary', but other departments would be under Cypriot ministers. It was at this stage, when talks had broken down after five months of negotiation, that the British government felt it essential 'to let the world know of the offers that they had made and to make their position clear'. 'As to the future', Lennox-Boyd continued, 'the first and most important duty is to restore law and order. . . . In the constitutional field our objective remains the same, that is to reach agreement with the communities in Cyprus in accordance with the principles that I have indicated.'[4]

If the deportation of Makarios on 9 March, combined with the official statement that 'the archbishop now personally constitutes a major obstacle

[1] *News from Turkey*, 8 March 1956.
[2] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 549, col. 1716.
[3] See Cmd. 9708.
[4] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 549, col. 1718.

to a return to peaceful conditions, and that his influence must therefore be removed from the island in the interest of promoting peace, order, and good government',[1] was intended as evidence of the British government's determination to pursue the policy outlined above, its effect in practice was rather to contribute another complicating factor to an already confused situation. Hostile critics pointed out the idiosyncracies of a British policy, which, while it had shown itself capable of giving independence to other subject peoples, seemed determined to keep the 'direct descendants of Plato's compatriots' in a condition of permanent bondage.[2] The Greeks based their demands and their appeals to the United Nations on the principle of self-determination,[3] an argument which might to some appear irrefutable in theory but for which post-war developments had shown, at least in the cases of Trieste and Jerusalem and Okinawa, few encouraging precedents. It might be held that the political activity of the archbishop followed long-established principles and an ancient tradition, or (with Dr. Fisher) that Makarios had shown himself to be a 'politician calculating risks and chances'.[4] The archbishop's own position had been clarified on 5 March, when he stated that he was not prepared to reopen negotiations. 'It is for Britain to say yes or no. We will make an appeal to the United Nations in any case . . . we shall under no circumstances lower the flag of self-determination.'[5]

In the United States it was generally felt that 'the British handling of the whole Enosis episode has been a monument of diplomatic ineptitude'.[6] But the diplomacy of the United States ambassador in Athens, who expressed the 'sympathetic concern' of his government at the deportation of Makarios and congratulated the Greek foreign minister on the 'dignity and statesmanship with which the Greek government had dealt with the current situation',[7] was not appreciated in London. The British government sought an explanation and the Greeks evidence of practical endorsement of the statement. Whereupon the State Department, which was preoccupied with the effects of the controversy upon N.A.T.O., made conciliatory statements and Eisenhower spoke of the difficult situation which had arisen between 'two of our very best friends', in which the United States was 'ready to do anything that is reasonable and practicable to help reaching some solution'.[8]

In fact, so far as it treated Cyprus as a separate issue between Great Britain and Greece, or between Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey, comment tended to be irrelevant. The British case rested on the argument that Cyprus was not simply a question between the three powers directly

[1] Official communiqué in *The Times*, 10 March 1956.
[2] *N.Y. Times*, 11 March 1956.
[3] *The Times*, 12 March 1956.
[4] H.L. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 196, col. 471.
[5] *Manchester Guardian*, 6 March 1956.
[6] *Baltimore Sun*, 10 March 1956.
[7] *The Times*, 14 March 1956.
[8] *The Times*, 15 March 1956.

concerned, but an cssentiall elcment in thc British position in thc Middle East as a whole. During the spring the British government had sent 1,500 paratroops to Cyprus, not for use in the island, but for employment in the Middle East in general. The decisive issue would therefore seem to have been British preoccupation with the increasing instability—revealed by such incidents as the Bahrein riots and the dismissal of Glubb Pasha—throughout the region, and the belief that this could still be countered by traditional military methods. So long as this belief persisted, and the great powers were unprepared to recognize the comprehensive changes which had occurred in the Middle East, any positive development in the Cyprus situation was improbable. On the other hand, events soon showed that the British government had underestimated the difficulty of breaking the Cypriot opposition and restoring 'law and order'. The measures taken were severe—as indicated by Lennox-Boyd's announcement early in July that 118 persons under 18 had been sentenced to whipping[1]—but they only provoked equally violent counter-measures. When, on 10 May, two Cypriot 'terrorists' were hanged on the orders of Sir John Harding—'the first political executions', it was said, 'since E.O.K.A. took to armed violence'—the Cypriot resistance movement executed two British soldiers in reprisal. The next day British troops shot dead a Cypriot boy, aged 13, caught distributing leaflets.[2] Thus a pattern was set, which was to last many months longer.

*North Africa*

The same sort of situation as faced Great Britain as the occupying power in Cyprus, confronted the French on a larger scale in North Africa. Here the central issue was by now the intractable problem of Algeria. In Morocco the agreement of 6 November 1955 on independence had been followed on 6 December by the formation of the first Moroccan government by Si Bekkai. Not unexpectedly Tunisia thereupon asked for a revision of the June agreements to give complete independence. But this was a minor complication by comparison with developments in Algeria. The scope of the Algerian problem is best indicated by the fact that France, which had a force of 80,000 men committed to 'pacification' on 1 May 1955, had increased the number of troops at its disposal to 160–170,000 by the beginning of 1956, and calculated that a force of 220,000 men would be necessary before 'the security of the population could be better guaranteed'.[3] Yet the military commitment, large though it loomed, was only one aspect of the Algerian problem. In addition there

[1] Of these thirteen were under 14 and the remainder between 14 and 18; *Daily Sketch*, 11 July 1956. By that date 96 of the 118 sentences had been carried out.

[2] For the various incidents, cf. *Manchester Guardian*, 9–12 May 1956.

[3] *Daily Telegraph*, 9 January 1956.

was the pressure of the French settlers, and the attitude of the French government itself, which persisted, against all the evidence, in the view that the heart of the problem was poverty, to be combated by economic measures and administrative reform.

Both these problems came to a head in the first days of 1956. In the first place, the sixty-one Algerian Moslems, who had resigned from the local assembly the previous September, reiterated their former standpoint. 'The Algerian problem', they declared,[1] 'is essentially a political, not an economic one, as some would have it believed.' Hence the only solution, in their view, lay in early recognition of the principle of Algerian nationality, in talks with Moslem representatives, and in the release of political prisoners. But if this was the Moslem view, it was immediately countered by the European groups, who asked for a reaffirmation of the principle that Algeria was French, and took positive steps on 14 January to make their views heard by forming a committee to defend French Algeria.[2] At the same time a report by M. Jacques Soustelle was submitted to the French government. In his report Soustelle advocated equality of rights and duties between Moslems and Algerians of French extraction. This, he emphasized, must be applied in all spheres—transport, banking, wages, and social security. It was a measure which would certainly entail financial sacrifices, but they would be small compared with the cost of alternative policies. He also advocated abolishing the post of governor-general and administering Algeria on the same basis as the rest of metropolitan France with a single electoral college and a concomitant increase in Algerian Moslem representation in Paris.[3] In fact, Soustelle saw no alternative between integration combined with complete equality, on the one hand, or federalism leading to eventual secession, on the other. But it was doubtful, nine years after the abortive 1947 reforms, whether proposals on these lines were not too late.

The policy of the Mollet government soon emphasized the dilemma. On 29 January General Georges Catroux was appointed minister-resident in Algeria. He was known to be sympathetic to Moslem aspirations, and it was felt that his personal standing would reassure legitimate anxieties among European Algerians. But on 6 February Catroux resigned, only a few days before he was due to take up his post. At the same time Mollet, visiting Algiers, was being mobbed and molested by French extremists; while the police produced evidence to convince him of the lengths to which the latter would go to ensure that no real changes were made.[4]

[1] *Le Monde*, 6 January 1956.

[2] This was called 'Front français d'Algérie pour l'association paritaire des deux communautés algériennes'.

[3] *Le Monde*, 13 January 1956. This would have meant that 30 to 35 Algerians would have seats in Paris.

[4] *Manchester Guardian*, 7 February 1956.

On 17 March the French cabinet announced the transfer of two divisions from Germany, and further troops from west Africa towards the additional 200,000 men Lacoste claimed to be necessary in order to provide protection from the 'rebels'. Other measures were announced at the same time. These envisaged the reform of the system of selection for administrative posts so that Moslems would be able to hold half of the responsible positions, instead of, as currently, eight out of 864;[1] an increase in agricultural wages; some agrarian reforms; and the delegation of special powers to the governor-general to use in the event of a further deterioration in the security situation.[2]

At the same time, France redoubled its efforts to strengthen its hand by securing the support of its allies. In a speech on 2 March, Pineau spoke pointedly of the failure of the western powers to co-ordinate their policies.[3] He had been impressed, he said, by the fact that there was really no common Franco-Anglo-American policy anywhere in the world. In the Near East the British had concluded the Baghdad pact without consultation with France; and in Asia the United States, having supported the Vietnamese government against the French, were now asking France to influence the Vietnamese not to ask for the withdrawal of the expeditionary force. But differences were particularly apparent in respect of North Africa. In Algeria the French had the impression that behind certain sorts of insurrection and propaganda there was evidence that other powers wished to take over the French inheritance. France acknowledged that she had made many mistakes in North Africa, but whatever the solution to the present situation might be, greater unanimity between France, England, and the United States would help in its application. The existing situation, on the other hand, gave the impression that hostile forces could play off one western power against the other.

The implications of this speech were obvious, and steps were taken to back it up when, later in March, Mollet visited London for 'cordial and intimate talks' with Eden, at which the world-wide responsibilities of both powers were emphasized and close and continuing consultation to further their joint policies was envisaged.[4] Already Sir Gladwyn Jebb, speaking in Paris on 6 March, had stated that 'we must all salute the admirable solutions, worthy of a great modern nation, which France has already achieved in Tunisia and Morocco, and the struggle for a liberal settlement which will yet preserve France's position as a great power, that is now taking place in Algeria'. 'In this struggle', he promised—and his undertaking can scarcely have been given without sanction from London—'France has every right to expect, and will of course get all support and

[1] *The Times*, 19 March 1956.
[2] Cf. *L'Année Politique*, 1956, p. 504, for the text of the law.
[3] *Le Monde*, 4 March 1956.
[4] Cf. the communiqué in *Le Monde*, 13 March 1956.

encouragement from her ally across the channel.'[1] Similar—though perhaps more cautious—encouragement was also given by the American ambassador in Paris. Speaking on 20 March, he emphasized that the United States had 'loyally supported the French government' in North Africa; it had responded promptly and favourably 'to French requests for helicopters', and given 'strong support' to 'the position that Algeria is an internal French problem and therefore not appropriate for discussion by the United Nations'. Misunderstanding of the American attitude might, he added, be due to the fact that 'we thought that public expression of our views would be considered to be undue interference in other peoples' affairs, and accordingly we have kept silent'. But he emphasized that 'the United States hopes for and favors the continuation of the closest possible interdependence between France and Morocco and Tunisia . . . and has no desire to interfere in any way with the close relationship between France and these two countries, a relationship which we count upon as one of the bulwarks of the free world'. With respect to Algeria, 'the United States stands solidly behind France in her search for a liberal and equitable solution to the problems'.[2]

This affirmation of great-power support was followed by contacts between France and Egypt. When M. Pineau was in Cairo after the Karachi meeting of the S.E.A.T.O. powers, the Egyptian government announced that it 'only wished to support a peaceful settlement of North African problems according to the freely expressed will of the peoples'.[3] Although Pineau enlarged on this statement, revealing that 'Nasser gave me his soldier's word of honour that for several months no Algerian commando has been trained in an Egyptian camp', it was clearly open to different interpretations, and Pineau was not slow to add the qualification that free elections could not take place while the atmosphere remained disturbed.[4]

In North Africa itself the Algerian question had by now increased in importance to such an extent that it overshadowed the completion of Moroccan independence on 2 March, and of Tunisian independence on 20 March.[5] M. Bourguiba, speaking in the Tunisian electoral campaign, was ready to reaffirm, with all the overtones that the word 'guest' has in the Moslem world, that French residents there were 'our guests, and while they respect the laws of our hospitality they will be well

[1] *Le Monde*, 7 March 1956.

[2] *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, 1956, p. 378.

[3] *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 15 March 1956. This was in line with Afro-Asian policy. On 26 January 1956 it had been announced that the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations would not ask the Security Council to discuss Algeria until the new Mollet government had had time to consider the problem.

[4] *Le Monde*, 16 March 1956.

[5] The texts and related documents are in *L'Année Politique*, 1956, pp. 505 and 509.

treated'. But he repeated that the possibility of Algeria remaining under a colonial yoke was inconceivable. 'A solution must be found to end the struggle and stop the bloodshed of our brothers in race and religion—a solution that must be freely discussed so that Algeria reassumes a political personality.'[1] Moreover, he added, a rapid solution was essential if there were to be any hope of concessions to French feeling in the negotiations. Tunisia would not declare war on France, but neither would the Tunisian government prevent help reaching Algeria; 'the French are our friends, but the Algerians are our brothers'.[2] Meanwhile El Fassi, speaking in Madrid, affirmed that Moroccans held similar views. They wished to avoid a breakdown in Franco-Algerian relations, and the sultan had offered to mediate. In Paris the Moroccan minister of state, M. Bouabid, emphasized that there were many Algerians with whom the French could open discussions, and that even among the *maquis* the majority sought a peaceful solution.[3] In Morocco itself guerrillas of the Moroccan National Liberation army were rallying to the sultan, which put the French troops sent there to help restore order in an equivocal position.

In Algeria itself the situation was daily becoming more desperate. At the end of March, the Algerian Front of National Liberation announced that since 'France had begun to attack unarmed Algerians, to destroy their villages, to blow up their homes, to scatter their families, and to arrest youths and kill women and children', the Algerian army could no longer be bound by humane considerations and would fight France by the same methods that the French were employing. France alone would be responsible for the consequences.[4] The results were soon visible, when a new 'get-to-grips' campaign, initiated by the French army, resulted not only in increased Algerian casualties but also in more ambushes and sabotage against the French. Meanwhile the Algerian National Liberation Movement, without the support of any of the big French trade unions, was able to organize increasingly successful strikes among North African workers in metropolitan France; and the Liberation Front urged the United Nations 'to take prompt and effective measures to stop colonial aggression in Algeria'.[5]

In May Nehru made a five-point proposal for a negotiated settlement.[6] He prefaced his suggestions with a tribute to French action in Morocco and Tunisia, and emphasized that while he supported the right of peoples to self-determination and independence, he had the highest regard for the traditions of France. Nehru proposed that both sides should formally declare themselves to be in favour of ending violence; that the national entity of Algeria, as a distinct body politic, should be recognized by the

[1] *Le Monde*, 24 March 1956.
[2] *Figaro*, 9 and 24 April 1956.
[3] *Le Monde*, 24 April 1956.
[4] *Manchester Guardian*, 31 March 1956.
[5] *The Times*, 4 April 1956.
[6] *Hindu*, 23 May 1956.

French government; that equality irrespective of race should be accepted; that it should be emphasized that Algeria was the motherland of all the people living there and that they should be entitled, irrespective of race, to share the benefits and burdens arising from the recognition of Algerian nationhood; and finally, that direct negotiations between the parties should be started, based on these principles and in accordance with the United Nations' Charter.

Nevertheless, on 6 June, the French National Assembly passed a vote of confidence in the government, at the end of a debate during which Mollet had stated categorically that the Algerian problem was solely a French concern and that the French government did not desire a mediator. 'I personally believe . . . that Nehru made his proposition with the greatest care to respect the French position, but we cannot hold with it because it introduces the notion of mediation.' Mollet was in favour of a single electoral college. and he rejected any solution which involved the division of Algeria into Moslem and European zones. But for the rest, France seemed determined to follow its previous policy.

*Jordan, Israel, and Middle Eastern Alignments*

Meanwhile the Middle East itself remained in a state of chronic unsettlement, despite negotiations among the Arab states throughout the spring to co-ordinate their policy and action towards both Israel and other powers. These negotiations had their origin in Jordan, where the disorders which had led to the formation of an interim government at the end of 1955, continued spasmodically throughout January. Jordan was peculiarly sensitive to the tensions in the Middle East, which seemed to threaten its internal stability; and for this reason King Hussein had every reason to attempt once again a reconciliation between the groupings in the region led respectively by Egypt and by Iraq. Hence at the beginning of the year soundings were made in Damascus and Beirut with a view to gauging interest in a possible conference of the heads of all the Arab states.[1] But by the second week in February it was clear that Egypt would not co-operate, although Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria were agreed that such a meeting was urgently necessary.[2]

It is true that, in Cairo, it was denied that Egypt had rejected Hussein's proposal, or had implied that there was no need to co-ordinate action against Israel; but it was pointed out that, so long as Iraqi policy was based on a British alliance, and Egypt was opposed to any external influence, a meeting could achieve little except to provide still another occasion for the expression of differing opinions. Nevertheless one significant result of the exchanges was that Samir el-Rifai indicated his

[1] *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 4 February 1956.

[2] *The Times*, 13 February 1956.

government's willingness to reduce British influence in Jordan. This resulted in a renewal of Nasser's offer to join with Saudi Arabia and Syria in giving aid to Jordan to enable Hussein to have an Arab commander of his army; the British subsidy, he pointed out, was not dependent on the continued appointment of a British commander. Nevertheless Jordan seemed unwilling to jeopardize the British subsidy.[1]

This was the situation at the end of February, by which time King Saud and president Kuwatly were preparing to meet Nasser in Cairo, with the intention of continuing with further preparatory talks in Amman before taking up King Hussein's suggestion for a wider conference. But at this point a new and unexpected event intervened. On 1 March Hussein dismissed General Glubb, the chief-of-staff of the Jordanian army. As pointed out above,[2] the dismissal of Glubb had widespread repercussions. On Hussein's part, it may have been due to the feeling, sedulously propagated by Arab nationalists, that he was not master in his own house and was consequently forfeiting respect among his subjects; it was also further evidence of his determination to pursue a policy 'in full response to Arab hopes and aims'. In the west, however, the first reaction was to seek a more drastic interpretation, and to see in Hussein's action evidence that 'the present government of Jordan had decided against the spirit of the [British] alliance to join with Egypt and Saudi Arabia in harrying Britain in the Middle East'.[3] Nevertheless it soon became clear that this interpretation was not altogether correct. It is true that in Amman the action was greeted with 'universal and genuine' pleasure. In part, this was because it was seen as ending a system under which promotion was refused to officers who were unsympathetic to western policies. On the other hand, it was also felt that, by clarifying the situation, it might help rather than hinder the development of good relations with Great Britain.[4]

Once the initial repercussions had died down, the two governments directly involved quickly adopted the latter point of view, and minimized the affair. On the Jordanian side, Samir el-Rifai emphasized that his country's treaty relationship with Britain should be based on common interests, not on individuals. Rightly or wrongly, he maintained, the impression had been formed that Glubb was 'more than merely a Chief-of-Staff', and that although he may not have fostered or deserved this opinion, 'he never acted in a way that would dispel the impression'.[5] Samir el-Rifai went on to dismiss as hypothetical the possibility that Jordan would accept subsidies from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, if

[1] *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 14 February 1956.
[2] Cf. above, p. 287.
[3] *Manchester Guardian*, 6 March 1956.
[4] *The Times*, 6 March 1956.
[5] 'He was considered the true ruler of Jordan', Samir el-Rifai continued. 'One British magazine headline said the other day that General Glubb ruled the legion with an iron hand, and the legion ruled Jordan. How could the king allow this impression to continue?' Cf. *The Times*, 6 March 1956.

the British subsidies were discontinued, and expressed the hope that the British government would not take such action. For its part, the British government seemed to share the Jordanian wish to play the episode out in a minor key. In reply to questions in parliament, Eden affirmed that fifteen British officers in executive positions would be withdrawn and that other aspects of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty would be discussed; but he refrained from further comment.[1] A similarly reticent attitude was also maintained by Nutting. 'Our best and wisest course', he said, 'is to show ourselves reliable, consistent, patient, but yet firm in the policy of seeking and extending co-operation with the Middle East states in the things that matter —the defence of their security and the development of their life and resources.'[2] This general line of policy, it is evident, applied not only to the Middle East in general, but to Jordan and Egypt in particular. The result was that what looked at one moment as though it might develop into a major crisis, died down. After a month of discussion it was agreed that England would lend Jordan a number of officers as instructors and technicians. On the other hand, the question of the future of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and the British subsidy, which was the underlying cause of Arab disaffection, was left over to the future, dependent in part on the course of events in the Middle East and in part on the success of Hussein's attempts to trim an independent line between the contending Arab blocs.

That such was his policy was seen, early in March, when the earlier proposals for an inter-Arab conference resulted in a meeting in Cairo, attended by the rulers of Syria and Saudi Arabia with their foreign and war ministers, for discussions 'to safeguard the interests of the Arab nations, expel the imperialists, and protect Arab soil'.[3] Nevertheless there was still no unanimity among the Arab leaders that Cairo was the appropriate place from which to direct this policy. Hussein not only refused to attend the meeting, but also made it clear that he had no intention of joining either the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian alliance or the Baghdad pact; and this, together with the Lebanon's continued independence of both groupings, caused some speculation as to the extent of the influence exercised by Egypt in the making of official policy in the area. A tripartite statement at the end of the conference spoke of determination to reinforce Arab security and to co-ordinate policy against nations which helped in equipping Israeli forces; to repulse pressure exerted through the Baghdad pact, and in particular to support Jordan against foreign pressure; to co-ordinate Egyptian, Saudi Arabian, and Syrian policy in political, military and economic spheres, and in regard to the British occupation of the Buraimi oasis and Oman; finally, it reaffirmed the belief that France must recognize the claims of North Africans to liberty in

[1] H.C. Deb., 5th ser., vol. 549, col. 1709.
[2] Ibid., col. 2113.
[3] *The Times*, 6 March 1956.

accordance with the United Nations' Charter and the right of self-determination.[1]

The immediate practical result of the meeting and communiqué, however, was to re-arouse internal antagonism between the Arab powers. Iraq refused to endorse the communiqué, and Nuri es-Said denounced the 'baseless attacks' made on the Baghdad pact, which he described as a 'defence against the communist danger from within and without'. Nasser's opposition to the pact, Nuri maintained, dated 'only from the moment when he thought it might interfere with his personal ambition to shine as the leader of all the Arabs'; earlier he had discussed the possibility of Egyptian adherence 'on a perfectly friendly basis'. Nevertheless Nuri agreed with Nasser that Israel was 'the cancer in the vitals of the Middle East', and he believed that, having regard to memories of the Palestinian war and the Gaza incident, it was essential for a man in Nasser's position to obtain modern arms to ensure that such defeats were not repeated. The west, Nuri argued, 'should have understood this and agreed to supply Egypt with reasonable quantities of arms'.[2] But the real dilemma between the west and the Arabs still remained: on the one hand, the overwhelming majority of western states had recognized Israel's right to existence, while on the other hand, what was judged by one disputant to be a reasonable quantity of arms, was unlikely to be accepted by another. Nevertheless, as the Dulles–Eden proposals in the autumn of 1955 had shown, the inviolability of Israel's existing frontiers was no longer considered in western quarters to be beyond question.

A further factor was the attack, on 11 December 1955, by Israeli regular armed forces across the demilitarized zone east of Lake Tiberias. This was the subject of much debate and a resolution of condemnation in the Security Council.[3] In April 1956 an attempt was made to put an end to such incidents and bring a measure of peace to the area through United Nations action. This move was welcomed by the Soviet representative in the Council, Mr. Sobolev, who criticized the tendency of certain western states, which (he alleged) were planning armed intervention under pretext of preventing war. He referred to reports of plans in London for the use of British land, sea, and air forces in the area, and to the deployment of the United States Sixth Fleet in the vicinity. According to Mr. Sobolev, talks had already taken place between the United States and Great Britain, and France had proposed a tripartite meeting; but, to his knowledge, 'none of the parties concerned had been invited to attend these meetings'.[4] Any action, he maintained, should be taken in agreement with the parties concerned and through the United Nations. Nevertheless the Soviet delegate accepted the American resolution and

[1] *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 13 March 1956.
[2] *Daily Telegraph*, 31 March 1956.
[3] *N.Y. Times*, 17 December 1955, 20 January 1956.
[4] *The Times*, 4 April 1956.

Mr. Hammarskjöld was asked to survey the state of compliance with the armistice agreement, to seek to determine measures which would reduce existing tension, and to report back within a month.

This move was countered on the part of the Arab states by a further attempt to co-ordinate their policy. Hussein visited Damascus, and Syria and Jordan reaffirmed their solidarity in face of the danger from Israel.[1] On 21 April Nasser signed a five-year military pact with Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. This provided for mutual defence; a unified command under General Hakim Amer, the Egyptian commander-in-chief (who also led the Egyptian-Syrian forces); and a supreme council as a policy-making body which would instruct the commander of the joint armies. A joint communiqué issued in Cairo on 6 May stated that Egypt and Jordan had decided to co-ordinate and unify their armies to guarantee the defence and interests of the Arab nations. On 22 May a further announcement made known that Jordan and Lebanon would co-ordinate their military policy.

What was noteworthy in the Egyptian communiqué of 6 May was the absence of the usual references to the threat of Israeli aggression. This caused considerable speculation and led some observers to wonder whether Egypt was seeking to consolidate the Arab front as a preliminary to accepting an Israeli initiative for a peace settlement. Such speculations were, perhaps, not far wide of the mark. During April Egypt had agreed to order the cessation of all hostile acts against Israelis by Egyptian regular and irregular forces, and on 18 April a widely phrased cease-fire agreement came into force.[2] Later it was reported that Jordan had agreed to a similar measure and that Nasser had pledged his influence in Syria and Lebanon to the same end. The interim report, issued by Mr. Hammarskjöld, emphasized the difference between former cease-fire arrangements, which were made between local commanders, and the new agreements which were governed by an undertaking, given by the governments concerned to the United Nations, to comply unconditionally with the fundamental clause of the various armistice agreements and to establish anew the legal situation on which the armistice régime was to be based.[3] This was certainly true; but the fact that negotiations were still going on for the gradual achievement of full compliance with other clauses of the agreements, and that no arrangement proved possible on an arms embargo for the area, meant that there was still a tendency for each side to continue to manœuvre for position.

Israel, in particular, was naturally concerned to restore the balance disturbed by the Czech arms deals. During the spring it had made a

[1] *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 10 April 1956.
[2] Cf. *The Times*, 20 April 1956, for the communiqué.
[3] *N.Y. Times*, 4 May 1956; for the text of the full report cf. ibid., 11 May 1956.

series of requests for defence aid from the United States and Great Britain, and on 2 March Sharett, speaking in the Knesset, asked for a definite answer. The American answer was given on 3 April. The position in regard to the sale of arms by the United States to Israel, Dulles stated, remained unchanged; the Israeli request had not been rejected, but it had not been decided what action should be taken. On the other hand, he specifically added that the United States had 'no objection to the sale of arms to Israel by other western countries'.[1] This statement appears to have determined the western line, and as a consequence deliveries of Mystère fighters ordered for use by N.A.T.O. were postponed in favour of Israel. Twelve were delivered in March; a further eight on 15 April; and a final consignment of twelve aircraft on 13 May. These deliveries, together with orders still pending in western capitals, were intended to counterbalance arms delivered to Egypt from eastern Europe. But if by this policy Dulles hoped to avoid involvement in the area, he was quickly disappointed. On the one side, such limited measures failed to placate Israeli supporters in the United States; on the other side, Arab opinion was alienated and judged him guilty of following a pro-Israeli line.

A further factor was the course of internal political development in Israel, where, following a cabinet crisis, Mrs. Meir in June took over the foreign ministry in the Ben-Gurion government from Mr. Sharett. This change was generally regarded as the replacement of an official who was cautious and who occasionally put a brake on the prime minister's ideas, by a consistent supporter of Ben-Gurion's policies; and together with the appointment of a new minister of labour it was expected to lead to a more vigorous line of action.[2] Ben-Gurion denied that any change of policy was envisaged and repeated earlier pledges to observe the armistice agreements, 'provided the Arabs observe them too'. It was, nevertheless, widely believed that the main difference leading to the cabinet crisis had been over the interpretation of the armistice agreements. This view was reinforced when the prime minister announced that Israel's grave security position made it essential to maintain the closest co-operation between the ministries of defence and foreign affairs. Somewhat cryptically, he added that Israel's stand, while he believed it to be just and logical, 'may be difficult to maintain, and may bring Israel into conflict with important powers for which Israel has great respect'.[3] Meanwhile the arms build-up went on. On 21 June Israel received two British destroyers, which not only balanced two recently delivered to Egypt but also constituted the largest warships in the Israeli navy. Nevertheless, there was general compliance with the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire agreement, which was timed

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 4 April 1956.
[2] Ibid. 18 June 1956.
[3] *The Times*, 20 June 1956.

to last for six months from the end of April; and on a short view this seemed to be restoring stability to the region after the series of attacks and reprisals which had occurred in the early spring.

While, however, the Arab-Israeli feud and the other internal problems diminished in intensity, the intervention of forces from outside the area remained a disturbing factor. In the first place, a treaty of friendship was signed between the Soviet Union and Yemen, and was followed by economic agreements with Czechoslovakia and Poland. As a result of complaints regarding alleged British obstruction of Yemeni oil prospecting, *Pravda* assured the 'courageous and freedom-loving Yemeni people' that the Soviet Union was their 'staunch and reliable friend and ally', and the crown prince of Yemen visited Moscow and established diplomatic relations.[1] At the same time the British government sought to strengthen its position in the area by making known its plans for the future of the Aden protectorate. In the British view the states of the Aden protectorate were individually 'too small in area, population and reserves, to be able to become economically and politically fully developed'; 'therefore they should seek some form of close association with each other'. While the British government intended that they should have complete freedom of choice regarding the nature of the association, it pledged 'assistance and protection' to any eventual combination.[2] Not unexpectedly this statement provoked Egyptian hostility. Egypt's objective, Nasser said, was the complete liberation of strategic points on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, 'where foreign positions may always jeopardise the military, economic, and political independence of the Arabs in the hinterland'.[3] His argument was underlined by the action of demonstrators who greeted the arrival of the colonial under-secretary in Aden with shouts of 'down with colonialism' and demands for independence. Even economic development, Nasser had maintained, could only be of real value to the Arabs when they were entirely independent of imperialist domination.

This was a factor in policy which the great powers seemed either unable or unwilling to take into account. By now educated opinion in the Middle East had reached a stage where even economic assistance was gauged less by its monetary value than by the existence or non-existence of 'strings' or conditions, however tenuously attached. Nationalists regarded any association of their leaders with the policies of Great Britain, France, or Turkey, with intense suspicion, and seem to have believed that even if the 'imperialists' did not openly exploit a situation, their actions were nevertheless designed to subvert the nationalist cause. The negotiations concerning the financing of the Aswan Dam brought this common feeling

[1] *The Times*, 6 and 29 March 1956.
[2] Ibid. 2 April 1956.
[3] *Daily Telegraph*, 5 April 1956.

into particular prominence, with results that were to unleash a general crisis; they were the last straw in a deteriorating situation.

*The Aswan Dam and the Genesis of the Suez Crisis*

The project for a dam on the Nile, which the revolutionary régime had revived, had become, by December 1955, the main feature of Egypt's internal development programme. One hundred and ten metres high and 5,000 metres long it would have a storage capacity of 130 milliard cubic metres which, allowing for reserves and evaporation, would still leave 60 milliard cubic metres for irrigation purposes. Moreover the increase of 10 million kilowatts would provide power for Egypt's industrialization programme and thus prevent the standard of living falling lower in spite of the anticipated population growth. The project was to be completed in two stages. The first would take about four years at a cost of 280 million dollars, of which Egypt would contribute 210 million, and the United States and Great Britain 70 million in foreign exchange. The second stage would cost 1,020 million dollars, of which Egypt would provide 690 million, the World Bank 200 million, and other contributors 130 million. By December 1955 a High Dam Authority had already been formed of independent experts assisted by engineers from the United States, France, and western Germany. A contract had been signed with Sir Alexander Gibb and partners to act as consulting engineers, prepare final specifications, and invite tenders.

But this advance in the technical aspects of the project was vitiated by lack of agreement over the political aspects. The High Dam at Aswan was only one of several projects proposed as methods of increasing the agricultural and industrial potential of the area. An alternative one to provide similar facilities envisaged the building of a diversion channel to carry the river round the Sudd marshes to Jonglei, with regulating dams on Lakes Kioga and Albert, a dam at Roseires and a flood protection barrage at Merowe, together with the completed dam at Jinja and a hydro-electric station there for Uganda and the Belgian Congo. The intrinsic merits of the plans were soon confused by political issues. It was pointed out, in the first place, that a barrage at Aswan, the hottest point of the Nile, would mean unnecessary loss of water through evaporation. More significant, however, was the fact that whereas the Aswan dam would only require Sudanese agreement before building began, the alternative project would put the Nile under the control of all riparian states at all times, and a permanent working agreement would be necessary. Although there was no reason to believe the Aswan project would necessarily be detrimental to the interests either of the Sudan, East Africa, or Ethiopia, it would entail the flooding of Wadi Halfa and the displacement

of about 50,000 Sudanese. In these circumstances agreement between the Sudan and Egypt was a precondition of any loan.

In Egypt the High Dam had become the symbol of the new régime, and the project was regarded as evidence of a new social and economic awakening. By December 1955 the Soviet Union had made an offer in general but attractive terms, and the British and American governments, having shown little interest during the previous two years, had made a preliminary offer of 70 million dollars. Nasser, it would seem, hoped to finance the dam through the International Bank, if possible; if he could not do that, his second choice was a consortium of English, French, and German engineering firms; alternatively, he would try to carry it through with Egyptian resources or with the help of the Soviet Union; but in any case he intended to do it. Hence at the beginning of 1956 Egypt sought firm offers for both stages of the project and at the same time sought minute clarification of the terms to make sure that the guarantees demanded would not constitute foreign control of the Egyptian national economy.

On the western side, there is some reason to believe that policy was affected by divergencies in the American and British appreciation of the Middle East situation. The United States saw Nasser as a stabilizing influence, and unrequited nationalism, such as that which had caused riots in Jordan and the Buraimi dispute, as the real source of trouble. They believed Egypt capable of leading an Arab bloc which would not be neutralist in the Asian sense, but would exercise a passive benevolence towards the west. Since Nasser was, in American eyes, the key to the area, they felt he should be treated with care, and sought financial formulas which would make the loans politically acceptable to him. London did not seem happy with this assessment, but was in no position to refuse to test it. Consequently, when Eisenhower, in his State of the Union message, emphasized the value of long-term economic agreements, and appealed to Congress 'to grant limited authority to such projects to be fulfilled from appropriations to be made in future fiscal years', Britain fell into line. It was believed, in the Middle East and elsewhere, that this implied a change from the former position of the U.S.A., and would increase the scope and stability of American foreign aid.

Meanwhile negotiations had continued between Egypt and the World Bank, the president of which was in Cairo from 28 January until 9 February. The main need was for guarantees from Egypt that sufficient foreign exchange revenue would be kept free to service the loan, which might run for as long as twenty-five years. Furthermore, it was agreed that an understanding should be reached with the Sudan on the sharing of the surplus water and on the resettlement of the Sudanese who would be displaced by flooding. On 9 February it was announced that the World Bank would grant a 200 million dollar loan, that preparatory work would

begin about mid-summer, and the work on the dam itself about July 1957.[1] The conditions were not published immediately and it is evident that the decision was not popular in Egypt, where nationalists feared that Nasser might have sold out to the western imperialists. Hence the Egyptian press was given the task of convincing the country that this was not so, and that the government was still able to pursue an independent policy. To demonstrate this independence the announcement that a 'substantial measure of agreement' had been reached with the World Bank was timed to coincide with a further announcement that agreement had been reached between the Soviet Union and Egypt on the construction of an atomic energy station. These announcements were followed by the arrest of sixty-five members of a communist organization, and by the arrival of an east German delegation to advise the government on economic development. Thus the Egyptian government demonstrated that its freedom of action was not impaired.

On the other hand, little progress was made throughout the spring in implementing the agreement with the World Bank, particularly in regard to the Sudan. Mirghani Hamza, the Sudanese minister of agriculture and irrigation, was among those who were optimistic that agreement would soon be reached with Egypt; but other Sudanese felt that agreement at any cost was out of the question, and that close attention should be given to ensuring that sufficient scope was secured for Sudanese development.[2] By April there was anxiety in Cairo whether a loan would, in fact, be forthcoming, and Nasser made it known that he had not rejected the Soviet offer of aid. 'I do not mention it,' he said, 'as a threat or as a bluff. The Soviet offer was very general, and really, we have not studied it.' On the other hand, Nasser added, although negotiations with the United States and Britain to get the project started were progressing, he was worried by statements made by members of parliament in London, who urged the government to renounce its offer of aid as retaliation against Egypt's anti-British propaganda campaign.[3] Moreover, Nasser expressed himself convinced that the British were trying to turn the Sudanese against the Aswan project, although Selwyn Lloyd had denied this when he was in Cairo in February. More serious, however, was Nasser's admission that his government had not yet started negotiations with the Sudan, and that it had been decided to postpone beginning the High Dam project in 1956 'mainly because of the many complex difficulties of arranging all details of such a big undertaking'.[4] This meant that the dam would probably be built as a continuous project instead of in two stages as originally planned. A month later an Egyptian official spokesman

[1] *Financial Times*, 10 February 1956.
[2] *The Times*, 13 February 1956.
[3] On 25 March 1956 there had been a further British protest at the content of the 'Voice of the Arabs' broadcasts.
[4] *N.Y. Times*, 2 April 1956.

again complained at British discussion of the sharing of the Nile waters, and added that the House of Commons was 'no place to debate such matters'.

In fact, London was becoming increasingly unhappy at the obvious differences in western appreciation of the Middle East situation, and official jargon could no longer cover up the discrepancies. Dulles described American policy as a desire to maintain peace in the Middle East and to prevent any movement from subverting the genuine independence of the peoples of the area. He amplified this by affirming that in so far as Colonel Nasser's public and official statements could be regarded as an index of Egyptian policy, it seemed to him that Colonel Nasser was 'actuated primarily by a desire to maintain genuine independence in his area, the same desire as I have expressed'.[1] London and Paris, on the other hand, were more concerned with the fact that Nasser's 'area' seemed to extend from Cyprus to Zanzibar, and from Morocco to the Persian Gulf. By the beginning of April there were reports in the press that Eden had written to Eisenhower privately and Selwyn Lloyd to Dulles officially about this divergence of opinion. Eisenhower at first stated that he was 'unaware' of any communication, although admitting that there were 'slightly different viewpoints with respect to certain areas, including the Baghdad Pact'. He emphasized that peace in the area depended on the realization of 'legitimate aspirations'.[2] Nevertheless the belief spread that London had appealed for a more resolute assertion of American leadership in regard not only to the Arab-Israeli dispute and Colonel Nasser's hostility to the west, but also to Soviet wooing of the Arab states. At the same time an article by the French prime minister appeared in *United States News and World Report*, criticizing the Middle East policy of the western powers who seemed to be 'wandering along in isolation'.[3] Observers in western Europe noted that 'American public support for the [Baghdad] pact, which was originally conceived by Mr. Dulles, has latterly been so lukewarm as to be almost unnoticeable', and criticized the American view of Nasser as a 'western type democrat with healthy anti-colonialist ideas which should be encouraged'.[4]

A few days later it transpired that Eden and Lloyd had, in fact, sent notes to the United States on 24 March, although Eisenhower had not received them when he spoke on 4 April.[5] Their purpose, it was believed, was to impress on the United States government the need to pursue consistently one of two alternative policies: either to establish a *modus vivendi* with Egypt, which would mean going ahead with economic co-operation, and suspending arms deliveries to Israel; or to ignore Egypt

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 4 April 1956.
[2] Ibid. 5 April 1956.
[3] For Mollet's article, cf. above, pp. 263–4, 277.
[4] *Daily Telegraph*, 4 April 1956.
[5] *The Times*, 12 April 1956.

and attempt to stabilize the area without it. On the other hand, neither power believed it possible to co-operate with the Soviet Union in the interests of stabilization. It is true that Eisenhower admitted on 14 March that an exchange of letters had taken place between himself and Bulganin on the Middle East, about which the other western powers had not been informed; but there is little indication of a new approach, or evidence that either the Americans or the British intended to use the opportunity of the forthcoming visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to London to sound out Soviet opinion about the area.[1] The French, on the other hand, seem to have felt the desirability of seeking a wider solution to Middle East problems than that provided by the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, which was now visibly out of date; they were 'more aware . . . of the need at least of weighing up the advantages' of bringing the Soviet Union into any discussions, even if this produced difficulties.[2]

The divided counsels of the western powers had unfortunate effects. It was generally believed that Nasser had agreed to discontinue propaganda against the Baghdad pact, provided that no more Arab states joined it, so long as there seemed some hope of a *modus vivendi* between Egypt and the west. On the other hand, the possibility of consultations on the Middle East by the great powers or in the United Nations was thought, in Arab circles, to foreshadow the imposition of an arms ban. Not unnaturally, Nasser wished to forestall this; and it seems likely that this was one reason for his recognition of communist China—a country outside the United Nations Organization, and therefore a possible independent source of arms, in the event of a ban—which was announced on 16 May. Few steps were more momentous; for in America recognition of the arch-enemy was regarded as a gratuitous affront to the United States. Moreover, as if to underline the implications, a few days later the Egyptian minister of national production explicitly recalled that 'the Soviet offer to finance the construction and equipment of the dam still stands', and that Egypt was free 'to accept this offer whenever we chose'.[3] Dulles's reply was characteristic. 'We welcome with sympathy', he said, 'all measures that Nasser takes to consolidate the independence of his country', but 'we deplore those that tend to promote the interests of the Soviet Union and communist China in the Middle East'. He added, moreover, that it was unlikely that the United States would help Egypt with the Aswan Dam if the Soviet Union also had a share in the project.[4] Nor were American feelings soothed when, a fortnight later, Egypt refused U.S. technical aid for the application of radioactive isotopes to agriculture.

Visibly the situation was deteriorating. On the other hand, negotiations

[1] Cf. above, pp. 276–7.
[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 4 April 1956.
[3] Ibid. 22 May 1956.
[4] *N.Y. Times*, 23 May 1956.

had meanwhile been continuing between Egyptian and Sudanese ministers on the division of the Nile waters and related questions, and although no agreement had been reached, Mirghani Hamza emphasized on 7 June the intention of both governments to reach an early solution. The Egyptian government therefore asked the Americans and British to deposit their loans with the International Bank.[1] But by now the international tug-of-war was on in earnest. During the celebrations to mark the official ending of the British occupation of the Canal Zone on 18 June, Nasser once again reiterated his desire 'to be on good terms with everybody, providing it is not done at the expense of our nationalism and Arabism'.[2] But such a posture was by this time easier to proclaim than to adopt. The arrival of the new Soviet foreign minister, Shepilov, in Cairo, and the congratulatory messages transmitted from London and Washington, were evidence of a continued competition for Egyptian favour and a refusal by both sides to rest satisfied with Egyptian neutrality. By mid-June the president of the World Bank, Eugene Black, was again in Cairo. At the same time it was reported that Shepilov had made an offer to cover the whole enterprise, although there was some doubt locally as to the authenticity of this report.[3] Nevertheless the spectacle of Shepilov and Black each trying to pay for Nasser's new pyramid, was symptomatic: the negotiations with Egypt were being conducted in the competitive spirit of the cold war.

The same spirit was now gaining the upper hand in Washington, where a good deal of rethinking was going on. In particular, it was being questioned whether, in accepting neutralism as Nasser understood it, the State Department was not also accepting the Soviet conception of peaceful coexistence. Although the United States was ready to support Nasser's efforts to strengthen Egyptian independence, such moves as the recognition of Peking caused the 'most serious eyebrow-raising', since they 'did nothing for Egyptian independence' and raised the question whether Nasser was 'securing Egyptian interests or those of the Communist bloc'.[4] This questioning was reinforced by the fact that Nasser had been invited and was proposing to visit Jugoslavia in July and Moscow in August. Meanwhile Khrushchev, speaking at the American embassy in Moscow on 4 July, made Moscow's position clear by stating that it was for Egypt to choose between the Soviet and American offers.[5] The Egyptians can hardly have failed to see through this game; but, confident that they could avoid entanglement in a Soviet alliance, they probably calculated that a flirtation with the eastern bloc would help to bring the west up to scratch. If so, it was a dangerous calculation, particularly as the U.S. appropriation

[1] *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 9 June 1956.

[2] *The Times*, 19 and 20 June 1956. Nasser's remarks were specifically directed 'to the United States, Russia, and other Powers'.

[3] *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 June 1956; *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 20 June 1956.

[4] *N.Y. Times*, 24 June and 9 July 1956.

[5] *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 5 July 1956.

for the financing of the dam had run out on 30 June. It is true that it was emphasized, on the American side, that this did not mean that the offer had been withdrawn; but the fact remained that it would now require new appropriations by Congress—and all the risk of public and party political debate which that entailed—before it could be implemented.[1]

Nevertheless the available evidence indicates that the Egyptian government, however much it may have manœuvred for position, was definitely determined to clinch matters with the west. It may be, as rumour at the time indicated, that the Soviet Union, on being asked to be more specific about its offer, was evasive. In any case, as early as 21 June it was reported that Nasser had asked the United States to speed final negotiation of the loan.[2] When the Egyptian ambassador returned to Washington in July, he stated explicitly at the airport that Egypt had decided on aid from the west, and that it would be his endeavour to see Mr. Dulles immediately. The evident urgency with which he spoke confirms the report that Nasser had told him, before he left, that if the loan were not forthcoming, it was his intention to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. But by now the decision about the loan was no longer, if it ever had been, in Egyptian hands. Nor is it clear whether, even if Ahmed Hussein were successful in his negotiations with Dulles, the United States administration would have been any longer able to control Congress.

The end of the financial year on 30 June, the automatic ending of the allocation for the dam project, and the fact that the aid set aside for the dam had been otherwise used, put the ball at Congress's feet, particularly as Congress had still not acted on Eisenhower's six months' old request for special authority for long-term commitments. It is true that these were only technical difficulties; but not only congressional opposition to the whole project but also the reluctance of the administration to override it, was growing, In Congress there was a strong anti-Egyptian lobby, composed of Zionist supporters of Israel, those who had been angered by Egyptian recognition of the Chinese government, and opponents of any measures leading to an increase in Egyptian cotton production.[3] In addition, there were genuine doubts on the part of financial experts whether, as a result of its arms deals with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, Egypt had not mortgaged in advance the funds which it had promised to allocate to the dam. Faced by these doubts and the growing opposition, Dulles's attitude was equivocal. On the one hand, he preserved his formal freedom of action by declaring that the administration would not be bound by the finance committee's decisions regarding funds already voted, since 'it is not merely a question of American action'; on the other hand, he announced that 'none of the funds which may be appropriated for the fiscal year 1957 will be committed to finance the

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 21 June 1956. [2] Ibid. 22 June 1956. [3] Ibid. 15 July 1956.

Aswan dam without specific prior consultation with the committee'.[1] The statement as a whole left much to be desired; but it was sufficient for Congress because, by 17 July, it was already widely believed 'that, in view of Congressional opposition, the project was dead'. Even earlier, 'top Eisenhower administration officials' had expressed 'serious doubts' about continuing with it.[2]

Such was the situation when Dulles and the Egyptian ambassador, Ahmed Hussein, met. Meanwhile, new factors had entered the picture. First of all, there were complaints from America's allies, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia, who were aggrieved at the notion of large-scale aid to Egypt when their own appetites had not been satisfied. More important was the upsurge of restlessness in the Soviet bloc, of which the Poznan riots had provided, in American eyes, graphic evidence. This change in 'the east-west picture generally' could not fail to have repercussions on American policy towards Egypt. 'Informants in an excellent position to know' put forward the view that large-scale Soviet aid to Egypt would aggravate 'discontent behind the iron curtain', and that the United States would 'profit more' by leaving the Soviet Union to undertake this additional economic commitment.[3] In any case, Soviet preoccupations in Europe made it easier to take a strong line with Egypt. Consequently when Dulles saw Ahmed Hussein, he is reported to have asked specifically for positive evidence that Cairo's request for aid was part of 'a general shift in Egyptian foreign policy towards the west and away from neutralism'.[4] The spectacle of Nasser's simultaneous meeting with Tito and Nehru at Brioni on 18 July can hardly have given him the assurances he desired.

It was while Nasser was at Brioni that the final blow fell. On 19 July the United States officially withdrew its offer to help finance what would have been the first stage of the Aswan Dam. The operative motives of the State Department are still obscure. According to the communiqué which it issued shortly after Ahmed Hussein had seen Dulles, the reasons for American action were the absence of agreement between the riparian states and doubt whether Egypt was able to devote adequate resources to ensure the project's success.[5] It is difficult, however, to believe that this major change in American foreign policy was based solely on conditions which had been in existence seven months previously. It had already been announced that the pro-Egyptian American ambassador in Cairo would be replaced; and the withdrawal of the Aswan offer was seen as a further attempt to trim Nasser down to a more manageable size.

Since it was recognized that the United States was the 'key to the whole deal',[6] American action was decisive. Twenty-four hours later—a curious

[1] *N.Y. Times*, 15 July 1956. [2] Ibid. 18 July 1956; *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 July 1956.
[3] *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 July 1956. [4] *N.Y. Times*, 18 July 1956.
[5] Ibid. 20 July 1956. [6] Ibid., 15 July 1956.

delay in view of the alleged 'continuous consultation' between Whitehall and Washington—Great Britain followed suit, although as late as 18 July the foreign office had confirmed that England was still willing to join in the project. The World Bank's offer, since it was conditional upon Anglo-American support, lapsed automatically. The British withdrawal, in the circumstances, was not surprising; for the evidence indicates that Great Britain had been drawn into the project somewhat unwillingly, at the tail of the United States, and that neither politically nor financially was it viewed with enthusiasm. On both the American and the British sides, in any case, it is clear that the consequences of the action were misjudged. It is possible, but not probable, that it was calculated that the reverse would undermine Nasser's position at home, and perhaps even dislodge his government. But although there may have been satisfaction both in Washington and in Whitehall at the expected setback to Egyptian policy, it seems likely that greater importance was attached, in Washington at any rate, to calling the Soviet bluff. Soviet policy in the Middle East, it was believed, was based on offers of aid which it was in no position to fulfil. If the Aswan loans were withheld, it seems to have been calculated, Egypt would soon discover how empty Soviet promises were, and would be forced to return to a western orbit. This calculation seemed to be borne out when, on 21 July, Shepilov stated that the Soviet Union did not regard the financing of the Aswan Dam as an urgent question. Mr. Dulles, it was recognized, was 'playing for extremely high stakes',[1] and Egypt was not a principal piece but only a pawn in the game. Unfortunately, it was forgotten that a pawn can capture the queen and checkmate the king. Preoccupied with the international aspects of the east-west struggle in the Middle East, Washington underestimated Nasser's possibilities of action. For east and for west the Aswan Dam was only a move in their diplomatic game of check and countercheck; for Egypt it was a major issue and for Nasser a matter of prestige. There is some evidence, as already noted,[2] that nationalization of the Suez Canal Company had been privately discussed at an earlier stage; but when, on 26 July, Nasser announced definitely that Egypt was nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, and that its revenues would be used to pay for the dam, his action took the world by surprise. Moreover, it ushered in a new chapter; for whereas the withdrawal of the offer of an Anglo-American loan was intended to bring a phase of policy to an end, without altering the basic conditions in the Middle East, and indeed to restore the position to what it had been six months earlier, Nasser's reply brought new forces into operation and threw into turmoil an area it had been western policy to stabilize.

[1] *Christian Science Monitor,* 20 July 1956.

[2] Cf. above, p. 308.

# CONCLUSION

President Nasser's announcement, on 26 July 1956, of the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company marks the end of one period and the beginning of another; it was an action which cut sharply through the continuity of events. The Suez crisis, which immediately followed, and its consequences were to dominate the scene for six months and give a new turn to international affairs.

The events covered by the present volume were at first sight disappointingly inconclusive. After the winding up of old problems in the early months of 1955, it looked as though things might rapidly move forward in a new and more hopeful direction. In fact, nothing positive was achieved. The hopes of a détente and of a new spirit of accommodation raised at the time of the Geneva summit conference were not fulfilled. The biggest disappointment of all, for a world increasingly alarmed by the risks of thermonuclear warfare, was the failure of the two power groupings to agree on practical measures of disarmament, or even of arms limitation and disengagement. On the contrary, the armaments race continued unabated.

Nevertheless, beneath the surface changes were more considerable than at first glance appeared to be the case. In the first place, under the impact of the thermonuclear revolution, the old 'cold war' pattern of the period down to 1954 was no longer operative. This, as we have had ample opportunity to see, had the somewhat unwelcome result of weakening the cohesion of the west, and its effects were visible in the communist world after the Twentieth Party Congress. But it also had wider consequences. It was certainly not accidental, as Mr. Bulganin pointed out to President Eisenhower in his letter of 23 January 1956,[1] that 'the past year was one in which no war was being waged in any part of the world'. This, in itself, was a notable advance. In addition, there was the fact that the Geneva conference of the heads of government of the four powers, however negatively its results might be judged, was the first meeting of its kind to be held since the conclusion of the Second World War. Furthermore, it was also true that 'certain complicated international problems that had remained unsolved after the end of the Second World War'—most notably of all, the Austrian question—had been satisfactorily settled. All this betokened a change in the international atmosphere which, however much it left to be desired, should not be under-estimated.

On the other hand, the emergence of new patterns did not mean a sudden change of orientation. Although the Russians, particularly in the

[1] *U.S. Documents*, 1956, pp. 217–18.

major speeches at the Twentieth Party Congress, made great play with new concepts of policy, the old grooves were too deep to be easily departed from. What was characteristic of the period, therefore, was a struggle of old and new, the latter surging up, as it were, from below and seeking to influence the attitudes of statesmen, the former still operative at the highest level—for example, in the German question, where western policy-makers clung to formulations and solutions which, in the view of increasing numbers of people, were no longer practicable, whatever their theoretical merits might be. But the feeling was growing, on both sides, that there was no way forward along these lines. In the Soviet Union it accounted for the abandonment of Stalin's 'hard line' policies, which, it was realized, had failed in their later phases to produce results.[1] In the west it produced a sense of frustration, and doubts whether policies based on a 'position of strength' and 'massive retaliation' were sufficient. In Germany, in particular, it was questioned whether a policy of strength would lead to reunification, or whether perhaps it was not a main obstacle in its way. Elsewhere, particularly in France and Great Britain, frustration was producing the feeling that, as diplomatic solutions were apparently out of reach, the only course was to cut through the maze of complications which—contrary to the hope that the evacuation of the Suez base in 1954 would mark the opening of a new and better chapter—were accumulating in North Africa, Cyprus, and the Middle East.

There was a widespread feeling that the balance, if it was not moving in favour of the Soviet Union, was turning against the west, and that something must be done to check it, whatever the risks involved. The main cause of this feeling was the increased role played, after the Bandung conference, by the uncommitted nations, with their strongly anti-colonialist policies. In this sense, as marking the rising importance of a group committed neither to communism nor to the west, and determined to pursue an independent line in international affairs, the Bandung conference was not the least significant event of the period under review. It marked, more clearly than anything else, the shift away from cold war postures and the rise of new forces standing between Washington and Moscow. It is true that the impact of the new developments foreshadowed at Bandung was slower and less spectacular than some people, at first, thought likely; the shadow of Kashmir and rumblings in Indonesia weakened the influence of the uncommitted peoples, and their determination to have recourse only to peaceful pressure in a world where force seemed to predominate, perhaps created the impression that, in the last resort, they could be left out of account. Nevertheless, when in the autumn of 1956 the Suez crisis held the world in suspense, it was soon evident that the Bandung powers had an important role to play; and even earlier the

[1] Cf. Chester Bowles, *Ideas, People and Peace* (London, 1958), p. 45.

changes in the composition of the United Nations and the shift in balance which they brought about, gave their voice a new weight in the counsels of the nations. Whereas in the immediate post-war decade the constellation of forces had been polarized round Moscow and Washington, by 1956 a new and looser international system, more flexible and multilateral, was in process of formation. The Soviet Union and the United States, as the two great nuclear super-powers, were still predominant; but both henceforward had to give greater attention to independent forces, both within their own camps and in the wider world. On the one horizon China, on the other horizon India, were looming up as nations of the future.

As awareness of these new factors grew, they combined to produce an explosive situation. It was not explosive in the old sense of an imminent struggle between east and west, between the communist and the so-called 'free' worlds. Even the sudden gathering of a storm-centre in the Middle East, as a result of the breakdown of the Aswan Dam negotiations, probably carried with it less risk of a general conflagration than was widely thought at the time. Rather, the situation was explosive in the sense of a desire for a forceful solution of local issues while the great-power conflict was in abeyance, and, on the western side, of a desire to check what was widely regarded as a process of erosion undermining western positions. This was the background to the Suez and Hungarian crises in the autumn of 1956. But these events, as will be seen in a subsequent volume, only confirmed that the changes in the preceding period were real. There was no going back, but as yet the world was not ready to go forward.

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

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